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THE FELLOWS AND ASSOCIATES
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PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
DEDICATE
THIS VOLUME
TO THE MEMORY OF
NIKOLAUS M. HÄRING, S.A.C.

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NIKOLAUS M. HÄRING, S.A.C. (1909-1982)

Walter H. Principe, C.S.B.

Nikolaus M. Häring was born 1 June 1909 in Urmitz am Rhein in Germany. After completing his early education in Urmitz, he went to the house of studies of the Pallottine Fathers (*Societas Apostolatus Catholici*) in Schönstatt in 1923 and in 1930 matriculated with honours at Coblenz. In the fall of 1930 he entered the novitiate of the Pallottine Fathers; he took his first vows as a member of the community in 1932 and his final vows in 1935.

After completing his philosophical studies at the Pallottine Hochschule between 1931 and 1933, he went to Rome for theological studies at the Gregorian University from 1933 until 1938. During this time he was ordained to the priesthood (12 July 1936) and completed his doctoral studies, including a thesis entitled *Die Theologie des Erfurter Augustiner-Eremiten Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen*. He was awarded the Doctorate in Sacred Theology (S.T.D.) in 1939.

Häring appeared destined for a teaching career in the Pallottine Fathers' Theologische Hochschule at Limburg (Lahn), where in 1938 he began to teach metaphysics and cosmology. His desire to master the English language led, however, to a dramatic change in his life because while he was studying in England during the summer of 1939, the Second World War broke out. Like many other German and Italian citizens in England at the time, Häring was interned and sent to Canada where, in an internment camp, he suffered so much from the winter's cold that his health was permanently affected. In 1942 his release from the camp was arranged by the Apostolic Delegate to Canada and sponsored first by the Redemptorist Fathers, for whom he taught in 1942-43, and then by the Basilian Fathers, at whose St. Basil's Seminary in Toronto he taught Sacred Scripture between 1943 and 1945. While he was in Toronto, he began further study and research in the history of mediaeval theology and civilization at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. The fruit of this labour was his important thesis, *One Baptism. A Historical Study on the Origins*

of the Doctrine of Sacramental Character (3 volumes), an investigation that broke much new ground and furnished hitherto unexpected conclusions. This work merited for him the difficult and rarely obtained degree of Doctor of Mediaeval Studies (M.S.D.), which was conferred upon him in 1949.

Already in 1946 Häring had begun giving a graduate seminar at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies and in 1947 he was named, with the generous approval of his religious superiors who could well have used him elsewhere, Professor of the History of Theology and subsequently Senior Fellow at the same Institute. When in 1967 the University of Toronto established its own Centre for Mediaeval Studies in close cooperation with the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Häring was appointed Professor of the History of Ideas in the University of Toronto. After thirty years of teaching and research, Häring retired in 1976 as professor emeritus of both the Institute and the University of Toronto. Returning to his homeland and his religious community, he continued to teach, do research and publish while living at the Pallottine Theologische Hochschule at Vallendar in the Rheinland, not far from his place of birth and his family. In the succeeding years, however, his health gradually deteriorated; towards the end of 1981 he suffered a stroke and was taken to Coblenz for convalescence, but he died there on 12 January 1982. His funeral services and Requiem Mass were held on 18 January 1982 at Limburg. In Toronto, on 19 January 1982, a concelebrated Eucharist was offered for him, the principal celebrant being J. Ambrose Raftis, C.S.B., President of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. A homily recalled for staff, students and alumni the life and accomplishments of our departed colleague and friend.

Although Häring's doctoral thesis for the Institute examined the entire period from Augustine to the end of the twelfth century, the latter period soon became the dominant but not exclusive field of his scholarly research and teaching. He had the rare ability of combining a penetrating analysis of each author's thought with scrupulous attention to the author's own texts, to historical influences on the author, and to the author's own personal development during his life. It was indeed his constant attention to the original texts that led him to challenge and correct the inaccuracy of many historical summaries of mediaeval philosophy and theology and to present his own original interpretations. These, solidly based on the texts, revised many previously accepted opinions about doctrines or authors in the history of mediaeval thought. Häring's concern for the authentic texts and doctrines of mediaeval authors led him more and more to one of his greatest contributions, the editing of forty-nine mediaeval texts, most of them from the twelfth century. Several of these, such as his critical editions of Gilbert of Poitiers' commentaries on the *opuscula sacra* of Boethius and his editions of similar works by Clarembald of Arras and Thierry of Chartres, attained book length; these and his other shorter but still substantial editions

opened to other researchers a vast literature hitherto unknown or inaccessible except in rare manuscripts.

Häring had an unusual flair for discovering formerly unknown and unpublished mediaeval texts. So numerous were his discoveries and editions that Étienne Gilson once jokingly remarked: 'Father Häring, I do not believe that you have found these texts in manuscripts: I think you write them yourself!' The element of truth in this jest is that Häring's knowledge of twelfth-century authors and their thought and style was so thorough that he could indeed have written treatises that would have misled the scholarly community!

One such discovery and edition reveals Häring's concern for accuracy and his intellectual probity. One of his favorites had always been Gilbert of Poitiers, whose difficult thought he successfully penetrated, whom he judged intellectually superior to Bernard of Clairvaux, and whom he thought the influential abbot had misinterpreted doctrinally and treated unfairly. But when he discovered and identified a small treatise by Gilbert that revealed how correct Bernard had been in his interpretation of at least one aspect of Gilbert's thought, Häring did not hesitate to publish the treatise and to point out the accuracy of Bernard's insight.

In addition to these editions, Häring published some seventy-five articles that furnished new insights into many areas of mediaeval philosophy and theology, for example: the notion of character; definitions of sacrament; Eastern influences on Latin theology; the *quod est - quo est* philosophy of Gilbert of Poitiers and of his whole school together with their insistence on exact grammatical form in theological and doctrinal statements; debates on the Trinity and the Incarnation, including clarification of the sources and meaning of Peter Lombard's well-known 'three opinions' on the union in Christ; and the doctrine of creation in the school of Chartres (whose existence he defended firmly but amicably against the opinions of others). He also contributed a whole host of studies of individual authors ranging from Augustine through Boethius, Berengar and Abelard to Alan of Lille. So thorough and convincing were his many contributions that almost every area touched upon by his editions and studies has had to undergo some revision among scholars.

As his editions and publications poured forth, Häring's reputation grew throughout the scholarly world. He was awarded a prestigious Guggenheim Fellowship, was made in 1965 a member of the Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften at Munich, and in 1972 was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. His many friends and admirers in the international scholarly community constantly asked him for papers or conferences at various international congresses or symposia; these drew on his wide-ranging knowledge and resulted in many new publications.

Despite his profound and truly astounding learning and dedication to research, Nikolaus Häring always remained a simple friendly man and a priest devoted to others. He lived modestly, indeed poorly, receiving with the approval of his Pallottine superiors a moderate salary and thereby contributing to the continued existence and work of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Although his powers of concentration were exceptional, he never totally lost himself in his research. He loved to preach simple sermons and hear confessions for the many Italian immigrants newly arrived in Toronto, who often spoke with wonder and admiration of the pastoral work done so effectively and generously by this great scholar. He also spent many hours patiently instructing Italian immigrants in the English language he had himself mastered so well, and he took a long time to teach a devout but simple man the Latin responses of the Mass so that this man could satisfy his desire to serve Father Häring's daily Eucharist.

Although he retired to his religious community in Germany, Häring maintained a keen interest in his Toronto colleagues and in their work; he was always happy to receive letters or visits from them. Despite his deteriorating health, he continued to search out new materials and to write and give lectures as long as he could. In a letter written to a former student and colleague a few months before his death, he asked for photocopies of some material and added: 'I may need it for my paper on Boethius if I ever complete it. I have collected a lot of material but feel I should go easier on my one eye left. Non si scherza!!'

This devotion to scholarship and to publication of its results was Nikolaus Häring's chief way of serving others. He once remarked that to provide editions of new texts (or critical editions of poor texts already published) was a service that would endure far into future generations after one was long gone from the scene. While mourning the loss of their friend and colleague, the Fellows of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies are indeed confident that the service rendered by Nikolaus Häring's scholarship will keep his name remembered with gratitude and affection not only by them but by all mediaeval scholars for many generations and even centuries to come.

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On the occasion of Nikolaus Häring's seventieth birthday a list of his publications was prepared by his devoted confrere, Prof. P. Dr. Franz Courth, S.A.C., and was published in the Calendar ('Personen- und Vorlesungsverzeichnis') of the Theologische Hochschule Vallendar (Pallottistr. 3, Postfach 230, D-5414 Vallendar, Rhein, West Germany) for the Wintersemester 1979/80 on pp. 14-20.

Since that publication Professor Courth has collected addenda, and he has graciously given permission to publish the entire bibliography in *Mediaeval Studies* so as to make it more widely available for mediaevalists. We wish to express our warm gratitude to Professor Courth for this work and for his kindness in allowing us to reproduce the bibliography. An asterisk signals the new items.

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- 110 Clarembald of Arras, Bd. III, 914.
- 111 Eucharistic Controversies, Bd. V, 618-620.
- 112 Everard of Ypres, Bd. V, 657 f.
- 113 Gilbert de la Porrée, Bd. VI, 478 f.
- 114 Hugh Etherian, Bd. VII, 190.
- 115 Hugh of Honau, Bd. VII, 191 f.
- 116 John of Salisbury, Bd. VII, 1071 f.
- 117 Paschasius Radbertus, Bd. X, 1050.
- 118 Peter of Vienna, Bd. XI, 230.
- 119 Thierry of Chartres, Bd. XIV, 89 f.

Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Berlin 1977 ff.

- 120 Chartres, Schule von, Bd. VII, 698 f.
- *121 Gilbert von Poitiers (noch nicht erschienen).

Lexikon des Mittelalters, München-Zürich 1977 ff.

- 122 Angilram, Bd. I, 635.
- 123 Anselm von Besate, Bd. I, 680.
- *124 Boethius. Wirkungsgeschichte im Mittelalter, Bd. II, 312 f.

QUAESTIONES CONCERNING CHRIST
FROM THE FIRST HALF OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY:

IV. QUAESTIONES FROM DOUAI MS. 434:
CHRIST AS HEAD OF THE CHURCH;
THE UNITY OF THE MYSTICAL BODY *

Walter H. Principe, C.S.B.

THE many *quaestiones* concerning Christ that are contained in manuscript 434 of the Bibliothèque de la Ville at Douai include six dealing with various aspects of Christ in relation to the Church, especially his Headship and the unity of the Church or Mystical Body.¹ In Palémon Glorieux's detailed

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¹ The previous articles in this series are found in *Mediaeval Studies* 39 (1977) 1-59 (*quaestiones* from the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris), 42 (1980) 1-40 (the first set of *quaestiones* from ms. 434 of Douai, on the need of the Incarnation and the defects assumed), 43 (1981) 1-57 (the second set of questions from ms. 434, on the Hypostatic Union).

My study, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century*, 4 vols. (Studies and Texts 7, 12, 19, 32; Toronto, 1963-75), will be cited as follows:

Hyp. Union 1 – William of Auxerre's *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1963)

Hyp. Union 2 – Alexander of Hales' *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1967)

Hyp. Union 3 – Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1970)

Hyp. Union 4 – Philip the Chancellor's *Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (1975).

Glossa Alex will be used to designate Alexander of Hales' *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 3: *In librum tertium*, and 4: *In librum quartum* (Quaracchi, 1954 and 1957).

A number of studies serve as excellent background for the content of the questions edited here. Among them may be mentioned the following: Martin Grabmann, *Die Lehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin von der Kirche als Gotteswerk* (historical sections) (Regensburg, 1903); Émile Mersch, *Le corps mystique du Christ 2* (Louvain, 1933); Sebastianus Tromp, *Corpus Christi quod est Ecclesia 1*, 2nd ed. (Rome, 1946); Artur Landgraf, 'Die Lehre vom geheimnisvollen Leib Christi in den frühen Paulinenkommentaren und in der Frühscholastik', *Divus Thomas (Freiburg)* 24 (1946) 217-48, 393-428; 25 (1947) 365-94; 26 (1948) 291-323, 395-434: of the vol. 26 section, pp. 291-323 and 395-419 are reprinted in the author's *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 4.2 (Regensburg, 1956), pp. 48-99, under the title 'Sünde und Gliedschaft am geheimnisvollen Leib'; idem, 'Die Mittlerschaft Christi' in *Dogmengeschichte* 2.2 (Regensburg,

description, five of these six questions are numbered 32, 52, 164, 203, and 522.² Because he overlooked a sixth question on this topic, it lacks a number in his list.³ Since this question follows question 525, it is here given the number 525a. Victorin Doucet, noticing that question 52 refers to one or more of the other questions, concluded that the order of the questions in the manuscript differs from the order in which the six questions were originally written.⁴ The editors of the *Gloss* of Alexander of Hales, among whom was Doucet himself, modified his suggestion as to which questions were referred to by question 52.⁵ While agreeing with Doucet that the order of questions is not that of the order of the manuscript, we have reached conclusions different from his and from the editors of Alexander's *Gloss* about some of these references and what they can tell us about the order of these questions.

Question 164 alludes to question 203 and therefore follows it in order of writing. Question 52 refers to one or both of these questions; if it refers only to question 203, it could precede question 164. Other than this possibility, question 52 is the last in order (and indeed may have been written into a blank page of the manuscript after the others were transcribed) because it refers to each of the other questions. Questions 522, 525a, and 32 are linked as a group in that order because question 32 refers to question 525a, which itself must follow question 525 because it comes after it in the same gathering. No relationship has been discovered between this group and question 203, so that this question could precede or follow the whole group or one or two of them. There are a good number of possibilities. We shall diagram a few of them, which should show the relationships sufficiently and suggest the other possibilities, whose variations are of minimal importance.⁶

1a and 1b: question 203 preceding the 'group of three' (522, 525a, and 32), with 164 preceding (a) or following (b) this group or one or two of them.

1954), pp. 288-328 (reprint of articles in *Gregorianum* 31 [1950] 391-413 and 32 [1951] 50-80); Johannes Beumer, 'Zur Ekklesiologie der Frühscholastik', *Scholastik* 26 (1951) 364-89; 27 (1952) 183-209; Yves Congar, *L'Église de saint Augustin à l'époque moderne* (Paris, 1970), chaps. 1-8.


² See his 'Les 572 Questions du manuscrit de Douai 434', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 10 (1938) 131, 133, 141, 143, 243.

³ This question was identified by the editors of the *Glossa Alex*: see 4, Prolegomena (4.29* n. 7).


⁴ See his 'À travers le manuscrit 434 de Douai', *Antonianum* 27 (1952) 531-80, especially 542-47. On pp. 546-47 he discusses the references: his suggestion is that they refer to either or both questions 164 and 203 (our questions 2 and 1) but probably not to question 522 (our question 3); on p. 544 he notes the different order of questions.

⁵ See *Glossa Alex* 3, Prolegomena (3.20*-21*), and 4, Prolegomena (4.28*-29*).


⁶ The bases for our conclusions are given in the introductions to the questions, *infra*, pp. 4-9.



2: the 'group of three' (or 522 alone, or 522 and 525a) preceding 203 and 164. There are in fact six possibilities here because 203 and 164 could *together* follow one, two, or all three of the group, or 164 could follow the first two or all three of the group *separately* from 203.



3a (related to 1a) and 3b (related to 2): either 1a or 2, but with question 164 following question 52.



Among all these possibilities it was necessary to make an arbitrary choice for the order of the questions in our edition. We have chosen the order diagrammed in 1a, an order that helps in clarity of exposition of the doctrine.

I. THE *QUAESTIONES* EDITED AND ANALYZED HERE*Question 1 (no. 203) (Summary by 'G' of Redaction L of the 'Gloss on the Sentences' of Alexander of Hales)*

Listed by Glorieux as number 203, our first question is found in volume 1, fol. 98va-b, and is attributed to 'G.' in the manuscript.⁷ It is written in hand *m*, the hand of the compiler of the manuscript and the hand always used when G is identified.⁸ The title is given as 'De Christo capite'. The compiler had before him the text of Redaction L of Alexander of Hales' *Gloss on the Sentences*, as is clear from the detailed comparison of our question with the text of Redaction L to be seen in the introduction to the edition of book 3 of the *Gloss*.⁹ Although the editors transcribe a large part of the text of our question, they omit the quotations from the authorities. Our edition will give the complete text and thereby allow analysis of this question in conjunction with our other five questions; we shall also point out the differences between the original text of the *Gloss* and the summary made by G.

Question 2 (no. 164) (Anonymous)

Our second question, number 164 in Glorieux's description, is found in volume 1, fol. 90ra-vb, of the Douai manuscript. It is written in hand *m*, the hand of the compiler of the manuscript.¹⁰ The longest of our questions dealing with Christ in relation to the Church, it bears the title 'Utrum Christus fuerit via ab aeterno', but in addition to discussing Christ as the Way, it treats of him as Mediator and as Head of the Church.

Glorieux assigns this question to Philip the Chancellor because he thinks that the group of questions 161 to 164 is linked with question 159, which the manuscript assigns to 'Canc.', a sure designation of Philip in the Douai manuscript.¹¹ His conjecture is based on the similarity of topics that he sees in the questions. But although questions 161 to 163 are indeed similar in topic to question 159 in that all four discuss Trinitarian problems, question 164 is quite different in subject matter because it deals not with the Trinity but with Christ

⁷ See Glorieux, 'Les 572 Questions', 143.

⁸ See *ibid.*, 141 n. 29, for the manuscript hand. It is Doucet, 'À travers', 549-50, who indicates that hand *m* is always used for the questions attributed to G. He concludes that hand *m* is in fact the hand of G, so that the mysterious G mentioned so often in the manuscript is the compiler of the collection. Doucet suggests 'G. de Soissons' as the person concerned, since the compiler alludes to his being from Soissons; on all this see 549-50.

⁹ See *Glossa Alex* 3, Prolegomena (3.16*-21*).

¹⁰ See Glorieux, 'Les 572 Questions', 141 and n. 29.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, 256, 264, and (for q. 159) 141 and 255 (the designation 'Canc.').

as man in relation to those saved by him.¹² Thus Glorieux's basis for the attribution is quite tenuous. It is made even more so by comparison of our question 5 with question 2. Question 5, in our opinion, can be assigned to Philip the Chancellor with rather more assurance than question 2, and although the two questions touch upon the same topics only a few times, when they do, the approach is somewhat different, enough to make one think they could not both be by the same author.¹³ Question 2, as will be seen from our analysis, has some affinities with Redaction L of Alexander of Hales' *Gloss on the Sentences*.¹⁴ We shall also see that it refers to our question 1 and so must have been written after it.¹⁵

Question 3 (no. 522) (Anonymous)

Our third question, number 522 in Glorieux's catalogue, is found in volume 2, fols. 165rb-166ra (333b-335a in Glorieux's numbering at this point, which follows a second numbering given in the manuscript). It is written in hand *m*¹⁰ of Glorieux's classification of hands and is listed by him as anonymous.

This question, it seems, is referred to by the compiler of the manuscript in question 52, our sixth question. An argument presented there holds that the unity of the Church would have to be according to either essence, operation, or virtues, but since among the holy persons who would constitute the one Church there is no oneness or unity by any of these alternatives, there is no

¹² For the titles and brief outlines of the questions see *ibid.*, 141, and for Glorieux's method of associating questions see *ibid.*, 522.

We have noted (*Hyp. Union* 4.153-54) that Glorieux's method of association was correct for one question of Philip the Chancellor (q. 142) in the Douai manuscript; it is likely wrong, however, concerning q. 140, as was indicated in 'Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: II...', *Mediaeval Studies* 42 (1980) 2-3.

¹³ There are four topics common to the two questions: (1) whether the Holy Spirit, rather than Christ, should be called Head (2.38-40), or whether the faithful should be called the one Body of the Holy Spirit (5.6 and 9-10): the question is posed in different terms in the two discussions; (2) Christ as a non-separated principle communicating in nature, the Holy Spirit as a separated principle not communicating in nature (2.41), and Christ as having a conformity of nature and being an internal mover while the Holy Spirit lacks conformity of nature and is an external mover (5.9): the doctrine is the same, but the terminology is different; (3) whether Christ is Head of the good only, or of the predestined and of those to be glorified (some of whom are now evil) (2.43-49), and a similar question and similar basic reply, but with a quite different approach (5.7-8 and 10); (4) whether Christ was Head of Abel and of others before his Incarnation or whether he became Head only at his Incarnation (2.50-59), and only a passing reference to Abel (5.6 and 10): the appeal to faith as transcending time is similar in each, but the approaches are quite different.

¹⁴ See below, pp. 19-20, 21, 22, 23: the texts in question are nos. 39, 41, 48, 57, and perhaps 62 of our edition of q. 2.

¹⁵ See below, p. 19: the clearest reference is in no. 40 of our edition; par. 62 might be another.

unity of the Church, and the Church is not one (12).¹⁶ In reply the compiler says: 'Solve ut alibi scripsi de eodem' (13). The solution which he has 'written elsewhere on the same topic' is found, within our six questions, only in question 522. This question points to a first and universal unity by grace and then to a derived unity by the virtues (6, 8). The problematic and the response correspond fairly closely with the problem raised in question 52. Doucet had suggested that the reference was to our question 1 (number 164),¹⁷ but that question has no discussion of the unity of Christ. Nor do any of the other questions that do deal with the unity of Christ have anything close enough to the argument and reply of question 52 to lead one to think they are being referred to. There is indeed a possible reference to our question 4 (number 525a) in question 52, but it is not on this precise point.¹⁸ Thus it seems safe to assume that the reference in question 52 at this point is to our present question 522.

Question 4 (no. 525a) (Anonymous)

Omitted by Glorieux from his list, this question has been identified by the editors of Alexander of Hales' *Gloss on the Sentences*.¹⁹ It is found in volume 2, fol. 168ra-vb (338a-d of the alternate numbering, whose inconsistencies at this point may have misled Glorieux).²⁰ It is contained in the same gathering as our question 3 (number 522) and is written in the same hand (*m*¹⁰), so that it must have been written after question 3.

The editors of Alexander's *Gloss* believe that our question 6 (number 52) refers to this question 525a when it says: 'Tertio fuit quaesitum a quo sit unitas Ecclesiae, et procede ut notavi de eodem post Cancellarium...' (9).²¹ In our

¹⁶ Numbers in parentheses refer to paragraph numbers in our edition of the questions.

¹⁷ 'À travers', 546-47.

¹⁸ See below, p. 43, concerning nos. 13 and 14.

¹⁹ See above, n. 3.

²⁰ As Glorieux notes ('Les 572 Questions', 242 n. 45), there are two errors in page numberings: none are given for fols. 166v and 168v (following pp. 335 and 338, p. 336 being given for fol. 167r and p. 338 for fol. 168r). For these two skipped pages Glorieux uses the letters *c* and *d* of the previous page.

The correspondence of folio and page numbers is as follows:

q. 522: fols. 165rb-166ra (pp. 333b-335a)
 q. 523: fol. 166ra-va (pp. 335a [not 335b as in Glorieux]-335c)
 q. 524: fols. 166va-167rb (pp. 335c-336b)
 q. 525: fols. 167rb-168ra (pp. 336b-338a)
 q. 525a: fol. 168ra-vb (pp. 338a-338d)
 q. 526: fols. 168vb-169va (pp. 338d-340a)
 q. 527: fols. 169va-170va (pp. 340a-342a).

²¹ See *Glossa Alex* 4, Prolegomena (4.29* n. 7).

opinion, however, question 52 refers not to the present question 525a but to question 32 (our fifth question). For after the words just seen, question 52 adds:

... et adde hic: Videtur quod a fide, quia pone aliquem habere solam fidem, scilicet informem, qui baptizatur adultus, alium non baptizatum habentem caritatem: primum unit fides, secundum caritas. Ergo non sola caritas unit, sed etiam fides (9).

This argument, which comes from an opponent of the master who is leading the disputation, presupposes that charity has been proposed as the only source of unity in the Mystical Body; it counters with this argument that faith should also be considered a source of that unity. Now, as will be seen from our analysis, question 525a constantly maintains that both faith and charity are conjoined sources of the unity of the Mystical Body. Hence to add this text to the discussion would make no sense, and therefore question 525a should be eliminated as the one referred to by question 52. We shall see that our question 5 (number 32) has a claim to this reference.

Question 525a is, however, referred to by another question, our question 5 (number 32), when it says of the unity of the Church: 'Illa unitas pure spiritualis est: est enim a fide et a caritate, sicut alias ostensum est' (5). Among our questions dealing with the unity of the Church or Mystical Body, only question 525a is so clear about this dual role of faith and charity as sources of this unity.²² Question 52, as has just been seen, refers to another question on this matter (question 32, we believe). Questions 1 and 2 (numbers 203 and 164) do not deal directly with the unity of the Church and when they treat of it indirectly, their doctrine is not so clear as is implied by this reference. Question 3 (number 522) does mention faith and charity as sources of unity, but it has a quite novel opinion about a primary grace distinct from these and prior to them as a source of unity.²³ Thus only question 525a, our question 4, stands as a serious contender to be the object of the reference in question 32.

Question 5 (no. 32) (Philip the Chancellor?)

Glorieux's question 32, the fifth in our group, was written by hand *m*¹ and is found in volume 1, fol. 39ra-va. Despite its early position in the manuscript, it was written, as we have just seen, after question 525a and also after question 522, which precedes question 525a. It is entitled 'De corpore mystico quaestio secunda', and is listed by Glorieux as anonymous.²⁴ Since the reporter calls it the 'second question' on the Mystical Body, one wonders which he considers

²² See below, p. 31.

²³ See below, pp. 24-25.

²⁴ 'Les 572 Questions', 131 and 264.

the first. Only question 52, which we shall see refers to the present question, can be eliminated. The 'first' question on the Mystical Body could be any of the other four in our group.

In discussing our question 4 (number 525a), we rejected it as the referent of question 6 (number 52), when the latter says: 'Tertio fuit quaesitum a quo sit unitas Ecclesiae, et procede ut notavi de eodem post Cancellarium.' In our opinion question 52 there refers to the present question 32 because this is the only one of those discussing the unity of the Church or Mystical Body to stress charity as the bond of unity and to downplay or even deny faith as the source of this unity. This will become clear from our analysis of question 32.²⁵ It is within such a context that the counter-argument of question 9 (52), which was quoted above, makes most sense, and therefore we think it is question 32 that the compiler refers to as the text of which he says: '... notavi post Cancellarium'.

Discussing this remark, Doucet was of the opinion that the compiler meant he had made a résumé of a question by Philip the Chancellor.²⁶ The Quaracchi editors of Alexander of Hales' *Gloss* concur in this interpretation of 'post Cancellarium'.²⁷ Unless one can find within the manuscript itself some notation coming after a question belonging to Philip the Chancellor, Doucet's interpretation seems the most logical. And if our deduction is correct about the referent of the remark, question 32 can be assigned to Philip the Chancellor.

Question 6 (no. 52) (William of Durham)

Our sixth and last question, number 52 in Glorieux's list, is found in volume 1, fol. 56va. It is written by hand *m*, the compiler of the manuscript, who attributes the question to 'M. G. de D^x'.²⁸ Both Glorieux and Doucet identify this author as Magister Guillelmus or Gulielmus de Durham (William of Durham); Doucet dates the question before the scholars' strike of 1229.²⁹ The question is entitled 'De unitate Ecclesiae'. As has been seen, the compiler of the manuscript, while reporting William's discussion, introduces several personal remarks or notations referring to other questions on the topic in the vast collection.

There is one further such reference still to be mentioned. The compiler says at one point that William 'inducebat illud Augustini: "Quomodo Jacob manus praemisit" etc., in alia quaestione infra de eodem' (4). Now, as Doucet has noted and as can be seen from our edition, this authoritative text of Augustine is

²⁵ See below, pp. 35-38.

²⁶ 'À travers', 546-47.

²⁷ See *Glossa Alex* 4, Prolegomena (4.28*-29* n. 7).

²⁸ Glorieux, 'Les 572 Questions', 133 and 131 n. 17.

²⁹ *ibid.*, 256, and Doucet, 'À travers', 542-44.

quoted in each of our questions 1 (number 203) and 2 (number 164), in paragraphs 15 of the first and 54 of the second.³⁰ It is unclear which of the two questions is referred to by the compiler at this point, or whether he may have had both questions in mind.

One interesting detail emerges from this notation. By saying that there is another question *infra* about the same matter coming after the present one, the compiler shows that he is aware of other questions already written on the topic and of the different ordering of the questions. The same is also seen from his calling question 32, the first in the present order of the manuscript on the topic, the 'quaestio secunda'. It is possible that question 52 was added by him in a section of parchment that had been left blank. Indeed, it breaks off before completion of a sixth announced topic, perhaps because of lack of space. If question 52 were added afterwards in a blank space, this would explain his reference to a quotation coming afterwards in either or both of questions 164 and 203, each of which is done in his own hand.

II. ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE QUESTIONS

Question 1 (no. 203): On Christ as Head ('G.', summarizing the 'Glossa in Sententias' of Alexander of Hales)

This question gives us a summary done by 'G' of the doctrine found in Redaction L within Alexander of Hales' *Gloss on the Sentences*. 'G' follows his source very closely, sometimes obscuring the meaning by excessive abbreviation but occasionally adding slight modifications that clarify the teaching. We shall refer to Redaction L's text as that of Alexander and our own text as that of 'G' or of 'our author' or 'writer', even though he is not, strictly speaking, an author or original writer of the material.

In both Alexander and G the question opens with a long list of topics for discussion (1). The first is whether Christ is Head by reason of the Incarnation. A text of the *Gloss* on Ephesians seems to assert this for it says that Christ is the Head in whom are all the spiritual senses of the Church, that is, the gifts of grace. Therefore it seems that the life of grace is from Christ as Head through the spiritual senses (2).³¹ That the Father and Holy Spirit are not Head by the

³⁰ Doucet, *ibid.*, 547.

³¹ The *Glossa Alex* (3.19.41.1 [Redaction L]; p. 220.24-37) develops the argument at greater length: 'As a body has life in the head, so does the Church have spiritual life' (in the Head). A long text from the *Glossa Lombardi* on Col 1:18 confirms this and applies the statement to the relation of Christ and the Church with more consistency of argument than is seen in the summary by our author.

same reason as is Christ³² is clear from an authoritative text stating that the Father is Head of Christ in a way differing from that in which Christ is Head of man (3).

Alexander's and G's solution is that the Father is called Head of Christ in so far as the Son is his by being begotten from him. The Trinity is called Head of Christ in that, as man, he was made through creation unto (its) image; Christ as man is the Head of other men as the middle (*medium*) communicating in the same nature with those whose Head he is (4).³³

The next four paragraphs discuss the other titles of Christ. Some names, such as 'Temple' or 'Head', befit Christ by reason of the Incarnation. Although these are metaphors, the name 'Mediator' is properly applied to Christ because he exists in two natures.³⁴ It befits the Son to be Mediator because he is the middle person in the Trinity and therefore a medium or middle person among the three persons. Hence it is fitting that he mediate between the divine and human natures because there was a certain discord between God and man, a discord he pacified by his mediation (5).

Christ is called the 'Corner Stone' in faith (or perhaps of faith because faith rests on him); he is a 'Priest' in his conferring the sacraments of the Church, 'Pastor' because his word of doctrine is the food of life, 'Redeemer' because he freed humankind from the penalty of sin, the 'Way' by conferring grace, the 'Savior' by conferring glory.³⁵

³² The *Glossa Alex* (ibid. II.a; p. 221.1-7) gives a quotation from the *Glossa Lombardi* to support the statement that the Father and Holy Spirit are Head as well as the Son, indeed that they are Head of Christ in his humanity.

³³ There are slight differences between G and the *Glossa Alex* about what the *Glossa* calls the *ratio diversitatis* of the various Headships (see *Glossa*, ibid. II.b; p. 221.12-21). For both, the Father is Head of Christ as Son of God by begetting him as Son. Alexander says that according as Christ is man, the Father (G says the Trinity) is his Head by being the *principium* through creation of all men, including Christ as man, unto his own image and likeness – something unique to the rational creature; Christ as man is the Head of other men in that he is their *principium* sharing their nature, and through him as *principium* spiritual senses flow to the members. Being Head, Alexander goes on, differs from being *principium* because the latter can sometimes be separated from that of which it is principle, but the former never can be. This last statement is missing from G's summary; another significant difference is that G speaks of Christ in his humanity as the Head *secundum medium communicans in natura eadem* etc., thereby replacing Alexander's *principium* (which could be separate) with a *medium*. Perhaps G has been influenced to make this change by the next discussion.

³⁴ There is a textual variation between the printed edition of the *Glossa Alex* and our manuscript. Where G says that *proprie nomine mediator dicitur*, the text of the *Glossa* (ibid. III.a; p. 221.23-25) puts this phrase in relation to the names 'Temple' and 'Head' and says 'Templum dicitur..., deinde caput ... nomine vel numine, proprie autem minime', thus stating that these names are metaphors. The doctrine is the same, but G is more explicit about 'Mediator' as a proper and not metaphorical name.

³⁵ The *Glossa Alex* (ibid. III.a; pp. 221.32-222.3) has some details not found in G: Christ is 'Corner Stone' (*fundamentum*) 'in fide Christi secundum divinam et humanam naturam',

He is also the Way, as Augustine says in a text describing the role of divine providence in providing means to salvation – means that should be used as means and not be made into ends to be loved for their own sake as one journeys the road to salvation (7). A text from the *Gloss* indicates that Christ, who is both ‘Pastor’ and ‘Door’, shares the name and role of ‘Pastor’ with others but not that of ‘Door’. Although it is not clear in G’s text, Alexander’s more complete text states that Christ does share the name ‘Gate’ with preachers (8).³⁶

A brief discussion now follows about whether the Holy Spirit should be called Head of the Church instead of Christ.³⁷ The *Gloss* says that the Holy Spirit, like the soul in the body, contains and feeds the Body of the Church so as to make it the society whereby we become one Body of the Son of God (9), and it is the Holy Spirit who distributes gifts in the Church (10).³⁸ The reply is that wisdom is attributed to Christ as Son of God and goodness to the Holy Spirit. Since knowledge flows from wisdom and movement from goodness, spiritual movement flows from the Holy Spirit and spiritual senses from the Son of God (11). G thus answers the question by quoting the text from Redaction L that

whereas G says simply ‘in fide’; he is ‘Pastor’ ‘ad conservandum per pabulum vitae, quod consistit in verbo doctrinae’, whereas G omits the idea of conserving; G expands slightly on the *Glossa* by adding verbal forms to its prepositions. Although the final word of the paragraph is *gratiam* in G, the *Glossa* shows that it should be emended to *gloriam*.

The *Glossa Alex* (ibid. III.b; p. 222.3-9) shows the ‘reason of the order’ (*ratio ordinis*) among these various names: the list begins from the Divinity and ends in glory (the glory achieved by human persons through Christ). But two of these names, it says, contain in themselves the properties to designate which all the other names are applied to Christ. These are the names ‘Christ’ and ‘Jesus’. Since the name ‘Christ’ signifies ‘anointing’, it denotes the anointing whereby the Trinity anointed humanity (in Christ) and consecrated it to itself as a Temple in order to instruct us in faith, and so that through the sacraments Christ should be our way and the door to be passed through on the way to him in glory. This last name is designated by the name ‘Jesus’, which means ‘Saviour’.

³⁶ See the notes to our question 1, lines 43-44.

³⁷ At this point G skips two paragraphs in the *Glossa Alex* (ibid. IV and V.a; pp. 222.27-223.8). The first asks whether Christ can be said to be Head by reason of each nature; the answer is given by a text of Lombard’s *Gloss* saying that he is Head according to both natures but properly according to his humanity, ‘according to which the Church is joined to him by nature and grace. For the fullness of grace was in him, of whose *fullness we have all received* (Jn 1:16); and no greater gift can be given to men by God than to make his Word, through whom he created all things, their Head, and to fashion them into his members’.

The second paragraph gives a text of Augustine that describes differences between the human head and body on the one hand and the relation of Christ to his members on the other.

³⁸ In these two paragraphs G skips a considerable amount of material in the *Glossa Alex* by omitting certain points (ibid. V.b; p. 223.16-21) amplifying the Holy Spirit’s role and right to be called Head: the one who gives life moves and so on this analogy the Holy Spirit is the source of spiritual movements from the Head; nerves that give movement are more principally from the head than those giving sense, and since the Holy Spirit gives movement (and Christ spiritual senses), he should be called Head more than Christ.

assigns different roles to the Son and Holy Spirit, but fails to resolve the difficulties; Alexander's text, however, gives a fuller treatment and seeks to resolve the difficulties.³⁹

The next series of arguments asks about the various persons who might or might not be members of Christ. Only the good seem to be included by a text of the *Glossa* saying that just as a member of the human body, when cut off, loses the life-giving spirit, so those cut off from the unity of peace (of the Church or Body of Christ) no longer live by the Spirit (12).⁴⁰ Another text of the *Glossa* appears to indicate that Christ is Head only of the predestined (13).⁴¹ Those who preceded the Incarnation seem to be excluded from membership since the head of a body must be formed before the members (14).⁴²

Opposed to this is a text of Augustine allegorizing the birth of Esau and Jacob. Jacob's hand came forth from the womb before his head and laid hold of the foot of his brother, Esau, who had already been born. Now Jacob was greater in dignity than his brother. So, although Christ was born after the patriarchs and prophets in time, he laid hold of them in the sense that as Head he preceded them in dignity just as Jacob preceded Esau in dignity although not in time of birth (15).⁴³

³⁹ Alexander amplifies the response by saying that the Holy Spirit is Head as a separated principle from whom flow spiritual movements, whereas Christ is a united principle from whom flow spiritual senses. But he then goes on to say that in each of these two modes Christ is Head according to his two natures. 'For he is Head through faith – not the faith that is in him, but faith existing in his members, whereas the [beatific] vision is in him; and this is according to his human nature, in which he communicates with us. He is also Head through charity because in him abides the fullness of charity, of which *we have all received*. In so far as he is principle and Head through faith, spiritual senses flow from him; inasmuch as he is Head through charity, spiritual movements flow from him. And in this way he was Mediator in [his members'] faith in the Redeemer and by [their] love for the Saviour.' See *ibid.* V.c (p. 223.26-35).

⁴⁰ G skips a short statement in the *Glossa Alex* (*ibid.* VI; p. 224.1-2) saying that it is clear that Christ is not Head of the angels because he does not communicate with them in nature.

⁴¹ The *Glossa Alex* is fuller and helps explain the cryptic remark of G that Christ is Head of the predestined 'also according to his humanity' because the fuller text says: 'And according to his humanity, because the Church is founded on faith in his humanity. Hence it is not to be conceded simply speaking that they [the predestined] are members, but only with this qualification: "through predestination"' (*ibid.* VII; p. 224.15-17). The *Glossa* is seeking to explain how the predestined who actually lack justice are now members of Christ since, as he says (*ibid.*, l. 12), 'praedestinatio ... nihil ponit in re'.

⁴² The *Glossa Alex* (*ibid.* VIII.a; p. 224.18-26) gives a much fuller development in which he quotes other philosophers besides Aristotle (the source of the statement about the human head and member given by G). He also adds another argument: 'Praeterea, non ens non est alicuius caput; ergo non caput antequam homo esset.'

⁴³ The text of Augustine leads to a conclusion opposed to that of the previous paragraph. Hence both the text of the *Glossa Alex* and our question should emend 'Item' to read 'Contra'.

Finally, Adam seems to be excluded from the Body of Christ because the *Gloss* says that the Body of which Christ is Head began from Abel (16). Yet, it is argued, Adam was the first to believe (17) and so he should have had Christ as his Head. The answer to this is simple and direct: Adam shared sin and grace, but Abel shared only grace and not sin. That is why the Church is said to have begun from Abel rather than from Adam (18). As always at this time, membership seems linked closely if not exclusively with grace and charity and is excluded by serious sin.

Leaving the other questions unresolved (as does the text of Alexander's Redaction L), G asks whether we confer anything on Christ as co-members of an ordinary body confer something on their head (19).⁴⁴ Although this happens in a material body, says the reply, such is not the case with a spiritual head (20), so that, it appears, the members confer nothing on Christ as Head. G's rather cryptic summary is better understood from Alexander's text, which says:

Each member has something of matter and something of the form of the body. By reason of what it has of matter, another member confers [something] on it; with respect to what it has of form, it is the other way round, and therefore member confers [something] on member. But in a spiritual head and members there is nothing of matter, but everything is form, and therefore there is not in that case a mutual sharing [of goods].⁴⁵

At this point both the text of Alexander in Redaction L and the summary by G come to an end. On the whole, it is a rather limited and undeveloped treatment of the various questions raised in the discussion. At the same time, it touches many of the problems discussed in this period about Christ and his Body or the Church.

Question 2 (no. 164): On Christ: the Way, Mediator, and Head (Anonymous)

This clearly articulated question examines three roles or titles of Christ: the Way, Mediator, and Head of the Church or Mystical Body.

(a) *On Christ as the Way*

This first article of the question asks whether Christ was the Way from all eternity or whether he began to be the Way; it then goes on to ask about the

⁴⁴ At this point the *Glossa Alex* (ibid. X; p. 225.24-26) adds a text from Lombard's *Gloss on Ephesians* denying that the members confer anything on Christ and saying that he confers benefits on his members.

⁴⁵ ibid. X (p. 225.26-31): 'Respondeo: unumquodque membrum habet aliquid de materia et aliquid de forma corporis. Ratione eius quod habet de materia, confert ei aliud membrum; in quantum habet de forma, e converso; et ideo membrum confert membro. Sed in spirituali capite et membris nihil est de materia, sed totum forma; et ideo non est ibi collatio mutua.'

beginning and end of this Way. The third section inquires whether Christ is the Way at present (*modo*).

(i) *Was Christ the Way from eternity or did he begin to be the Way?*

The question opens with the assertion that there are many ways of proving Christ was not the Way from eternity (1). A psalm-verse applied by Peter Lombard's *Gloss* indicates that Christ was not the Way from eternity because it says he became the Way (2), his becoming the Way implying a beginning in time. Also, Christ is the Way as man and since he became man (again, in time), he could not be the Way from eternity (3). Another text of the *Gloss* speaks of man's access to God through Christ as the Way: this access, it is argued, was not from eternity and so Christ was not the Way from eternity (4).

The master seems to concede the force of these arguments, but he then meets two others in opposition, one based on another text of the *Gloss*, the second using speculative grammar. Each seeks to show that Christ is the Way from eternity and did not begin to be the Way (5-6). The master first replies by saying simply that Christ did begin to be the Way (7). He answers the first of the two counter-arguments by pointing out that the psalm-verse speaking of the 'eternal way' is applied to Christ by reason of the eternal person of Christ, but that the term 'way' itself connotes something created, by reason of which Christ is said to have begun to be the Way. The second argument is answered by a technical discussion of the position of a term as predicate or subject of a sentence (8).

(ii) *What are the termini of the Way that is Christ?*

If every way has a twofold terminus (a beginning and end), what are the two termini of Christ as the Way, it is asked? It can be argued that since God is the final terminus of this Way, Christ as God is not the Way (the terminus and the way cannot be identical). But because we are led to God from Christ as man, Christ as man is the initial terminus or beginning of this Way (9). There would seem to be an inconsistency in the argument because its proponent refuses to identify God as terminus with the Way but then seems to describe Christ the man as both terminus and Way. But perhaps by saying that '*de ipso homine ad Deum ducimur*', he may think he has presented Christ as man as the beginning of the journey and can still see him as the Way.

In his solution the master agrees that Christ is the Way not as God but as man. He interprets the termini as a state of misery and a state of beatitude, while Christ, the Way, is the means of our passing from one to the other. Christ acts as man to achieve this passage (*transitus*) formally by his teaching and example, and effectively by his meriting and 'the sacrament' (10). The efficacious sacramental role of Christ refers to the Eucharist: the author quotes a text of Hebrews that first assigns 'entry into the holies' (suggesting voyage on a way) to

the blood of Christ and then speaks of Christ's flesh as the 'veil' through which 'a new and living Way' has been opened to us; hence, our author continues, the Eucharist is called *viaticum* (food for those journeying on the Way that is Christ). As the Way between misery and beatitude in both formal and effective modes, Christ shared our misery, the misery of penalty for sin but not of sin itself, as Gregory the Great indicates; Christ was also at the other terminus because he was himself blessed (10).

This concise statement implies and partially states an interesting theology of Christ's mode of causing salvation by his human activity. As man, Christ though sinless shares the misery of the human condition, a misery resulting from sin, but because he also possesses (partially, one presumes) the goal of the journey while on earth, he is able to help others in various ways to reach the goal of the *transitus*. The text of Hebrews and the reference to *transitus* may evoke Christ's passing to the Father by his death and resurrection: having travelled the full route, his teaching and example present the *form* which the lives of the saved should have; his merits and the sacrament of the Eucharist *effect* the change from sin and punishment to a state of beatitude. In all this Christ stands as the Way.

The statement that now follows in the text helps us to understand what the author means by Christ's effective role as Way. It is an efficacy in that Christ had authority to dispose (*auctoritas ut disponderet*) others to go to the Father. Christ had to have his authority in order to act as effective dispositive Way; therefore as man he went to God, as the *Gloss* says (11). Here again one can hear overtones of a theology of Christ's glorification by his resurrection, ascension and sitting at the Father's right hand whereby he receives authority to be the Way for those seeking to reach God at the end of their wayfaring.

(iii) *Is Christ the Way at present (modo)?*

The foregoing discussion, referring to Christ's glorification, leads to the question whether Christ is the Way at present. A gloss on the text of Hebrews already quoted supports an affirmative view, for it holds that Christ is a permanent and accessible Way that afterwards (*postea*) is never closed to any of the faithful (12).

Two arguments deny this. Christ was the Way by practising obedience (Augustine) and he now no longer does so (13). Again, although Christ is now the Way 'in faith and in scripture, for we believe what he taught and did', this was true before his Incarnation (as a psalm-gloss confirms) so that he is no more Way as man now than he was before becoming man (14). Although this is not an absolute denial of Christ's being the way at present, it would say that he is less the Way now than he was during his earthly life.

The master agrees in part with the second argument. In a certain manner (*quodammodo*) Christ was the Way before his Incarnation, but now his mode of being the Way is proper and absolute (*proprie et simpliciter*). Existing as corruptible and mortal man, Christ suffered for us and opened the gates of heaven. Speaking of Christ as the Way, the master indicates that the analogy of a way used here is not that of a space to be passed through but rather that of the movement of one travelling along the way. In relation to Christ, this movement could be by merit or by passing from misery to happiness. The former existed before the Incarnation, the latter only after, because this passage took place through Christ's passion, which opened the gates of paradise (15). The author here seems to distinguish between a moral right to happiness achieved by those before Christ (undoubtedly through faith in him) and the actual transition from misery to beatitude.

The master now adds the opinion of others on this matter. They distinguish two stages of going to God, the route (*iter*) itself leading to God and the act of going: the former pertains to the soul while the latter includes the body. Both should be included in order to have the full meaning of the Way. Hence before the Incarnation the Son of God was the Way for the soul because good persons had the right to go to God (*ius eundi ad Deum*), but only after the Son of God became man did they have Christ as the Way for both body and soul to go to God at some determinate time after the day of judgment (16). The master does not indicate his attitude toward this argument: apparently it is an alternate solution he offers should anyone disagree with his own. In any case, it is in general agreement with his own position.

When Augustine says that Christ was the Way by practising obedience (13), he was referring, the master says, to the chief effect of the passion of Christ, the opening of the gates of heaven, through which completion of the way took place. In that effect Christ's obedience still remains, not as exercised by Christ but as present in our faith that Christ obeyed the Father in all things (17). Here the author seems to have in mind his earlier statement about Christ's being formally the Way by his example,⁴⁶ an example which inspires faith in those who believe.

To the other argument about Christ's being the Way for those before the Incarnation (14) the master replies that Christ was the Way for them either because of their faith in Christ or (using the distinction already made) because the Way meant for them their meritorious movement toward God (19) rather than the actual transition.

⁴⁶ See above, p. 14, and no. 10.

A final short discussion states that Christ as the Way differs from his commandments as way because Christ is the universal way and the commandments are particular ways or the way taken in a material sense only (19).

To summarize: the author of this question sees Christ as the Way in terms of his human nature and actions. Thus Christ is not the Way from eternity except in a secondary sense; he becomes the Way properly and absolutely as man, leading believers from misery to beatitude by his teaching and example (formally) and by his merits and the Eucharist (effectively): his effective leadership disposes the faithful to go to God. As Son of God he was the Way for those who existed before Christ through their movement of meriting to go to God, but he is most fully the Way as incarnate, for thereby he effects the transition of persons from misery to beatitude.

(b) *In what way is Christ our Mediator?*

That Christ was our Mediator is clear, the master says, from the gloss on Galatians that has already been seen (4) and also because Christ as God and man shares the natures of the extremes, which sharing is the role of a middle (*medium*) or mediator (20-21). This sharing of divine and human natures is Christ's substantial mediation, a mediation Gregory compares to that of electrum mixed from gold and silver, the gold signifying the divine nature of Christ and the silver his human nature. Christ's mediation is also accidental, this time by way of properties and qualities: Augustine indicates its presence by speaking of two properties in Christ: 'Christ was mortal with men and just with God' (22).

As both Augustine and Gregory indicate in other texts, Christ's mediation effected reconciliation between God and man. As man, Christ's mediation was of the accidental type defined as being by way of properties or qualities because Christ mediated by his activities shown forth in his humanity (activities that would be classified as qualities). These actions being completed, Christ's accidental mediation has ceased, but his substantial mediation and the mediation of reconciliation endures since Christ continues 'as a good and faithful advocate' to reconcile us to God (23); this is a reference to Christ's prayer for us before the Father.

Here an objection is made that Christ was not mediator between God and man because there was no offense between God and man precisely as man, but only between God and sinful man. Therefore Christ was Mediator between the sinner and God. But against this one must say that Christ did not communicate with the sinner as sinner (24).

To this argument implying that Christ was, because sinless, really not the Mediator the author replies that it was unnecessary for Christ to share the

nature of each extreme, that is, for him to be actually a sinner. It was enough that he share the misery of human penalty, which he took upon himself voluntarily so that, by satisfying for the sin of the first parent, he might reconcile the human race to God. This was no communication with the sinner but rather with the human person who was a sinner. The sinner is a man, and Christ's mediation was a substantial mediation between God and sinful man (25).

But the objector insists that the text of Ephesians saying that in Christ all things in heaven and on earth were brought into peace indicates that Christ reconciled as God and so was Mediator as God (26). The master replies that Christ as God was the reconciler authoritatively (or as first source of reconciliation), but that as man Christ was reconciler as the advocate of the human race, and this in two ways: by his prayer, as a text of Wisdom indicates, and by paying the debt for us to the Father (27).

The scriptural passage that speaks of a Mediator as 'not of one' leads to an objection saying that because there is only one nature in God and only one human nature in Christ, Christ cannot be Mediator either as God or as man (28). Perhaps referring to someone else's attempt to reply to this, the master says it would not be enough to say that, because there is only one divine nature but several human natures in individual human beings individually or according to species, Christ can be Mediator as man though not as God. Numerical plurality, the master says, is in fact not needed for mediation because there could be a mediator between God and one man in whom human nature exists individually. His own view is that Christ was Mediator by reason of acts performed in his humanity, and he was universal Mediator or Mediator of the whole of human nature, as Paul indicates in Romans when he compares Christ's obedience to the disobedience of Adam (29).

Moreover, the master adds, the Son of God became incarnate to restore not the human person, but human nature. Hence the divine nature was united to human nature, not to a human person or to this or that man as individual, but with respect to all so that Christ could stand for them all.

Finally, it is asked why it is Christ rather than the Holy Spirit who is said to have been our Mediator (31). Likely the author is thinking of a text quoted earlier about the Holy Spirit asking for us with unutterable groanings (27). The master replies that the Holy Spirit did not work and merit for us as Christ did: the Holy Spirit distributes the gifts to us (32); moreover, the middle person by reason of distinction of persons in the Trinity (the Son) should be the middle by reason of distinction of natures (33), that is, he should mediate between the natures. Finally, a text of Gregory indicates that, in order that the Mediator give example of good works, he should be human (34).

(c) *In what way is Christ Head?*

Four problems are raised within this third article of the larger question. According to what is Christ Head, that is, according to which nature? Is he Head of the good only? When did he begin to be Head? Is there a mutual conferral of benefits from members to Head as well as from Head to members? (35) These questions are already familiar to us from the first question, and there might be some relationship between the two discussions, but question 2 is lengthier and independent in many aspects of the discussion.

(i) *According to what is Christ Head?*

Although a text of the *Gloss* says that Christ is Head as man, other Pauline texts and the *Gloss* seem to say that he is Head as God or that the Trinity is Head of the Church (36-37). Two other arguments claim that the Holy Spirit should be called Head of the Church rather than Christ: the flow of graces is more from the Holy Spirit, and this flow of graces to the members of the Church is the reason why Christ is called Head (38). Moreover, in the human head the nerves give rise to sensation and motion, motion being more important than sensation. But since the Holy Spirit gives motion, he should be called Head rather than Christ, from whom flow spiritual sensations (39). These arguments are very much like those in the *Gloss on the Sentences* by Alexander of Hales that we have already seen.⁴⁷ Since they are not found in our question 1, the author of question 2 seems to be relying on Alexander's *Gloss* or on some common source.

Some, says the master, reply by way of appropriation: wisdom is appropriated to the Son and from this flows knowledge and therefore spiritual senses; goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit and from this flows forth motion (40). This reply does not meet the point of the previous argument and seems inconclusive. We have seen that this is where G, the author or rather compiler of question 1, left the matter, and it seems reasonable to suppose that he is the *quidam* (or one of them) who is referred to here.⁴⁸ The master goes on to develop his own reply, and again he is very close to the reply of Alexander of Hales in Redaction L of the *Gloss on the Sentences*. It is certain, he says, that a head must share membership with other members of the body. Since Christ is a co-member of the Mystical Body and from him flow forth spiritual senses in other members of the Church, and since moreover he is the principle of their senses – a principle not separated but sharing in nature with the rest – he is Head. The Holy Spirit is indeed a principle of movements in the Mystical Body

⁴⁷ See above, n. 38.

⁴⁸ See q. 1, no. 11.

and so can be said in some way to be Head, but he is a separated principle not sharing the nature of the members (41).⁴⁹ It is clear from this that for the master the Holy Spirit is less perfectly Head than is Christ.

The whole Trinity is said to be Head of the Church not precisely as creative, as an argument (37) said, for then the Trinity could be called Head of asses or of any other created things! But it is called Head of Christ because it caused Christ by pouring into him nature and grace simultaneously. The Trinity is called Head of the Church because from it flow the gifts of grace into the Body of the Church and its members. Thus God is Head of the Church, but Christ as man is also Head because of the connection in him of nature and grace: he shares with us in grace and nature, and through the fullness of grace in him he merited that we should have in part what he has in fullness (42). There are some similarities with the doctrine of Alexander's *Gloss* but also enough differences to show that our author is not copying Alexander so closely as did G in question 1, if indeed our author is using Alexander.

Thus it is the combination of Christ's sharing human nature with the other members of the Church and his fullness of grace that make him in a special way Head of the Church or of the Mystical Body according to his human nature.

(ii) *Is Christ Head of only the good?*

Two opening arguments contend that evil persons are not members of Christ: they are members of the devil, as Job says, and so Christ is not their Head (43); the wicked lack sanctifying grace (*gratia gratum faciens*) and since Christ is Head by a conjunction of nature and grace, as the *Gloss* says, Christ is not their Head (44).

Authoritative texts are now quoted to uphold the opposed position. Augustine says that the Church is the society of the faithful found in those predestined and called. But since many who are evil for a time are predestined, they are in fact members of the Church and so Christ is Head not only of the good but also of those evil persons at least who are predestined (45).⁵⁰ A text of Jerome also indicates that there are some members of the Church who are weak by reason of their vices, and since Christ is Head of all who are gathered in the Church, he is Head of these and so of some evil persons. Jerome is not referring to venial sinners because few if any persons lack venial sins, as the first letter of John says. Moreover, Jerome in the text says that sinners are in the Church as subject to necessity, and it is only those who are in mortal sin who are subject to necessity. Hence, the argument concludes, their solution is null (47), that is,

⁴⁹ See above, n. 39.

⁵⁰ Cf. the *Glossa Alex* as summarized above, n. 41.

the position of the two first arguments which would say that venial sinners might be members but not mortal sinners whom they have identified as members of the devil (43) and as persons lacking sanctifying grace (44).

The master, who agrees with the opening arguments that the evil are not members of Christ, repeats the conclusion of Alexander's *Gloss* but adds to it a grammatical discussion of the meaning of *praesens*, which can be either the present as now or the present *simpliciter*, which is the present as vague (*confusum*). From his example of Easter as a beautiful time, we see that one can be speaking about this present here and now ('this present Easter here and now is a beautiful time') or about the present in an undefined way ('Easter is ordinarily a beautiful time even if in a particular "now" it is not beautiful'). The vague present is not opposed to the here-and-now present. Thus one can say that here and now this (wicked) person is not a member of Christ but one cannot conclude that he is not a member if he is predestined because even if here and now (*ut nunc*) he is not a member of Christ, he is a member 'in predestination' (48).⁵¹ The master thus attempts to maintain the position that the evil are not members of Christ and at the same time to allow for a type of membership for the evil who will one day be in fact, in the here and now of some future time, members of Christ.

He seems to think he has taken care of some of the authoritative texts, but he must deal with the argument drawn from Jerome's statement about sinners subject by necessity to the Church, who are weak members but still part of the Church with Christ as Head (47). He gives the text what is perhaps a benign interpretation, saying that Jerome wanted to allude to the difference between the perfect and the imperfect. In the former only charity rules, but in the latter love has fear associated with it, and it is of these latter Jerome is speaking when he says that they are subject by necessity, that is, subject to fear because they frequently have an occasion to sin (49). In this way he would insist that Jerome's text refers not to mortal sinners, as had been inferred by the opponent, but to venial sinners who possess love and grace but have fear of sin intermingled with it.

(iii) *Did Christ begin to be Head at the Incarnation?*

Christ could not be said to have become Head at the time of the Incarnation, says an opening argument, because the head and heart are the principle and first members of a human body in its generation, and therefore in the Mystical Body the Head is the chief and first member. But this means that Christ should be

⁵¹ Cf. *ibid.*

among the first members and therefore be Head before Abel was a member, and not only at the time of the Incarnation (50).

Again, was not Christ Head of those who preceded him, such as the prophets and patriarchs? A text of the *Gloss* indicates that the members who preceded Christ have him as Head (51), and Augustine's allegorizing the description of Esau and Jacob at their birth leads to the same conclusion that Christ is Head of the fathers who lived before the Incarnation (52). Another text of the *Gloss* associates Christ's Headship with Abel and those following Abel; still another says that the Church began with the Jews and not with Abel (54). Although this last argument disagrees with the preceding one, it would agree that Christ was Head before the Incarnation.

In his determination of the question the master says that Christ is first in dignity among the members of the Church: this answers the first argument about his being the principal member. As for his being the first, the master maintains that Christ was the first member in the order of time with respect to faith (55), that is, the faith of all members is directed to Christ.

With respect to Augustine's allegory on Esau and Jacob, he says that all the members of the Mystical Body are simultaneous in being predestined even though the patriarchs and prophets saw 'the light of actual existence' before others (56), including Christ. What the master means is that Christ is Head of all the predestined because of their simultaneity in being predestined (and perhaps he insinuates that they are all predestined in Christ), but that Christ exercises his Headship according to the order of actual existence, becoming actual Head at the time of the Incarnation.

In reply to the argument that Abel and not Adam was the first member of the Church (53), the master simply quotes Augustine, who agrees with this statement and explains the reason for it. Adam had within himself two states, that of grace and that of sin, so that the city of the good and the city of the evil were not yet distinct in him. They became distinct in Abel and Cain, in the former as the city of the good, in the latter as the city of the evil, and that is why the Church (which Augustine seems to equate with the city of the good in this text) is said to have begun from Abel (57). This same reply is also found in the *Gloss* of Alexander of Hales and was repeated, but only in brief summary, by G in our question 1.⁵²

Another reason is given by the master himself, and he says it seems to be stronger. (This may indicate that his previous solution is taken from Alexander or some common source.) Although some members in the Church militant on earth could become non-members, he says, those in the 'Church in

⁵² See q. 1, no. 18.

expectation', that is, in Purgatory, cannot become non-members. Now Abel was the first member to live 'in expectation' (he was the first good person to die and to go to the abode of those awaiting Christ's saving work and liberation). Therefore the Church is said to have begun from him because from his time onwards the possession of the Church could not be interrupted (58). As for the Church's being said to begin from the Jews, this refers to the beginning of the Church's explicit faith (59), the era of explicit revelation by God and so of explicit faith.

(iv) *Is there a mutual conferring of goods from the members to the Head and from the Head to the members?*

A final discussion asks whether the members confer benefits on the Head in addition to receiving them from the Head. Two authoritative texts imply that Christ receives something from his members (60). But an opposed authority denies that the members confer anything on Christ, who gives everything to the members (61).

Some, the master says, argue that Christ receives nothing from his members because they reject the argument based on the analogy of the human body (where the head does receive something from the members). They maintain that this analogy fails in the case of the Mystical Body because there are differences between a material body made up of matter and form and the relation of Christ as Head to his Body: as Head he does not have the notion of matter and form (62) and so cannot have the receptivity of matter whereby he might receive something from his members. Here again the master is summarizing the argument of either the *Gloss* of Alexander or of our question 1 (more likely the former) or of some common source.⁵³ He does not, however, like this solution. He says that members do confer something on Christ, their Head, not absolutely but in a certain respect. Christ as God conferred on himself that he should be born from some members preceding him, and therefore the members did confer something on him. There can, of course, be no doubt that he himself confers all things on the members (63).

Thus ends the second question, a fairly well ordered and clearly developed treatment of themes we have already seen in question 1 and in the *Gloss on the Sentences* of Alexander, both of which the author seems to have had before him as he wrote, and to which he reacts either by following their opinions or by quoting and sometimes rejecting them.

⁵³ See above, p. 13 and n. 45.

Question 3 (no. 522): On the unity of the Church (Anonymous)

This and the following question concentrate more on the unity of the Church but also touch other matters we have already seen.

(a) In what does the unity of the Church consist?

This first article comprises over half the question. The first suggestion as to the source of the Church's unity is mutual service, as is suggested by texts from the *Gloss*, from Augustine, and Paul (1, 2, 4). This position is defended against a text of the *Gloss* suggesting that the union is one in nature like that of the Father and Son: the unity of the Church cannot be a union in one numerical nature, as is theirs, and their unity is not one in species (of several individuals). Hence our unity in the Church is not like that of the Father and Son (3), and so, the argument implies, it must be by union of wills rather than by any union of nature. Another argument suggests three sources for the unity of the Church, namely, faith, charity, and peace (5).

The master answers the question by first analyzing the notion of the one, which, he says, is 'multiplied according to the multiplication of being'. Since being is distinguished as natural, moral, and rational, so there is a natural one, a moral one, and a rational one. Again, as there is a being of creation and of recreation, which is the same as the image of creation and of recreation, so it is with 'one'. The image of creation, which was wounded, and the image of recreation, which was lost (by sin), have been repaired by the unity of the Church, and it is grace that establishes that unity. The author now gives a rather formal definition: 'Unity is the non-differing society or association (*indifferens societas*) of members in relation to the same image of likeness, whereas the society or association is the grace that conforms and assimilates the members of the Church to the uncreated image.' This unity, he says, is the first and universal unity, and it belongs to both angels and human persons, whether they are children or adults. Other unities, such as that of faith or sacraments or charity or peace, are particular kinds of unity following upon this first and basic unity (6).

This analysis, one of the most profound to be seen in all our questions, uses a distinction of being that is found in the *Gloss on the Sentences* of Alexander of Hales, in Philip the Chancellor's questions, and in one of the questions edited earlier in this series.⁵⁴ Being and the one on the level of nature correspond to physical being and unity; on the moral level they refer to being and oneness in

⁵⁴ See *Hyp. Union* 2.34, 40n, 60-65, and 4.45-48, and 'Quaestiones concerning Christ from the First Half of the Thirteenth Century: III...', *Mediaeval Studies* 43 (1981) 34 (q. 2A, no. 13) and 40 (q. 2B, no. 49).

the realm of human mores, human dignity, and human ethics; the level of reason is the level of metaphysics for most authors of this period, who are basically essentialist in their philosophy.⁵⁵ The author links this inquiry with the history of salvation, seeing the unity of the Church as restoration of the image of God lost by the fall. The unity of the Church's members is presented especially in terms of its relating them to or imaging the Uncreated Image (the Son) by way of likeness.

Our author has said that the grace effecting this unity is first and most fundamental. Now he is questioned about this 'first grace, since all the saints and masters say that faith is the first grace' (7). He replies that grace and virtue are the same in subject but differ by reason: grace is related to the person giving and receiving as well as to the repairing of natural goods and the restoring of gratuitous goods; virtue, on the other hand, is related to free choice, which disposes one to act. In the realm of the gratuitous, grace therefore gives primary being (*facit primo esse*) and virtue gives the being of action (*facit ad actum esse*). Thus if we consider faith and charity as grace, they bring about the first and universal unity (of the Church), but in so far as they are virtues they achieve particular kinds of unity (8). Here one sees the distinction between grace and the virtues delineated in an important manner; this distinction was stated clearly for the first time by Philip the Chancellor,⁵⁶ and one wonders whether there may have been some mutual influence between Philip and the author of this question. In any case, the doctrine is that the unity of the Church comes from a more fundamental grace than that of the particular virtues or of the sacraments, and therefore the author disagrees with the opening statements and arguments that located this unity in the union of wills or mutual service.

Against the master's position two arguments are now made: the *Gloss* says the Holy Spirit accomplishes ecclesiastical unity (9) and therefore it is not this primary grace that effects it; the *Gloss* also speaks of the one body as established by the union of many members without mentioning any 'first grace' (10). It is evident that our author's doctrine is considered novel in view of the previous authoritative texts and magisterial discussions (cf. 7). The master replies by pointing to the case of someone separated from the unity of the Church by sin: such a one is drawn by 'uncreated charity' (the Holy Spirit of the first argument) so that he should be in the Body; he is cleansed through grace, which makes him to be (in the unity of the Church) and afterwards the virtues (held by others to give unity) dispose him to acts (11). Thus our author agrees with the others in

⁵⁵ See *Hyp. Union* 2.215-16, and 4.191.

⁵⁶ On Philip's contribution see A. Landgraf, 'Die Erkenntnis des Übernatürlichen' in his *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1.1 (Regensburg, 1952), pp. 141-219, especially pp. 214-19.

assigning a role to the Holy Spirit and to the virtues, but he locates the essential or basic unity of the Church in the grace of the primary order of being preceding the grace of activity.

In answering the opening arguments, our author meets a new problem. His opponents had insisted that the unity of the Church is by will and service and not by nature; he says it is a oneness by nature achieved through the Word's becoming flesh (12). This means that because the Word shared our human nature while still retaining his unity of nature with the Father, the unity of the Church is, as the *Gloss* had said (3), a unity in nature with Christ as man like the unity in nature of the Son with the Father. The objection made against this is that such unity is not universal or extensive to all creatures since it fails to include the angels (13). This exchange indicates more clearly the direction of the master's argument, for a unity by the Word's sharing human nature would exclude the angels whose nature he did not share. The objector goes on to quote two texts of the *Gloss* indicating that the angels feed on Christ and wish always to behold the clarity of his assumed humanity (14), that is, they have some relation of unity to the humanity of Christ, a relation that seems to be at least implicitly denied by the master's positions.

His reply calls upon a text of Anselm which differentiates between the relation to Christ of humans and angels: for us Christ became a 'rich bread' (*panis pinguis*) because he clothed himself in our humanity and gave us his flesh to eat; for angels, however, he is simply bread (*tantum panis*) because they only see him spiritually in his Deity and do not feed upon his humanity (15) as we do. This, he says, is what the second text quoted from the *Gloss* maintains: so, he says in a sharp retort that undoubtedly reflects the debate itself, 'What you say is false, or give some other solution.'

He next explains the role of faith, charity, and peace that had been proposed as sources of the Church's unity (5). Faith achieves unity in the rational power, charity in the concupiscible power, and peace in the irascible power. Therefore, he continues, the first uniting prepares (*adaptat*) nature, but in heaven unity will be full and complete when we seek nothing outside God (17). The work of grace is to begin the work of adapting nature to the unity of the Church, a unity that will be perfect in heaven when we are no longer distracted from this unity by things other than God.

A new argument again appeals to a text of the *Gloss* that now assigns the activity of animating members of Christ's Body to the Holy Spirit, in whom all are one (18). The point of quoting this text is to substitute the Holy Spirit for our author's primary grace. The master simply replies that the text is speaking about the Body of the Church militant or about the 'consequent unity' (19). What he means is that the role of the Spirit is to stir up the primary grace so that the Church militant may carry on the activities of the virtues: these virtues give the

unity 'consequent upon' the primary unity achieved by the primary grace. He consolidates this argument by referring to a text of the *Gloss* on Ephesians that says the Body of the Church is compacted by faith and joined by the bond of charity: this text, he says, refers to the modes of unity, not to the unity itself (20), that is, the compacting by faith and joining by charity are modes of unity following upon the fundamental unity achieved by the primary grace. The master also adds that when several things are called one and no specification is added, we are to understand numerical oneness. Hence when the text of Corinthians cited (18) speaks of our being one, it means that we are like the Father and Son in being one in number (21).

Against this it is argued that the Father and Son are one through the notional unity whereby they spirate the Holy Spirit, so that it is by being one in love that we are one in the same way as they (22). Also, a text of Romans indicates that we are incorporated into Christ by charity and faith (23). To these arguments the master replies that incorporation consists in acting, not in simple being (24), that is, incorporation in Christ by faith and love, or unity by love, is union with Christ through these activities which are themselves consequent upon the fundamental unity achieved by the primary grace held by him to be the root source of the unity of the Church.

(b) *To whom does the unity of the Church belong?*

A brief discussion now follows about whether evil persons are members of this unified Body of the Church. As in question 2, a text of Jerome is quoted to indicate that the Church has both holy and evil members (25), and a text of the *Gloss* is alluded to because it implies that all the predestined, including someone like Saul when he was persecuting the Church, are members of the Body of Christ that is the Church (26). The master distinguishes between the being of predestination (*esse praedestinationis*) and absolute or unqualified being (*esse simpliciter*). The predestined are members of Christ in the first sense but (if they are evil, he implies) they are not members of the Church absolutely or in an unqualified manner (27). This is the same doctrine as has been seen in our previous questions and in the *Gloss* of Alexander of Hales, but here it is put in terms of *esse*, which is typical of this author.

(c) *On the unity of the body of the devil*

We have met allusions to the wicked as members of the devil.⁵⁷ Here a brief discussion asks how the body of the devil or of those who are evil can be one, since a diversity of contrary vices does not seem to lead to any unity (28). The

⁵⁷ See above, p. 20; cf. q. 2. no. 43.

master says that the unity of this body is opposed to that of the Body of Christ by way of privation. Since, as he admits, he cannot see how that which tends to nothingness can produce any unity, he decides to follow the opinion of others who say this unity consists in a unity of privation (29). The only unity had among the evil is the fact that they are all one in being deprived of the unity of Christ's Body.

(d) *Why is Christ said to be Head?*

The whole Trinity or God the Father should be called Head of the Church, says an opening argument based on a text of the *Gloss* (30). The master's lengthy reply bases its argument on the human body's composition from matter and form and deduces from this that the Body of the Church consists of a quasi-matter and a quasi-form. As man Christ is able to receive grace because he is a rational spirit: this is quasi-matter in him. He also has the fullness of all graces and therefore a most perfect form. Because of this adaptation (of Christ as man to the human body composed of matter and form), Christ is Head of the Church rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit. Our author goes on to speak similarly of the members of this Body. Every rational spirit, he says, is able to receive grace and so has matter; it receives grace and so has form. Hence it is a member of the Body of Christ. If, however, it receives the opposite of that form, in other words, the privation of grace, it becomes a member of the devil's body rather than of Christ's (31). Here the master looks to the implications of the metaphor of the body in order to explain why we should call Christ Head rather than the Father or Holy Spirit. This is an indirect way of affirming that Christ is Head according to his human nature rather than according to his divine nature.

Continuing his exploration of the metaphor of head and body, the author says Christ is called Head rather than Heart of the Body even though, as some say, movement is from the heart. A biological analysis shows that the soul's activities on the subtler elements such as light and air begin in the anterior and posterior parts of the head respectively and from there flow through the whole body (including the heart). Guided by this comparison, he says, we call Christ Head because from him comes every grace, knowledge, sense, and movement or affect (32).

(e) *Final objections against the master's opinion*

The master's novel opinion about a primary grace as source of the unity of the Church prior to the unity coming from faith, charity, sacraments, and peace continues to raise objections and arguments. A text of the *Gloss* teaching that the Church is united to Christ as Head by both grace and nature is held to nullify the master's teaching about this primary unity by grace, which for him includes angels as well as human beings (cf. 7). The objector maintains that the

unity in Christ according to (human) nature spoken of by the *Gloss* would exclude the angels from this unity, and so the master's opinion is wrong (33).

Again, a text of Colossians affirming that we are called into peace in the one Body of Christ shows that peace is necessary for the unity of the Church, which unity is effected by charity. Hence this unity is not produced by the 'first grace which you posit' (34). Again, another approach says, you maintain that the Church or the Body of the Church or its unity includes the angels. But if that is so, it did not begin from Abel (35), as is commonly held.

Finally, a text of Augustine is introduced against the master's position. Beginning from the Johannine context evoked at the start of this question, it teaches that the unity of Christians realized through the mediation of Christ (and so by his Headship) is not a unity of nature comparable to the Father and Son's unity by equality of substance but rather a unity of will inflamed by the fire of charity (36). This is a strong authoritative text against the master's position. It is unfortunate that the report of the disputation ends abruptly here without any replies from the master to the last set of arguments.

Throughout this question we meet a theologian of vigorous and original thought, one who pushes things further than most of his contemporaries and who seems for that reason to have aroused considerable opposition to his new theory, one that was to become important to the distinction between grace and virtue as well as to subsequent discussions of the unity of the Mystical Body.

Question 4 (no. 525a): On the unity of the Mystical Body (Anonymous)

This question contains two sections, a longer one dealing with the sources of the unity of the Mystical Body, and a shorter one comparing the roles of the Holy Spirit and Christ in relation to the Mystical Body.

(a) *From what source is the Mystical Body one?*

A first argument maintains that the Holy Spirit is the source of the unity of the Mystical Body: the *Gloss*, in a text seen in the previous question, says that the Holy Spirit does all things in the members of Christ just as the one soul gives life to all the members of a human body (1). Against this, however, another text of the *Gloss* in the same chapter of 1 Corinthians says that this unity comes from faith, which cannot be the Holy Spirit. If it is said that this unity comes from both faith and the Holy Spirit, one must ask where the difference is to be found between the two since this statement linking the two cannot express the same relationship to unity for each (2). Moreover, in that case the Holy Spirit would be an extrinsic cause, whether efficient or exemplar. Now just as one does not explain the oneness of a material body from such extrinsic causes but from an intrinsic cause, so here it is insufficient to say that the unity of the Mystical Body is from the Holy Spirit (3). For this reason, says

the reporter of this debate, the master said that the unity of the Mystical Body is from faith (4). As we shall see, this is not his final or complete answer.

Several objections arise against his position. Christ is a co-member (*com-membrum*) or fellow-member with us in the Mystical Body, as the *Gloss* says. But Christ had no faith (since, one presumes, he enjoyed the vision of God) and if it is faith that gives unity to the Mystical Body, Christ would not be a member of such a Body (5). Again, the cause of unity must be something common to both members and Head, and this is charity rather than faith. Therefore it is charity that effects this unity (6). A text of (pseudo-)Augustine confirms this by saying that charity unites us to God (7).

In reply to these arguments it is said that the charity in question cannot be that of Christ since the Mystical Body existed, as well as its unity, even when the Son of God was not yet incarnate and there was no Christ and no charity in Christ. Hence it would be the charity of others and not of Christ that would effect that unity. But this could not be the case because the charity of any other member is singular or particular to that one member, so that none of the members' charities can unite the whole Body (8).

What if one were to say that it is not charity belonging to this or that member, but the charities of all members joined together, that effects one Mystical Body? This means nothing, says a reply. For if several people come together or agree in music, they are not one but similar. So here, these charities would not produce something one but only a similarity (9). Moreover, this would make the Mystical Body one in species only and not one in number, and so it would be a unity in a particular respect and not the absolute unity the Apostle speaks of in his first letter to the Corinthians (10).

A counter-argument rejects the Holy Spirit as source of this unity. A list of types of oneness given by the pseudo-Dionysius includes oneness by principle and oneness by totality. But, says the argument, when we ask about the source of the unity in the Mystical Body, we are asking not about its one principle but about its oneness by totality. The Holy Spirit, who as one principle is an extrinsic cause, either efficient or exemplar, would not suffice as an answer to this question (11).

Several other arguments follow: one may be an attempt to answer the difficulty raised against the Holy Spirit as source of unity. It says that a text of the *Gloss* points to the co-working of the Holy Spirit, who directs all the gifts to achieve oneness. It is the gifts that tend to unity, and so from all comes the unity of the Holy Spirit (13). It is not entirely clear whether this means that it is all the gifts from which the unity comes, or whether it comes from all the members who are gifted. In any case, the argument seems to try to make the unity coming from the Holy Spirit something intrinsic even though the Holy Spirit is extrinsic.

Other arguments point to hope, together with faith and charity, as a source of this unity (12), or to a justice analogous to the civil justice which orders the whole universe (14), or to the justice that establishes order among various classes, a justice analogous to the compassion and help that members of the Mystical Body should show to each other (15).

In his determination of the question, the master distinguishes between the unity of the Mystical Body binding members to each other and the unity of the Body with the Head. If we are asking about the first unity, he says, we must maintain that it arises from both faith and charity, with faith as the beginning and charity – the charity of fraternal love, he specifies – as confirming it. Faith produces unity in the cognitive area by our believing the same articles of faith, while charity produces unity in our motive area by fraternal love (16). Turning to the second aspect, the unity of members and Head, he first answers the argument that faith could not produce this unity because Christ would not be a member of a Body united by faith (5). He says that the term ‘Mystical Body’ can refer either to the Body without its Head or to the Body with its Head. Taken in the first way, the Mystical Body does not have Christ as member, but it does if taken in the second way; yet he is member in such a way as to be Head of the Body (17). But when the *Gloss* says that we are the Body of Christ by faith, it is referring to the Body in the second way, namely, as being under the Head (18). By his distinction in the meaning of the term ‘Mystical Body’ the master is able to maintain the role of faith as uniting the Body and yet include Christ in one way among the members of that Body.

Next there is brought forth a definition of the Church as ‘the congregation of faithful who believe in Christ and the sacraments of Christ’; this definition is intended to show that if Christ is a member, he will have faith. But the master replies that another definition changes the word ‘believe’ to ‘know’, and according to this definition Christ can be a member of the Church (19).

In what is an expansion of his first reply the master now concedes that the Holy Spirit causes the unity of the Church but, he adds, he does it as a remote cause (*per remotam causam*), for the Holy Spirit is an efficient or exemplary extrinsic cause who pours the interior perfection into the Church (20). He then meets an argument based on a (pseudo-)Augustinian text saying that sacramental grace consecrates the Church to Christ; if this is so, sacramental grace causes the unity of the Church (21). The master replies that sacramental grace does confer unity on the Mystical Body in so far as it has its parts, but charity effects its unity according as the Mystical Body is organized or has organs. The dictum quoted about sacramental grace refers to the Mystical Body according as it has parts (not yet organized), for, the master says somewhat cryptically, a sacrament is a sign and cause of the *res* or reality conferred, a sign related to knowledge and a cause related to the work to be accomplished

(the *opus*), and sacramental grace has this relationship to knowledge and to the work or effect to be accomplished (22). What he seems to be saying is that sacramental grace has its relationship to and effect in individual persons by making them individual parts or units of the Mystical Body: as signs, the sacraments bring them to faith or evoke it in them; as causes, they produce the *opus* of charity. But it is charity that makes the individual parts into organs. That is, as internal unifying principle, charity organizes the parts into a deeper union in the Mystical Body.

The master now answers the arguments that sought to reject charity as a source of unity. For him the charity of Christ is source, principle and, as it were, exemplar cause of charity found in his fellow-members, and therefore charity is common to us and to Christ. Nor does it produce something only similar, as the arguments had urged, but rather something one – not a oneness in species but rather ‘the kind of one that is proportional to what is one in number’. This is the reason why all charities are numerically one in a certain respect for they all have the same object and the same end, the first and supreme good. Likewise, faith has the same object and the same end. Hence individual charities are one in something that is one in number because they are one in the supreme good. The same is true of the faith found in this person and in that. Therefore charity and faith effect one Mystical Body, whose oneness is proportional to something one in number (23). Here the master invokes the analogy of proportionality, whereby a unity is found in diverse things by reason of their reference to something that is numerically one. By using it, he shows that there is a type of unity to be found among distinct individuals, each possessing some qualities and yet being united and being one because of the reference of these qualities to an analogate that is one and that possesses the quality in a special way that furnishes a basis for referring others to the prime analogate. This is an interesting example of the application of Aristotelian thought within a theological problem as a way of cutting through the arguments of his opponents.

As for justice, which had been suggested as a possible source of this unity, the master rejects justice considered as a cardinal virtue because cardinal virtues, he says, are concerned not with the end but with means to the end. (They are not directed to the supreme truth or highest good but rather deal with means to reach these as end.) Even ‘theological justice’ (which probably means the supernatural virtue of justice as opposed to the natural virtue of justice) does not effect the unity of the Mystical Body because charity is closer to the supreme good, the end absolutely speaking. Hence charity has more unitive power for the Body of the Church than any other virtue (24), and therefore more unitive power than theological justice.

Moreover, he adds, charity is the virtue appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and just as the Holy Spirit is the unitive power of the Father and the Son, so created

charity is the unitive power of the Mystical Body (25). This reply presumes what has been accepted about the role of the Holy Spirit in producing the interior effects of unity. This role is made explicit in the next reply on the same topic: because the Holy Spirit loves us, the master says, he pours the charisms into us and so love is the way through which that inflow takes place. Thus charity is closer to the Holy Spirit than is theological justice, which therefore must yield to charity as source of the unity (26, 27).

Thus, to summarize, the master sees an important but external role for the Holy Spirit, who is the extrinsic efficient and exemplar cause of the gifts and charisms that in fact produce the unity of the Church. Chief among these are faith and charity; the master never replies to the suggestion that hope should be included. These effect a union among the members that is more than a similarity; it is a unity of proportion related to the goodness and truth of God, each of which is numerically one. This makes charity common to Christ and to the members, so that Christ is a co-member or fellow-member of the Church while still remaining its Head. The unitive force of charity and its link with the Holy Spirit make it, along with faith, the strongest unitive force above other virtues such as justice or other influences such as sacramental grace.

(b) *Should the Mystical Body be said to be the Body of the Holy Spirit more than of Christ?*

If, as has been seen, charity is appropriated to the Holy Spirit and effects the unity of the Mystical Body, the question arises whether the Mystical Body should be called the Body of the Holy Spirit rather than of Christ (28). To answer this question, the master appeals to the conformity of human nature between Christ and his Mystical Body. To meet a possible objection that no conformity of nature existed between Christ and the Mystical Body before the Incarnation (so that the argument against the Holy Spirit would have no force), he says that, while after the Incarnation the conformity of nature was actual, before the Incarnation it already existed potentially. By reason of this conformity, therefore, the Church is said to be Christ's Body rather than the Holy Spirit's (29).

What about glorified souls?, asks an objector. This conformity in the Mystical Body should include the body and they have none. According to this they would not be members of Christ (30). In his reply the master assimilates the state of glorified souls to that of persons who were members of Christ before his actual Incarnation. In both cases the conformity of nature is had potentially if not actually, and therefore glorified souls are members of Christ. By contrast angels are members not of Christ as man but of Christ as God since they have no conformity with Christ, the Head, in human nature (31). This reply seems to reduce the status of glorified souls to that of potential membership in Christ the Head, a membership that will be actualized only at

the resurrection. One would expect the master, on his own principles, to say that they are at least partially actual members by reason of their vision (now shared with Christ) replacing faith and by reason of their charity shared with Christ and the blessed in heaven. In any case, conformity of nature is the key to his solution of problems in this area. With this discussion the question comes to an end.

Question 5 (no. 32): On the Mystical Body (the second question) (Philip the Chancellor?)

This question moves quickly from one topic to another within a fairly loose articulation; this is especially true of the second set of problems discussed.

(a) On the unity of the Mystical Body

The opening arguments ask whether the oneness Christ asked of the Father for his followers was a oneness by a unity of grace or of nature. It could not be a unity of nature because the disciples were already of one specific nature, nor could it be a numerical oneness. On the other hand, if Christ asked for a unity of grace, why did he ask that they should be one 'as we are one'? (1), the oneness of the Father and Son being a oneness by nature and not by grace. The *Gloss* interprets Christ's prayer as requesting that his followers be one in their nature as he and the Father are one in their nature (2): this remark seems to point towards a unity of nature as the object of the prayer.

The master's reply is that Christ asked for the unity of his disciples 'in the clarity of glory and in the conservation of nature'. Two authoritative texts confirm this by comparing the way the faithful will have unending clarity in their mode just as the three persons of the Trinity have unending clarity. The mode of the faithful will be to see clearly what they now know through faith (3). This is the clarity of glory that the master spoke of. When he speaks of conservation of nature, he is thinking of the second argument, which said the object of the prayer is that they may be one in nature: what the oneness in nature means, he says, is that Christ prays that the natures of his followers be preserved lest they be diminished in any way or be wounded through sin, for sin draws one toward non-being, likening the sinner to the devil who, as Job implies, 'is not' (4).

(b) Different questions concerning the Mystical Body

Four questions on three rather divergent topics concerning the Mystical Body are now raised in succession before the master answers any of them. If the unity of the Body of Christ is from faith and charity, as has been shown elsewhere (here is the redactor's reference to our question 4),⁵⁸ everything in it

⁵⁸ See the discussion of this above, p. 7; cf. p. 31.

is spiritual. Why then is it called one Body rather than one Spirit? A body seems to stand in opposition to spirit; also, those who adhere to Christ or to another person through charity become one spirit with Christ or that other person, not one body (5).

A second question is this: since the unity of the Body of Christ is through charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, why are the faithful said to be one Body of Christ rather than one Body of the Spirit? A text of Augustine seems to indicate that one should speak of the Body of the Spirit because this text describes the unity of the society of the Church as pertaining to the Holy Spirit. It does no good, says the proponent of this view, to invoke a conformity of nature between Christ and human persons to support speaking of the Body of Christ because the Church was the Body of Christ even before Christ was born, and at that time there was no conformity of nature between Christ and his Body. If one were to maintain that the Body did not exist then, it could not be said that Christ was Head of Abel (6); this would eliminate the traditional view that the Church began from Abel.

Still another question is posed: what kind of members constitute this Body? It would seem to be only the predestined who possess grace, for just as the body which Christ received from the Virgin was constituted from the most pure members of the Virgin, so the Mystical Body should be constituted from the faithful who are most pure. Those who are reprobated but who possess charity at present are pure; those predestined but who lack charity are purer; those predestined and who have charity are purest (7). Along the same lines, but with an opposite conclusion, it is argued that the Church consists only of those to be glorified and therefore only of the predestined. But if this is so, Judas was never a member of the Church, something that is false because he was among those chosen by Christ (8).

The master now answers these questions in turn. To the query why the one Body of the Church is not called one Spirit of the Church he replies that it is called a Body because, as in a human body, the members serve each other mutually in diverse services and offices; also because, just as a body has three dimensions, so charity in this Body has three dimensions because by it we love what is above us, what is on our level, and what is beneath us; again, because there is a conformity of this Body to the Head in grace and nature. With regard to conformity in grace, the Holy Spirit moves only from outside whereas Christ moves from within.

This solution already answers part of the second question as to why one does not speak of the Body of the Spirit, but the master returns to this question to answer the problem it raised about lack of conformity between Christ and others in the time before his Incarnation. He argues that this conformity was indeed present 'according to the presence of faith even if not according to

presence of reality (*rei*): Augustine, he says, expressly determined this in one of his works (10).

To the third and fourth questions about whether the Church consists only of the predestined or only of those to be glorified (and so only of the predestined), the master replies that the Church consists of members having charity, whether they are predestined or not, because these are the purest. Those lacking infidelity are pure; those lacking other mortal sins are purer; those having charity are purest. He adds that the Church consists only of those to be glorified either because they are worthy of glory or because glory is owed to them, but it does not consist only of those to be glorified in the future (11). Thus he includes in the Church some who may not be glorified in the future because of future sin but who are in a present state of grace or charity by reason of which they would be worthy of glory or would have glory owed to them should they die now or should they persevere in their present condition.

(c) *Is Christ a member and co-member or fellow-member ('commembrum') of the Church?*

The discussion now turns to the question whether Christ is a member of the Church: this is suggested by a text of 1 Corinthians as well as by the *Gloss*, which also calls Christ a co-member or fellow-member (*commembrum*) (12). This is denied because a fellow-member needs a fellow-member whereas Christ needed no one spiritually (13). Moreover, Augustine defines the Church as 'the congregation of the faithful who profess Christ and his sacraments'. But Christ was not one of the faithful because he had no faith (because of his beatific vision). Hence he was not of the Church (14). To say that Christ was faithful by reason of the sacrament of faith, Baptism, is unacceptable because persons like heretics or those in mortal sin have this sacrament of faith and yet are not members of the Church (15). And if Christ is both Head and member of the Church, of what Church is this true? Is it the Church as Body alone under its Head or the Church as embracing both Body and Head? If the former, Christ is not a member; if the latter, he is not Head because a head is outside that of which it is head (16).

In his solution the master takes up this last dilemma at once, saying that Christ is a member of the Church according as the Church contains both Body and Head, but not of the Church as made up only of members: in this latter sense Christ is Head only and not a member of the Church (17). As fellow-member with others, Christ is conformed in nature with them. But if being a fellow-member means equality with them, Christ is not a fellow-member because in that case there would be mutual need of one member in relation to another, and this is not true of Christ (18). In this respect the master agrees with the argument making the point about Christ's lack of spiritual help from others.

Although the definition of the Church as a congregation of faithful refers to the Church as containing only the members under the Head and not the Head, another definition of the Church speaks of it as 'the congregation of those having, through charity, the same consensus of the Incarnate Word'. If the Church is defined in this way, Christ is a member of the Church (19).

In replying to the final argument, which said that a head is not part of that of which it is head, the author expands his answer to an earlier argument: a head not only expresses conformity of nature with members but it can also express preeminence in or toward that nature or, again, preeminence above that nature. If it expresses preeminence in or toward the nature, the head is part of the whole of which it is head; if it expresses preeminence above the nature, the head is then not part of that of which it is head. If 'head' is taken to mean preeminence above the nature, it must be said that Christ was not and is not a member and Head of the Church. But if the Church is taken to mean both Head and members, Christ is a member of the Church; if it is taken as containing only the Body, Christ is Head (20) and not a member.

(d) *Should Christ be called the Heart rather than the Head of the Church?*

Several reasons are given to show that Christ should be called Heart rather than Head of the Church. In the sense just distinguished, Christ is the noblest member of the Church and for that reason is called Head. But it seems he should rather be called Heart because, as Matthew says, from the heart proceed good things as well as bad (21). One presumes that only the first part of the quotation is meant to apply to Christ!

Again, theologians as well as the *Gloss* hold that the soul has its seat in the heart. Hence because of the flow of good things from the heart, Christ should most especially be called the Heart of the Church (22). Also, the heart is located in the middle (position of the body) and since Christ is Mediator, a middle position is attributed to him in everything, as is seen from several passages of scripture (23). Moreover, voluntary acts related to those matters that are its sole concern proceed from the heart (24). Finally, charity is the supreme perfection of a member, and scripture says that God is to be loved with one's whole heart (25). All these seek to give priority to the heart and to love flowing from it as the most proper analogy for Christ in relation to his Body.

The master's determination of this question states that in addition to a conformity of nature and grace, two things are required for the highest nobility of any member, namely, preeminence and fullness. Now these are found in the head and not in the heart, and that is why Christ is called Head rather than Heart. A further requisite can be called superiority (the head being at the upper part of the body). This quality of a head means that Christ is 'middle' without any reference to other persons, for he is not in the middle in such a way as to

have anything human or created above him (26). The heart, being in the middle position, does have the head above it, and the master seems to think that speaking of Christ as Heart could imply something or someone superior to Christ in the Mystical Body.

This statement meets most of the arguments. As for charity being the highest perfection and the command to love with one's whole heart, the master says that the *Gloss* indicates that 'heart' in this text refers to the 'intellect without error', that is, the practical intellect which is located or seated in the head (27) and not in the heart. Hence this text cannot be used for the proof it was intended to make.

(e) *Concerning terms to be especially attributed to God in the members and to Christ by reason of his members*

Two sets of problems concerning predication are raised at this point before the master gives his basic solution. The first is more a problem of predication about God. If God works all our works in us, as Isaiah says, one wonders why some actions such as speaking or asking are especially attributed by scripture to God in us, as when it says that God speaks in us or that the Holy Spirit asks for us, whereas other terms such as running or eating are not attributed to him (in us) (28). It is insufficient to say that interior activities are predicated of God but not exterior or corporeal activities because the *Gloss* says in comment on a text of Matthew that 'God begot his son Isaac from Sarah', and begetting is corporeal and extrinsic (29-30). Should someone say that only those activities are predicated of God for which some special grace, a gift or a miracle, is given us to perform them, this reply would be unacceptable: we do not grant that God believes in us or hopes in us, and yet these are spiritual acts flowing from grace (31).

The master replies to this first set of problems in his main solution, which in the text follows the second set of questions. Only those acts denominate God in the members of the Church that are spiritual either through themselves or because they come from a special grace, either a grace of miracle or of a gift, but this holds of such spiritual acts as do not of themselves express any imperfection. Believing and hoping are not used to denominate God acting in us for this last reason: they express imperfect knowledge and imperfect goodness (39).

The second set of problems asks about various expressions used of Christ by reason of his members. Some texts identify Christians with Christ by reason of his members. Which terms may be so used, the questioner asks? (32) If one were to reply that only those expressions are used of Christ which teach us about him, that would be false because sin does not teach us about Christ and yet, although he is without sin, Paul speaks of him as sin in Romans (33).

Likewise he is called in Galatians 'a curse': this, like sin, teaches us nothing about Christ (34).

Again, how can Augustine say that the Bridegroom is the Bride (*sponsus est sponsa*)? The reason for this cannot be the identity of spiritual perfection in Christ and the Church since Christ is Bridegroom of the Church according to his divinity and not according to his humanity (in which he is Head) (35). If one were to reply that this is said because of the union of natures in Christ, one would also have to grant that the divine nature suffered (36). The author of this argument seems to take the term 'Bridegroom' in a very literal and material sense, as if Christ's being Bridegroom according to his human nature would involve him in concrete physical actions. A strange doctrine of the union in Christ also seems to stand behind these statements.

Another problem is that the *Gloss* says that all the faithful are Christ: how is this true? Another question that is posed is whether any of the faithful would be Christ (37-38).

After his solution to the first set of questions, the master takes up these particular cases of predication concerning Christ by reason of his members. With respect to texts identifying Christ with Christians, he says that those are accepted which show forth his 'philanthropy' and human love for us; these include suffering, being persecuted and the like, and even 'sin' if it is interpreted as 'victim for sin', or 'accursed' if it is explained as a torment (40). On this principle the term 'drunk' used of the apostles in Acts cannot be said of Christ in his disciples except by those who falsely accused the apostles of drunkenness, for this term does not pertain to Christ's 'philanthropy' (41).

In reply to the question how the Bridegroom could be said to be the Bride, the master says it is because of the union of natures in the same person of the Son who is both God and man. He corrects the faulty notion of the union in Christ held by his opponent when he says that one cannot argue from this text to conclude that the divine nature would suffer: the union is an association of the natures in the person of the Son of God (35), an association that would mean the natures remain distinct in such a way that the divinity is not involved in the sufferings of the humanity.

Finally, the master explains how all the faithful may be called 'Christ'. This name may be used of them in so far as it embraces the Head together with his members. Properly, however, none of the faithful is called 'Christ' unless the name refers to (its root meaning of) anointing, and even then it must not refer to a preeminence in anointing (which belongs to Christ alone). The name is used by the psalmist only of the anointing of the faithful when he says: 'Do not touch my anointed ones (*christos meos*).'

The master adds that the name 'Christ' should not be used in the singular (about any of the faithful), but because of the authoritative passage in the psalm,

it may be used in the plural. The case is like that of the name 'God'. We would not grant that any justified Christian is God and yet, because scripture says 'You are gods', we do accept the name 'gods' in the plural for those who are justified. In the case of each name, plural usage makes it clear that they are not being used in their proper and special meaning (43).

Question 6 (no. 52): On the unity of the Church (William of Durham)

As was mentioned in section one, the compiler of the Douai manuscript (hand *m*) attributes this question to 'M. G. de D^x', who is in all probability Master Gulielmus or William of Durham. As was also mentioned, the text we have is clearly a summary or report of a dispute containing several editorial remarks made by the compiler himself.

(a) Does the Church consist only of those who exist at present?

This question is put in terms of a philosophical principle, namely, anything that is put together with non-being does not produce anything that is one. Hence nothing one comes to be from persons who exist now and others who were but now do not exist. And if nothing one comes from these two groups of persons, neither does any whole or totality (*totum*) come to be from them, so that the Church cannot be said to come from them. Therefore the Church consists only of those who exist at present. But the Church existed at the time of the prophets and patriarchs – indeed it began from Abel. Therefore the Church is now other than what it was previously (1).

Opposed to this are two texts, one from the Canticle ('My dove is one') read allegorically of the Church, the other a text from the *Gloss* that maintains that among the many and diverse people in the Church there is a unity of faith, Baptism, God, and work; it adds that this unity is not different before the law, under the law, and under grace (2). But, in line with the opening argument, the statement is then made that the persons are not integral parts of something one, and therefore no totality or whole is produced (3).

Master William's solution begins by examining the philosophical principle. It is true, he says, that from being and non-being nothing one comes to be so long as non-being refers to a pure privation because a pure privation is nothing. But if 'non-being' refers to a particular privation, where being is only partially lacking, it is false, because in this way something whole can come to be from being and non-being. This is the case with the Church or Mystical Body of Christ: it can come to be from the saints who existed and from holy people now in existence. Those who no longer exist in body and soul at least exist according to their more important part, that is, their soul. Thus even today we still ask St. Peter to pray for us. Therefore the integral parts exist, if not wholly, at least as to their more excellent parts, the souls of the dead. To prove this, the master

applied a text of Augustine about Jacob putting forth his hand, a text, the redactor says, that has already been seen in another question below about the same topic (4).

Thus Master William holds that the continuing existence of the souls of the dead means they have some being, indeed the principal part of their being, still in existence. This suffices for them to be integral parts of the whole that is the Church or Mystical Body. The application of the philosophical dictum failed to take account of their continuing being by reason of their souls. The reference made by the redactor to the text of Augustine is to one or both of our questions 1 and 2, in each of which the text is quoted to show that Christ's Headship extends back to the patriarchs and prophets.⁵⁹

(b) *What is the unity of the Church in the order of being?*

Another philosophical approach lies behind the inquiry about where the unity of the Church is located in the order of being (*esse*). One is undivided being, it is said, so that unity is undivided essence. Therefore the unity of the Church is an undivided essence, which means that (in the order of being) it is an essence (5). But against this conclusion stands the opinion that the unity of the Church is a quality, so that it cannot be an essence (6). Master William advises that the first argument contains a fallacy of consequence, the inconsistency of concluding from the higher to the lower (or from the general to the particular), because being (*ens*) is related in common to essence and qualities, whereas essence (*essentia*) is related only to substances (7). The argument had identified being (*ens*) with *essentia* in order to draw its conclusion. William says that being cannot be thus restricted to essence because it includes qualities; the logic of the argument fails. The unity of the Church could be and is undivided being, but being here is taken as a quality and not only as an essence.

What for William is the unity of the Church? He says it is the will to share spiritual good, or the bond of charity of one for another. This unity is found only among the good (8), which is why charity and the will to share spiritual good are part of the definition. Thus William, seeing this unity as a quality, defines it in terms of the quality of loving or willing which unites members of the Church.

(c) *What is the source of the unity of the Church?*

The next question posed was about the source of the unity of the Church. The redactor notes that he has already transcribed a discussion 'post Cancellarium', that is, it seems, he has given the substance of Philip the

⁵⁹ That is, in q. 1, no. 15, and in q. 2, no. 52: it is unclear whether the redactor refers to one or both of these.

Chancellor's examination of this question. Here he says (perhaps to himself, if he was writing this for himself and for later reference) that Philip's treatment should be followed with respect to the present question, but with one addition, namely, an argument saying that the unity of the Church proceeds from faith as well as charity. He suggests a comparison between a baptized adult who has unformed faith, that is, who lacks charity, and an unbaptized adult with charity. The first is united to the Church by faith, the second by charity. Therefore not only charity, but faith unites to the Church (10) and is a source of the unity of the Church. This addition presupposes that someone holds that only charity is a source of unity for the Church. As we have seen, this is the position taken in our question 5 (number 32) and only by it among the questions in the Douai manuscript dealing with this topic.⁶⁰ This has helped us to identify question 5 as Philip the Chancellor's, provided that the interpretation of 'post Cancellarium' is correct.⁶¹

The redactor then includes one point among the many he says were discussed concerning the relation of faith to charity as sources of the unity of the Church. William holds that we must distinguish between God's general care of all things by conserving and administering them and his special care for the human race since it is made up of those who are rational. This care includes God's teaching and instructing them as well as his pouring grace into them; in this way he brings them into union spiritually, which is not the case with beasts who lack reason. William then applies this notion of the general and special to the bonds uniting members of the Church, but only analogously and without seeing a complete correspondence between the original example and its application. Analogous to the generality of God's care by conservation and administration is charity as a general bond uniting us in this life as it will do in heaven, where it already unites the saints who are there, for 'charity never fails', as Paul says. Faith is a special bond of union analogous to the speciality of God's care for rational creatures. Faith unites us in this life but will not do so in heaven because there 'faith and hope will pass away'. Thus, to say that faith unites is true in part and false in part (10). This is a teaching not found in any of the other questions of the Douai collection, at least not in this form; this was undoubtedly the reason why the redactor wished to include it and to add it to the discussions he had already transcribed elsewhere on this subject.

(d) *How does created charity 'contain' the Church?*

This question arises from the text of Wisdom which says that the Holy Spirit, uncreated charity, 'contains all things': this, says the argument, includes his

⁶⁰ See above, pp. 6-8, 35-38.

⁶¹ See above, p. 8.

uniting all things and conserving them in being. In a proportionate manner, it is suggested, created charity, which unites the Church, contains the Church as uncreated charity contains all things. The question, then, is how these two ways of 'containing' differ (11).

William replies that the Holy Spirit contains all things because he governs and rules all, whereas created charity contains the Church because it conserves it in unity through persevering love (12). Thus he focuses on the element of conservation in the being or quality of unity in order to find a likeness between the role of the Holy Spirit and of created charity.

Another question included by the redactor at this point fails to correspond to the topic he has assigned for this fourth discussion. It appears that it should have been placed within the second topic concerning the being of the unity of the Church. The argument is made that things united and things divided are united or divided according to essence, operation, or virtue. Since holy persons are united to constitute one Church, they are united in one of these three ways. But the union cannot be according to essence because they are not one in essence, nor according to operation because there is not one operation for all; nor can it be according to virtue because there is not one virtue for all. Therefore it seems that there is no unity of the Church or that the Church is not one (13). Instead of giving William's reply, the redactor simply says: 'Solve this argument as I have written elsewhere about the same topic' (14). This is a reference to either or both of our questions 3 and 4, the only places where a similar discussion has been given.⁶² The answer of question 3, we recall, was that the unity is fundamentally by grace in the essence and then by way of particular virtues.⁶³ Question 4, with its discussion of proportionate unity, helped solve the problem of there not being one virtue for all.⁶⁴ Thus it may also be alluded to by the present question, for this is also part of the argument the master is opposing. The two questions are so close together in the manuscript that the redactor could easily have both in mind as he makes his reference.

(e) *What is the difference between the 'compaction' of the Church and the 'connection' of the Church?*

The Pauline use of the words 'compacted' and 'connected' concerning the Body of Christ leads to an inquiry as to the difference between the two terms. We shall see that this apparently trivial question yields an important result. According to William, the redactor tells us, 'compaction' is a more general term and 'connection' is a more special one. Compaction is a conjoining essentially

⁶² See above, p. 6.

⁶³ See above, pp. 24-26.

⁶⁴ See above, p. 32.

with nothing intervening (*sine medio*). This is the way that faith conjoins a person and makes that person a part of the Church although not a member of the Church: this is evident in the case of a person who has unformed faith; such a person is a part of the Church because he is in the Church by number but not by merit. Connection, however, is the compaction of those who are united through one medium. Charity is such a connection: it unites in this way (that is, through a medium) and it is comparable to the Holy Spirit, who is said to be the nexus or link between the Father and the Son. Hence charity makes a person a member of the Church and conjoins the person, that is, joins that person with others (15). That faith is a compaction without a medium seems to mean that there is no nexus or link of love between the believer who lacks love and other members of the Church: the example of the Holy Spirit as nexus or link seems to be in his mind when he speaks of a medium. Charity is a kind of compaction with a medium or link, and this is why he calls it a connection: through charity the person is linked to other members of the Church in a way that those with unformed faith are not. There is a slight ambiguity in his use of 'compaction'. At first he defines it as essentially without a medium but then says that 'connection' is a type of 'compaction' for those joined through a medium. He may see a medium as accidental to compaction but essential to connection.

In any case, William, like others, sees charity as the more fundamental source of unity by comparison with faith. His distinction between being a part of the Church through unformed faith without being a member is an interesting one. Like other authors we have seen, he reserves the term 'member' for those having charity, but he does give principles whereby those lacking charity can be understood to be part of the totality or whole that is the one Church. This is the clearest exposition of the point we have seen in all our questions, and it is a valuable contribution to the topic.

Finally, the question is raised whether God, rather than charity, should be said to be the source of the unity of the Church. The argument uses a homely example. A nail joins beams and at the same time causes them to bear other things. Now if there were some material that would bind together the beams and by means of which they would be joined together, that material thing would be called a nail in a more excellent way: what seems to be thought of is something like a strong glue that would not only bind the beams as nails do but also be an intervening substance (a medium) between the beams to join them together by itself. Now, the argument continues, in spiritual conjoining God is the one who joins and who is at the same time a conjoining medium, and therefore he should be called the source of the unity of the Church rather than this being said of charity (16).

The master replies with a scholastic dictum: 'Where one thing is for the sake of another, there is equality in each'. This dictum fits the case of God and

charity: charity conjoins the Mystical Body and is a conjoining medium, and it has this from God who conjoins in a similar way, the two of them being causes working for the same effect. Another answer one might make, he says, is that charity conjoins the Church formally (that is, from within), while God does it effectively (17) (as efficient cause externally producing the internal form of charity).

(f) *Does the sacrament unite the Church, and in what way?*

The manuscript contains only the beginning of this discussion, which asks whether the sacrament unites the Church and, if it does, how it does so. It also gives the title of a debate about the different roles of the sacrament and charity in uniting (18). At this point the redactor leaves the remaining few lines of the manuscript blank. Perhaps, recalling the short discussion of sacramental grace as a source of union contained in our question 4, the redactor thought it superfluous to repeat this discussion.⁶⁵ Perhaps he did not have enough space in the manuscript to complete the question. Or it may simply be that Master William himself broke off the debate after announcing the topic but without discussing it.

Summary and Conclusion

A brief overview of the six questions will show the main points of convergence and of contrast or even disagreement. Within all these questions the terms 'Mystical Body', 'Church', 'Body of Christ', and 'Body of the Church' seem to be pretty well equivalent to one another. Two authors, however, distinguish between the Mystical Body as Body alone (in which sense Christ is not a member of the Mystical Body) and the Mystical Body as including Head and members (in which sense Christ is a co-member or fellow-member with others, although still a member by being Head (qq. 4 and 5). Four definitions of the Church are met, each of which speaks of it as a *congregatio*: a congregation of the faithful who *believe* in Christ and his sacraments (q. 4) or who *profess* Christ and his sacraments (q. 5); a congregation of the faithful who *know* Christ and his sacraments (q. 4); a congregation of those having, through charity, the same consensus (agreement in sense) of the Incarnate Word (q. 5). According to the first two definitions, Christ, who did not live by faith but by vision, would not be a member of the Church; according to the third and fourth, he would be such a member (qq. 4 and 5).

⁶⁵ See above, pp. 31-32.

'Mystical *Body*' is used rather than 'Mystical *Spirit*' because love in the Church has a threefold dimension corresponding to the threefold dimension of the human body (q. 5). Christ is called Head of the Church rather than Heart of the Church because first movements in the human body come from the head (as first spiritual movements come from Christ to his members) (q. 3), or because the head signifies preeminence and fullness as well as superiority of position (all found spiritually in Christ) (q. 5). Terms predicated of Christ by reason of his members should be only those that show forth his 'philanthropy' and human love for us (q. 5). Members of Christ may be called 'Christs' (they are anointed, and 'Christ' means 'anointed') but the term should be used of them only in the plural and should be understood as improper by comparison with its use for Christ, the Head of the Body (q. 5).

Christ rather than the Holy Spirit is Head because he shares human nature or is conformed in human nature with the members, whereas the Holy Spirit is not (qq. 1-5). In this sense Christ is a conjoined principle of spiritual goods, of whose fullness we have all received, but the Holy Spirit is a separated principle of these goods (q. 2), an external mover by contrast with Christ, who moves internally, for the Holy Spirit is an efficient or exemplar cause, a remote cause external to the members in whom he causes graces (q. 5). The Holy Spirit, says question 1, gives spiritual *movements* whereas Christ gives spiritual *senses*. Applying its own original and novel opinion about grace, question 3 says that the Holy Spirit draws persons into the primary union of grace and then invigorates that grace so that virtues consequent upon it flow forth from it.

By reason of the union of Head and members, does Christ, like a head in a human body, receive anything from his members? He receives no spiritual help, replies question 5; the analogy of human members helping the head fails here, so that one cannot argue from it to say Christ receives anything from his members (q. 1). But he does get something from his members by being born from among his members (q. 2).

What is the source of the unity of the Church? The Church's unity comes from faith in the cognitive aspect and charity in the motive aspect and not from justice or sacramental grace (q. 4). In all the questions there is generally at most only a passing mention of the sacraments of Baptism or the Eucharist. The faith and charity existing in individual members are nevertheless one by more than similarity: they are one by a unity of proportionality (a unity by analogy) because each virtue of faith and of charity is ordered to the one object of faith and charity, God, and this proportioning to something one in itself makes them all one (q. 4). The unity of the Church, consisting in faith and love, is in the category of quality rather than essence; charity is the medium of unity working from within and containing the Church by conserving it in unity in a way that is somewhat like the Holy Spirit's containing all things (q. 5).

Question 3, however, is not satisfied with faith and charity as sources of union or unity. From the Holy Spirit comes a primary grace, a grace primary in the order of being, which achieves unity in *esse*; consequent upon this and in the order of activity are the other unities coming from faith, charity, the sacraments, and peace. This first unity is prior even to incorporation, for the latter takes place by acting, by willing. This primary unity or oneness is a oneness of nature with the Word Incarnate (whereby the theme of conformity of nature is found again). For its part, question 5 says that the unity of the Church is a unity of glory and of conservation of nature from the non-being of sin.

Christ was Head of those who went before him because they were potentially if not actually conformed in nature with him; this is also true of the souls in purgatory (q. 4); this conformity is one by faith (q. 5). The dead by reason of the being of their souls can be integral parts of the Mystical Body, so that a philosophical dictum about non-being does not apply to the union between those who are dead and those who are now alive (q. 6). Christ is first in dignity with respect to those who existed before him; in the order of time, he is first in their faith (q. 2). The Church or Mystical Body is said to have begun from Abel rather than from Adam because Adam shared sin as well as grace, which does not befit the Church (q. 1); Abel, who died before Adam, was the first to live in expectation of Christ's salvation in a mode (Purgatory) that could never be lost by sin so that membership in Christ was permanent (q. 2).

Finally, who are members of the Church? All the questions except the fourth raise this question and all reply in one way or another that only those with charity are, strictly speaking, members of the Church. Those who are now evil but who are predestined and who are to be glorified can be called 'members in predestination' but not members strictly speaking (q. 2), or they can be called members 'according to the being of predestination' only (q. 3). On the other hand, those who are not predestined or who will not be glorified are, if they have charity, members so long as they retain charity (q. 5). Baptism does not suffice for membership because mortal sinners and heretics have been baptized but are not members (q. 5). Finally, an important point made in question 6 is that those with faith but without charity are part of the Church although not members of the Church; they are in the Church numerically but not by merit.

These questions give an interesting panorama of the discussions that took place in the late 1220s and 1230s with respect to the Church or Mystical Body and Christ's relation to the Church. If one compares these discussions with the text of William of Auxerre's influential *Summa aurea*, one sees a similarity of topics to some degree and in some places a similarity or identity of doctrine, but one also notes in our questions a new probing and new directions of inquiry

and response.⁶⁶ In particular, some of the questions introduce elements of Aristotelian and other philosophies of the one or of unity, and one of them applies the doctrine of analogy of proportionality to the problem of unity amid the diverse virtues of faith and charity in the individual members. The clarification of who are members of the Church is still a difficult topic at this time, but William of Durham makes one interesting contribution. Although these questions, found only in reports, leave much to be desired, one sees that they are preparing the way for the more sophisticated discussions of the same topics that would take place in the next few decades among the compilers of the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* (likely John of La Rochelle at this point of the *Summa*) as well as in the works of Odo Rigaldus, Albert, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas.

III. EDITION OF THE TEXTS

In the edition that follows the same principles have been used as in the previous articles in this series. 'ms.' always refers to the hand of the original scribe.

In the references the following abbreviations will be used:

Alexander, *Glossa* (seu *Glossa Alex*) = *Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 4 voll. (Quaracchi, 1951-57).

apud Lyranum = *Biblia sacra cum glossa ordinaria et glossa interlineari ... et postilla Nicolai Lyrani*, 7 voll. (1, 3, 6: Paris, 1590; 2: Venice, 1603; 4, 5: Lyons, 1545; 7: Lyons, 1590).

Glossa Alex: vide Alexander, *Glossa* (supra).

Glossa Lombardi = Petrus Lombardus, *Commentarius in psalmos davidicos*, in PL 191.55A-1295B, et *Collectanea in omnes d. Pauli Apostoli epistolas*, in PL 191.1297A-1696C et PL 192.10B-520A.

Glossa ord. = *Glossa ordinaria*, in PL 113.67B-1315C et 114.9A-752B, et apud Lyranum (q.v.).

⁶⁶ William's treatment is found in book 3, tract 1, chapter 4, on fols. 115vb-116vb of the Pigouchet edition (Paris, 1500). It begins with the following outline of topics: 'Dicto de illa dignitate praedestinationis Filii Dei propter quam non fuit decimatus in lumbis Abrahae, dicendum est de illa dignitate secundum quam ipse est caput Ecclesiae. Et primo quaeritur quare Ecclesia dicitur incepisse a membro illo quod est Abel; secundo, quomodo et secundum quam naturam Christus sit caput Ecclesiae; tertio, quomodo Christus fuit caput Abel; quarto, quare potius dicitur Christus caput quam cor; quinto, quae membra habuit Christus in sui constitutione et quae non; sexto, utrum Christus sit membrum Ecclesiae; septimo, quomodo Christus dicitur habere delicias in hominibus; octavo et ultimo, de unitate corporis et capitis' (Pigouchet, fol. 115vb; London, British Library ms. Royal 8.G.iv, fol. 164rb).

One can see the similarity between his treatise and many of the topics treated in our questions. Lack of space prevents a detailed comparison, which would show many similarities but also many innovations or differences in our questions.

< Quaestio 1 >

Idem [G.], de Christo capite

1 < 98va > Quaeritur utrum esse caput conveniat Christo ratione In-
carnationis, sicut esse templum, mediator, fundamentum, ostium, sacerdos,
5 pastor, redemptor, via, salvator, et utrum secundum utramque naturam, et si
secundum humanam, utrum ratione sensus spiritualis infusi supra membra vel
ratione motus infusi supra membra, ut patet in capite et in membris
materialibus, et utrum sit caput bonorum et malorum, et utrum bonorum
< tam > per praedestinationem quam per praesentem iustitiam, et utrum
10 bonorum existentium ante Incarnationem et post, et si omnium, quaestio est
quare dicitur Ecclesia incepisse ab Abel et non ab Adam.

2 Ad primum dicebat sicut dicit *Glossa*, Eph 1: *Omnem Ecclesiam* etc.:
'Caput dedit in quo sunt omnes spirituales sensus Ecclesiae, scilicet dona
< 98vb > gratiae.' Et ita videtur quod vita gratiae sit ab ipso capite per
15 spirituales sensus.

3 Item, quod < non > conveniat secundum eandem rationem esse caput
Patri et Spiritui Sancto secundum quam Filio patet: dicit enim sic auctoritas:
'Caput Christi Pater, quia ab ipso est genitus. Una ergo dictio diversam habet
intelligentiam quia aliter dicitur caput Christus viri et aliter vir mulieris et Deus
20 caput Christi.'

4 Solutio: Pater dicitur caput Christi secundum quod Filius eius per
generationem, et Trinitas dicitur caput Christi secundum quod homo factus per
creationem ad imaginem, et Christus secundum quod homo est caput aliorum
hominum secundum medium communicans in natura eadem cum illis quorum
25 est caput.

5 Dicendum etiam quod quaedam conveniunt Filio ratione Incarnationis,
ut esse templum etc. divinae naturae ipse Christus; deinde dicitur esse caput
omnium membrorum nomine (vel numine), sed proprie nomine *mediator*
dicitur *Dei et hominum* in duabus naturis existens. Et si quaeritur quare Filio

4 mediator: mediatorem ms.

24 secundum: *fort.* scilicet *legendum est.*

3-11 Quaeritur ... Adam: Cf. *Glossam Alex* 3.19.41 (Redactio L) (p. 220.1-23).

12-15 Ad ... sensus: Cf. *ibid.*, I (p. 220.24-33).

13-14 Caput ... gratiae: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Eph 1:22 (PL 192.178D).

16-20 Item ... Christi: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, II.a-b (p. 221.1-12).

18-20 Caput ... Christi: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 11:3 (PL 191.1629B).

21-25 Solutio ... caput: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, II.b (p. 221.12-21).

26-32 Dicendum ... pacificavit: Cf. *ibid.*, III.a (p. 221.22-32).

30 convenit esse mediatorem, dicendum quod Filius est media persona et ita medium in personis. Unde ei bene convenit mediare naturas, quia inter Deum et hominem erat quaedam discordia quam per suam mediationem pacificavit.

6 Dicitur autem fundamentum, id est, in fide, et ostium in Ecclesia militante et triumphante, sacerdos in conferendo sacramenta Ecclesiae, pastor
35 per pabulum vitae quod consistit in verbo doctrinae, redemptor in liberando a poena peccati, via gratiam conferendo, salvator gloriam.

7 Quod autem sit via dicit Augustinus, *De doctrina christiana*: “‘Per me’ viam ‘venitur, ad me’ veritate < m > ‘pervenitur; in me’ vita ‘permanetur’.” Unde ‘facta est tota pro salute nostra per divinam providentiam dispensatio
40 temporalis qua debemus uti non quasi mansoria dilectione sed transitoria potius tamquam viae tamquam vehiculorum vel aliorum huiusmodi instrumentorum.’

8 Item, super illud: *Ego sum Cephae*, Cor, *Glossa*: ‘Christus est ostium et pastor intrando per se; quod vero sit pastor dedit aliis, ostium vero non’, ut habetur in psalmo super illud: *Attollite portas* etc.

45 9 Item, quod Christus sit caput ratione motus superinfusi super membra videtur super illud Eph: *Unum corpus*. Et quod illud sit Spiritus Sancti videtur ex *Glossa* quae dicit: ‘Ad Spiritum pertinet societas qua efficimur unum corpus unici Filii Dei; sicut anima vegetat membra, ita Spiritus corpus Ecclesiae continet et vegetat.’

50 10 Praeterea, cum Spiritus Sanctus distribuat dona in Ecclesia, potius debet dici caput Ecclesiae quam Filius.

36 gloriam: gratiam ms. 39 dispensatio: dispensationis ms. 40 potius: *Aug.*, potentia ms. 41 tamquam²: *Aug.*, tantam ms. vehiculorum: *Aug.*, vehiculat ms.
43 dedit *bis exh.* ms. 45 *post* superinfusi *add.* videtur *et del.* ms. 50 potius: *post* ms.

33-36 Dicitur ... gloriam: Cf. *ibid.* (pp. 221.32-222.3).

37-41 Quod ... instrumentorum: Cf. *ibid.*, III.b (p. 222.10-16).

37-38 Per me ... permanetur: Cf. Augustinum, *De doc. christ.* 1.34.38 (CCL 32.28; PL 34.33).

39-41 facta ... instrumentorum: Cf. *ibid.* 1.35.39 (CCL 32.29; PL 34.34).

42-44 Item ... etc.: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, III.c (p. 222.20-24).

42-43 Christus ... non: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 1:12 (PL 191.1537C-D).

43-44 ut ... etc.: Textus *Glossae Alex* amplius dicit: ‘Sed tamen convenit aliis esse “portas”, ut in Psalmo: *Attollite portas*, id est praedicatores, ut dicit *Glossa*’ (*ibid.*, III.c [p. 222]). Ut notant editores (*ibid.*, n. 6), ‘Non invenitur in *Glossis* editis ap. Lyranum’, nec invenimus in *Glossa Lombardi* in Ps 23:7 et 9, vel *ibid.*, in Ps 86:1-2, sed in Augustino, *Enarr. in Ps* 86. 4 (v. 1-2) (CCL 39.1201; PL 37.1103): ‘Quare sunt fundamenta apostoli et prophetae? Quia eorum auctoritas portat infirmitatem nostram. Quare sunt portae? Quia per ipsos intramus ad regnum Dei; praedicant enim nobis. Et cum per ipsos intramus, per Christum intramus: ipse est enim ianua. Et dicuntur duodecim portae Ierusalem, et una porta Christus, et duodecim portae Christus...’

45-49 Item ... vegetat: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, V.b (p. 223.11-16).

46 Unum corpus: Eph 4:4.

47-49 Ad ... vegetat: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Eph 4:4 (PL 192.197A).

50-51 Praeterea ... Filius: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, V.b (p. 223.9-10).

11 Solutio: Christo attribuitur sapientia in quantum Filius Dei; Spiritui Sancto dicitur attribui bonitas. Sed ex parte sapientiae effluit cognitio et ex parte bonitatis motus. Ideo a Spiritu Sancto effluunt motus spirituales, et a Christo
55 Filio Dei sensus spirituales.

12 Item, quaeritur an omnium bonorum sit caput. Super illud Eph 4: *Unum corpus*, *Glossa*: 'Sicut humani corporis membrum praecisum formam qua cognoscitur retinet, sed nequaquam spiritus sequitur quo praeter unitatem vivat, sic quicumque a praedictae pacis unitate divisus fuerit sacramentum
60 tamquam formam retinet, sed Spiritu praeter unitatem non vivit.'

13 Item, utrum sit tantum caput praedestinatorum, super Col 1: *Ipsa est caput*, *Glossa*: 'Virtute divinitatis et suae misericordiae dono omnes iustos illuminavit', et ita est caput secundum divinitatem, et etiam secundum humanitatem.

65 14 Item, prius debet formari caput quam membrum. Ergo Christus non fuit caput eorum qui praecesserunt Incarnationem.

15 Contra, Augustinus in libro *De catechizandis rudibus*: 'Sicut Jacob, priusquam nasceretur, misit manum ex utero qua pedem praenascentis teneret, deinde utique secutum est caput, deinceps cetera membra, sed caput tam cum
70 hac quam cum illa dignitate praecessit licet tempore subsequeretur, sic Christus, *Mediator Dei et hominum*, antequam appareret in carne, praemisit in prophetis et patriarchis manum suam.'

16 Item, *Glossa*, Col 1: 'Universo populo omnium sanctorum tamquam uni corpori caput est homo Christus, quos omnes ab Abel usque ad ultimum iustum
75 sapientia Dei illuminat quae plenius fuit in Christo', et ita videtur quod Adam non fuerit de corpore Christi.

17 Contra: Adam fuit primus credens.

18 Sed dicendum quod Adam fuit particeps peccati et gratiae sed Abel

58 spiritus: *Glossa*, specie (?) MS.

59 vivat: vivit MS.

67 Contra: Item MS.

52-55 Solutio ... spirituales: Cf. *ibid.*, V.c (p. 224.22-28).

56-60 Item ... vivit: Cf. *ibid.*, VI (p. 224.3-8).

57-60 Sicut ... vivit: *Glossa Lombardi* in Eph 4:4 (PL 192.197A-B).

61-64 Item ... humanitatem: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, VII (p. 224.9-13).

62-63 Virtute ... illuminavit: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Col 1:18 (PL 192.264C).

65-66 Item ... Incarnationem: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, VIII.a (p. 224.19-25).

67-72 Contra ... suam: Cf. *ibid.*, VIII.b (p. 224.25-33).

67-72 Sicut ... suam: Cf. Augustinum, *De catech. rudibus* 3.6 (CCL 46.125; PL 40.313-14).

Cf. *infra*, q. 2, num. 52, et q. 6, num. 4.

73-76 Item ... Christi: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, IX (p. 225.10-15).

73-75 Universo ... Christo: *Glossa Lombardi* in Col 1:18 (PL 192.264A).

77-80 Contra ... Adam: Cf. *Glossam Alex*, *ibid.*, IX (p. 225.15-20).

80 gratiae, non peccati, et ideo potius ab Abel dicitur Ecclesia incepisse quam ab Adam.

19 Item, cum unum membrum confert aliquid capiti et aliis membris, quid conferimus nos Christo?

20 Solutio: Membra materialia conferunt aliquid capiti materiali, non sic in capite spirituali, et hoc est gratiâ materiae.

79 ideo *corr. ex Deo ms.* potius: *post ms.*

81-84 Item ... materiae: Cf. *ibid.*, X (p. 225.21-31).

< Quaestio 2 >

< De Christo via, mediatore, et capite >

(a) < De Christo via >

(i) < Utrum Christus fuerit via ab aeterno an inceperit esse via >

1 < 90ra > Quaeritur utrum Christus fuerit ab aeterno an inceperit esse via, et probatur multipliciter quod ab aeterno non est via.

5 2 Primo sic: Super psalmum: *Qui regis Israel*, in versu (secundum aliam litteram) *viam fecisti in conspectu eius*, *Glossa*: 'Id est, Christum.' Ego Christus factus est via. Ergo ab aeterno non est via.

3 Item, Christus incepit esse homo. Sed Christus secundum quod homo est via. Ergo incepit esse via. Ergo ab aeterno non est via.

10 4 Ad illud, *Glossa* super Gal 3: *Mediator unius non est*, ubi dicitur: 'Ut esset nobis via qua veniremus ad Deum, accedit homo ad Deum.' Sed ille accessus non fuit ab aeterno. Ergo nec ipse fuit via ab aeterno.

5 Hoc concesso, contra: Super illud Psalmi: *Deduc me in via aeterna*, *Glossa*: 'Via quae est Christus.' Ergo Christus est via aeterna. Ergo ab aeterno
15 est via.

5-6 Qui ... eius: Ps 79:2: *Dux itineris fuisti in conspectu eius* (ed. Vulg.). Pro 'alia littera' vide notam sequentem.

6 Id est, Christum: *Glossa Lombardi* in Ps 79:10 (PL 191.762B): 'Vel secundum aliam litteram, et dirigitur sermo ad Deum Patrem: *viam fecisti in conspectu eius*, id est Christum visibilem ei misisti, qui dicit: *Ego sum via, veritas et vita*.'

10 Mediator ... est: Gal 3:20.

10-11 Ut ... Deum²: *Glossa Lombardi* in Gal 3:20 (PL 192.130B).

13 Deduc ... aeterna: Ps 138:24.

14 Via ... Christus¹: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Ps 138:24 (PL 191.1222C). Cf. Augustinum, *Enarr. in Ps 138.30* (in v. 24) (CCL 40.2011; PL 37.1802).

6 Forte dicet quod haec est falsa; 'Christus est via aeterna sive via ab aeterno', sicut haec: 'Christus est puer ab aeterno.' Sed haec conceditur: 'Iste puer ab aeterno est Deus', et haec similiter est concedenda: 'Haec via aeterna est Deus.' Sed hoc dicto, non cessat praedicta obiectio quia si haec est vera: 'Via
20 aeterna est Deus' et aeternum quod caret initio, tunc ista erit falsa: 'Via aeterna est Deus', vel: 'Christus non incepit esse via.'

7 Solutio: Christus incepit esse via.

8 Quod obicitur in contrarium [5-6] dicendum quod in Psalmo *Deduc me in via aeterna*, 'via' supponit pro persona Christi, et cum dicit *Glossa*: 'quae est
25 Christus', li quae refert personam suppositam per hunc terminum 'via', et praeter personam quam supponit, iste terminus 'via' connotat aliquid creatum. Unde ratione connotati conceditur haec: 'Christus incepit esse via', et huiusmodi terminos qui connotant aliquid creatum refert an ponantur ex parte
30 praedicati an ex parte subiecti. Haec enim est vera: 'Iste puer est ab aeterno', quia sic fit determinatio respectu personae suppositae; haec autem falsa: 'Iste est puer ab aeterno', quia si < c > fit determinatio respectu accidentis.

(ii) < Qui sunt termini viae quae est Christus >

9 Item, obicitur: Via duplicem habet terminum. Ergo, cum Christus sit via, huius viae duplex erit terminus. Sed huius viae terminus est Deus. Ergo
35 Christus in quantum Deus non est via, et hoc videtur per glossam Gal supra positam. Sic in quantum hoc non est via. Quod probo quia de ipso homine ad Deum ducimur, et ita homo est terminus initialis huius viae, Deus vero finalis.

10 Solutio: Christus est via in quantum homo, non in quantum Deus. Sed in quos terminos fuerit via? Dico quod inter miseriam et beatitudinem ut a
40 miseria per Christum-hominem-viam transitus esset ad beatitudinem. Sane autem est intelligendum Christum esse viam in quantum hominem, ut sit sensus: Christus in quantum homo est via, id est, secundum actus quos exhibuit in humanitate: via enim fuit doctrina, exemplo, merito, sacramento. Via formaliter fuit doctrina et exemplo, effective vero merito et sacramento, unde
45 Heb 10: *Habemus itaque fratres fiduciam in introitu sanctorum in sanguine Christi, quam initiavit nobis viam novam et viventem per velamen, id est, carnem suam*. Unde illud sacramentum viaticum dicitur. Factus est ergo Christus via formaliter et effective inter duos terminos, ut dictum est, miseriam scilicet et beatitudinem: Christus enim miser fuit miseria poenae, non culpae, et

46 viam s.s. MS.

47 viaticum: viaticus MS.

45-47 Habemus ... suam: Heb 10:19-20.

50 beatus. Unde Gregorius in *Moralibus*: 'Nos, quia decideramus per peccatum primi parentis in duplicem miseriam, occurrit Filius Dei ad poenae miseriam.'

11 Ad glossam Gal [4] dicendum quod oportuit quod Christus haberet auctoritatem ut disponderet ad eundem ad Deum, et ideo 'accessit homo ad Deum' ut esset nobis via qua veniremus ad Deum.

55 (iii) < *Utrum Christus modo sit via* >

12 Item, quaeritur utrum modo sit via. Videtur quod sic, quia super illud Heb 10: *Initiavit* etc., *Glossa*: 'Id est, permanentem et perviam quia postea nulli fidelium clausa fuit.'

13 Contra: Augustinus super Joan 12: *Nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me*, 60 dicit: 'Tam sibi quam aliis factus est via per oboedientiam, id est, per usum oboedientiae.' Ergo cum modo non sit in ipso usus oboedientiae, modo Christus non est via.

14 Si dicat quod Christus modo est via in fide et scriptura – credimus enim ea quae docuit et fecit – eadem ratione potest dici quod ante Incarnationem fuit 65 via. Et hoc videtur, quia super Psalmum: *Voce mea ad Dominum clamavi*, ibi: *In via qua ambulabam absconderunt suum laqueum mihi*, dicit *Glossa*: 'In via quae est Christus.'

15 Solutio: Christus fuit ante Incarnationem via quodammodo, modo similiter est via sed alio modo. Proprie quidem et simpliciter via fuit dum homo 70 corruptibilis et mortalis exstitit et, passus pro nobis, ianuam caeli aperuit: via enim dupliciter sumitur: quandoque enim dicitur spatium transeundi, quandoque motus euntis et hic motus duplex, scilicet vel motus merendi vel motus transeundi de miseria ad felicitatem. In quantum dicitur motus euntis quoad meritum, fuit ante Incarnationem, sed prout dicitur motus transeundi de 75 miseria ad felicitatem, non fuit ante Incarnationem. Sed ille transitus fuit per ipsius passionem qui nobis ianuam paradisi aperuit.

16 Quidam vero dicunt quod ante Incarnationem Filius Dei fuit via animae quia tunc boni habebant iter ad Deum, id est, ius eundi ad ipsum, sed non

50 quia s.s. MS. 69 sed s.s. MS.

50-51 Nos ... miseriam²: Non est detectum. Doctrina similis invenitur apud Gregorium, *Moralia in Job* 24.2.3 (PL 76.287D-288A), et 13.30.34-13.31.35 (CCL 143A.687-88; PL 75.1032C-1033A).

57 Initiavit: Heb 10:20. Cf. supra, l. 46.

57-58 Id ... fuit: *Glossa Lombardi* in Heb 10:20 (PL 192.483C).

59 Nemo ... me: Joan 14:6.

60-61 Tam ... oboedientiae¹: Non invenitur in loco citato ab auctore nec deteximus alibi.

66 In¹ ... mihi: Ps 141:4 (In via *hac* qua etc.).

66-67 In² ... Christus: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Ps 141:4 (PL 191.1244C): 'Christus enim est via, qui non sinit eos laqueum ponere in via.' Cf. Augustinum, *Enarr. in Ps* 141.9 (CCL 40.2052; PL 37.1838-39).

actum, id est, ius agendi sive ducendi iumentum suum, id est, corpus suum
80 secum. Unde cum via contineat et actum et < 90rb > iter, tunc non habebant
viam, sed quia post Incarnationem habuerunt utrumque, tunc proprie viam
habuerunt et tunc fuit via toti homini, scilicet in corpore et anima, eundi ad
Deum, scilicet tempore determinato post diem iudicii.

17 Ad id quod dicit Augustinus *Super Joan* [13], dicendum quod loquitur
85 de via quoad potissimum eius effectum, scilicet passionis Christi, in quo fuit
viae consummatio, et ille effectus fuit apertio ianuae, in quo manet adhuc
oboedientia non in usu sed in fide: credimus enim Christum Patri in omnibus
oboedisse.

18 Sed potest quaeri utrum dicatur Christus via differenter et mandata eius,
90 et dico quod sic, nam, ut innuit Augustinus in libro *Soliloquorum*, una est via
universalis quae est Christus, aliae sunt particulares viae, ut mandata Christi.
Unde in Psalmo: *Vias tuas, Domine, demonstra mihi*, id est, mandata quae sunt
via materialiter, et de hac via dicitur quod permanens est.

19 Ad glossam: *In via qua ambulabam* etc., 'id est, in Christo' [14], dic 'in
95 Christo', id est, in fide Christi, vel quia tunc erat via quantum ad motum euntis
quoad meritum. Per hanc viae distinctionem solvuntur multa quae contra hoc
possint quaeri.

(b) < *Quomodo Christus sit mediator noster* >

20 Secundo quaeritur quomodo sit mediator noster: quod enim sit mediator
100 patet quia 'accessit homo ad Deum et sic factus est mediator', ut dictum est
supra in glossa Gal 3 [4].

21 Praeterea, medium est quod communicat naturam extremorum, et hoc
facit Christus quia Deus est et homo. Ergo vere Christus medium est sive
mediator, quod verum est.

22 Sed attende quod dicitur: Est mediatio quaedam substantialis, et haec est
105 naturarum, alia accidentalis, quae est proprietatum seu qualitatum. Quoad
utramque fuit mediator Christus: in ipso enim fuit mediatio substantialis quia
fuit homo et Deus, et mediatio accidentalis, ut dicit Augustinus: 'Mortalis erat
cum hominibus et iustus cum Deo.' De mediatione substantiali dicit Gregorius
110 *In Ezech* quod electrum significat Christum: est enim mixtum ex auro et

79 ducendi s.s. MS.

90-91 una ... Christi: Non est detectum in opere citato.

92 Vias ... mihi: Ps 24:4.

108-109 Mortalis .. Deo: Non est detectum.

110-112 electrum ... argentum: Cf. Gregorium, *Homiliae in Hiezech.* 1.2.14 (CCL 142.25;
PL 76.801C-D): 'Quid electri species, nisi Christus Iesus Mediator Dei et hominum designatur?
Electrum quippe ex auro et argento est.' Cf. *ibid.* 1.8.25 (CCL 142.115-16; PL 76.865B-C).

argento. Sic Christus ex duplici natura, scilicet ex divinitate, quae per aurum, et humanitate, quae per argentum.

23 Item, in Christo fuit mediatio efficaciae quoad reconciliationem, et secundum hanc loquitur Augustinus, Gal 3, quod non est unius mediator sed
 115 duorum, scilicet hominis et Dei. Unde super Job 19: *Non est qui utrumque valeat arguere et ponere manum in ambobus*, ibi Gregorius: 'Videns Job quam perverse fecit homo, quam iratus fuerit Deus, optat neutrum mediatorem qui hominem arguit ne delinqueret et patiendo restituit Deo ne periret.' His visis, patet quod Christus secundum quod homo fuit mediator mediatione accidentali,
 120 non mediatione substantiali, et secundum quod homo mediator fuit opere, id est, secundum actus exhibitos in humanitate. Accidentalis mediatio desiit esse, sed manet substantialis et reconciliationis: adhuc enim Christus sicut mediator bonus et fidelis advocatus nos Deo reconciliat.

24 Sed adhuc obicitur: Inter quos fuit mediator? Non inter Deum et
 125 hominem quod in Deum nulla cadit offensa erga hominem in quantum est homo sed in quantum est peccator. Fuit ergo mediator inter peccatorem et Deum. – Si hoc, contra: Christus non communicat cum peccatore in eo quod peccator: *Qui peccatum non fecit* etc., 1 Pt 2.

25 Solutio: Christus fuit mediator inter Deum et hominem miserum
 130 miseria duplici, scilicet poenae et culpa, et Christus voluntarie poenam assumpsit ut, satisfaciens pro peccato primi parentis, humanum genus Deo reconciliaret, et quod dicit: 'Non communicavit cum peccatore' [24] verum est, sed communicavit cum homine peccatore in quantum peccator est homo, et fuit mediator mediatione substantiali inter Deum et hominem qui erat peccator quia
 135 reconciliavit eum Deo. Nec propter hoc fuit necesse quod communicaret naturam utriusque extremi.

26 Sed obicitur: Reconciliavit nos in quantum Deus, quoniam in ipso fuerunt pacificata *quae in caelis sunt et quae in terra*, Eph 1. Si ergo fuit reconciliator in quantum Deus, fuit in quantum Deus mediator.

140 27 Sed dic quod Deus fuit reconciliator auctoritate, Christus vero in quantum homo fuit reconciliator sicut advocatus humani generis et solutor debiti: pro nobis enim emendam Patri exhibuit. Oportuit ergo quod esset minor ad hoc quod per modum allegationis impetraret a Patre reconciliationem. Unde

118 restituit: restitit ms. periret: feriret ms. 133 *post quantum add. erat et del.* ms.

114-115 non ... Dei: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Gal 3:20 (PL 192.129B); ex Augustino, *Enarr. in Ps* 90.2.1 (CCL 39.1266; PL 37.1159-60).

115-116 Non ... ambobus: Job 9:33.

116-118 Videns ... periret: Cf. *Moralia in Job* 9.38.61 (in Job 9:33) (CCL 143.500-501; PL 75.893C-894A).

128 Qui ... fecit: 1 Pt 2:22.

138 quae¹ ... terra: Eph 1:10.

145 Sap 18: *Per incensum deprecationem allegans restitit irae et finem imposuit necessitati*. Dicitur ergo Deus reconciliator per auctoritatem, sicut *Spiritus sanctus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus*, Rom 8.

28 Sed iterum obicitur: *Mediator unius non est* nec qui habet unam tantum naturam mediator est. Ergo neque Christus in quantum Deus mediator est neque in quantum homo quia Deus unius naturae est et homo similiter.

150 29 Si forte dicat quod una est natura divina secundum numerum sed non est una natura hominis in pluribus hominibus vel individualiter sed secundum speciem, ideo Christus mediator est in quantum homo licet non in quantum Deus, contra: Hoc non exigitur ad hoc quod sit mediatio: poterat enim esse mediator inter Deum et unum hominem in quo esset humana natura
155 individualiter. Sed dic quod Christus secundum actus exhibitos in humanitate fuit mediator et fuit universalis mediator, id est, totius humanae naturae, et hoc intendit Apostolus probare, Rom 6: *Sicut per inoboedientiam unius hominis etc.*

30 Praeterea, Filius Dei incarnatus est ut restitueret naturam, non personam. Unde natura divina unita fuit naturae, non personae, non in isto
160 homine tantum vel in illo sed quantum ad omnes ut pro eis steterit.

31 Item, quare dicitur Christus fuisse mediator noster, et non Spiritus Sanctus?

32 Respondeo quia operando et merendo pro nobis, quod non fecit Spiritus Sanctus, sed est retributor noster.

165 33 Praeterea, decuit ut qui medius erat secundum distinctionem personalem medius esset secundum distinctionem naturarum.

34 Praeterea, Job 9: *Non est qui utrumque possit arguere etc.*, ibi Gregorius: *‘Exhibuit exemplum boni operis’ etc.*, et ita secundum quod homo mediator fuit.

170 (c) <Quomodo Christus sit caput>

35 Tertio quaeritur quomodo Christus sit caput, et primo secundum quid sit caput; secundo, utrum sit caput bonorum tantum; tertio, quando incepit esse caput; quarto, utrum mutua sit collatio membrorum ad caput et e converso.

- | | | |
|---|---------------------------|----------------------|
| 146 postulat: postulare ms. | 147 nec: vero (?) ms. | 151 vel in marg. ms. |
| 157 probare: propriare ms. | 160 in s.s. ms. | pro eis: per eas ms. |
| 165 distinctionem: distinctionctive ms. | 167 Praeterea: potest ms. | |

144-145 Per ... necessitati: Sap 18:21.
 145-146 Spiritus ... inenarrabilibus: Rom 8:26.
 147 Mediator ... est: Gal 3:20.
 157 Sicut ... hominis: Rom 5:19.
 167 Non ... arguere: Job 9:33.
 168 Exhibuit ... operis: Cf. Gregorium, *Moralia in Job* 9.38.61 (in Job 9:13) (CCL 143.501; PL 75.894A): ‘... in utrisque manum posuit, quia et exempla hominibus quae imitarentur praebuit, et Deo in se opera quibus erga homines placetur, ostendit.’

(i) < *Secundum quid sit caput* >

175 36 Circa primum sic: Eph 1 et Col 1, in *Glossa*: 'Christus secundum quod homo caput est.' Sed videtur similiter quod secundum quod Deus: dicitur enim 1 Cor 12: *Omnis viri caput Christus est, caput autem mulieris vir, caput vero Christi Deus.*

37 Item, Trinitas est caput Ecclesiae quia creatrix est, Eph 1 in *Glossa*.

180 38 Item, Christus dicitur caput quia ab ipso influunt in membra Ecclesiae dona gratiarum: *de eius enim plenitudine omnes accepimus.* Sed magis est fluxus gratiarum a Spiritu Sancto, Eph 4: *Unum corpus et unus Spiritus* etc. Ergo magis debet dici Spiritus Sanctus caput quam Christus.

39 Praeterea, in capite materiali sic quod ibi sunt nervi sensibiles per quos
185 fit sensus et motus, et principalior est motus quam sensus. Cum ergo Spiritus Sanctus det motum, magis debet dici caput quam Christus, a quo effluunt sensus < 90va > spirituales.

40 Respondent quidam quod Filio appropriatur sapientia, Spiritui Sancto bonitas. Ex parte sapientiae effluit cognitio, ex parte bonitatis motus, et propter
190 hoc a Christo sunt sensus spirituales et a Spiritu Sancto motus.

41 Sed dico quod Christus in quantum homo caput est proprie. Certum est autem quod caput commembrum est corporis. Unde cum Christus sit commembrum corporis mystici, a quo effluunt sensus spirituales in alia membra Ecclesiae et eorum, scilicet sensuum, sit principium non separatum sed
195 communicans in natura, caput est. Sed Spiritus Sanctus principium est motuum separatum et non communicans in natura, et quantum ad hoc quodammodo caput potest dici.

42 Item, Trinitas tota dicitur caput Ecclesiae non quia sit creatrix fidelium [cf. 37], quia similiter posset dici caput asinorum quorum est creatrix sicut

186-187 effluunt sensus in marg. inf. ms.

175-176 Christus ... est: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Eph 1:22 (PL 192.178D-179A): 'Est etiam et proprie dicitur caput secundum humanitatem, secundum quam coniungitur ei Ecclesia, et naturā et gratiā.' Cf. ibid. in Col 1:18 (PL 192.263D).

177-178 Omnis ... Deus: 1 Cor 11:3.

179 Trinitas ... est²: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Eph 1:22 (PL 192.178C-D): 'Et, id est quia, ipsum, qui adeo altus est dedit Deus caput.... Subjiciuntur enim illi quasi capiti, ex quo trahunt originem. Ab ipso enim facti sunt secundum deitatem, et ita secundum deitatem caput est Ecclesiae....' Cf. ibid. in 1 Cor 11:3 (PL 191.1630A), quod videtur esse textus: 'Est ergo Deus, id est divina essentia, vel Trinitas caput (*correx*i) Christi secundum quod homo, quia divinitas utpote creatrix est creaturae assumptae.'

181 de ... accepimus: Joan 1:10.

182 Unum ... Spiritus: Eph 4:4.

188-190 Respondent ... motus: Cf. *Glossam Alex* 3.19.41.V.c (p. 223.22-28), et supra, q. 1, no. 11.

200 aliarum rerum, sed ipsa dicitur caput Christi quia causavit Christum influendo
simul naturam et gratiam. Caput etiam Ecclesiae dicitur quia ab ipsa in corpus
Ecclesiae vel membra influunt dona gratiarum. Sic Deus est caput Ecclesiae,
Christus autem secundum quod homo caput est propter connectionem naturae
et gratiae: communicat enim nobis in gratia et natura. Ipse enim per
205 plenitudinem gratiae, quae in ipso fuit, meruit ut nos haberemus in parte quod
ipse in plenitudine.

(ii) < *Utrum Christus sit caput bonorum tantum* >

43 Circa secundum articulum quaeritur sic: Non est idem membrum
Christi et diaboli. Mali autem sunt membra diaboli, ut habetur super Iob 41.
210 Ergo mali non sunt membra Christi. Ergo Christus non est caput malorum.

44 Praeterea, *Glossa*, Eph 1: 'Christus caput est coniunctione naturae et
gratiae.' Ergo cum in malis non sit gratia gratum faciens, illorum non erit caput.

45 Contra: Joan 6: *Panis quem ego dabo pro mundi vita*, ibi Augustinus:
'Hunc cibum et potum vult intellegere societatem fidelium quod est Ecclesia in
215 praedestinati et vocatis' etc. Ex hac glossa videtur quod praedestinati sunt de
Ecclesia. Sed multi sunt mali ad tempus qui tamen sunt praedestinati. Ergo mali
sunt de Ecclesia. Ergo Christus non solum bonorum est caput sed etiam
malorum.

46 Item, super illud Mt 6: *Adveniat regnum tuum*, *Glossa*: 'Regnum
220 militantium ad regnum triumphantium.' Sed tantum glorificati sunt de regno
seu Ecclesia triumphanti. Ergo tantum glorificandi sunt de Ecclesia militanti.
Sed praedestinati sunt glorificandi. Ergo sunt de Ecclesia militanti, et inde ut
prius.

215 et vocatis: invocatis ms.

209 Mali ... diaboli: Cf. Gregorium, *Moralia in Job* 34.4.48 (in Job 41:14) (PL 76.722A):
'Carnes vero Leviathan istius sunt omnes reprobi, qui ad intellectum spiritalis patriae per
desiderium non assurgunt. Membra vero sunt carnum qui eisdem perverse agentibus, et sese ad
iniquitatem praecedentibus junguntur.' Textus invenitur etiam in *Glossa ord.* in Job 41:14 (apud
Lyranum 3.399B).

211-212 Christus ... gratiae: vide supra, n. ad linn. 175-176.

213 Panis ... vita: Joan 6:52.

214-215 Hunc ... vocatis: Cf. Augustinum, *Tract. in Joan* 26.15 (in Joan 6:54-55) (CCL
36.267; PL 35.1614): 'Hunc itaque cibum et potum societatem vult intellegi corporis et
membrorum suorum, quod est sancta ecclesia in praedestinati et uocatis, et justificatis, et
glorificatis sanctis, et fidelibus eius.'

219 Adveniat ... tuum: Mt 6:10.

219-220 Regnum² ... triumphantium: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* nec in *Glossa interlineari*
in hoc loco.

47 Item, Hieronymus: 'Multa sunt quorum nonnulla sunt vitiosa, scilicet
 225 debilia membra. Ita et Christus caput Ecclesiae habet omnes congregatos in
 Ecclesia: sanctos subditos voluntate, peccatores necessitate', nec loquitur de
 peccatoribus quoad venialia quod vel nullus vel pauci careant veniali, unde 1
 Joan 1: *Si dixerimus* etc. – Praeterea, illi soli qui sunt in mortali sunt necessitate
 subiecti, et ita nulla est eorum solutio.

230 48 Unde dico quod duplex est praesens: praesens ut nunc et praesens
 simpliciter sive praesens confusum, sicut cum dicitur: 'Pascha est pulchrum
 tempus.' Praesens autem confusum non opponitur praesenti ut nunc. Ideo non
 sequitur: 'Iste non modo est membrum Christi; ergo non est membrum',
 demonstrato praedestinato, quia licet non sit ut nunc membrum Christi, tamen
 235 in praedestinatione est membrum.

49 Ad illud Hieronymi [49] dicendum quod Hieronymus vult ibi innuere
 differentiam inter perfectos et imperfectos, ut perfecti dicantur in quibus
 imperat et regnat sola caritas, imperfecti vero in quibus non solum imperat
 amor sed sibi socium habet timorem, et tales dicit 'necessitate' scilicet timoris
 240 'subiectos' qui saepius habent occasionem peccandi.

(iii) < *Utrum Christus inceperit esse caput in Incarnatione* >

50 Tertio obicitur sic: Principalia membra et primitiva secundum viam
 generationis sunt cor et caput secundum philosophos. Similiter ergo continget
 in corpore mystico quod caput est principale et primitivum membrum. Ergo
 245 Christus debet esse de primitivis membris. Ergo debuit esse ante Abel.
 Quomodo ergo potest dici quod incepit esse caput in Incarnatione?

51 Item, quaeritur utrum Christus sit caput priorum ut prophetarum et
 patriarcharum. Videtur quod sic quia super illud Psalmi: *Quousque irruitis* etc.,
Glossa: 'Ad caput pertinent membra quae ante ipsum prodierunt.'

237 in s.s. ms.
 propharum ms.

242 primitiva *corr.* ex. primaitiva ms.

247 prophetarum:

224-226 Multa ... necessitate: Cf. Hieronymum, *In Eph* 1.1 (in 1:22) (PL 26.493A): 'Quo-
 modo enim caput plurima sibi habet membra subjecta, e quibus sunt nonnulla vitiosa et debilia:
 ita et Dominus noster Jesus Christus, cum sit caput Ecclesiae, habet membra eos omnes qui in
 Ecclesia congregantur, tam sanctos videlicet quam peccatores: sed sanctos voluntate, peccatores
 vero sibi necessitate subjectos.'

228 Si dixerimus: 1 Joan 1:8, 10.

248 Quousque irruitis: Ps 61:4.

249 Ad ... prodierunt: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Ps 61:3 (PL 191.564A): 'Hoc ergo dicit:
 Quousque irruitis in hominem, quasi a sanguine Abel, quia ad caput pertinent membra, quae
 ante caput prodierunt?' Cf. Augustinum, *Enarr. in Ps* 61.4 (in v. 4) (CCL 39.774-75; PL 36.731-
 32), ex quo fonte glossa ista hauriri videtur.

250 52 Praeterea, Augustinus, *De catechizandis rudibus*: 'Sicut Jacob manum prius, dum nasceretur, emisit ex utero qua pedem fratris sui praenascentis tenebat, deinde utique secutum est caput, deinceps cetera membra, ita Christus *Mediator Dei et hominum*, antequam appareret in carne, manum suam praemisit in patriarchis et prophetis.' Ergo si manus est commembris capitis, 255 aequaliter est Christus caput priorum patrum sicut et eorum qui post Incarnationem fuerunt: simul enim sunt unius corporis membra. Ergo si manus erat, et caput erat.

53 Item, super Col 1, *Glossa*: 'Christus est caput omnium sanctorum qui ab Abel fuerunt.' Ergo, ut videtur, Abel fuit primum membrum Christi. Ergo 260 Adam non fuit primum membrum Christi.

54 Item, super illud Psalmi: *Vineam de Aegypto transtulisti* etc., *Glossa*: 'Id est, Ecclesiam quae incepit a Judaeis.' Ergo non incepit ab Abel.

55 Solutio: Ad primum [51] dicendum quod secundum ordinem dignitatis prius membrum inter membra Ecclesiae fuit Christus, iuxta Apostolum dicentem: *Ipse surrexit primogenitus mortuorum*. Item, quantum ad fidem 265 ordine temporis prius est membrum.

56 Ad aliud [52] dicendum quod per uterum mystice significatur praedestinatio in qua membra corporis mystici simul sunt licet manus prius sit egressa in patriarchis et prophetis quoad lucem actualis existentiae.

270 57 Ad aliud [53] solvendum secundum Augustinum: 'Quod Ecclesia dicitur incepisse ab Abel, non ab Adam, quia in Adam non fuit distincta civitas bonorum et malorum eo quod in ipso fuit uterque status, scilicet gratiae et peccati. Sed Abel tenuit unum statum, Cain alium, unde in ipsis primo distincta civitas bonorum et malorum.'

275 58 Alia est ratio quae videtur esse potior quia omne membrum Christi vel est in militia vel in expectatione vel in triumphatione: membrum in militia, sicut hic in via, et tale potest esse non-membrum; membrum autem in

253 Dei: Christi ms. 267 post quod add. q et del. ms. 271 Adam¹⁻²: Adan ms.
277 membrum: primum ms.

250-254 Sicut ... prophetis: Cf. Augustinum, *De catech. rudibus* 3.6 (CCL 46.125; PL 40.313-14). Cf. supra, q. 1, num. 15, et infra, q. 6, num. 4.

258-259 Christus ... fuerunt: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Col 1:18 (PL 192.264A): '... sic in universo populo omnium sanctorum, tamquam uni corpori, caput est homo Christus, quos omnes ab Abel usque ad ultimum justum Sapientia Dei illuminat, quae plenius fuit in Christo.'

261 Vineam ... transtulisti: Ps 79:9.

261-262 Id ... Judaeis: *Glossa Lombardi* in Ps 79:9 (PL 191.761D-762A).

265 Ipse ... mortuorum: Cf. 1 Cor 15:20 et Col 1:18.

270-274 Quod ... malorum: Cf. Augustinum, *De civitate Dei* 15.1 (CCL 48.453-54; PL 41.437-38).

expectatione, in purgatorio scilicet, non potest esse non-membrum. Abel autem fuit primum membrum in expectatione. Ideo ab ipso dicitur Ecclesia
 280 incepisse quia ex tunc non potuit interrumpi possessio Ecclesiae.

59 Ad aliud [54] dicendum quod quantum ad fidem distinctam et explicitam Ecclesia incepit a Iudaeis.

(iv) < *Utrum mutua sit collatio membrorum ad caput et e converso* >

60 Quarto quaeritur utrum sit mutua collatio membrorum ad caput et e
 285 converso. Videtur quod sic quia super illud Cor 13 dicit *Glossa* quod 'sicut Christus commembrum nostrum confert nobis et nos ipsi' et in Psalmo 'Mater Sion', < *Glossa* >: 'Quasi mater in ea Sion', quod non dixisset nisi aliqui praecesserunt de quibus natus esset, et sic patet quod collatum est capiti a membris.

290 61 Contra: Eph 1, super illud: *Omnem Ecclesiam*, *Glossa*: 'Omnia in omnibus, hic vel in futuro, quia ei nihil membra conferunt, sed ipse omnia membris.'

62 Solvunt quidam quod non est ex toto similitudo in capite materiali et in Christo capite quia sic est quod in corpore materiali membra habent rationem
 295 materiae et formae: < 90vb > nisi enim ab elementis et ab anima esset virtus in membris, non esset membrum. Sed Christus in quantum caput non habet rationem materiae et formae.

63 Haec solutio non videtur mihi bona quia, sicut dictum est, Christus est caput secundum coniunctionem naturae et gratiae. Ideo dicendum aliter est, scilicet quod membra conferunt Christo capiti secundum quid, non simpliciter: Christus enim in quantum Deus sibi contulit ut ab aliquibus membris ipsum
 300 praecedentibus nasceretur, et ita per consequens sibi contulerunt membra. Quod autem ipse contulerit membris omnia non est dubium, ut dicit glossa praemissa, Eph 1.

286-288 et² ... esset in marg. ms.
 301 Deus s.s. ms.

291 conferunt corr. ex confuerunt ms.

285-286 sicut ... ipsi: Non invenitur in *Glossa Lombardi* nec in *Glossa ord.* in 1 Cor 13 sive in 2 Cor 13.

286-287 Mater Sion: Ps 86:5: 'Numquid Sion dicet: homo et homo natus est in ea' (ed. Vulg.). Pro alia lectura vide notam sequentem.

287 Quasi ... Sion: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Ps 86:5 (PL 191.807C): 'Vel secundum aliam litteram, mater Sion dicet homo, quasi dicat: Unde alieni perveniunt ad Jerusalem? Ecce est homo quidam, scilicet Christus homo, qui dicet: Sion, id est Synagoga est mater mea, secundum carnem, et per hunc isti omnes veniunt.' Cf. Augustinum, *Enarr. in Ps* 86.7 (in v. 5) (CCL 39.1204-1205; PL 37.1106-1107).

290 Omnem Ecclesiam: Eph 1:22.

290-292 Omnia ... membris: *Glossa Lombardi* in Eph 1:23 (PL 192.179A-B).

303-304 glossa praemissa: vide notam praecedentem.

< Quaestio 3 >

De unitate Ecclesiae

(a) < *Quid sit unitas Ecclesiae* >

1 < 165rb > Quid sit unitas Ecclesiae quaeritur, et videtur quod mutua
servitus in Domino, Joan 12: *Invicem serviendo*, *Glossa*: 'Aliter non est servus
5 amor nisi mutuis se perveniant obsequiis.' Ergo, ut videtur, circa mutuam
servitatem in Domino consistit unitas Ecclesiae.

2 Ad hoc idem facit illud Augustini in 6 *De civitate Dei*: '*Qui plantat et qui
rigat unum sunt*: hic sunt duo servitia in Ecclesia', et inde ut prius.

3 Item, Joan 17: *Pater, serva eos ut sint unum sicut et nos*, *Glossa*: 'Unum
10 natura sua sicut et nos sumus unum in nostra.' Ergo unitas ista non est
voluntatis tantum sed et naturae. Cuius igitur naturae unius? In numero? Hoc
impossibile est. Aut specie? Et sic non est similitudo inter unitatem nostram et
unitatem Patris et Filii.

4 Item, ad hoc 2 Cor 1: *Ut ex multorum personis facerent, per multos
15 gratiae aguntur pro nobis*, et inde ut prius.

5 Item, videtur quod sit una triplici unitate: fide, caritate, et pace.

6 Solutio: Unum est dispositio entis, unde secundum multiplicationem
entis multiplicatur unum. Unde cum sit ens natura, est et unum natura, ens
moris et unum moris, ens rationis et unum rationis. Est etiam esse creationis et
20 esse recreationis, hoc est, imago creationis et imago recreationis, ita et unum.
< 165va > Unitatem itaque Ecclesiae facit gratia, quae reparat imaginem
laesam < creationis > et restituit imaginem recreationis deperditam. Sic ergo
notificatur: unitas est indifferens societas membrorum relatorum ad eandem
imaginem similitudinis; societas vero est gratia conformans et assimilans

1 De ... Ecclesiae in marg. manus moderna	5 circa: circum ms.	10 ista corr. ex
istas ms.	14 multorum: multarum ms.	facerent: facierunt ut vid. ms.
igitur ms.	esse: s.s. ms.	19 etiam:

4 Invicem serviendo; Cf. Joan 13:34: *Ut diligatis invicem*, et Gal 5:13: *sed per caritatem
spiritus servite invicem*.

4-5 Aliter ... obsequiis: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* in Joan 12-13 vel in Gal 5.

7-8 Qui ... sunt!: 1 Cor 3:8.

8 hic ... Ecclesia: Non invenitur in loco citato nec deteximus alibi.

9 Pater ... nos: Joan 17:11.

9-10 Unum ... nostra: *Glossa ord.* in Joan 17:11 (PL 114.416D; apud Lyranum 5.235ra.A):
'Ut sint unum in natura sua, sicut et nos in nostra sumus unum.'

14-15 Ut ... nobis: 2 Cor 1:11.

23-24 indifferens ... similitudinis: Fort. respicit definitionem imaginis Hilarii, *De synodis* 13
(PL 10.490B): '... imago omnis, ejus ad quem coimaginetur species indifferens sit.... Imago itaque
est rei ad rem coequandae imaginata et indiscreta similitudo.'

25 Ecclesiae membra Imagini increatae. Haec est prima et universalis unitas, quae
convenit angelis et hominibus et parvulis et adultis; aliae vero, sive fidei sive
sacramentorum sive caritatis sive pacis, particulares sunt et hanc primam
consequentes.

7 Sed quaero quae est haec gratia quae prima est, cum ab omnibus sanctis
30 et magistris fides dicatur prima?

8 Solutio: Gratia et virtus idem sunt subiecto sed differunt ratione. Gratia
quidem dicitur respectu dantis et recipientis, item, quantum ad reparationem
naturalium et restitutionem gratuitorum; virtus vero dicitur respectu liberi
arbitrii quod disponit ad actum, et ita gratia facit primo esse, virtus facit ad
35 actum esse. In quantum igitur fides et caritas sunt gratia, faciunt unitatem
primam et universalem; in quantum vero virtutes, particulares unitates faciunt.

9 Item, ad Eph 4: *Solliciti servare unitatem*, *Glossa*: 'Id est, unitatem
ecclesiasticam quam facit Spiritus Sanctus.'

10 Item, ibidem: *Unum corpus* esse debetis multorum adunatione mem-
40 brorum, et constat quod ibi non loquitur de prima gratia.

11 Solutio: Is qui non est in unitate trahitur a caritate increata ut sit in
corpore et mundatur per gratiam quae facit eum esse et postea virtutes
disponunt ad actum.

12 Ad illud: *Qui plantat* etc. [2] dicimus: Unum natura simpliciter et hoc
45 per *Verbum caro factum*.

13 Sed contra: Hoc non est universale quoniam non pertinet ad angelos.

14 Sed contra: *Panem angelorum manducaverunt*, ibi *Glossa*: 'Panem qui de
caelo descendit Christum vel corpus Christi, qui vere est cibus angelorum'; 1 Pt
1: *In quem desiderant angeli prospicere*, *Glossa*: 'Tanta est eius hominis qui
50 passus est pro nobis posterior glori<a> ut etiam angelicae virtutes in caelo,
cum sint aeterna felicitate perfectae, non solum immortalis deitatis magnificen-
tiam sed etiam assumptae humanitatis eius claritatem semper aspicere gaudent.'

37 servare: servari ms.

48 Christum: *Glossa*, Christus ms.

38 quam in marg. ms.

vere: *Glossa*, nunc ms.

41 non: vero ms.

37 Solliciti ... unitatem¹: Eph 4:3.

37-38 Id ... Sanctus: *Glossa Lombardi* in Eph 4:3 (PL 192.196C).

39 Unum corpus: Eph 4:4.

45 Verbum ... factum: Joan 1:14.

47 Panem¹ ... manducaverunt: Cf. Ps 77:25.

47-48 Panem² ... angelorum: *Glossa Lombardi* in Ps 77:25 (PL 191.732B).

49 In ... prospicere: 1 Pt 1:12.

49-52 Tanta ... gaudent: *Glossa ord.* in 1 Pt 1:12 (apud Lyranum 6.1311A).

15 Solutio: Christus factus est nobis 'panis pinguis' secundum illud
Anselmi: 'Panis pinguis, quia humanitatem nostram induit et nobis carnem dat
55 ad manducandum; angelis vero est tantum panis quia tantum vident eum
spiritualiter in deitate et non reficiuntur eius humanitate.'

16 Quod tamen sancti dicunt, ut patet in *Glossa* 1 Pt 1 [14], unde aut quod
dicis falsum est aut aliam solutionem da.

17 'Fide' etc. [5]: Dicimus quod fides facit unitatem in rationabili, caritas in
60 concupiscibili, pax in irascibili. Ergo nunc prima < unitas > adaptat naturam,
sed in patria plenaria erit unitas quando nihil extra Deum quaeremus.

18 Item, 1 Cor 12: *Etenim in uno Spiritu omnes nos in unum corpus
baptizati sumus*, *Glossa*: 'Ut totum corpus una anima vegetatur, ita unus
Spiritus Sanctus facit omnia in membris Christi corporis, sicut una anima videt
65 in oculo, audit in aure, et in ceteris omnibus omnia facit, et etiam per hoc
sumus unum quia *sumus in uno Spiritu potati*.'

19 Solutio: Loquitur ibi de corpore militantis Ecclesiae vel de unitate
consequente.

20 Item, ad Eph 4: *Ex quo totum corpus* < 165vb > *compactum et con-*
70 *nexum*, ibi *Glossa*: < 'Ex quo, id est, per quem, *totum corpus*, id est, Ecclesia,
est *compactum* per fidem et *connexum* vinculo caritatis' >. Ideo ibi modos
unitatis, non unitatem.

21 Item, cum plura unum dicuntur et non additur quod unum, unum
numero intelligitur. Ergo unum numero sumus, sicut Pater et Filius.

22 Contra: Pater et Filius sunt unum unitate notionali qua spirant Spiritum
75 Sanctum. Ergo qui dilectione sunt unum ita sunt unum.

23 Ad hoc facit illud ad Rom < 4, *Glossa* >: 'Credere in Deum est
credendo' etc. Ergo caritate incorporamur Christo et fide.

24 Solutio: Incorporari consistit in agendo et non in esse simpliciter.

80 (b) < *Quorum sit unitas Ecclesiae* >

25 Item, quaeritur quorum sit unitas. Hieronymus: 'Christus caput Eccle-

60 nunc: vero ms. 61 in patria: id est non prima ms. 75 sunt s.s. ms. 76 post
qui add. fecit et del. ms.

54-56 Panis ... humanitate: Non est detectum.

62-63 Etenim ... sumus: 1 Cor 12:13.

63-66 Ut ... potati: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:13 (PL 191.1654D).

66 sumus ... potati: 1 Cor 12:13.

69-70 Ex ... connexum: Eph 4:16.

70-71 Ex ... caritatis: *Glossa Lombardi* in Eph 4:16 (PL 192.203A).

77-78 Credere ... credendo: Cf. ibid. in Rom 4:5 (PL 191.1367C): 'Qui < d > vero est credere
in eum? Credendo amare, credendo diligere, credendo in eum ire, et ejus membris incorporari.'

siae habet sibi membra iustos omnes et malos in Ecclesia.' Ergo Christus habet membra sanctos et malos. Ergo Christus habet putrida membra.

26 Item, Joan 6: *Caro mea* etc., *Glossa*: 'Id est, societas sanctorum.' Ergo
85 omnes praedestinati sunt de corpore Christi. Ergo et Saulus persecutor.

27 Solutio: Aliud est esse praedestinationis et aliud est esse simpliciter. Praedestinati sunt membra corporis iuxta esse praedestinationis, non tamen sunt simpliciter membra Christi.

(c) < *De unitate corporis diaboli* >

90 28 Sequitur de unitate corporis diaboli, quomodo unum est corpus malorum cum non pateat esse quia diversificatur per contraria vitia.

29 Solutio: Haec unitas per modum privationis opponitur unitati corporis Christi. Sed quomodo ad quod nihil est faciat unum non video, unde, sicut alii dicunt, credo consistere unitatem istam in privatione.

95 (d) < *Quare Christus dicitur caput* >

30 Item, ad Col 1: *Ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae*, *Glossa*: 'Qui omnibus secundum divinitatem infusus.' Ergo tota Trinitas est caput Ecclesiae. Quare non dicitur Deus Pater caput Ecclesiae?

31 Solutio: Corpus humanum ex materia et forma constat. Ex eius igitur
100 similitudine corpus Ecclesiae ex quasi-materia et quasi-forma constat. Christus autem secundum quod homo susceptibilis est gratiae quoniam rationalis spiritus, et hoc est quasi-materia. Item, habet plenitudinem omnium gratiarum; ergo formam perfectissimam. Propter hanc igitur adaptationem Christus caput Ecclesiae, et non Pater aut Spiritus Sanctus. Et omnis spiritus rationalis est
105 susceptibilis gratiae, et sic habet materiam, et suscipit gratiam, et sic habet formam, unde est membrum corporis Christi, aut suscipit oppositum eius formae, hoc est, privationem gratiae, et sic est membrum diaboli.

32 Item, Christus dicitur caput et non cor (licet motus sit a corde, ut dicunt quidam), hoc ideo quia anima agit in subtiliora elementa, hoc est, in lucem,
110 quae est ignis, et in sensus in anteriori parte capitis, demum in aerem agit et

84 Joan: Co ms. 94 privatione: positione ms. 97 Quare: Pro ms. 109 ideo quia: ideoque ms.

84 Caro mea: Joan 6:55. Id ... sanctorum: *Glossa ord.* in Joan 6:54 (PL 114.384A; plenius apud Lyranum 5.206va.E): 'Augu. Hunc cibum et potum societatem vult intelligere corporis et membrorum suorum, quod est ecclesia in praedestinis, quod iam factum est et in vocatis et iustificatis, quod factum est et fit et fiet in glorificatis....' Ex Augustino, *Tract. in Joan* 26.15 (in Joan 6:54) (CCL 36.267; PL 35.1614), cit. supra, q. 2, n. ad linn. 214-215, ubi verbum 'sanctis' invenitur.

96 Ipse ... Ecclesiae: Col 1:18.

96-97 Qui ... infusus: *Glossa Lombardi* in Col 1:17 (PL 192.263D): 'Et sicut omnia creavit, ita et ipso constant omnia qui omnibus secundum divinitatem infusus omnia sustinet et regit.'

inde motus in posteriori parte capitis et inde per totum corpus. Ad huius similitudinem rectus, Christus dicitur caput quoniam ab ipso omnis gratia, cognitio, sensus, et motus sive affectus.

(e) <Instantiae ultimae contra opinionem magistri>

- 115 33 Illud notandum, ad Col 1: *Ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae*, Glossa: 'Quae est unita Christo gratiâ et naturâ.' Ergo non videtur quod Apostolus de unitate quae est angelorum loquitur, ut ibi in *Glossa* patet, et si hoc, ergo prima solutio huius quaestionis nulla, quoniam unitas est secundum naturam, sed angelica natura in Christo non est sicut humana.
- 120 34 Item, Col 3: *Vocati estis in uno corpore*. Caritas vero Spiritu sancto habet *pacem in qua vocati estis*, per eam positi in *uno corpore* Ecclesiae: pax enim est necessaria ad unitatem Ecclesiae quam facit caritas. Non ergo prima gratia quam ponis.
- 125 35 Item, Ecclesia, ut dicis, sive corpus Ecclesiae seu unitas extenditur ad angelos. Ergo non inceptit ab Abel.
- 36 Item, Augustinus in libro quarto *De Trinitate*: '<E>go et Pater unum sumus' <166ra> in suo genere, hoc est, in eiusdem naturae consubstantiali parilitate, vult esse suos *unum* sed in ipso quia in seipsis non possent dissociari ab invicem per diversas voluptates et cupiditates et immunditias peccatorum; unde mundantur per Mediatorem *ut sint* in illo *unum* non tantum per eandem naturam qua omnes ex hominibus mortalibus *aequales angelis* fiunt sed etiam per eandem in eandem beatitudinem conspirantem concordissimam voluntatem in unum spiritum quodammodo caritatis igne conflata. Ad hoc enim valet quod ait: *Ut sint unum sicut nos unum sumus*, ut quemadmodum Pater et Filius, non tantum aequalitate substantiae sed etiam voluntate *unum* sunt, ita et ii inter quos et Deum *mediator* est Filius non tantum per id quod eiusdem naturae sunt sed etiam per eandem dilectionis societatem *unum* sint.'
- 135

120 Spiritu: semper ms. 127 naturae: Aug., numero ms. 128 parilitate: Aug., puerilitate ms. seipsis: Aug., se ms. possent: Aug., possunt ms. 129 voluptates: Aug., voluntates ms. immunditias: Aug., immunditiam ms. 130 eandem: Aug., eius corr. ex eiusdem ms. 133 quodammodo: Aug., quod modo ms. conflata: Aug., conflant ms. 134 quemadmodum: Aug., secundum idinudum ut vid. ms. 135 et ii inter: Aug., lacuna in ms. 136 et om. et corr. ms. per id: Aug., id per ms.

115 Ipse ... Ecclesiae: Col 1:18.

116 Quae ... naturâ: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Eph 1:22 (PL 192.178D-179A); vide supra, q. 2, n. ad linn. 175-176.

120 Vocati ... corpore: Col 3:15.

121 pacem ... corpore: Col 3:15.

126-127 Ego ... sumus: Joan 10:15.

127-137 in ... sint: Augustinus, *De Trin.* 4.9.12 (CCL 50.177-78; PL 42.896).

< Quaestio 4 >

De unitate corporis mystici(a) < *A quo sit unum corpus mysticum* >

1 < 168ra > Quaeritur de unitate corporis mystici, et primo circa hoc
quaesitum est a quo sit unum corpus mysticum, et dicebat quod Spiritus
5 Sanctus facit illam unitatem, et innuatur haec responsio per illud quod habetur
1 Cor 12: *Etenim in uno Spiritu omnes nos in unum corpus baptizati sumus*,
Glossa: 'Sicut totum corpus hominis una anima vegetatur, ita unus Spiritus
Sanctus facit omnia in membris corporis Christi.'

2 Sed contra hanc responsionem proceditur sic: In eodem capitulo, super
10 illud: *Vos estis corpus Christi*, *Glossa*: 'Fidei unitate'. Ergo a fide est unitas
corporis mystici. Ergo cum fides non sit Spiritus Sanctus, a Spiritu Sancto non
erit illa unitas, vel si dicatur esse unitas illa a fide et a Spiritu Sancto, quaeratur
diversitas, nam sub eadem habitudine non dicitur hoc.

3 Praeterea, si quaeretur a quo est illud corpus materiale unum et
15 responderetur: 'A causa efficiente vel exemplari extrinseca, non esset
competens responsio quia non quaeritur de tali causa sed de < 168rb > causa
intrinseca. Ergo similiter si quaeritur a quo est unum corpus mysticum, non est
dicendum quod a Spiritu Sancto cum Spiritus Sanctus sit causa efficiens sive
exemplaris extrinseca.

20 4 Propter hoc dicebat quod a fide est unitas corporis mystici.

5 Contra, super illud: *Vos estis corpus Christi*, *Glossa*: 'De Christo capite et
commembro nostro'. Ergo Christus membrum est corporis mystici. Sed non est
illius corporis membrum cuius unitatem facit fides quia ad ipsum pertineret
illud secundum quod est unitas, scilicet fides. Sed constat quod fides non fuit in
25 Christo. Ergo a fide non est unitas corporis mystici.

6 Ad idem: Illud debet dici causa unitatis in corpore mystico quod
commune est tam membris quam capiti. Sed haec est caritas et non fides. Ergo
caritas facit huius unitatem.

1 De ... mystici in marg. manus moderna 4 post et add. haec responsio et et del. ms.
15 efficiente vel: vel efficiente ms. 17 intrinseca: intrinea ms. 22 commembro: cum
monbro ms.

6 Etenim ... sumus: 1 Cor 12:13.

7-8 Sicut ... Christi: *Glossa Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:13 (PL 191.1645D).

10 Vos ... Christi: 1 Cor 12:27. Fidei unitate: *Glossa Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:27 (PL 191.1657B).

21 Vos ... Christi: 1 Cor 12:27.

21-22 De ... nostro: *Glossa Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:27 (PL 191.1657B).

7 Item, Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*: 'Humilitas nos Deo subicit,
30 puritas iungit, caritas unit.' Ergo potius dicenda est caritas faciens unitatem
corporis mystici quam fides.

8 Si concedatur hoc, contra: Aut caritas Christi facit illam unitatem aut
caritas alterius. Caritas Christi non, quia, Filio Dei non incarnato, non erat
Christus nec caritas in Christo, et tamen erat corpus mysticum et unitas corporis
35 mystici. Ergo caritas Christi non facit unitatem illam. Si caritas aliorum, contra:
Quaelibet alterius membri caritas est singularis. Ergo nulla illarum est virtus
unitiva totius corporis. Ergo caritas non facit illam unitatem.

9 Si forte dicat quod caritas istius membri ut est istius vel illius non facit
unitatem illam sed caritates membrorum insimul iunctae faciunt unum corpus
40 mysticum, hoc nihil est, quia si dicam: 'Isti conveniunt in musica; ergo sunt
unum', non sequitur, sed bene sequitur quod sint similes. Similiter caritates illae
non unum faciunt sed simile.

10 Praeterea, secundum hoc corpus mysticum non esset unum numero sed
tantum specie, et ita esset unum secundum quid et non unum simpliciter, quod
45 est contra Apostolum qui dicit 1 Cor 12, quod *nos <in> unum corpus sumus
baptizati* etc.

11 Item, non debet dic*<i>* quod a Spiritu Sancto est unitas corporis
mystici [*cf. 1*]. Ostenditur sic: Dicit Dionysius quod multiplex est unum, scilicet
unum numero, unum specie, unum genere, unum subiecto, unum totaliter,
50 unum principio. Cum autem quaeritur a quo est corpus unum mysticum, non
quaeritur de uno principio (quod dico principium est causa extrinseca, sive
efficiens sive exemplaris), sed quaeritur de uno totaliter.

12 Item, super illud: *Vos estis unum corpus*, Glossa: 'Fide, spe, caritate'.
Ergo non solum a fide vel caritate est unitas corporis mystici, sed ab istis tribus
55 virtutibus.

47 est: esse ms.

29-30 Humilitas ... unit: Ps.-Augustinus, *De spiritu et anima* 20 (PL 40.794): 'Habet [anima]
etiam virtutes, quibus proficit, et quibus Deo coniungitur, ut est humilitas, puritas, charitas.
Humilitas eam Deo subicit, puritas iungit, charitas unit.'

45-46 nos ... baptizati: 1 Cor 12:13.

48-50 Dicit ... principio: Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, *De divinis nominibus* 13.2 (PG 3.980A;
versio Joannis Scoti Eriugena, PL 122.1169C-D; *Dionysiaca* 1, edd. Ph. Chevalier et al. [Bruges,
1937], pp. 542-43): 'Neque enim est multitudo non participans quid unius: sed hoc quidem multa
partibus, unum toto: et hoc multa accidentibus, unum subiecto: et hoc multa numero aut
virtutibus, unum specie: et hoc multa speciebus, unum genere: et hoc multa processionibus,
unum principio; et nihil est existentium quod non participat vel quid unius....'

53 Vos ... corpus: 1 Cor 12:27. Fide ... caritate: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* nec in
Glossa interlineari, nec etiam in *Glossa Lombardi* in hoc capitulo.

13 Praeterea, *Glossa*, eodem capitulo 1 Cor 12: 'Hoc *in* uno *Spiritu* Sancto cooperante, qui omnia dona ad unum efficiendum dirigit.' Ergo omnia dona sunt ad unum tendentia. Ergo ab omnibus est unitas Spiritus Sancti.

14 Iuxta hoc volebat probare quod a iustitia est unitas corporis mystici: ita
60 enim est quod iustitia civilis, quae est ordinatrix universitatis. < Ergo iustitia > facit unitatem corporis mystici.

15 Praeterea, dicit *Glossa*, 1 Cor 12, et etiam textus, quod unum membrum debet compati alii et adiuvare unum aliud per subministrationem. Sed sub-
ministratio ad iustitiam pertinet. Ergo a iustitia est illa unitas. < 168va >
65 Iustitia enim est virtus ordinem tenens inferioris ad superiorem, superioris ad inferiorem, paris ad parem: oboedientia enim ordinat ad superiores, recta dominatio ad inferiores, aequalitas inter pares.

16 Solutio: Quaedam est unitas corporis mystici quantum ad hoc quod membra sibi invicem coaptantur, alia unitas inter corpus et caput. Cum ergo
70 quaeritur a quo est unitas corporis mystici, aut loquitur de unitate prima aut de secunda. Si de prima, dicendum quod ipsa est a duobus, a fide scilicet et a caritate: a fide dico sicut inchoante et a caritate confirmante, et loquo < r > de caritate quae est amor fraternitatis. Ab his ergo duobus, a fide scilicet et a caritate est unitas corporis mystici, a fide quantum ad cognitivam, a caritate
75 quantum ad motivam: quando enim idem credimus, scilicet eosdem articulos fidei, in fide convenimus: *una enim columba mea*, una sponsa sive dilecta mea, Cant 6. Quod dico 'columba', pertinet ad fidei simplicitatem; quod dico 'dilecta', ad amoris fraternitatem.

17 Quod autem obicit de Christo commembro nostro qui fidem non habuit
80 [5], dicendum quod 'corpus mysticum' sumitur dupliciter: uno modo praeter caput, alio modo cum capite. Primo modo Christus non est membrum, sed secundo modo membrum est, ita tamen quod caput.

18 Quod dicit *Glossa*, 'unitate fidei' super illud: *Vos estis corpus Christi* [2], intelligitur de corpore prout sub capite.

58 unitas: uni ms. 71 scilicet: s.s. ms. 76 mea¹: mori vel in ori ms.
78 amoris fraternitatem: fort. amorem fraternitatis legendum est. 79 commembro: cum membro ms.

56-57 Hoc ... dirigit: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:13 (PL 191.1654D): '... hoc in Spiritu Sancto, cooperante qui omnia dona ad unum efficiendum dirigit.'

62-63 unum ... subministrationem: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:26 (PL 191.1657A): 'Unde subdit: *Et si quid* [quia PL] *patiat*ur in adversis *unum membrum*, *compatiuntur*, id est compati debent *omnia membra*, quasi suum sit malum.'

76 una ... mea¹: Cf. Cant 6:8: 'Una est columba mea, perfecta mea, una est matris suae electa genitrici suae.'

77 columba ... simplicitatem: Cf. Mt 10:16: 'Estote ergo prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae.'

85 19 Si obiciatur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus: 'Ecclesia est congregatio fidelium Christum et Christi sacramenta credentium', ergo cum Christus sit membrum, habebit fidem, dicendum quod illa definitio est corporis mystici sub capite: alia enim datur definitio, scilicet haec: 'Ecclesia est congregatio fidelium cognoscentium Christum et Christi sacramenta'.

90 20 Quod autem dicit unitatem illam esse a Spiritu Sancto [1; 13] concedimus hoc, sed hoc dicitur per remotam causam: Spiritus enim Sanctus est causa efficiens vel exemplaris extrinseca qui influit interiorem perfectionem.

21 Item, dicit Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*: 'Ecclesia habet gratiam sacramentalem qua Christo consecratur.' Sed eodem consecratur et
95 unitur. Ergo gratia sacramentalis facit illam unitatem.

22 Solutio: Gratia sacramentalis facit unum corpus mysticum secundum quod habet suas partes. Caritas vero unitatem corporis mystici facit secundum quod organizatum est sive secundum quod organa habet. Et primo modo loquitur Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu* de gratia sacramentali, quae
100 respectum habet ad cognitionem et opus: sacramentum enim 'signum et causa rei existit': ex parte signi est cognitio, ex parte causae opus.

23 Ad aliud [9; cf. 7-8] dicendum quod caritas Christi est fons et principium et quasi causa exemplaris caritatis quae est in commemorbris, et ita caritas communis est nobis et Christo, nec tamen caritas facit simile sed unum, non
105 unum specie sed tale unum quod proportionale est uni numero, et haec est ratio < quare > omnes caritates sunt unum numero secundum quid, nam caritatis creatae idem est obiectum et idem finis, scilicet primum et summum bonum; similiter fidei est idem obiectum et idem finis. Unde omnes caritates singulares sunt unum in uno numero quia in summo bono; similiter de fide istius et illius,
110 et ideo et caritas et fides faciunt unum corpus mys < 168vb > ticum. Quod dico unum proportionale est uni numero.

101 est: et ms. 104 non in marg. ms. 110 et caritas et fides: caritas et fides et ms.
post dico add. unum et del. ms. 111 proportionale: proportionalem ms.

85-86 Ecclesia ... credentium: Non est detectum in operibus Augustini examinatis; cf. autem Nicholaum Amiensem, *De articulis catholicae fidei* 4, introd., et 4.7 (PL 210.613B et 615A): 'Ecclesia est congregatio fidelium confitentium Christum et sacramentorum subsidium.' Cf. Augustinum, *De civ. Dei* 10.6 (CCL 47.279; PL 41.284): '... tota ipsa redempta ciuitas, hoc est congregatio societasque sanctorum....'

88-89 Ecclesia ... sacramenta: Non est detectum; fort. codices auctoris 'cognoscentium' pro 'confitentium' exhibent.

93-94 Ecclesia ... consecratur¹: Ps.-Augustinus, *De spiritu et anima* 20 (PL 40.794): 'Habet autem anima sacramentales virtutes quibus initiatur, id est, fidem, spem, sacramentum Baptismi, inunctionem, Confirmationem, et caetera quibus Deo consecratur.'

100-101 signum ... existit: Lombardus, *Sent.* 4.1.4.2, 3a editio, edd. Patres Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2 (Grottaferrata, 1981), p. 233: 'Sacramentum enim proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa exsistat.'

24 Ad aliud [15] dicendum est quod non est simile de iustitia cardinali et
 theologica, nam cardinales virtutes non in finem sed sunt eorum quae sunt ad
 finem. Praeterea, non sequitur. Licet cardinalis iustitia faciat unitatem civilis
 115 corporis, non tamen iustitia theologica facit unitatem mystici corporis quia
 caritas propinquior est summo bono, quod est finis simpliciter, et ideo magis
 virtus unitiva corporis Ecclesiae quam alia virtus.

25 Item, caritas est virtus appropriata Spiritui Sancto et ita, sicut Spiritus
 Sanctus est virtus unitiva Patris et Filii, ita creata caritas est virtus unitiva
 120 corporis mystici.

26 Praeterea, quia Spiritus Sanctus amat nos, ideo influit charismata in
 nobis, et ita amor est via per quam est ille fluxus, et ita Spiritui Sancto
 propinquior est caritas [cf. 2].

27 Hae sunt rationes quare caritas faciat unitatem praedictam, et non
 125 iustitia theologica.

(b) < *Utrum corpus mysticum potius dicendum est corpus Spiritus
 Sancti quam Christi* >

28 Sed quaeritur: Sicut iam dictum est, caritas est virtus creata quae Spiritui
 Sancto appropriatur, et caritas unitatem facit corporis mystici. Ergo corpus
 130 mysticum potius dicendum est corpus Spiritus Sancti quam Christi.

29 Solutio: Inter Christum et corpus mysticum conformitas est quantum
 ad humanam naturam, et post Incarnationem haec conformitas est actu; ante
 Incarnationem illa conformitas fuit potentiâ. Et ideo Ecclesia magis dicitur
 corpus Christi quam Spiritus Sancti.

30 Sed adhuc obicitur: Debet esse conformitas in humana natura, etiam ex
 parte corporis, inter caput et membra. Ergo cum animae glorificatae non
 habeant huiusmodi conformitatem, non erunt membra Christi.

31 Solutio: Membra animae glorificatae habent illam conformitatem
 potentiâ, non actu, sicut Caput habuit ante Incarnationem conformitatem illam
 140 potentiâ, non actu, et ita animae glorificatae membra sunt Christi. Angeli autem
 membra sunt Christi < non > secundum quod Christus est homo sed
 secundum quod Deus, quia ipsi non habent conformitatem cum Capite in
 humana natura.

112 *post est*¹ *add.* quod non est *et del.* ms. 124 *quare:* *quaet vel quaer* ms. *post non*
add. est ms. 125 *post iustitia add.* *logic et del.* ms. 141 *sed:* s ms.

< Quaestio 5 >

De corpore mystico quaestio secunda

(a) < *De unitate corporis mystici* >

1 < 39ra > 16 Joan legitur: *Rogo, Pater, ut ipsi unum sint sicut et nos unum*
sumus. Quaeritur utrum petat quod sint unum unitate gratiae aut naturae.
 Naturae non, quia unius naturae in specie erant; unius in numero esse non
 5 poterant. Si vero gratiae petit unitatem, quomodo erit verum: *sicut et nos*?

2 Praeterea, super illud: *Quos dedisti mihi, ut sint unum* etc., dicit *Glossa*:
 'Ut sint unum in natura sua sicut et nos in natura nostra unum sumus.'

3 Solutio: Rogat Christus unitatem suorum in claritate gloriae et in
 conservatione naturae, unde auctoritas dicit: 'In claritate, ut sicut tres personae
 10 claritatem habent indeficientem, sic et modo fideles haberent postea claritatem
 suo modo indeficientem', 'videntes per speciem quod modo cognoscunt per
 fidem', sicut dicit alia glossa.

4 Item, 'ut sint unum in natura sua' [cf. 2] intelligimus de conservatione
 naturae ne in aliquo diminuatur vel laedatur per peccatum (quasi ut non
 15 peccent): peccatum enim trahit ad non esse, assimilans diabolo qui non est, sicut
 dicitur Job 18: *Habitant in tabernaculo eius socii eius qui non est*.

(b) < *Quaestiones diversae de corpore mystico* >

5 Item, nos sumus unum corpus in Christo, et constat quod illa unitas pure
 spiritualis est: est enim a fide et a caritate, sicut alias ostensum est. Nihil igitur
 20 est ibi nisi spirituale. Propter quid igitur potius dicitur unum corpus quam unus
 spiritus? Corpus enim videtur habere oppositionem ad spiritum, maxime quia
 sexto 1 ad Cor dicitur: *Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus efficitur cum eo*. Similiter
 qui per caritatem alii adhaeret vel Christo unus spiritus est cum eo, non unum
 corpus.

3 post unitate add. substantiae et del. ms.
 legendum est.

9 auctoritas ut vid. ms., sed fort. Augustinus

2-3 Rogo ... sumus: Cf. Joan 17:11.

6 Quos ... unum: Joan 17:11.

9-11 In ... indeficientem: Non est detectum; cf. autem Augustinum, *De catech. rudibus*
 25.47 (CCL 46.170; PL 40.343): 'Efficiemur ... aequales angelis dei, et cum eis pariter illa
 trinitate perfruemur iam per speciem, in qua nunc per fidem ambulamur.'

11-12 videntes ... fidem: Cf. *Glossam ord.* in Joan 17:23 (apud Lyranum 5.235va.F): '... ut
 perfecta beatitudine fruamur, ubi cognoscet mundus per speciem quod modo per fidem.' Cf.
 Augustinum, *Tract. in Joan.* 110.4 (in Joan 17:23) (CCL 36.625; PL 35.1922) et *De catech.*
rudibus 25.47 (CCL 46.170; PL 40.343).

16 Habitant ... est: Job 18:15.

22 Qui ... eo: Cf. 1 Cor 6:16-17.

25 6 Item, quaeritur quare potius dicantur omnes fideles esse unum corpus Christi quam unum corpus Spiritus Sancti cum illa unitas sit per caritatem, quae Spiritui Sancto appropriatur, et sicut dicit Augustinus in sermone ad populum *De blasphemia in Spiritum Sanctum*: 'Ad Spiritum Sanctum pertinet unitas societatis Ecclesiae in qua fit remissio peccatorum.' Si tu dicis propter
30 conformitatem naturae, nihil est quia antequam Christus nasceretur, erat Ecclesia corpus Christi (aliter non fuisset Christus caput Abel), non tamen erat corpus per conformitatem naturae.

7 Item, cuiusmodi membra constituunt illud corpus? Videtur quod ex solis praedestinatis habentibus gratiam constituatur. Nam sicut 'corpus Christi quod
35 traxit de Virgine ex purissimis membris sive sanguinibus Virginis', sic et corpus mysticum ex purissimis fidelium personis. Purissimi autem non videntur esse nisi praedestinati habentes caritatem, nam puri sunt reprobi habentes caritatem, puriores praedestinati non habentes modo caritatem, purissimi praedestinati habentes caritatem.

40 8 Item, glorificandum non dicitur nisi dupliciter, scilicet dignum gloria vel cui debetur gloria. Sed solum huiusmodi constituunt corpus Ecclesiae. Ergo corpus Ecclesiae constat tantum ex glorificandis. Videtur ergo quod ex solis praedestinatis. Sed si hoc, Judas numquam fuit membrum Ecclesiae, quod patet esse falsum quia fuit de electis a Christo.

45 9 Solutio: Corpus Ecclesiae, cum non sit corpus naturale sed mysticum, corpus potius dicitur quam spiritus vel anima propter tria, scilicet propter mutuum obsequium membrorum invicem in diversis obsequiis vel officiis, sicut est in corpore humano; item, propter trinam dimensionem caritatis qua diligimus <39rb> quod supra nos, quod iuxta nos, et quod infra; propter
50 conformitatem ad caput in gratia et natura. Per hoc patet quare potius dicatur corpus Christi quam Spiritus Sancti [cf. 6]: propter conformitatem naturae et gratiae creatae. Unde Spiritus Sanctus extra est motor tantum, Christus vero est motor intra.

10 Ad hoc autem quod obicitur quia ante Incarnationem non erat

28-29 Ad ... peccatorum; Cf. Augustinum, *Sermo 71 sive de blasphemia in Spiritum Sanctum* 20.33 (PL 38.463): 'Ideo remissio peccatorum, ... ideo societas unitatis Ecclesiae Dei, extra quam non fit ipsa remissio peccatorum, tanquam proprium est opus Spiritus sancti, Patre sane et Filio cooperantibus, quia societas est quodam modo Patris et Filii ipse Spiritus sanctus.' Cf. ibid. 21.34 (PL 38.464): '... remissione peccatorum, quae fit in Ecclesia per Spiritum sanctum', et ibid. 22.36 (PL 38.465).

34-35 corpus ... Virginis: Cf. Damascenum, *De fide orthodoxa* 3.2 (PG 94.98C), in versione Burgundionis, ed. Eligius M. Buytaert, *De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus* (Franciscan Institute Publications: Text Series 8; St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), p. 171: '... et confixit sibi ipsi ex castis et purissimis sanguinibus carnem....'

55 conformitas haec [6], dicimus quod immo secundum praesentiam fidei etsi non secundum praesentiam rei, sicut expresse determinat Augustinus in libro *De catechizandis rudibus*.

11 Ad ultimum [7-8] dicimus quod corpus Ecclesiae constat ex membris habentibus caritatem sive praedestinati sint sive non: huiusmodi enim purissimi
60 quia puri carentes infidelitate, puriores carento aliis mortalibus, purissimi habendo caritatem. Dicimus autem quod constat ex solis glorificandis dignitate et debito sed non ex solis glorificandis de futuro.

(c) < *Utrum Christus sit membrum et commembrum Ecclesiae* >

12 Item, dicit Apostolus: *Vos estis membrum de membro*, et dicit *Glossa*
65 quod Christus est membrum Ecclesiae, immo et commembrum.

13 Contra: Commembrum indigens est suo commembro. Christus autem nullo fuit indigens spiritualiter. Ergo non fuit membrum.

14 Item, dicit Augustinus quod Ecclesia est 'congregatio fidelium confitentium Christum et eius sacramenta'. Christus autem non fuit fidelis cum non
70 haberet fidem. Ergo non fuit de Ecclesia.

15 Si dicas quod fuerit fidelis sacramento fidei, scilicet Baptismo, contra: Hoc non sufficit ad hoc quod aliquis sit membrum Ecclesiae quia etiam haereticus habet fidei sacramentum, scilicet Baptismum, vel saltem existentes in mortali habent fidei sacramentum, tamen non sunt Ecclesiae membra.

75 16 Item, Christus est caput et membrum Ecclesiae. Quaero cuius Ecclesiae? Aut Ecclesiae secundum quod dicit solum corpus sub capite aut secundum quod comprehendit corpus et caput. Si primo modo, tunc non est membrum Ecclesiae; si secundo modo, tunc non est caput: quod enim caput est, extra illud est cuius est caput.

80 17 Solutio: Revera Christus est membrum Ecclesiae secundum quod Ecclesia continet et corpus et caput. Secundum vero quod continet solum membra sub capite, sic non est Christus membrum Ecclesiae sed caput solum.

18 Ad primum [13] dicimus quod cum dicitur Christus est commembrum, potest notari conformitas vel aequalitas. Si notetur conformitas, tunc est verum;
85 si aequalitas, tunc non est verum quia sic esset mutua indigentia commembri ad commembra.

55-56 secundum ... rei: Cf. Augustinum, *De catech. rudibus* 19.33.13-18 (CCL 46.157-58; PL 40.334-35) (ad sensum).

64 Vos ... membro: Cf. 1 Cor 12:27.

65 Christus ... commembrum: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in 1 Cor 12:27 (PL 191.1657B): '*Vos autem estis corpus fidei unitate Christi, id est capitis, et membra pendentia de membro, id est de Christo capite, et commembro nostro.*'

68-69 congregatio ... sacramenta: vide supra, q. 4, n. ad linn. 85-86.

19 Ad aliud [14] dicimus quod definitio illa Augustini data est de Ecclesia secundum quod continet solum membra sub capite, sed alia datur totius Ecclesiae talis: 'Ecclesia est congregatio hominum per caritatem eundem
90 habentium consensum Verbi incarnati'. Sic autem est Christus membrum Ecclesiae.

20 Ad aliud [16] dicimus quod caput praeter conformitatem naturae ad membra potest dicere praeeminentiam in illa natura vel ad illam sive super illam naturam. Si primo modo, tunc caput est pars illius totius cuius est caput; si
95 secundo modo, tunc non est caput pars illius cuius est caput. Unde si hoc secundo modo sumeretur 'caput', dicendum esset quod Christus non esset uno modo membrum et caput Ecclesiae, sed membrum Ecclesiae secundum quod caput et corpus continet, caput vero secundum quod continet solum corpus.

(d) < *Utrum Christus potius debuerit dici cor quam caput Ecclesiae* >

100 21 Item, Christus est nobilissimum membrum Ecclesiae et ideo dicitur caput. Sed videtur quod potius deberet dici cor, nam *de corde exeunt bona sicut et mala*, ut Mt 15.

22 Item, anima secundum theologum situm habet in corde ut ibidem in *Glossa* dicitur. Igitur propter fluxum bonorum a corde deberet dici potissime
105 cor Ecclesiae Christus.

23 Item, propter situm medium: cum enim sit mediator, attribuitur ei per omnia medius situs, ut Joan 1: *Medius vestrum stat quem vos nescitis*, et ipse est *lignum in medio paradisi*; medius etiam inter latrones suspendit.

24 Praeterea, a corde procedunt quantum ad ea de quibus solum motus
110 voluntarii.

25 Item, caritas est summa membri perfectio. Praecipitur autem, ut Deut 6, quod *ex toto corde diligatur Deus*.

26 Solutio: Ad nobilitatem membri summam duo exiguntur praeter conformitatem naturae et gratiae, scilicet praeeminentia et plenitudo. Haec
115 autem in capite reperiuntur, non in corde, propter quod dicitur caput potius

101 deberet: deberat ms.

89-90 Ecclesia ... incarnati: Non est detectum. Videtur esse definitio magistralis.

101-102 de ... mala: Cf. Mt 15:19.

103 anima ... corde: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* in hoc loco, sed cf. Hieronymum, *Comm. in Matt* 2 (in Matt 15:19) (CCL 77.131-32; PL 26.112D-113A): '*De corde*, inquit, *exeunt cogitationes malae*. Ergo animae principale non secundum Platonem in cerebro sed iuxta Christum in corde est....'

107 Medius ... nescitis: Cf. Joan 1:26.

108 lignum ... paradisi: Cf. Gen 2:9.

112 ex ... Deus: Cf. Deut 6:5.

quam cor. Tertium etiam potest dici superioritas. Quod igitur dicitur medius [cf. 23] intelligimus sine acceptione personarum: non sic medium ut aliquid habeat super se humanum vel creatum.

27 Ad illud quod obicit de caritate [25], dicimus quod *Glossa* solvit *ex toto corde*, id est, 'intellectu sine errore', unde intellectus practicus appellatur ibi cor qui in capite habet principatum.

(e) < *De terminis specialiter attribuendis Deo in membris et Christo gratia membrorum* >

28 Item, dicit Is: *Omnia opera nostra operatus es in nobis, Domine*.
125 Quaeritur ergo quare specialiter attribuantur ei quaedam opera ut loqui, postulare, quam alia ut currere, manducare: dicitur enim in Evangelio: *Vos autem estis qui loquimini* etc., et David dicit: *Audiam quid loquatur in me Dominus Deus*, et ad Rom 8: *Spiritus Sanctus postulat pro nobis* etc.

29 Dicet quod interiores actus dicuntur de ipso, exteriores vero et corporales non.
130

30 Contra: Super Mt 3: *Potens est Deus* etc., dicit *Glossa*: 'Deus de Sara genuit filium Isaac.' Gignere autem corporale est et extrinsecum.

31 Si dicit quod actus ad quos exercendos datur alia gratia specialis, vel doni vel miraculi, contra: Non conceditur quod Deus credat in nobis vel speret;
135 tamen hi sunt actus spirituales et a gratia.

32 Item, quaeritur quid de Christo concedendum sit gratiâ membrorum: dicit enim: 'Vado Romam iterum crucifigi', et 9 Rom: *Saule, quid me persequeris*, et in evangelio: *Qui vos spernit, me spernit*.

135 hi: haec ms.

120 intellectu ... errore: Non invenitur in *Glossa ord.* in hoc loco; in *Glossa interlineari* invenitur altius supra verba *ex toto corde suo* haec glossa tantum: 'intellectu' (apud Lyrantum 1.1499-1500).

124 Omnia ... Domine: Cf. Is 26:12.

126-127 Vos ... loquimini: Mt 10:20.

127-128 Audiam ... Deus: Ps 84:9.

128 Spiritus ... nobis: Cf. Rom 8:26.

131 Potens est Deus: Mt 3:9.

131-132 Deus² ... Isaac: *Glossa ord.* in Mt 3:9 (PL 114.80D; apud Lyrantum 5.14ra.B): 'Suscitare signanter dicit, quia Christus Saram, id est, Ecclesiam, accepit, et suscitavit per gratiam filios Abrahae defuncto sine liberis, ne tantus patriarcha privaretur promissis. In cuius rei praesagium olim Deus de Sara genuit filium.'

137 Vado ... crucifigi: Vide Ambrosium, *Sermo contra Auxentium* 13 [inter epistolas] (PL 16.1053B): 'Petrus ... ait: Domine: quo vadis? Respondit Christus: Venio iterum crucifigi.' Cf. Origenem, *Comment. in Joan* 20.12 (in Joan 8:56) (PG 14.600A-B).

137-138 Saule ... persequeris: Ac 9:4.

138 Qui ... spernit²: Luc 10:16.

33 Si dicas quod illa quae doceat ipsum, contra: Ipsum non docet
 140 peccatum: *tentatus* enim ex infirmitate nostra *per omnia absque peccato*, ut ad Heb, verumtamen ad Rom 8 appellatur 'peccatum', ibi: *ut de peccato damnaret peccatum*.

34 Item, 3 ad Gal appellatur 'maledictio', ibi: *Maledictus omnis qui pendet in ligno*, tamen haec non docent ipsum: maledictio et peccatum.

145 35 Item, qua ratione conceditur quod dicit Augustinus super illud Is: <39va> *Sicut sponso alligavit mihi mitram* etc.: 'Sponsus est sponsa.' Hoc enim non potest dici propter perfectionis spiritualis identitatem Christi et Ecclesiae: Christus enim non est secundum humanitatem sponsus Ecclesiae, immo secundum deitatem.

150 36 Si dicis quod hoc conceditur propter unionem naturarum, ergo pari ratione deberet concedi quod divina natura sit passa.

37 Item, qua ratione est verum quod 'omnes fideles sunt Christus', sicut dicit *Glossa*?

38 Item, possetne concedi quod quilibet fidelis esset Christus?

155 39 Solutio: Dicimus quod illi et soli actus Deum denominant in membris qui sunt spirituales vel per se vel a gratia speciali miraculi vel doni, dummodo non sonent secundum se in imperfectionem. Unde non est instantia de credere et sperare, nam alterum sonat in imperfectionem cognitionis, alterum in imperfectionem bonitatis.

160 40 Ad aliud [32-34] dicimus quod illa conceduntur de Christo quae ostendunt philanthropiam et amorem humanum erga nos, sicut est pati,

146 mitram: mutram ms.

147 spiritualis identitatem *corr. ex identitatis spiritualis* ms.

161 philanthropiam: philotropiam ms.

140 tentatus ... per ... peccato: Cf. Heb 4:15.

141-142 ut ... peccatum: Cf. Rom 8:3.

143-144 Maledictus ... ligno: Cf. Gal 3:13.

146 Sicut ... mitram: Is 61:10 (altera versio); vide notam sequentem. Sponsus est sponsa: Cf. Augustinum, *Enarr. in Ps* 101.1.2 (CCL 40.1427; PL 37.1295-96): 'Iam ergo audiamus quid oret caput et corpus, sponsus et sponsa, Christus et ecclesia utrumque unus: sed Verbum et caro non utrumque unum; Pater et Verbum utrumque unum; Christus et ecclesia utrumque unus, unus quidam vir perfectus in forma plenitudinis suae.... Iste ipse pauper est, quia idem ipse Christus est, qui se apud prophetam, et sponsum dixit, et sponsam: *Sicut sponso alligavit mihi mitram; et sicut sponsam induit me ornamento*. Se dixit sponsum, se dixit sponsam; unde hoc, nisi quia sponsum propter caput, sponsam propter corpus?'

152 omnes ... Christus: Non est detectum; fort. respicit *Glossam ord.* in Is 61:10 (cit. supra ad lin. 146): '¶ VESTIMENTIS SA. virtutibus ipsi Christo, unde: Christum induistis, etc. Christus enim est indumentum sanctis, et ipsi ei. ¶ QUASI SPON. Christus, ecclesiae sponsus, sed tamen perfectos in ecclesia eodem nomine dignatur.... Ipse ergo sponsus Christus sponso facit et sponsas, tamen una in capite et in membris ecclesia' (apud Lyranum 4.100ra.A; cf. PL 113.1305B).

persequi et huiusmodi, et etiam peccatum secundum quod exponitur ibi, id est, 'hostiam pro peccato', et maledictum, id est, 'supplicium', sicut exponitur ibidem.

165 41 Si quaeris utrum posset dici ebrius in discipulis, sicut 2 Ac vocantur *ebrii* discipuli, dicimus quod sic ab illis qui hoc apostolis imponebant, sed falso; tamen esse ebrium non pertinet ad philanthropiam.

170 42 Ad aliud [35] dicimus quod sponsus dicitur sponsa propter unionem naturarum in eadem persona Filii qui Deus est et homo, nec est simile de naturis, cum unio illarum non sit nisi associatio in persona Filii.

43 Ad ultimum [37] dicimus quod omnes fideles dicuntur Christus secundum quod Christus comprehendit caput cum membris, proprie autem non dicitur aliquis fidelium Christus nisi Christus solum dicat unctionem et non praeeminentiam unctionis: hoc modo sumitur ibi: *Nolite tangere christos meos*.

175 Nota tamen quod singulariter non est concedendum < nec pluraliter > nisi auctoritatis gratiâ, sicut non conceditur ut justus est Deus. Tamen conceditur: *Dii estis*, nam per plurale satis innuitur quod hoc nomen 'dii' vel hoc nomen 'christi' non sumitur in propria significatione sua et speciali.

167 philanthropiam: philotropiam ms. 176 ut: nisi ms.

162-163 peccatum ... peccato: Cf. *Glossam Lombardi* in Rom 8:3 (PL 191.1434A-B): '... de peccato, id est pro eo quod factus est hostia pro peccato.'

163 maledictum ... supplicium: Cf. ibid. in Gal. 13 (PL 192.123D-124A): '... et maledictum est omne peccatum, sive ipsum quod fit ut sequatur supplicium, sive ipsum supplicium.... Suscepit autem Christus sine reatu supplicium nostrum, ut inde solveret reatum nostrum, et finiret etiam supplicium nostrum.'

165 vocantur *ebrii*: Ac 2:15.

174 Nolite ... meos: Ps 104:15.

177 Dii estis: Ps 81:6.

< Quaestio 6 >

M. G. de D^x: *De unitate Ecclesiae*

(a) < *Utrum Ecclesia sit ex solis hominibus entibus* >

1 < 56va > Primo fuit quaesitum in hunc modum: Quod est cum non-ente non facit unum. Ergo ex hominibus qui sunt et qui fuerunt et non sunt non fit unum; ergo nec aliquod totum; ergo nec Ecclesia. Ergo ex solis hominibus entibus est Ecclesia. Sed tempore prophetarum et patriarcharum fuit Ecclesia, immo incepit ab Abel. Ergo alia est modo Ecclesia et alia fuit ante.

2 Contra, *Cant.* 6: *Una est columba mea* etc., et *Glossa* ibi: 'Quamvis multae
et diversae personae, tamen fides una est in eis, unum baptisma, unus Deus,
10 unum opus, non alia ante legem, alia sub lege, alia sub gratia.'

3 Item, ad primum: Partes integrales non sunt; ergo non totum.

4 Solutio: 'Ex ente et non-ente non fit unum' [1]: si 'non-ens' dicit puram
privationem, verum est quia pura privatio nihil est; si vero dicit privationem
particularem, relinquendo ens pro parte, falsum est: hoc modo ex ente et non
15 ente potest fieri aliquod totum, ut Ecclesia sive corpus Christi mysticum ex
sanctis qui fuerunt et sanctis hominibus qui modo sunt: etsi non sint in corpore
et anima, sunt tamen quantum ad potiore partem, scilicet quantum ad
animam. Unde sic: Adhuc quotidie dicimus, 'Sancte Petre, ora pro nobis.'
Partes ergo integrales sunt etsi non quoad totum, tamen quoad partem
20 excellentiorem, scilicet animam ex parte defunctorum. Et inducebat illud
Augustini: 'Quomodo Jacob manum praemisit' etc., in alia quaestione infra de
eodem.

(b) <Quid sit unitas Ecclesiae in esse>

5 Secundo quaesitum erat quid sit unitas Ecclesiae in esse, quia unum est
25 ens indivisum. Ergo unitas est essentia indivisa. Ergo unitas Ecclesiae est
essentia indivisa. Ergo est essentia.

6 Contra: Est qualitas; ubi ergo essentia?

7 Sed dic quod prima argumentatio non valet: fallacia consequentis a
superiori ad inferius affirmando; ens enim communiter se habet ad essentias et
30 qualitates: non essentia, sed ad substantias tantum.

8 Ad illud vero quod quaeritur, 'Quid est unitas?' [5], dic quod est voluntas
boni spiritualis communicandi sive caritatis vinculum unius ad alterum quia
inter bonos tantum est haec unitas.

(c) <A quo sit unitas Ecclesiae>

35 9 Tertio fuit quaesitum a quo sit unitas Ecclesiae, et procede ut notavi de
eodem post Cancellarium, et adde hic: Videtur quod a fide, quia pone aliquem
habere solam fidem, scilicet informem, qui baptizatur adultus, alium non
baptizatum habentem caritatem: primum unit fides, secundum caritas. Ergo
non sola caritas unit, sed etiam fides.

10 legem: legere ms.

30 qualitates: qualitatis ms.

8 Una ... mea: *Cant* 6:8.

8-10 Quamvis ... gratia: *Glossa ord.* in *Cant* 6:8 (PL 113.1159A; apud Lyranum 3.1866E-1867A). Cf. Eph 4:5.

21 Quomodo ... praemisit: Vide supra, q. 1, num. 15, et q. 2, num. 52.

35-36 ut ... Cancellarium: Vide introductionem nostram, supra, pp. 6-8.

40 10 Et circa haec plura fuerunt quaesita. Ad hoc [9] distingue quod sicut est
Deo cura generalis quia, ut dicit Apostolus, *Deo est cura de omnibus*, scilicet
quantum ad conservationem et necessariam administrationem et est ei cura
specialis, scilicet de hominibus tantum cum sint rationales, unde eos docet et
instruit et gratiam infundit et sic eos facit unire spiritualiter, non bruta quae
45 ratione carent, et ideo dicitur Sap quod *non est ei cura de bobus*. Sic dico quod
est vinculum uniens generale et vinculum uniens speciale: primum est caritas,
secundum fides: caritas enim unit nos et in via et uniet in patria et modo ibi unit
sanctos quia *caritas numquam excidit*; fides vero < unit > nos in via sed non
uniet in patria quia *fides et spes evacuabuntur*. Quod ergo dicit quod fides unit,
50 et verum est in parte sicut < falsum > est ex parte.

(d) < *Quomodo caritas creata 'continet' Ecclesiam* >

11 Quarto fuit quaesitum sic: Dicitur Sap 1 quod *Spiritus Sanctus continet omnia*, qui est caritas increata. Ergo cum caritas creata sit ab increata quae unit omnia, conservat in esse, caritas creata quae unit Ecclesiam continet eandem
55 sicut caritas increata continet omnia: modo est questio qualiter differat hoc continere ab illo.

12 Ad hoc est dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus continet omnia quia gubernat et regit, sed caritas creata continet Ecclesiam quia in unitate conservat per dilectionis perseverantiam.

60 13 Item, quae dividuntur aut dividuntur secundum essentiam aut secundum operationem aut secundum virtutem; similiter quae uniuntur. Cum ergo uniantur sancti viri ad constituendam unam Ecclesiam, aut uniuntur sic vel sic vel sic: non secundum essentiam quia non sunt unius essentiae; non secundum operationem quia non est omnium una operatio; nec secundum virtutem quia
65 non est omnium una virtus. Sic ergo < videtur > quod non sit unitas Ecclesiae vel quod Ecclesia < non > sit una.

14 Solve ut alibi scripsi de eodem.

42 necessariam: necessarium MS.

55 omnia: anima MS.

41 Deo² ... omnibus: Fort. venit in mentem auctoris textus 1 Cor 9:9: *Numquid de bobus cura est Deo?* Cf. Sap 12:13: *Non enim est alius Deus quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus, ut ostendas quoniam non iniuste iudicas iudicium* et 1 Pt 5:7: *... omnem sollicitudinem vestram proiicientes in eum, quoniam ipsi cura est de vobis*.

45 non ... bobus: 1 Cor 9:9. Cf. Sap 12:13.

48 caritas ... excidit: 1 Cor 13:8.

49 fides ... evacuabuntur: Cf. 1 Cor 13:8-13, praesertim 10.

52-53 Spiritus ... omnia: Sap 1:7.

67 alibi ... eodem: Vide supra, q. 3, numm. 6, 8, et q. 4, num. 15.

(e) < *Quomodo differant 'compactio' Ecclesiae et 'connexio' Ecclesiae* >

15 Quinto fuit quaesitum de eo quod dicitur Eph 4: *Ex quo totum corpus*
 70 *compactum et connexum per omnem iuncturam*, in quo differt 'compactio' et
 'connexio', et dicebat quod compactio est coniunctio essentialiter sine medio.
 Hoc modo fides coniungit et facit quod aliquis sit pars Ecclesiae et non
 membrum, sicut apparet in illo qui habet fidem informem: est enim pars
 Ecclesiae quia est in Ecclesia numero, non merito. Connexio vero est
 75 compactio eorum quae per unum me < dium > coniunguntur. Hoc modo
 coniungit caritas quae est connexio, sicut caritas increata, scilicet Spiritus
 Sanctus, dicitur nexus Patris et Filii, unde facit esse membrum Ecclesiae et
 coniungit, id est, unum cum alio iungit.

16 Item, clavus iungit asseres et simul tenere facit. Sed si esset aliquod
 80 materiale quod ligaret asseres et quo mediante coniungerentur, illud 'clavus'
 diceretur excellentiori modo. Cum ergo in spiritali coniunctione Deus
 coniungat et sit medium coniungens, potius dicetur a Deo esse unitas Ecclesiae
 quam a caritate.

17 Sed dic quod 'ubi propter alterum, utrobique tantum', quia et caritas
 85 coniungit et est medium coniungens, et hoc habet a Deo qui similiter
 coniungit. – Vel dic quod caritas coniungit formaliter, Deus effective.

(f) < *Utrum sacramentum unit et quomodo* >

18 Sexto fuit quaesitum utrum sacramentum unit et quomodo unit et quae
 sit differentia inter unire sacramenti et unire caritatis.

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69-70 Ex ... iuncturam: Eph 4:16.

THE *DE DOTIBUS* OF ROBERT GROSSETESTE

Joseph Goering

AMONG the works composed by Robert Grosseteste, the prolific and learned bishop of Lincoln (1235-53), is a relatively unknown theological treatise entitled *De dotibus*, 'On the Endowments' of the blessed in heaven.¹ This brief text belongs to an extremely popular but short-lived topic of scholastic disputation in which current notions of wedding endowments were applied to the solution of theological questions. I shall first describe the sudden appearance and subsequent demise of such discussions *de dotibus*, and then examine in greater detail Robert Grosseteste's contribution, an examination that will include an edition of the treatise for the first time.

I

Something of a novelty in the history of scholastic theology, discussions *de dotibus* appeared suddenly at the end of the twelfth century.² They consisted of arguments concerning seven attributes or qualities of the blessed in heaven: four qualities pertaining to the resurrected body and three to the soul. The term *dos*, root of our words dower and dowry,³ was borrowed from contemporary marriage practice to describe the seven qualities, which were imagined as wedding endowments of the blessed in heaven.

¹ See S. Harrison Thomson, *The Writings of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, 1235-1253* (Cambridge, 1940; rpt. 1971). On Grosseteste's career see the essays edited by D. A. Callus, *Robert Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop* (Oxford, 1955).

² The best general study is Nikolaus Wicki, *Die Lehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit in der mittelalterlichen Scholastik von Petrus Lombardus bis Thomas von Aquin* (Studia Friburgensia N.F. 9; Freiburg, S., 1954). See especially pp. 40-56, 'Der neue Traktat *de dotibus animae et corporis*', and pp. 202-37, 'Die Lehre von den *dots animae*'.

³ The distinction in English between 'dower' (a gift from husband to wife) and 'dowry' (a gift from wife to husband) is a modern one. For reasons that will become apparent, no distinction will be made here between 'dower' and 'dowry'; rather, 'wedding gift' or 'endowment' will be used to translate the Latin *dos*, in order to retain its original equivocity with respect to both kinds of gifts.

These discussions *de dotibus* emerged from the fusion of two independent theological traditions. The first was that of theologians who sought to understand and describe the state of human beings in the resurrection, an important topic for both speculative theology and practical preaching on the joys of heaven and the terrors of hell.⁴ They gradually identified seven qualities of the blessed, usually *claritas*, *subtilitas*, *agilitas*, and *impassibilitas* pertaining to the body, *visio*, *dilectio*, and *fruitio* pertaining to the soul. The second tradition was not concerned with resurrection attributes as such, but with wedding endowments (*dots*). In particular, these theologians sought to understand the nature of various gifts given by God to creatures by imagining the gifts as *dots* given by the divine bridegroom to his bride.

Nikolaus Wicki has explored the first tradition and elucidated the complex process by which discussions about the joys of the blessed in heaven led to identification of seven specific resurrection attributes.⁵ St. Anselm (d. 1109) listed fourteen heavenly blessings (*beatitudines*), seven pertaining to the glorified body and seven to the glorified soul. Although Anselm's list retained its influential authority well into the thirteenth century, other formulations also appeared; in them the attributes, variously called 'glories' (*gloriae*), 'graces' (*gratiae*), and 'blessings' (*beatitudines*) were gradually condensed from fourteen to the seven listed above.⁶

The origin of the other tradition, the use of the wedding endowment (*dos*) as an image for theological reflection on God's gifts to his creatures, is more obscure. Scholastic theologians seem to have ignored the wedding *dos*, nor did it play an important role in glosses and commentaries on sacred scripture or in theological discussions of marriage.⁷ Although in canon law the *dos* figured

⁴ See Wicki, *Seligkeit*; Hermann J. Weber, *Die Lehre von der Auferstehung der Toten in den Haupttraktaten der scholastischen Theologie von Alexander von Hales zu Duns Scotus* (Freiburger theologische Studien 91; Freiburg i. Br., 1973), pp. 173-263.

⁵ Wicki, *ibid.*, pp. 40-41, 202-206.

⁶ See Wicki, *ibid.*, pp. 203-205. Many different versions of Anselm's list circulated in the thirteenth century. See R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, eds., *Memorials of St. Anselm* (London, 1969), pp. 9-13. In addition, there existed a *Tractatus de quattuordecim beatitudinibus* ascribed to Anselm and published by J.-B. Malou, *S. Anselmi archiepiscopi Cantuariensis Meditationes XXI* (Liège, 1859), pp. 296-324. Moreover, an English *summa*, the *Summa brevis* or *Qui bene presunt* (c. 1230 ?), attributes this doctrine to a certain unidentified letter of Anselm: 'beatus Anselmus in epistola quadam' (London, British Library ms. Royal 9.A.xiv, fol. 102v). An important witness to this tradition not mentioned by Wicki is the sermon of Lothar of Segni (Pope Innocent III) 'De duplici corona sanctorum' (PL 217.616); see also Lothar's *De quadripartita specie nuptiarum* (PL 217.944).

⁷ Wicki, *ibid.*, pp. 57 n. 2, 202 n. 1. I have not found the *dos* discussed in any scholastic theological treatments of the sacrament of marriage, even though it figured prominently in ecclesiastical ritual. See the examples from liturgical manuals cited by Michael M. Sheehan, 'The Influence of Canon Law on the Property Rights of Married Women in England', *Mediaeval Studies* 25 (1963) 114 n. 22.

somewhat more prominently, there is no apparent link between canonical discussion of marriage dowries or endowments and the theological description of *dotes* as endowments given to creatures by God or Christ.⁸

Theological interest in marriage endowments seems to have arisen accidentally as an embellishment of the idea that Christians are brides of God or Christ (*Brautmystik*). Perhaps the earliest medieval example is in a letter of Hildebert of Lavardin (d. 1133) to the recluse Athalisa.⁹ There Hildebert expounds the blessings of virginal marriage to Christ as compared to those of carnal marriage to a mortal husband. Twice he mentions the *dos*: 'Nothing is more useful than [Christ's] wedding gift (*dote*) in which there is sufficiency for eternity.' He goes on to describe the fate of those who offend Christ: 'A deformity of the mind offends the spouse. He breaks off the betrothal, repudiates the wedding gift (*dotem*), expels her from his house.'¹⁰ This passing reference to Christ's *dos* marks the beginning of a growing interest in the theological dimensions of the wedding endowment.

A similar theme is developed by Hugh of St. Victor in his *De arrha animae* and *De amore sponsi ad sponsam* (c. 1139-40).¹¹ Hugh describes the *arrha*, a synonym for *dos*, which the soul receives from its spouse: 'The husband is God, the bride is the soul. ... There is no soul that has not received this spouse's wedding gift (*arrham*). But there is both a general and a special gift. The general gift is that we were born, we sense, we know, we judge. The special gift is that we have been reborn, that our sins have been forgiven, that we have received the gifts of the virtues.'¹² Although Hugh calls the wedding gift *arrha* rather

⁸ Wicki, *ibid.*, p. 208. For a general bibliographical orientation see Diane Owen Hughes, 'From Brideprice to Dowry in Mediterranean Europe', *Journal of Family History* (September 1978) 262-96; cf. Sheehan, *ibid.*, 109-11, 114. None of the legal uses, however, lends itself to theological explication. In fact, the *dos* of the lawyers was different from the *dos* of the theologians. Whereas theologians understood it to be a gift from husband (Christ, God) to wife (the Church, the soul, the blessed), canon lawyers increasingly understood the *dos* as a gift given by the wife or her family to the husband. Some implications of this difference are explored on pp. 88-90 below.

⁹ Ep. 1.21 (PL 171.193-97). I owe this reference to Dr. Mary Baldwin, who is preparing a study of *Hali Meïdhad* and its sources. There are earlier uses of *dos* as a gift from God in the patristic period (see *Thesaurus linguae latinae* 5.2044, 2046-47), but these do not seem to be the source of the scholastic usage; cf. Wicki, *ibid.*, pp. 201 n. 2, 209.

¹⁰ 'Ejus dote nihil utilius, in quo sufficientiam comitatur aeternitas. ... Mentis deformitas offendit virum, sponsalia diripit, abjudicat dotem, eliminat introductam' (PL 171.196).

¹¹ PL 176.951-70, 987-94. On these works see R. Baron, 'Hughes de Saint-Victor', *Dictionnaire de spiritualité* 7 (Paris, 1969) 911-12.

¹² *De amore sponsi ad sponsam*: 'Sponsus est Deus; sponsa est anima. ... Nulla est anima, quae hujus sponsi arrham non acceperit. Sed est quaedam arrha communis, quaedam specialis. Communis arrha est quod nati sumus, quod sentimus, quod sapimus, quod discernimus. Specialis arrha est, quod regenerati sumus, quod remissionem peccatorum consecuti sumus, quod charismata virtutum accepimus' (PL 176.987).

than *dos*, his two influential treatises must have helped further the tradition of using wedding gifts as images of God's beneficence to his creatures.

We know very little about the development of this wedding gift image during the rest of the twelfth century. Lothar of Segni (Pope Innocent III, 1198-1216) mentions the *dos* in his *De quadripartita specie nuptiarum* (before 1198?). There he denies that the Church gives any gift (*dotem*) to Christ, but affirms that Christ gives a gift (*donationem propter nuptias*) to the Church, namely, the remission of sins.¹³

In the early thirteenth century the term *dos* was still being used in a variety of contexts to designate gifts other than those given specifically in the resurrection. Two examples are found in the *Moralia super evangelium*, a work formerly attributed to Robert Grosseteste and now tentatively assigned to Alexander of Bath (before 1215).¹⁴ The first reference to *dots* in the *Moralia* is in chapter 1 of book 2 where the author discusses carnal and spiritual marriage. Elaborating the mystical implications of Christ's marriage with the faithful soul, the author relates this marriage to the sacrament of penance: 'I know that the *dos* is given by the man to the woman, the *maritagium* to the man by him who bestows the bride. When someone confesses, he contracts marriage with Christ, who gives him two things as endowment (*in dotem*), namely, that [Christ] look on him with a forgiving eye and confer on him the grace of repenting; secondly the remission of sin. Here you have the *dos*.'¹⁵ A passage in book 3 discusses the

¹³ 'Quod Ecclesia Christo dotem non tribuit. Verum nec anima Deo, nec Ecclesia Christo dotem aliquam pro suo tribuit conjugio contrahendo. ... Quod Christus donationem facit Ecclesiae. ... Haec est ergo donatio propter nuptias, remissio peccatorum' (PL 217.937-38). See also Innocent's consecration sermon 'De quatuor speciebus desponsationum' (PL 217.665-66) where the Church gives a wedding gift (*dotem*) to the bishop, and the bishop a gift (*donationem*) to the Church.

¹⁴ E. J. Dobson, *Moralities on the Gospels: A New Source of Ancrone Wisse* (Oxford, 1975), pp. 22-34. Dobson's case against Grosseteste's authorship is quite strong; but see the review of this book by R. H. Rouse and S. Wenzel in *Speculum* 52 (1977) 648-52, where questions are raised concerning Dobson's proposed dating of the earliest manuscript and about the *Moralities* as a source for the *Ancrone Wisse*. Dobson (p. 130) cites passages concerning the *dots* as evidence that the *Moralities* is a source for the *Ancrone Wisse*. Rather, one should conclude from them the opposite, that the two works are unrelated. The *Ancrone Wisse* draws its inspiration from the new discussion *de dotibus*, and mentions the gifts of *agilitas* and *claritas* in particular; cf. *The Latin Text of the Ancrone Riwle*, ed. C. d'Evelyn (EETS 216; London, 1944, rpt. 1957), p. 27. The *Moralities*, on the other hand, shows no awareness of this new discussion and instead offers idiosyncratic interpretations quite unrelated to the doctrine of the *Ancrone Wisse*. These passages, then, may be used to confirm Dobson's argument that the *Moralities* was not written by Robert Grosseteste, who also follows the new genre, but not to support his thesis that the *Moralities* is a source of the *Ancrone Wisse*.

¹⁵ 'Scio quod a viro mulieri datur dos, viro maritagium ab illo qui dat uxorem. Quando confitetur quis, contrahit matrimonium cum Christo, cui dat Christus duo in dotem, scilicet ut oculo clemencie eum respiciat et conferat ei gratiam penitendi, secundo remissionem peccati. Ecce dos' (Oxford, Lincoln College ms. Lat. 79, fol. 66v).

dos in different terms that illustrate its fluid conception in the author's mind. Commenting on the text 'The kingdom of heaven is like a certain king who made a marriage for his son' (Mt 22:2), the author concludes by listing four things required in spiritual as in carnal marriage: mutual consent, the expression of consent, the endowment (*dos*), and the ring. He says of the spiritual *dos* that it is twofold, namely, grace in the present and glory in the future.¹⁶ Although these interpretations apparently were not imitated, they illustrate the continuing importance of marriage customs, and of the *dos* in particular, as a possible source for theological reflection.

But however interesting such expositions are in themselves, they were not in accord with the growing consensus that, in the description of spiritual marriage, the term *dos* should be applied properly and exclusively to the four attributes of glorified bodies and three attributes of glorified souls mentioned above. We do not know who first used the term *dos* to describe the seven resurrection attributes.¹⁷ The earliest extant examples of this usage, in the works of Stephen Langton (1180 × 1206), Praepositinus of Cremona (1188 × 1194), Master Martin (c. 1200?) and in the *Summa 'Breves dies hominis'* (1195 × 1210), already imply an established tradition.¹⁸ During the early thirteenth century Godfrey of Poitiers and Guy of Orchelles contributed to the topic, and for about two decades after the publication of William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea* (1220 × 1225) questions *de dotibus* were a staple of the schools.¹⁹

The popularity of this topic rested in part on the juxtaposition of the two earlier traditions. By considering resurrection attributes as wedding endowments (*dotes*), theologians established a literal basis for arguing from the known (familiar wedding customs) to the unknown (the nature of spiritual gifts given by God the bridegroom in the resurrection). In addition, by emphasizing the image of God who gives wedding gifts to his bride, theologians transformed the questions *de dotibus* from simple treatments of one aspect of the resurrection into more wide-ranging discussions touching on such matters as Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology and the doctrine of marriage itself.²⁰

¹⁶ 'Et notandum quod sicut in carnali matrimonio requiruntur hec: mutuus consensus, expressio consensus, dos et anulus, similiter in hoc spirituali. ... Dos igitur duplex est, scilicet gracia in presenti et gloria in futuro. Unde Psalmista: *Graciam et gloriam dabit dominus*' (ibid., fol. 147v).

¹⁷ See Wicki, *Seligkeit*, pp. 41-42, 202-209.

¹⁸ The texts are conveniently edited in Richard Heinzmann, *Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die Auferstehung des Leibes ... von Anselm von Laon bis Wilhelm von Auxerre* (BGPTM 40.3; Münster, 1965), pp. 177, 191, 197, 218-19.

¹⁹ Wicki, *Seligkeit*, p. 41. On pp. 41-46 he summarizes the rich source materials from the first half of the thirteenth century.

²⁰ For the wide ramifications of the new questions *de dotibus* see Wicki, ibid., pp. 208-19. The expansion of the topic beyond the narrow bounds of discussions about the resurrection is

Such treatises *de dotibus* flourished in the period before 1250. Thereafter they declined in importance, being incorporated routinely, if often unimaginatively, into scholastic treatments of the resurrection alone.²¹ This sudden narrowing may have been occasioned less by abstract theological considerations than by changing social and legal customs in northwest Europe. The catalyst for such changes was the gradual introduction, during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, of Justinian's *Corpus* of Roman Law. As this 'new' law was carried northward from Italy, it displaced Germanic traditions in force throughout much of Europe. In particular, the Germanic custom whereby the husband gave the *dos* to his bride was slowly replaced by the Roman usage wherein *dos* designated a gift on the wife's part to her husband.²² The earliest theological discussions of *dotes* had been based on the Germanic tradition of a gift given by husband to wife,²³ and as late as 1220 × 1225 William of Auxerre was still asserting unequivocally that the *dos* is a gift which the bride receives in

illustrated strikingly in Alexander of Hales' *Gloss* on Lombard's *Sentences*. Rather than discussing the *dotes* in book 4 as an aspect of resurrection, Alexander suggests that the customary place for such a discussion is in book 2 in a context of creation, marriage, and procreation. On Lombard's text 'They begot sons in paradise by immaculate intercourse and without corruption', Alexander comments: 'In ista parte solet determinari de dotibus' (*Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* 2.20.2, eds. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 4 vols. [Quaracchi, 1951-57], 2.175).

²¹ Wicki, *ibid.*, p. 219: 'Wohl ... geschah es, daß die Theologie die Zusammenhänge mit der Christologie und Ekklesiologie nicht mehr beachtete und die Doteslehre losgelöst von ihren Grundlagen weiter tradierte. Albert behandelt sie noch in seinem Traktat de resurrectione und in der Quaestio de dotibus sanctorum in patria. Bonaventura und Thomas von Aquin gehen bereits nicht mehr darauf ein, obwohl beide die *dotes* zum Gegenstand einer mehr oder weniger ausführlichen Behandlung machen.' Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

²² In general see Hughes, 'Brideprice to Dowry' (n. 8 above) and also Sheehan, 'Influence' (n. 7 above), 109-11, 114, who notes (111 n. 9) the persistence of and respect for local customs regarding the *dos*. By and large, the term *dos* ceased to imply a gift from the husband to the wife and began to be used during the twelfth century in the Roman sense of a gift from wife to husband. Jean Hilaire, *Le régime des biens entre époux dans la région de Montpellier du début du XIII^e siècle à la fin du XVI^e siècle. Contribution aux études d'histoire du droit écrit* (Montpellier, 1957), describes the period 1100-60 as one of transition, in the south of France, from the Germanic to the Roman usage in marriage contracts, with the Roman terminology exclusively in use by the end of the twelfth century (pp. 192-93; cf. p. 25 n. 1). See also the contracts dating from the ninth to the thirteenth century quoted by André Lemaire, 'Les origines de la communauté de biens entre époux dans le droit coutumier français', *Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, 4th Ser., 7 (1928) 584-609, where the term *donatio propter nuptias* tends to replace *dos* in contracts from the end of the twelfth century. But some letters of Innocent III (1198-1216), reflecting the older use still current in some areas, continue to designate the husband's gift to his wife as *dos*, and these letters were included in the *Extravagantes* of Gregory IX (1234), X, 4.20.5-6 (E. Friedberg, ed., *Corpus iuris canonici* 2 [Leipzig, 1881], pp. 726-29).

²³ With the exception of Lothar of Segni (Innocent III), who had studied Roman law at Bologna. His arguments for the Roman usage seem to have had little immediate effect on other theologians. See the examples cited in nn. 9-19 above.

marriage.²⁴ By the 1230s, however, theologians increasingly tried to reconcile this outmoded usage with the new, Roman interpretation of *dos* as a gift to the husband on the part of the wife.²⁵ Hugh of St. Cher comments (1230 × 1235): 'Actually, in law, *dos* is a gift given to the husband together with the wife (*sponso cum sponsa*) for bearing the burden of the marriage.'²⁶ Albert the Great is even more specific (1245 × 1250): 'We ask what the *dos* is, and the definition should be sought from those whose task it is to inquire about the *dos* and its law, i.e., the legal experts, who say that *dos* is a gift on the part of the woman given to the man on account of the burden of marriage; according to this definition the word *dos* may not be applied to those things to be given in the heavenly marriage (*matrimonio futuro*) because the bride will give nothing to the husband, but rather will receive from him.'²⁷ The Roman usage – gifts given from the woman to the man – was clearly ill-suited to the needs and interests of medieval theologians discussing God's gifts to his people.

In attempting to reconcile the theological with the new legal uses of the word *dos* some theologians argued that the former should be understood metaphorically, as applying to spiritual marriage only, and need not conform to the laws and customs of carnal marriage.²⁸ Others claimed that *dos* in theological texts actually was intended to describe the *donatio propter nuptias* (the Roman term for a gift from husband to wife).²⁹ Still others attempted to retain the literal significance of *dos* by circumventing the problems of Roman law and current custom and appealing to scriptural evidence alone. Thus Alexander of Hales concludes: 'In the divine law, *dos* is taken properly to mean what is given to the woman from the man. ...'³⁰

²⁴ *Summa aurea* (Paris, 1500; rpt. Frankfurt, 1964), fol. 298vb: 'De dotibus resurgentium. ... Est enim dos illud donum quod sponsa habet ex matrimonio.' Cf. Wicki, *Seligkeit*, pp. 40-41, 202-203.

²⁵ See the examples in Wicki, *ibid.*, pp. 219-21.

²⁶ *De dotibus corporis*: 'Ad quod dico quod re vera dos dicitur in iure donum illud quod datur sponso cum sponsa propter honus matrimonii sustinendum' (Douai, Bibliothèque de la Ville ms. 434, vol. 1, fol. 112va).

²⁷ *De resurrectione*: 'Secundo queritur quid sit dos et accipienda est diffinitio ab illis qui de dote et iure dotis habent inquirere i.e. a iuris peritis qui dicunt quod dos est donatio a parte mulieris viro facta propter onus matrimonii et videtur primo quod secundum istam diffinitionem non transsumatur nomen dotis ad ea que dabuntur in matrimonio futuro, quia sponsa nihil dabit sponso, sed potius accipiet ab eo' (Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek ms. 1688, fol. 110vb, quoted by Wicki, *Seligkeit*, p. 219).

²⁸ See Wicki, *ibid.*, pp. 209 n. 34, 223 n. 13.

²⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 219-22.

³⁰ 'Respondeo: Secundum quod in lege divina invenitur, dos proprie accipitur "quod datur mulieri a viro"...' (*Magistri Alexandri de Hales Quaestiones disputatae 'antequam esset frater'*, q. 66, no. 5, eds. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 3 vols. [Quaracchi, 1960], 3.1318). This is the solution adopted by the English *Speculum iuniorum* c. 1250 (see below, n. 50): 'Aliter enim sumitur dos in iure civili, aliter in lege divina. In iure civili est quedam donacio a parte mulieris

None of these attempts at reconciliation, however, was widely accepted. None was able to preserve both the simplicity of the wedding-gift image and its literal basis in familiar marriage customs. When, in common speech, the term *dos* ceased to designate a gift from husband to wife, it became inappropriate as a metaphor for God's wedding gifts to his heavenly bride. The shifting reality in legal and customary usage had made the wedding-gift image confusing. Theologians continued to use the term *dotes* as an accepted designation for attributes of the resurrected in heaven, but by the 1250s the wedding-gift image had lost its vitality and ceased to play a formative role in theological discussions.

II

One important and heretofore unstudied contribution to the discussion *de dotibus* is a treatise ascribed in the two known manuscripts to Robert Grosseteste. The earlier copy is in Cambridge, University Library ms li. 1. 19 (hereafter cited as *C*). The compilers of the Cambridge University Library catalogue describe this codex as 'a quarto on parchment containing ff. 212, in double columns of 35 lines. Date, the xivth century.'³¹ It contains the following:

(1) fols. 1-183. 'Liber Rabbi Mosse qui dicitur Dux dubiorum vel Dux neutrorum qui etiam ab aliquibus dicitur Mater philosophie' (Moses Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*).

(2) fols. 184-201. 'Tractatus Magistri Petri de Arvernensis, episcopi Parisiensis, Cur Deus homo' (William of Auvergne, *Cur Deus homo*).

(3) fols. 201-208. 'Tractatus de scala paupertatis Domini Lyncolniensis.' This is listed as sermon no. 8 by Thomson;³² excerpts are printed in A. G. Little, ed., *Tractatus de adventu Fratrum Minorum in Angliam* (Paris, 1909), App. 7, pp. 178-87.

(4) fols. 208-209vb. A copy of Grosseteste's famous correspondence concerning the appointment of a nephew of Pope Innocent IV to a canonry of Lincoln. This is one of the two manuscript copies of the letter used by H. R. Luard in his edition.³³ On this letter see L. E. Boyle, 'Robert Grosseteste and Pastoral Care', *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 8 (1976) 3-51. The letter is followed, without interruption, by the following postscript:

viro facta pro onere matrimonii quod sustinet. In lege divina est donum quod datur mulieri a viro suo; et quod nos vocamus dotem, vocant legiste donacionem propter nupcias' (Oxford, Bodleian Lib. ms. Bodley 655, fol. 71v).

³¹ *Catalogue of the Manuscripts Preserved in the Library of the University of Cambridge* 3 (Cambridge, 1858), pp. 334-35.

³² *Writings* (n. 1 above), pp. 168-69.

³³ *Roberti Grosseteste episcopi quondam Lincolniensis epistolae* (RS 25; London, 1861), pp. 432-37, no. 128.

... qui est in celis. Heresis est sententia humano sensu electa, sacre scripture contraria, palam edocta, pertinacitus (pertinaciter *recte*) defensa. Heresis grece, electio latine; dare curam animarum paruulo (*corr. ex* sententia est paruuli) altius (alicuius *recte*) prelati, humano sensu electa propter carnem vel terrenitatem; et est
 5 contraria sacre scripture que proibet fieri pastores qui non sunt idonei ad arcendos lupos; et palam edocta, quia manifeste portatur carta sigillata et bullata; et est pertinaciter defensa, quia si quis voluerit contradicere, suspenditur et excommunicatur, et *sn* (super *recte*) eum prelium alicuius sanctificatur. Cui tota diffinicio (heresis *in marg.*) convenit, heresus est. Set heretico quilibet fidelis tenetur
 10 opponere quantum potest. (Qui ergo potest *in marg.*) contradicere et non contradicit, peccat, et videtur esse fauctor secundum illud Gregorii: 'Non caret scrupulo societatis inique qui manifesto facinori desinit obviare.' Ysidorus: 'Non sunt fideles in amicitia quos minus (munus *recte*) copulat, non gratia, quia dileccio que munere conglutinetur eodem suspenso dissolvitur, set ea est vera dileccio que
 15 nihil querit ab amico nisi benevolentiam, hec est ut amans gratis amet amantem.' Explicit.

This addition concerning heresy is drawn from Matthew Paris' account of Grosseteste's deathbed speech.³⁴ The definition of heresy is cited by Wyclif in his commentary on Grosseteste's letter in the *De civili dominio*, ed. R. L. Poole, 4 vols. (London, 1885), 1.392-93. The quotation from Isidore of Seville is not from Matthew Paris but derives independently from Isidore's *Sententie* 3.30 (PL 83.703).

(5) fols. 209vb-211b. 'Tractatus Lincolniensis De dotibus', written by a second hand, contemporary with the first, in English cursive (Anglicana) of the mid-fourteenth century.

(6) fols. 211v-212. 'Tractatus Domini Lincolniensis De potentia',³⁵ by a third, contemporary hand.

The second manuscript of the *De dotibus* is London, British Library Cotton Vespasian D. xxiii (hereafter *L*). The entire codex was copied by a scribe named Wodewarde in an Anglicana formata hand of c. 1400.³⁶ Measuring approximately 175 × 115 mm., it is written in a single column of 24/25 lines and contains the following:

(1) fols. 1-15. 'Augustinus, De visitatione aegrotum' (a work of Baldric of Bourgueil, archbishop of Dol 1107-30).

(2) fols. 15v-19v. 'Robertus episcopus Lincolniensis De dotibus'.

(3) fols. 20-23. 'Bulla Gregorii (Innocentii *ante corr.*) papae ad Robertum Lincolniensem episcopum'. This is another copy of the famous letter 128; see above, *C*, no. 4.

³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 437 n. 7.

³⁵ Cf. Thomson, *Writings*, p. 112.

³⁶ *Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Cottonian Library Deposited in the British Museum* (London, 1802; rpt. New York, 1974), p. 478. On Wodewarde (Woodward), see N. R. Ker, *Medieval Libraries of Great Britain*, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1964), p. 261.

It is not listed by Thomson among the manuscripts containing the letter.³⁷ The text has the same postscript as in *C* and might be a copy of *C*.³⁸ The letter ends: '... qui est in celis. Heresis est. ...' as in *C* except: 1 sacer *L*; 3 paruulus *L*; 4 terrematatem *L*; 5 contrarie *L*; 7 pertinanter *L*; 14 conglutinam *L* suspensus *L*; 16 Expliciunt hic littere domino pape per Robertum episcopum Lincolnensem bone (memorie *in ras.*) *L*.

(4) fols. 23v-29. 'Contra fratres mendicantes tractatus' (John Wyclif, *De diabolo et membris eius*).

(5) fols. 29v-32v. A concordance of the Gospels.

Both manuscripts of the *De dotibus* are noted by Thomson, who asserts that each is from an independent tradition.³⁹ In fact, the two copies clearly belong to the same textual tradition, as is indicated by numerous shared errors and omissions.⁴⁰ Moreover, many of *L*'s independent errors seem to be misreadings of the particular hand and abbreviations of *C*, suggesting the possibility that *L* is a direct copy of *C*.⁴¹

The manuscripts' attribution of the treatise *De dotibus* to Robert Grosseteste has never been questioned. The unpolished style of the work is entirely in keeping with that of Grosseteste's short theological treatises.⁴² Even more typical of Grosseteste's writings is the penchant, evident in this treatise, for combining biblical exegesis with natural philosophy. The discussion of light (2.5) is particularly reminiscent of Grosseteste's interests in the metaphysics of light.⁴³

Until a reliable canon of Grosseteste's authentic works has been established it is impossible to demonstrate authorship from parallel passages, but it is worth

³⁷ *Writings*, pp. 143, 193.

³⁸ Both *C* and *L* share obvious errors, e.g., *pertinacitus*¹ and *minus* (see p. 91 above). *L* also has independent errors as noted below.

³⁹ *Writings*, p. 130.

⁴⁰ e.g., 2.2 ad Cor. 3^o] ad Cor. 15^o *recte* corrupcione] cor *CL*; 4.1 certaminibus] curābus *CL*.

⁴¹ See in particular: 1.2 angelicam (ange^{cam}) *C*: angelicam causam (ange^{cam} cām) *L*; 1.5 unde (ū) *C*: una (ū) *L*; 2.5 inmutans (inmūns) *C*: in numeris (innūmis) *L* infimum (infim) *C*: in suum (in suū) *L*; 2.6 attendas (attⁿdas) *C*: attradas (att^rdas) *L*; 2.7 siue (sū) *C*: bene (bñ) *L*; 6.2 est *C*: deo *L*.

⁴² See Daniel A. Callus, 'The *Summa theologiae* of Robert Grosseteste' in *Studies in Medieval History Presented to F. M. Powicke*, ed. R. W. Hunt et al. (Oxford, 1948), pp. 180-208. Cf. Beryl Smalley, 'The Biblical Scholar' in *Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop* (n. 1 above), pp. 70-97.

⁴³ Compare *De dotibus* 2.5 with Grosseteste's *De operationibus solis*, ed. James McEvoy, 'Sun as res et signum: Grosseteste's Commentary on Ecclesiasticus 43:1-5', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 41 (1974) 62-63: '... lux est forma prima que per se extendit materiam corporalem primam in molis dimensionem; et in qua parte deduxerit materiam ad summum rarefactionis et extensionis, remanet ipsa lux prima forma completiva in illa parte materiae...'; and with Grosseteste's *De luce* 51.10: 'Formam primam corporalem, quam quidam corporeitatem vocant, lucem esse arbitror' (ibid., 62 n. 7).

noting that there are other discussions of the *dotes* in works generally attributed to him. In the *Templum domini* seven *dotes* of the glorified body and soul are mentioned. The list is not identical with that in the *De dotibus*, especially with respect to the correspondence of the four *dotes corporis* and the four cardinal virtues:

Templum domini (Oxford, Bodleian)
Lib. Rawlinson A. 384, fol. 100v)

agilitas—temperancia
subtilitas—iusticia
claritas—prudencia
in corruptibilitas—fortitudo

De dotibus (3.2)

agilitas—fortitudo
subtilitas—temperancia
claritas—prudencia
inpassibilitas—iusticia.

But such lists of correspondences are often arbitrary, and minor variations should not be taken too seriously. Indeed, in another part of the *De dotibus* (5.1), the virtue *iusticia* is shown to be related to the gift *agilitas*. Potentially more significant is the *Templum*'s naming of *iudicium*, *dominium* and *unitas* as the three *dotes animae*, rather than the usual *visio*, *dilectio*, *fructio*.⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the treatise *De dotibus*, as it stands, does not include a consideration of the *dotes animae* and thus cannot be compared with the idiosyncratic teaching of the *Templum*. In the sermon *Tota pulchra es* Grosseteste also treats the *dotes*.⁴⁵ After discussing two attributes of Mary's glorified soul (corresponding to *visio* and *dilectio*, but not called *dotes*), he goes on to describe the four *dotes* of her glorified body: 'Quatuor igitur dotibus glorificatum gloriosissime virginis corpus in assumptione totum pulchrum effectum est.'⁴⁶ These he gives as *splendor*, *agilitas*, *impassibilitas* and *subtilitas*, and he associates them with *prudencia*, *temperantia*, *fortitudo* and *iustitia* respectively. While all three treatments of the *dotes* differ from one another in minor details, the differences are such as might occur in discussions written by the same author at varying times and in varying circumstances. They do not prove Grosseteste's authorship, but neither do they reflect any doctrinal inconsistencies which might suggest different authors for each of the treatises.

External evidence confirms the ascription of the *De dotibus* to Robert Grosseteste. The author of the *Speculum iuniorum*, an anonymous English pastoral *summa* written about 1250, quotes a substantial passage concerning the *dotes*, and notes the source as 'certain [disputed] questions of Robert Grosseteste' (*In*

⁴⁴ Cf. Wicki, *Seligkeit*, pp. 229-37, 'Zahl und Namen der *dotes animae*', for the traditional denominations.

⁴⁵ Ed. Servus Gieben, 'Robert Grosseteste and the Immaculate Conception with the Text of the Sermon *Tota pulchra es*', *Collectanea franciscana* 28 (1958) 221-27. Father Gieben has informed me that the sermon should be dated c. 1240 instead of c. 1230 as stated in the article.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 224.

quibusdam questionibus Lincolniensis). The text thus designated is found in our *De dotibus* edited below (2.2, 4, 5).⁴⁷ This explicit ascription by an early and generally reliable source, combined with the internal evidence of style and content, strongly suggests that Grosseteste is the author of the work.

Concerning a date for the composition of the *De dotibus*, Thomson writes: 'It is safe to assume that it is a work of [Grosseteste's] later years, perhaps from his archidiaconal period, though it might be placed in the early years of his episcopate.'⁴⁸ Grosseteste was archdeacon of Leicester from 1229 to 1232. He became bishop of Lincoln in 1235. The scholastic form and content of the *De dotibus* and the implication in the *Speculum iuniorum* that it originated as disputed questions in an academic milieu point toward a date when Grosseteste was actively involved in teaching theology, that is, before 1235.⁴⁹ Internal evidence suggests that Grosseteste knew William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea* (c. 1220 × 1225),⁵⁰ but probably not the work of Alexander of Hales (*Glossa*, 1222 × 1229; *Quaest. disp.*, before 1236), Hugh of St. Cher (*Scriptum*, 1232 × 1234) or the works of those (including Hugh) whose disputed questions on the *doctes* were included in the collection found in ms. Douai 434 (c. 1230 × 1235).⁵¹ Finally, a point of doctrine. Grosseteste's unhesitating

⁴⁷ On the *Speculum iuniorum* see Leonard E. Boyle, 'Three English Pastoral Summae and a Magister Galienus', *Studia gratiana* 11 (1967) 134-44; Joseph Goering, *The Popularization of Scholastic Ideas in 13th Century England and an Anonymous 'Speculum iuniorum'* (Diss. Toronto, 1977). I am preparing an edition of this work. The *Speculum iuniorum* reads: 'In quibusdam questionibus Lincolniensis. ... impassibilitas est optima et nobilissima dispositio quantum ad esse, sicut eius oppositum, scilicet passibilitas, est dispositio minus nobilis et minus bona quantum ad esse. Hanc enim dispositionem consequitur corruptio et mors. ... Claritas enim lucis maxime se exserit in corporibus glorificatis, et est sensatum illius sensus qui maxime est spiritualis, scilicet visus. Unde et Dominus in transfiguratione sua, in qua ostendit gloriam resurrectionis future, hanc solam dotem demonstravit: Mt xvii, *Resplenduit facies eius sicut sol*. ... De hiis quatuor dotibus dicit Apostolus i Cor xv, *Seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptione*, in quo notatur impassibilitas. *Seminatur in ignobilitate*, scilicet deformitatis, *surget in gloria*, id est in claritate: Phil iii, *Reformabit corpus humilitatis nostre configuratum corpori claritatis sue*. *Seminatur corpus animale*, id est alimonia indigens et sic grossum, *surget spirituale*, in quo notatur subtilitas. *Seminatur in infirmitate* ad movendum, sicut ponderosum quod infirmum est ad motum et inpotens, *surget in virtute*, in quo notatur agilitas' (Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Laud Misc. 166, fols. 60v-61r).

⁴⁸ *Writings*, p. 130.

⁴⁹ It is not known when Grosseteste began lecturing in theology. Callus, 'Robert Grosseteste as Scholar' in *Grosseteste, Scholar and Bishop*, p. 8, thinks it may have been as early as 1214; but cf. Josiah Cox Russell, *Dictionary of Writers of Thirteenth Century England* (London, 1936; rpt. New York, 1971), p. 137, where a date before 1229 is suggested. It is certain that Grosseteste lectured on theology to the Oxford Franciscans, probably between the years 1229/30-1235. See Callus, *ibid.*, 10-11, 27-28.

⁵⁰ See text below (1.1, note).

⁵¹ These texts are probably closest in date to Grosseteste's. I have examined all the texts discussed by Wicki, *Seligkeit*, pp. 40-56, and found no evidence that any is a source for Grosseteste's *De dotibus*.

identification of the *dos* as a gift from husband to bride (1.2) sets him apart from theologians writing after 1230, who, as noted above, regularly acknowledged the new usage of *dos* as a gift from the bride to the husband.⁵² A date of composition that harmonizes the evidence from Grosseteste's career with the evidence of doctrinal and literary developments would be c. 1225 × 1230.

One further question arises: is the *De dotibus* in fact, as the *Speculum iuniorum* suggests, a record of disputed questions from the schools? In its present form it is a literary treatise, not a *reportatio* of an actual scholastic exercise. However, a close examination of the text reveals traces of earlier redactions. For example, the chapter divisions in the extant manuscripts are clearly later additions awkwardly superimposed on the text. The original division of the material is preserved in the first sentence of the text, and this division reads very much like the introduction to a series of disputed questions.⁵³ Other traces of scholastic disputation are seen in such phrases as 'Ad quod dicendum quod...' (2.7), and in the last paragraph (6.4), not properly a part of the present chapter 6, which has the form of an objection and reply concerning the number of *dotes*. A similar change from disputed question to treatise form can be observed in other scholastic writings of Grosseteste. For example, Daniel Callus draws attention to the *De libero arbitrio* which 'in the form we now have it suggests the technique of a treatise. Yet the structure of the arguments ... and certain phrases scattered here and there ... may possibly hint at disputations. The earliest manuscript ... bears the colophon *Expliciunt questiones Roberti Grossetet*.'⁵⁴ This evidence supports the early and explicit statement of the *Speculum iuniorum* that the *De dotibus* originated as a series of disputed questions. As a record of scholastic disputations, then, the *De dotibus* provides valuable information about Grosseteste's teaching in or around the time of his lectorship at the Franciscan friary in Oxford.

III

The content of the *De dotibus* provides a classic, if somewhat spare, summary of early scholastic deliberations on the *dotes*. Chapter 1 begins with a question taken from William of Auxerre's *Summa aurea*: 'Since the Church – Christ's

⁵² See above, nn. 24-30.

⁵³ The text as it stands no longer conforms precisely to the order set out in the first sentence. The fifth topic, 'on the *dotes* of the body in order', has disappeared entirely, and the fourth, 'on the order of the body's *dotes*', is included within the third, 'on the number of the *dotes*'. But this proposed division accounts for the materials in the text more adequately than do the chapter divisions found in the extant manuscripts.

⁵⁴ Callus, '*Summa theologiae*', 191.

bride, to whom the *dos* pertains – is composed of both human and angelic beings, why are not *dotes* ascribed to angels as well as to humans?' In reply Grosseteste offers three arguments, each based on the assumption that the *dotes* of a spiritual marriage are to be judged in terms of human marriage practices.⁵⁵ His first response (1.2) parallels closely William of Auxerre's own argument, and in fact only becomes clear in the light of William's somewhat fuller treatment. It begins with the assertion that the *dos* refers to the gift to the bride, primarily in carnal marriage and secondarily in the spiritual marriages that are most like earthly ones. Of the two types of spiritual marriage recognized here, one is based on a bond of love (*vinculum caritatis*) and unites the whole Church, humans as well as angels, to the entire Trinity. The other is based on a bond of faith (*vinculum fidei*): not just faith in the Trinity, as suggested by the commentaries on Os 2:20,⁵⁶ but more specifically faith in the incarnate Son who unites divine and human nature. The marriage is between Christ and the soul, each sharing human nature. Grosseteste asserts that this second marriage is more like true, carnal marriage than the first, and thus the *dos* is ascribed more properly here than in the first type. William of Auxerre's conclusion is more specific: 'In this way the Church that is composed of human beings is said to have *dotes*, but not the angels because they are not united to Christ by a conformity of nature.'⁵⁷

The second argument (1.3) follows similar lines, reinforcing the importance of human marriage customs as the proper basis for theological reflection on the *dotes* of a spiritual marriage. Starting with the archetypal marriage of Adam and Eve, of which it is said in Gen 2:24 and Eph 5:31-32, 'They will be two in one flesh', Grosseteste argues that the phrase cannot apply to angels, who have no flesh, and therefore there is in them neither true marriage nor true endowment.

The third argument (1.4) is particularly striking in its use of human marriage practices as the norm for arguments about the spiritual *dotes*. Presupposing that the heavenly *dotes* will be given according to the same customs as earthly ones,

⁵⁵ This assumption contrasts sharply with the more common twelfth-century view that the heavenly marriage of Christ and his Bride is the prime instance and exemplar in the light of which all lesser (carnal) marriages should be judged.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Biblorum sacrorum tomus quartus cum Glossa ordinaria...* (Lyons, 1545), p. 336: 'Et sponsabo te mihi in fide: in adventu filii, quod est in fide trinitatis, in qua fide credentes statim sciunt, quia ille est deus quem prius negaverunt.' *Hugonis de Sancto Charo Tomus quintus, In libros prophetarum...* (Venice, 1732), fol. 169: 'Et sponsabo te, etc. Hieronimus: ... tertio desponsavit Dominus synagogam ... in adventu Filii, quod est in fide Trinitatis.'

⁵⁷ *Summa aurea* (n. 24 above), fol. 298vb: '... secundum hunc modum dicitur habere *dotes* ecclesia collecta ex hominibus, angeli autem non, quia non uniuntur ei scilicet Christo conformitate nature.'

Grosseteste excludes such gifts from angels because they receive their beatitude instantaneously without any temporal or local motion, whereas *dotes* are first promised to the bride while she is on her way to her new home and are given to her after she has arrived and been taken into her husband's house.

Having clarified some general notions about the heavenly *dotes* by relating them to analogous endowments in earthly marriages, Grosseteste proceeds to distinguish between the endowments of the soul and those of the body. Both body and soul are said to be glorified, that is, both are transformed into their most perfect condition. But the rational soul takes the primary part by first meriting glorification for itself, then for its body. The soul does this by submitting to its superior (God); thus it gradually purifies itself until it attains final cleansing and glorification. By reason of the soul's subjecting itself to its superior, it has subject to itself its own inferior, namely, its body, and by reason of the soul's having its inferior subject to itself, it renews the body little by little so that the body finally attains its own glorification and its highest new life.

In chapter 2 Grosseteste begins his discussion of the *dotes* of the glorified body (*dos corporis*) by establishing the number of *dotes* according to the Old and New Testament authorities (2.1-3). A passage from the Book of Wisdom, attributed to Solomon by the Vulgate, provides the Old Testament warrant for distinguishing four bodily gifts. The New Testament authority comes from Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. Grosseteste also raises (2.4-7) the question of the relative order of the four gifts. He asserts (2.4) that the order given by Solomon⁵⁸ in Sap 3:7 (*claritas, impassibilitas, subtilitas, agilitas*) is the same as that given by the Apostle Paul in 1 Cor 15:42-44 (*impassibilitas, claritas, agilitas, subtilitas*), 'if one pays attention to the construction and the meaning'. Grosseteste's argument is not clear in the text. He asserts that both authors, properly, place *impassibilitas* first and *claritas* second, even though the text of Sap 3:7 clearly reverses this order (*fulgebunt = claritas; iusti = impassibilitas*). Perhaps we should infer here an argument that would reverse the grammatical construction of the passage: *Fulgebunt iusti = Iusti fulgebunt*. This would not alter the meaning of the passage, and would produce the 'normal' grammatical order of noun followed by its verb. Attending, in this way, to the grammatical construction and the meaning of the passage, Solomon and Paul both agree on the order of the *dotes*.

⁵⁸ The manuscripts both have 'in verbis Philonis' but this reading cannot be retained. No such discussion is found in Philo Judaeus. It might be possible to emend *Philonis* to *philosophi* or something similar, but the order of Grosseteste's treatment, here discussing the gifts *per auctoritatem*, later *per rationem*, suggests that we look for a scriptural rather than a philosophical or theological source. 'Salomonis' (*Salōis*) could have easily been corrupted to 'Philonis' (*Philois*) by a careless scribe.

Inpassibilitas is placed first (2.4) because it is the best and most noble condition of the body pertaining to a person's being (*esse*), just as its opposite, *passibilitas*, with its consequences of bodily death and corruption is the worst condition.

Claritas is placed second (2.5) because it is the best condition of the body pertaining to a person's quality of being (*bene esse*), and it acts upon the most important sense (sight). Its opposite, darkness or obscurity, is the worst condition pertaining to quality of being, and is a privation of the most noble sense object. Here Grosseteste raises an objection. Splendor (*claritas*) follows on a lack of matter, i.e., bodies with less matter have more light and brightness and vice versa; but from this it would seem that *subtilitas* should precede *claritas* because it is from *subtilitas*, with its consequent lack of corpulence, that *claritas* arises. Nevertheless, *claritas* precedes *subtilitas* since *claritas* pertains to the sense of sight, which is the source of knowledge and the means of discrimination, and as such is more important to a person's quality of being than *subtilitas*. Grosseteste concludes with one of his typical descriptions of the nobility of light. Agreeing with Augustine that Christ is called 'light' not just figuratively but properly, he adds that 'light is said most appropriately of the first essence which is wholly form without any matter.'

Solomon and Paul both are said to rank *agilitas* third, 'if one pays attention to the construction and the meaning' (2.6). The same argument as above serves to correct 'Solomon's' ordering. In the verse '... et tanquam scintille in arundineto discurrent', *scintille* = *subtilitas*, *discurrent* = *agilitas*. Attending to the order and meaning of the sentence, the subject and verb (*discurrent*) syntactically precede the modifying clause (*tanquam scintille*), and thus *agilitas* precedes *subtilitas*. A further problem is presented by the manuscripts which reverse the order of the Vulgate text, placing '*Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale*' (= *subtilitas*) before '*Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute*' (= *agilitas*). I have emended the text (2.2, ll. 21-23) to restore the actual reading of 1 Cor and to preserve the clear intention of the author.

The last of the four gifts is *subtilitas* (2.7). Again an objection is raised. It seems that *subtilitas* should precede *agilitas* since something is agile because thin or elusive (subtle), not vice versa, just as something is slow because it is fat and heavy. Nevertheless, Grosseteste argues that an active or motive virtue, such as *agilitas*, properly precedes a passive one, such as *subtilitas*, which is a disposition of matter, like obesity.

In chapter 3 Grosseteste examines the rational, theological evidence for his enumeration of the four gifts of the glorified body. He presents arguments from a consideration of the soul (chapters 3-5), and from a consideration of the body (chapter 6). He begins chapter 3 by returning to the point made in chapter 1 (1.5) that the soul merits glorification and *dotes* for its own (*proprium*) body.

This is possible only if the soul is reformed by virtues so as to be informed by them. Of the virtues, three order the soul to God. These are the 'theological' virtues of faith, hope and charity, and through them the soul acquires for itself the three *dotes anime* that constitute its glorification. In addition, there are four 'cardinal' virtues by which the soul is ordered to its body so as to rule it through them, in order that finally through them the soul may acquire glorification for the body. Through the virtue of justice, which is perpetual and immortal, the soul acquires impassibility for the body; through prudence, a kind of light of the soul, it acquires clarity for the body; through courage, which overcomes adversities and easily confronts things causing fright, it acquires agility; through temperance, which thins the body, it acquires spiritual subtlety for the body. Grosseteste concludes that, as four virtues suffice for ordering the body, so the same number of *dotes*, corresponding to those virtues, also suffices for the body's glorification.

In chapter 4 Grosseteste develops a second argument that demonstrates the four *dotes* from a consideration of the soul. Like Anselm before him,⁵⁹ Grosseteste argues from the miseries of the body in hell to the contrary *dotes* of the body in heaven. But unlike Anselm, his arguments treat, not the bodies themselves, but rather the vices of the soul that are implied in the physical torments of the damned. Thus Grosseteste follows Augustine's interpretation of Mt 22:13, *ligatis manibus et pedibus eius, mittite eum in tenebras exteriores: ibi erit fletus et stridor dentium*. Grosseteste identifies three vices of the damned in Augustine's exposition: *ligatis* = *superbia* (4.1); *tenebras exteriores* = *concupiscencie oculorum* (4.2); *stridor dentium* = *concupiscencie carnis* (4.3). *Agilitas* corresponds to its opposite, 'binding', *claritas* to 'darkness', and *impassibilitas* to 'gnashing of teeth'. The fourth *dos*, 'subtilitas', Grosseteste fails to associate with any particular vice, but rather, *per oppositionem*, to the generally gross and ponderous nature of human beings (4.4).

The third psychological argument for this enumeration of the *dotes* is found in chapter 5. Again Grosseteste chooses a text of St. Augustine as his starting point. In the *De musica* Augustine describes four virtues or affections inhering in the souls of the blessed. He names these *contemplatio*, *sanctificatio*, *impassibilitas* and *ordinatio*, and relates them to the virtues of *prudentia*, *temperantia*, *fortitudo* and *justitia* respectively. Grosseteste describes this schema (5.1) and then proceeds to relate the four virtues of the glorified soul to the four *dotes* of the glorified body (5.2): *contemplatio* to *claritas*, *sanctificatio* to *subtilitas*, and *ordinatio* to *agilitas*. *Impassibilitas*, although not mentioned, is tacitly related to its bodily equivalent.

⁵⁹ See above, n. 6.

The demonstrations from a consideration of the soul for the existence of four *dotes corporis* can be represented schematically as follows:

Gift	Cardinal Virtue (chapter 3)	Vice of Damned (chapter 4)	Virtue of Blessed (chapter 5)
inpassibilitas	justitia	concup. carnis	inpassibilitas (fortitudo)
claritas	prudentia	concup. anime	contemplatio (prudentia)
agilitas	fortitudo	superbia	ordinatio (justitia)
subtilitas	temperantia	—	sanctificatio (temperantia).

In chapter 6 Grosseteste argues from the body itself, in particular from the four elements composing bodies, to demonstrate that the proper number of *dotes* for the body is four. In 6.1 he says that *claritas* corresponds properly (*per proprietatem*) to the element of fire and *subtilitas* corresponds properly to the element of air. Just as these elements themselves will be glorified at the end of time, so as constituent parts of human bodies they will be sublimated, according to the diverse merits of individuals, producing various degrees of clarity and subtlety in the glorified bodies.

The other elements – earth and water – correspond to *agilitas* and *inpassibilitas* ‘by appropriation’. Grosseteste illustrates the meaning of ‘appropriation’ by an example from Trinitarian theology where qualities are appropriated to someone so as to exclude possible errors or misunderstandings. For example, power is attributed to the Father by appropriation lest He be thought weak (as earthly fathers in their old age), and wisdom is attributed to the Son by appropriation lest the Son should be thought foolish (as earthly sons often lack wisdom because of their youth).⁶⁰ In this way *agilitas* is attributed to the element earth lest the earthy components of glorified bodies seem to imply some weightiness (*ponderositas*), and *inpassibilitas* is attributed to water (the most passible element) lest it be thought that the glorified body has any passibility.

At 6.3 Grosseteste goes on to explain that there will be a twofold glorification of the physical elements, one according to the elements in themselves, another as they constitute human bodies; the glorification will be further diversified in the latter according to the respective merits of individual souls. Thus each of the elements comprising Christ’s body has been elevated and changed to its highest realization and so has been most fully glorified, because his soul merited most fully.

This chapter concludes with a formal objection based on Anselm’s distinction of seven, rather than four, blessings of the glorified body. Grosse-

⁶⁰ For the method see Peter Lombard, 1 *Sent.* 34.4.1, 3rd edition, 1 (Grottaferrata, 1971), pp. 252-53.

teste solves the objection by arguing that six of the Anselmian gifts are subsumed under the four *dotes corporis* and that the seventh pertains properly to the soul, not to the body, and can be ignored.⁶¹

To judge from internal evidence, Grosseteste may have gone on to discuss each of the four *dotes* in more detail and to treat the three *dotes anime* as well, but such a continuation has not yet been identified.⁶² Even in its present abbreviated form, however, the text is an important example of the scholastic discussions *de dotibus* in the early thirteenth century. It also sheds a little more light on the important, but still poorly understood, teaching career of Robert Grosseteste.

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The edition below of Grosseteste's *De dotibus* was prepared from microfilms of the manuscripts and is based on *C*, the older surviving copy and possibly the exemplar of *L*. All variant readings in *L* are given in an *apparatus criticus*, but corrections made by the scribes of *C* and *L* are not noted. Punctuation and paragraph divisions follow modern practice; orthography and chapter divisions are those of *C*. Emendations have been kept to a minimum, and, where the text is particularly terse or obscure, elucidatory passages from other writers have been cited in the *apparatus fontium*. Square brackets are used to indicate a deletion, pointed brackets an addition in the text.

⁶¹ For other solutions see Wicki, *Seligkeit*, pp. 203-205. No other author reconciles the two traditions in exactly this way.

⁶² See the text (1.1), '... quinto de ipsis [dotibus corporis] per ordinem'; (3.1) 'Per has tres acquirit ipsa sibi tres dotes [anime] a quibus est ei sua glorificacio, de quibus infra dicendum est.'

TRACTATVS LINCOLNIENSIS DE DOTIBVS

C 209vb

Capitulum primum

L 15v

1 Primo dicendum est de dote, secundo quod anima meretur dotes tam sibi
quam corpori, tercio de numero dotum, quarto de ordine dotum corporis,
5 quinto de ipsis per ordinem.

2 Cum enim una sit ecclesia ex hominibus et angelis que est sponsa Christi
ad quam dos spectat, quare non dicuntur dotes angelorum sicut et hominum ?
Ad quod dicendum quod dos primo dicitur in matrimonio carnali donum
scilicet sponse accedens ex matrimonio. Secundo ergo dicitur in matrimonio
10 quod maxime assimilatur matrimonio carnali. Hoc autem est matrimonium
spirituale duplex, unum quod fit per uinculum caritatis, et illud est inter totam
trinitatem et naturam angelicam. Aliud est quod fit per uinculum fidei, non
trinitatis tantum set filii incarnati, unde Ozee 2^o: *Sponsabo te mihi in fide*. Hoc
matrimonium est inter naturam anime scilicet et filium Dei communicantem
15 una natura scilicet humana. Illius matrimonii est illud osculum de quo dicitur
Canticorum primo: *Osculetur me osculo oris sui*. Quoniam ergo hoc matri-
monium similius est uero matrimonio quod est carnale matrimonium quam
matrimonium prius, ideo hic dicitur uerius dos quam ibi.

3 Item sicut in primo matrimonio dicitur: *erunt duo in carne una*, ita et in
20 hoc matrimonio dici potest 'erunt duo in carne una' sicut habetur ad Eph 5^o:
Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et ecclesia. Sic autem
dici non potest in illo matrimonio; neque enim in carne una neque in natura

1 1-2 Incipit tractatus Lincolniensis de dotibus (capitulum primum *in marg.*) C, Robertus
Episcopus Lincolniensis de dotibus L (*manus recens*) 8 in om. L 9 ex matrimonio] de
mrois L ergo] igitur L 10 assimilantur L 12 angelicam causam L 14 filii
C 15 una natura] unum nomen L matrimonium CL 16 ergo] igitur L
19 una carne L

1 6-24 Cf. Guillelmum Altissiodorensem, *Summa aurea* 4.12.1 (Paris, 1500), fol. 298vb:
'De dotibus resurgentium. Queritur autem cum una sit ecclesia ex hominibus et angelis que est
sponsa christi quare non dicantur angeli habere dotes sicut et homines. Est enim dos illud donum
quod sponsa habet ex matrimonio. Et ad hoc dicunt magistri quod dupliciter dicitur ecclesia
sponsa christi. Primo, quia unitur ei per caritatem, et sic est sponsa non solum christi sed etiam
totius trinitatis. Secundo modo dicitur sponsa christi quia unitur ei caritate et conformitate
nature, et hoc modo est sponsa solius filii dei quia ad solum filium dei habet illud osculum de quo
dicit Salomon: *Osculetur me osculo oris sui*; et secundum hunc modum dicitur habere dotes
ecclesia collecta ex hominibus, angeli autem non quia non uniuntur ei scilicet christo
conformitate nature. Unde apostolus: Nusquam angelos apprehendit sed semen Abrahe
apprehendit.... 13 Os 2:20 16 Cant 1:1 19 Gen 2:24 20-21 Eph 5:31-32

una. Unde ad Eph 2^o: *Nusquam autem angelos apprehendit, set semen Abrahe.*
Non est ergo ibi ita uere matrimonium, quare nec dos.

25 4 Item dotes dicuntur in quantum sunt sponse a sponso promisse in uia et
eidem solute cum iam peruenta fuerit ad patriam et traducta in domum sponsi.
210ra Sic autem non est in / angelis. Non / enim prius fuerunt in uia ut postea essent
16r in patria, ideo eorum non est proprie dos.

5 Dos autem diuiditur in dotem corporis et dotem anime, et utraque
30 glorificacio dicitur. Est autem glorificacio rei in suum optimum inmutacio
siue sublimacio, primo ad Cor: *Omnes quidem resurgemus set non omnes*
inmutabimur. Anima autem rationalis prius meretur glorificacionem sibi,
deinde suo corpori. Ipsa enim prius se subicit suo superiori et sic paulatim se
35 mundat et purificat ut tandem ad sui glorificacionem et ultimam mundacionem
peruenit, secundo ad Cor 4^o: *Is qui uetus est homo noster renouatur de die in*
dies; ad Eph 4^o: *Renouamini spiritu mentis uestre;* Ac 15: *Fide purificans*
corda eorum. Unde autem anima se subicit suo superiori, inde sibi subiectum
habet suum inferius, scilicet corpus suum, et unde subiectum habet sibi suum
inferius, inde ipsum paulatim renouat ut tandem ueniat ad sui glorificacionem
40 et summam innouacionem. Unde Augustinus *De uera religione*: 'Post mortem
temporalem quam habemus post peccata, tempore atque ordine suo hoc corpus
restituatur pristina stabilitati quam non per se habebit, set per animam
stabilitam in Deo. Que rursus non per se stabilitur set per Deum quo fruitur,
ideoque amplius quam corpus uiuebit; corpus enim per ipsam et ipsa per
45 incommutabilem ueritatem.'

Capitulum secundum

1 Numerus autem dotum corporis quaternarius monstratur, prius auctori-
tate, post ratione. Auctoritate, prius ueteris testamenti, post noui. In ueteri enim
16v / testamento in libro Sap 3^o dicitur: *Fulgebunt iusti et tanquam scintille et*
5 cetera. In eo quod ait 'fulgebunt' notatur claritas. In eo quod ait 'iusti',

23 autem angelos] autem ad angelos L 28 est om. L post dos add. CL unde
Augustinus ... ueritatem (ex ll. 40-45) 29 diuiditur] diuisum L dotem] dote L
30 dicitur ... glorificacio om. L 37 unde] una L 38 unde] una L 41 habemus]
habens L ordine] corpore L

2 1 capitulum secundum de numero dotum in marg. C, om. L 3 post] prius L
5 in¹ ... claritas om. L

23 Heb 2:16; cf. supra, Altissiodorensem, *Summa aurea* 31-32 1 Cor 15:51 35-
36 2 Cor 4:16 36 Eph 4:23 36-37 Ac 15:9 40-45 Augustinus, *De uera*
religione 12.25.67 (CCL 32.202-203; Turnhout, 1962)

2 4-5 Sap 3:7

inpassibilitas in corpore ex qua est inpassibilitas in anima. Ipsa enim est ordinacio triplex sicut docet Augustinus ex qua uenit inpassibilitas. Unde Sap 1^o: *Iusticia perpetua est et immortalis*, et hec est causa inpassibilitatis in corpore. In eo quod ait 'tanquam scintille' notatur subtilitas, Eccli 42: *Quam desiderabilia opera eius et tanquam / scintille* et cetera. In eo quod ait 'discurent' notatur agilitas.

2 In nouo testamento primo ad Cor 3^o, *Seminatur in cor <rupcione>*, *surget incorruptum*, in quo notatur inpassibilitas: Sap 6^o, *Custodio legum consummatio est incorruptionis; incorruptio autem facit proximum esse Deo*.
 15 *Seminatur in ignobilitate[m]*, scilicet deformitatis et humanitatis, *surget in gloria*, id est claritate: ad Phi 3^o, *Qui reformabit corpus humilitatis nostre configuratum corpori claritatis sue*, et ab hac dote dicuntur corpora glorificata. Claritas enim lucis maxime se extendit in corporibus glorificatis et est sensatum sensus maxime spiritualis. Unde etiam Dominus in transfiguratione sua in qua
 20 *gloriam future resurrectionis ostendit hanc solam dotem ostendit*, Matt 17: *Et resplenduit facies eius sicut sol*. *Seminatur in infirmitate* ad mouendum, sicut ponderosum quod est infirmum ad motum et inpotens, *surget in uirtute*, in quo notatur agilitas. *Seminatur corpus animale*, id est alimonia indigens et sic grossum, *surget spirituale*, in quo notatur subtilitas.

25 3 Propter has quattuor dotes comparatur justus secundum corpus glorificatum soli, Matt 13: *Tunc iusti fulgebunt / sicut sol* et cetera; et Apoc 12: *Mulier amicta sole*, id est anima corpore glorificato. In lumine enim solis est claritas. Est etiam agilitas; in momento enim est ab oriente in occidentem. Est etiam inpassibilitas; percussus enim non leditur. Est et subtilitas, unde utrum
 30 pertransit sine aliqua diuisione.

4 Attende etiam quod idem est ordo dotum in uerbis Salomonis qui quidem est in uerbis Apostoli et e conuerso. Utrobique enim primo ponitur inpassibilitas, si attendas construccioni[s] et sentencie, et prima merito ponitur. Hec enim optima est et nobilissima dispositio quantum ad esse, sicut eius
 35 oppositum, scilicet passibilitas, est dispositio minime nobilis et bona quantum ad esse. Hanc enim disposicionem sequitur corruptio et mors.

9 scintille om. L 11 discurent om. L 19 sua] sue CL 21-23 seminatur in infirmitate ... seminatur corpus animale] seminatur corpus animale ... seminatur in infirmitate CL
 24 notatur] nota C 29 etiam] et L 31 Salomonis] Philonis CL; cf. supra, p. 97 n. 58 36 disposicionem enim L

6-7 Cf. Augustinum, *De musica* 6.15 (PL 32.1189) 7-8 Sap 1:15 9-10 Ecclus 42:23
 12-24 1 Cor 15:42-44; cf. Hugonem de s. Caro, *Opera omnia in uniuersum Vetus et Nouum Testamentum* 7 (Venice, 1732), ff. 118vb-119ra 13-14 Sap 6:19-20 15-16 1 Cor 15:43 16-17 Phil 3:21 20-21 Mt 17:2 21-24 1 Cor 15:43-44 26 Mt 13:43 26-27 Apoc 12:1

5 Secundo utrobique ponitur claritas, quia ipsa est optima et nobilissima
 210va dispositio quantum ad bene esse, et est sen-/satum inmutans sensum
 nobilissimum, sicut eius oppositum, scilicet tenebra uel obscuritas, est pessima
 40 dispositio quantum ad bene esse et priuacio sensati nobilissimi. Claritas etiam
 consequitur paucitatem materie et corpulencie, unde corpora que habent minus
 de materia plurimum habent de luce et claritate; et sic conuenienter ita quod
 corpus infimum, scilicet terra, quod plurimum habet de materia, minimum
 habet de luce et plurimum de tenebra; unde et lux est opus prime diei. Ex hac
 45 ratione uidetur quod subtilitas precedat claritatem. Subtilitas enim est ex
 paucitate corpulencie ex qua est claritas maior. Set tamen claritas precedit
 quoad bene esse, quod est in ordinacione ad uisum qui est principium sciencie
 et multas differencias ostendit. Tanta etiam est lucis nobilitas quod, sicut dicit
 Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, 4^o: 'Non sic dicitur Christus lux sicut
 [7v 50 lapis, set illud proprie, istud figurative', ita etiam / lux dicitur propriissime de
 essencia prima que est totaliter forma nichil habens de materia.

6 Tercio, utrobique ponitur agilitas si attendas construccioni[s] et sentencie.

7 Quarto et ultimo utrobique ponitur subtilitas. Set uidetur quod subtilitas
 55 debeat precedere agilitatem: non enim quia agile ideo subtile, set potius scilicet
 quia subtile ideo agile, sicut e contrario quia grossum et ponderosum, ideo
 tardum. Set nota quod uirtus actiua siue motiua dignitate prior est quam
 passiuia. Unde agilitas, cum sit a uirtute motiua, dignitate prior est quam
 subtilitas que est dispositio materie sicut et grossicies.

Capitulum tertium

1 Postquam ostensus est numerus dotum per auctoritatem, restat ipsum
 ostendere per rationem sumptam ex parte anime, post per rationem sumptam
 ex parte corporis. Quoniam autem anima meretur corpori suo glorificacionem,
 5 tunc meretur ei dotes per quas proprium glorificatur. Et quoniam glorificacio-
 nem corporis non meretur anima nisi informata uirtutibus, oportet eam
 uirtutibus reformari. Quedam autem sunt uirtutes quibus ordinatur ad Deum,

38 inmutans] in numeris *L* 41 sequitur *L* unde] una *L* 42 conuenienter]
 conuerter *L* 43 infimum] in suum *L* 44 unde] una *L* 52 attendas] attradas *L*
 56 siue] bene *L*

3 1 capitulum tertium in marg. *C*, om. *L* 4-5 corpori ... meretur om. *L*

49-50 Augustinus, *De Gen. ad litt.* 4.28 (CSEL 28/3.2; Prague-Vienna-Leipzig, 1894),
 pp. 126-27 50-51 Cf. *De operationibus solis*, ed. James McEvoy, 'The Sun as res and
 signum: Grosseteste's Commentary on *Ecclesiasticus* ch. 43, vv. 1-5', *Recherches de théologie
 ancienne et médiévale* 41 (1974) 62-63

sicud sunt uirtutes theologicæ, scilicet fides, spes et caritas. Per has tres acquirit ipsa sibi tres dotes a quibus est ei sua glorificatio, de quibus infra dicendum est.

10 2 Alie autem sunt quattuor uirtutes que cardinales dicuntur quibus
ordinatur ad corpus suum, ut per eas regant ipsum, ut tandem per eas adquirat
sibi glorificationem. Per iusticiam igitur que est perpetua et immortalis, acquirit
C 210vb ei impassibilitatem. Per prudentiam autem que est lux quedam anime, acquirit
15 ei claritatem. Per fortitudinem que aduersa superat et / terribilia facili-
ter aggreditur, acquirit agilitatem. Unde et Apostolus agilitatem uirtutem nominat,
L 18r primo ad Cor 19: *Seminatur in infirmitate, / surget in uirtute*; et Sap 8, ubi
loquitur de agilitate sapientie dicitur: *Attingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter et*
cetera, fortitudinem dicit uirtutem. Per temperanciam autem que corpus
attenuat, acquirit ei subtilitatem spirituales. Et sic si sufficiens est numerus
20 uirtutum quattuor cardinalium ad ordinacionem corporis, immo quia sufficiens
est, tunc et sufficit iste numerus dotum corporis illis quattuor uirtutibus
corespondencium.

Capitulum quartum

1 Potest autem et numerus dotum corporis per quas fit corpus beatum
monstrari per miseras illis contrarias que erunt in inferno, quarum tres
tanguntur Matt 24: *Ligatis illi manibus* et cetera. Hoc exponens Augustinus
5 *De uera religione* ait 'Qui certaminibus delectantur, summis difficultatibus
implicabuntur', quod significatur in hoc quod ait 'Ligatis' et cetera. Huic e
contra in corpore glorificato respondet agilitas. Quod Augustinus ait 'Qui
certaminibus delectantur', hoc superbie est. Inter enim superbos semper iurgia
sunt.

11 eas. Regant L

4 1 capitulum quartum in marg. C, om. L
8 certaminibus Aug.: curābus C: curacionibus L

5 certaminibus Aug.: curābus CL
delectantur] dolet CL

3 16 1 Cor 15:43 16-17 Sap 8:1

4 4 Mt 22:13 4-15 Augustinus, *De uera religione* 54.104.287-88 (CCL 32.254): 'Qui
ergo male utuntur tanto mentis bono, ut extra eam visibilia magis appetant, quibus ad
conspicienda et diligenda intellegibilia commemorari debuerunt, dabuntur eis exteriores
tenebrae. Harum quippe initium est carnis prudentia et sensuum corporeorum imbecillitas. Et
qui certaminibus delectantur, alienabuntur a pace et summis difficultatibus implicabuntur.
Initium enim summae difficultatis est bellum atque contentio. Et hoc significare arbitror, quod
ligantur ei manus et pedes, id est facilitas omnis aufertur operandi. Et qui sitire et esurire volunt
et in libidinem ardescere et defatigare, ut libenter edant et bibant et concumbant et dormiant,
amant indigentiam, quod est initium summorum dolorum. Perficietur ergo in eis quod amant, ut
ibi eis sit ploratus et stridor dentium.'

10 2 Hiis autem qui contemptis inuisibilibus appetunt magis uisibilia, dabuntur tenebre exteriores, hoc est, concupiscencie oculorum. Huic e contra in corpore glorificato respondet claritas.

3 Hii autem qui sitire et esurire uolunt et in libidine ardescere amant indigenciam, et est initium summorum dolorum et perficietur in eis quod
 15 amant ut sit eis ploratus et stridor dencium. Huic e contra in corpore glorificato respondet impassibilitas. Hec enim pena est maxima passibilitas carnis; unde
 18v Eccli 11, *Via[m] peccancium conplan[ata] et cetera, et in fine inferi et tenebre et pene:* / primum contra *superbiam*, secundum contra *concupiscenciam oculorum*, tertium contra *concupiscenciam carnis*. Hec est maxime fragilis et passibilis.
 20

4 Qui autem huiusmodi est homo carnalis et terrenus, et ita grossus et ponderosus. Huic autem in corpore glorificato respondet subtilitas. Unde primo ad Cor 15°, prius est quod animale est, deinde quod spirituale: *Primus homo de terra terrenus, secundus homo de celo celestis.*

Capitulum quintum

1 Item sicut ostendit Augustinus 6° *Musice*, hiis quattuor uirtutibus anime in uia corespondent quattuor affectiones uel uirtutes anime in patria, que sunt
 211ra contemplacio, sanctificacio, in-/passibilitas, et ordinacio-eius. Prima respondet
 5 prudencie, secunda temperancie, tercia fortitudini, quarta iusticie.

2 Hiis autem quattuor uirtutibus anime in patria corespondere possunt quattuor dotes corporis in patria: contemplacioni in anima, claritas in corpore; sanctificacioni in anima (qua scilicet immaculata manet, sicut dicitur ibidem), subtilitas in corpore; ordinacioni in anima, agilitas in corpore; ordinacio enim
 10 in anima corespondet iusticie. Iusticie autem debetur agilitas. Unde Eccli 7°: *Noli querere fieri iudex*, ecce iusticia; sequitur: *nisi ualeas irrumpere iniquitatem*, ecce agilitas. Sic enim agilitas nominatur ab Apostolo, primo ad Cor 15°: *Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in uirtute*. Unde Ysa 15°: *Uelociter reddetis quod iustum est*. Unde sequitur Eccli 6°: *Ne forte extimescas faciem*
 15 *potentis, et pones scandalum in agilitate tua.*

13 scitire L 17 et⁴ super lin. C

5 1 capitulum quintum in marg. C, om. L 10 unde igitur L 11 nisi nisi L

17-18 Ecclus 21:11 18-19 Cf. 1 Jo 2:16 23-24 1 Cor 15:47

5 2-5 Augustinus, *De musica* 6.15-17 (PL 32.1189-91) 8 Cf. ibid. 6.17 (PL 32.1191)
 10-12 Ecclus 7:6 13 1 Cor 15:43; cf. supra, 2.2 (p. 104) 13-14 Is 16:5
 14-15 Ecclus 7:6

Capitulum sextum

- L. 19r 1 Secundo restat ostendere numerum dotum corporis per rationem sumptam ex parte corporis. Iuxta ergo quattuor elementa possunt distingui quattuor dotes, due per proprietatem, due / per appropriacionem. Due per
 5 proprietatem ut splendor et claritas igni, subtilitas aeri. In corpore enim glorificato sublimabitur claritas ignis, uerumptamen non eodem modo set secundum maius et minus, quia sicut diuersimode glorificantur corpora hominum, sic diuersimode glorificabuntur elementa in eius corpore. Sic et subtilitas aeris.
- 10 2 Due autem per appropriacionem. Agilitas propter terram, ne ibi uideretur esse aliqua ponderositas. Inpassibilitas propter aquam, que alicomodo maxime passibilis est, ne ibi crederetur esse aliqua passibilitas, sicut potencia attribuitur patri per appropriacionem ne pater crederetur inpotens, sapiencia filio ne crederetur insipiens.
- 15 3 Et hec est una glorificacio que erit elementorum in quantum sunt constituencia corpus humanum. Hec autem diuersificabitur in elementis secundum diuersitatem glorificacionis in corpore elementato, cuius diuersitas erit secundum merita animarum. Ex hoc patet quod duplex erit elementorum glorificacio. Una secundum id quod sunt in seipsis, alia secundum id quod sunt
 20 in corporibus humanis, et hec erit adhuc diuersificata. In corpore enim Christi est unumquodque elementum sublimatum / et inmutatum usque ad summum sui, et ita summe glorificatum. Et hoc quia anima eius, cui pater dedit *non ad mensuram Spiritum*, sicut habetur Ioh 3^o, summe meruit.
- C 211rb 4 Set uidetur contrarium huic numero dotum quod habetur ab Anselmo *De quattuordecim beatitudinibus* ubi ait 'Septem mihi uidentur, que corporibus possunt adaptari, decentissima et ad beatitudinem sufficiencia, et sunt hec pulcritudo, uelocitas, fortitudo, libertas, sanitas, uoluptas, diuturnitas. Anime uero hec possunt aptari: sapiencia, amicitia, concordia, potestas, honor, securitas, gaudium. Hiis beatitudinibus totidem sunt miseriarum / genera
 L 19v 30 contraria que sunt turpitude, ponderositas, inbecillitas, seruitus, infirmitas, anxietas, uite breuitas, insipencia, inimicia, discordia, dedecus, inpotencia, timor, tristicia.' Ecce quod corpori glorificato assignantur septem, set attende quod illa reducuntur ad quattuor. Ad claritatem enim refertur pulcritudo. Ad inpassibilitatem, sanitas, diuturnitas, fortitudo que in patria inpassibilitas dicitur

6 1 capitulum sextum in marg. C, om. L
 12 est] deo L 20 corporalibus L
 31 insipencia] insapiencia L

7-8 glorificantur ... diuersimode om. L
 25 corporalibus L 26 adoptari L

- 35 ab Augustino. Ad agilitatem, uelocitas et libertas. Hoc est enim corpus esse liberum, scilicet a difficultate expeditum. Uoluptas autem corporis per se non est set anime. Potest etiam libertas per se reduci ad subtilitatem que resistenciam non habet.

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38 *post habet add.* Explicit Lincolniensis de dotibus C, Explicit liber Lincolniensis de dotibus quod Wodewarde L

THE *QVESTIO DE VNITATE VNIVERSALIS*
OF VINCENT FERRER *

John A. Trentman

VINCENT Ferrer began his *Tractatus de suppositionibus* with a discussion of the problem of universals, giving as his reason that since categorical propositions are distinguished logically according to their universal terms, one cannot properly discuss the supposition of terms in such propositions without first stating one's position in the universals controversy and distinguishing it from other possible options. This is by no means merely an excuse to drag the problem of universals into a logical treatise but is based on some of Vincent's fundamental beliefs about the relations between logic and metaphysics, beliefs about the ontological commitments of logicians.¹ In the *Tds*, three positions are distinguished, in good Aristotelian fashion two extremes and a mean. We should, of course, strive for the mean, which (it comes as no surprise) is Ferrer's own position. He remarks that it ought not to be called an opinion but, rather, the truth; and he identifies it with Aquinas and Aristotle along with a variety of other authorities, not all of whom, one might have thought, were completely of the same mind on the subject. The two extremes are pretty extreme, or perhaps one might better say that they are left rather crude and unqualified. One of them simply holds that the universal is a real thing, existing independently of any act of mind. This Ferrer attributed to Walter Burley. The other holds that the universal is in no way real, that it cannot 'be really distinguished from nothing'. This remarkable view is attributed to Ockham 'and his followers'. There is much to complain about on behalf of Ockham and Burley for such cavalier treatment, and Ferrer was, by our lights, generally imprecise and careless in his

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¹ Vincent Ferrer, *Tractatus de suppositionibus*, critical edition with introduction by John A. Trentman (Grammatica speculativa. Sprachtheorie und Logik des Mittelalters 2; Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1977). The abbreviation *Tds* here refers to this work.

historical attributions; but in this he was no worse than other medieval philosophers. There is, nevertheless, much of interest in the *prooemium* of *Tds*; the text edited here takes up in detail one aspect of the problems raised there, the sense in which one can speak of the unity of the universal and, following from this, the question of whether this unity can be called real.

Both the *Tds* and the *Questio de unitate universalis* have been attributed to St. Vincent Ferrer since his own lifetime. The only person to doubt their authenticity was Sigismund Brettle, writing in 1924.² Brettle's strongest argument, not a very strong one to overthrow a tradition of five centuries, is that the manuscripts identify the two philosophical works only as the work *Magistri Vincentii* without ever mentioning 'Ferrer'. As I have pointed out in the introduction to *Tds*,³ all three extant manuscripts of that work mention Ferrer. Although the single extant manuscript of the *questio* does not use the word 'Ferrer', it does identify Master Vincent as a Dominican. I shall have more to say about the manuscript shortly, but here it might be noted that the text is doubtless written in the same hand as the text of *Tds*, which is found in the same codex before it. It is most likely that the scribe, having already copied the long *tractatus*, giving a full account of the author, including where and when he wrote the treatise, thought it sufficient when he came to copying the shorter *questio* to abbreviate his description. In view of both contemporary testimony and the long tradition attributing both philosophical works to Ferrer, I cannot see that this abbreviated description constitutes grounds for doubting the authenticity of the *questio*.⁴ Apart from a few citations in his own time and shortly after, the two treatises have not been studied until recently. But all of Vincent's biographers throughout the centuries have attributed both works to him, although one of them in the nineteenth century declared both treatises to be entirely lost.⁵ There is no reason not to regard the *questio* as an authentic work of Ferrer's and to compare its doctrine with that of his other philosophical work.

Although the matter has not always been described in terms of the unity of the universal, the questions considered in this text are as old as western philosophy itself and continue to be discussed and debated. In general they

² *San Vicente Ferrer und sein literarischer Nachlass* (Münster, 1924), p. 33.

³ *Tds*, pp. 14-15.

⁴ In fact, there is considerable evidence that Ferrer was commonly called simply Magister Vincentius Ordinis Predicatorum. For a readily accessible example, see Edward A. Synan, *The Popes and the Jews in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1965), p. 143 n. 74, and p. 212. The authenticity of the two treatises is discussed in greater detail in *Tds*, pp. 14-15.

⁵ A. Bayle, *Vie de S. Vincent Ferrier de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs (1350-1419)* (Paris, 1855), p. 327.

concern the problem of the one and the many; more specifically they are about such concepts as oneness, sameness and difference. It is no accident that, when Plato in the *Sophist* took to sorting out the problem of the one and the many and the problems of predication and false judgement, he turned to these concepts for examples of the blending or combining of forms, and professional articles continue to be written about them. Ferrer's position (and his answer to the *questio*) is quickly stated, as he says, in two propositions.⁶ First, the unity of the universal is not properly speaking real; that is, in the strict sense of the word the only real unity is numerical unity, and there is no universal thing that is numerically one. Secondly, there is a unity of the universal, but it is a rational unity; that is, it is a product of and dependent on acts of mind.

In order to reach these conclusions, Ferrer builds on some classical sources. As he points out (IV.3, 64-67), an important key to his solution of the problem is found in what he calls modalities or nuances (*modificationes*) of identity and diversity. In order to describe these 'modalities' we need an analysis of sameness. For this Vincent turns to the primary source in Aristotle, *Topics* 1.7 (103a6 ff.). One can distinguish three senses in which we can talk about sameness (*idem*): first, numerically; there may be two names for one and the same thing, as an object might be called either a jacket or a coat; secondly, specifically; we may talk about two things that are the same in species, e.g., two men or two horses; and thirdly, generically; we may talk about two things that are the same with respect to genus, like a man and a horse. These distinctions are clearly and precisely stated by Boethius (whose terms are *idem* and *diversum*) in *De Trinitate* (1.16-31); they were later repeated by John of Salisbury in his *Metalogicon* (3.9) and became commonplace in later medieval philosophy. Items can be 'diverse' without being 'different' on each of the levels distinguished.

What Ferrer made of this set of Aristotelian distinctions can perhaps be illuminated by some modern comparisons. Many twentieth-century philosophers have taken the start if not the conclusion of their discussions of the problems of identity and sameness from the principle, attributed to Leibniz and Russell, of the identity of indiscernibles. This principle, expressed in the definition $(x = y) = \text{df. } (F) (Fx \rightarrow Fy)$, has generally been taken to define identity in terms of sameness, more precisely sameness of attribute. It entails that things are identical, if and only if they are the same in all respects. This is a little vague, however, and philosophers have reacted to it or amplified it in various ways. It will be useful here to consider briefly three different responses.

⁶ III.1 and III.2.52-56. (All references refer to sections, paragraphs, and lines in the text edited on pp. 122-37 below).

I shall identify them with particular authors, but since my purpose is to shed light on Ferrer's doctrine, more extensive scholarship is not to the point, and it goes without saying that these are not the only possible responses and that they are not necessarily the inventions exclusively of the authors I cite.

In *The Foundations of Mathematics* F. P. Ramsey raised an objection to the principle of the identity of indiscernibles by arguing that it is possible, at least logically possible, for two different things to have all their elementary properties in common.⁷ Ramsey found support for his point in Wittgenstein's doctrine in his *Tractatus* that identity is not a genuine logical function but can be replaced by the convention that different signs have different meanings. As Wittgenstein put it, 'Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs.'⁸ Ramsey, then, maintained that (1) identity is numerical and (2) things can be the same in all respects but not identical.

The idea that concepts like identity and difference are, following Wittgenstein, represented or 'shown' by formal or categorical features of an ideal logical schema for descriptive language has also been used in support of a rather different distinction between identity and sameness. According to this view, 'same' and 'different' (the medieval *diversum*) are taken in what is held to be their commonsense meanings such that whenever we are presented with two things and not one, we discern that there are two, i.e., that they are different; and the converse is true of sameness. This difference or sameness would be *shown* by the use of either two or one descriptive signs, not expressed by signs for difference or sameness. Against this background it is maintained that although the identity of indiscernibles holds for individuals, with respect to attributes or properties we have the discernibility of identicals: two properties can be identical while not being the same.⁹ What is intended here is that two perceived instances of the colour red are two and hence not the same, but they are identically red. In this view, then, we find that (1) sameness is numerical and (2) two (exemplifications of properties) can be identical but not the same.

It has also been maintained that all identity and all difference are numerical so that there are no such things as non-numerical specific identity or merely numerical difference. But, according to this third view, identity, sameness and difference are essentially incomplete. For every use of these concepts, one must always specify, or be prepared to specify, the context, the sort of identity or

⁷ F. P. Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays* (London, 1931), p. 31.

⁸ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London, 1961), 5.53.

⁹ Gustav Bergmann, *Meaning and Existence* (Madison, 1960), pp. 130-31, 132-38; cf. *idem*, *Logic and Reality* (Madison, 1964), p. 148.

difference at issue. Thus, in order to answer the question, 'Was the conflict in which Nelson fought at Trafalgar the same as that in which Napoleon fought at Austerlitz?', one must specify whether a war or a battle is presupposed. Given that the context can always be spelled out, every assertion that something is the same or two things are different is an assertion about one individual, one species, one genus or about two individuals, two species, two genera.¹⁰ The consequences of this view are that (1) identity and sameness are both numerical (indeed, 'identity' and 'sameness' are interchangeable) but (2) there can be different kinds of numerical sameness (or identity).

It now remains to fit Ferrer's doctrine into this sketch. This *questio* is about the unity of the universal, but *unitas* is also Ferrer's word for sameness. It is the word used to translate Aristotle's τὸ ταυτόν in the *Topics*; so we could as well say that the question at issue is that of the sameness of the universal – what sort of sameness characterizes it and whether this sameness is something real. Furthermore, Ferrer uses *unitas* and *identitas* as though they were interchangeable, so we must conclude that he made no general distinction between sameness and identity. In this respect his position is like the third modern one I sketched. It is also similar in another way. He allowed that there could be categorically different kinds of *unitas* or sameness depending on whether one talked about individuals, species or genera. In addition, his idea of the 'modalities' of sameness might be illuminated by the suggestion that there is an incompleteness about sameness or identity. The sort of sameness or the 'grade' of sameness, as he puts it in one place,¹¹ is brought out by filling in the context in question. Only when this context is filled in can we know what more can be coherently said about the particular instance of sameness in question.

Beyond this, however, Ferrer's doctrine parts company with our third modern option, because Ferrer, following the Aristotelian tradition, certainly thought one could talk about non-numerical specific identity. Indeed, specific identity is necessarily non-numerical; according to Ferrer, talk about numerical specific identity would be categorical confusion. And, of course, it follows that one can as well talk about merely numerical difference. It must be admitted, though, that Ferrer's language seems confusing if we assume a univocal 'unity' and forget his nuancing (*modificatio*) of the term. He argues that the only real, extra-mental, sameness is numerical, yet he uses *unum* such that he can say that the universal is 'one' as an object of the intellect, although there is no universal that is numerically one and the same, all numerical sameness being a property of individuals. *Unum*, then, appears also to be an incomplete concept, used

¹⁰ Alan Donagan, *The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood* (Oxford, 1962), pp. 220-21. The example is Donagan's.

¹¹ IV.3.65-67.

modificative. But, one might ask, what sense can there be in talk about a 'one' that is not numerical? Ferrer clearly wanted to distinguish sameness or identity as applied to individuals from sameness or identity as applied to universals (as all three modern positions attempt to do); yet, as both the second and third do, he wanted to say that there is a sense in which a universal can be said to be one. But the Aristotelian tradition had said that numerical sameness applied only to individuals, so oneness must be distinguished from numericality. Whether this is seen as a fatal confusion or a subtle distinction depends to a large extent on how sympathetic one is to Ferrer's aims and to his insistence on the systematically ambiguous character of 'unity' or *unum*. Some, however, might wish that he had expressed his distinctions in different terms.

In any case, these distinctions are a key to Vincent's solution to the problem of the unity of the universal, and the ambiguity of the question finds a response in the ambiguity of *unum*, as he uses it. We can talk of universals being *unum* and the same without implying that there is any sort of universal entity that is numerically one. There is no real unity to the universal because real unity requires us to identify an extra-mentally existing individual, whose self-identity is numerical. But universality is obviously bound up with the fact that we can say that two different things are the same. The sameness here is specific (or generic) sameness, to be distinguished, according to the Aristotelian tradition, from numerical sameness. Ferrer maintains, however, that specific or generic sameness is a matter of the action of minds, and it does not really exist apart from mental acts.

Here we see how he depends on further sources for his doctrine. His main medieval source is Aquinas. In *Tds* he quite extravagantly and implausibly claims that the whole work follows Thomistic doctrine, and, as I have mentioned, he begins the work with a statement of his Thomistic allegiance. It is, therefore, a little odd that he nowhere in this treatise explicitly mentions Aquinas. Nevertheless, both the general point of his conclusions and some particular arguments are clearly Thomistic, and some of what he attributes to Aristotle seems more immediately to have come from Aquinas' commentaries. Moreover, there is complete harmony and coherence between what he says in the *questio* and his doctrine in *Tds*. Perhaps he determined in this short *questio* to give explicit mention to no 'recent' authors, because the latest author named is Avicenna.

In any case, Avicenna is another of his primary sources. In his *Metaphysics*,¹² Avicenna claims that the nature of a thing, like humanity, what Ferrer in this

¹² *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. V-X*, ed. S. Van Riet and G. Verbeke (Louvain-Leiden, 1980), 5.1-2, pp. 227-45. Cf. a Latin edition of the *al-Najāt*, which was a summary of the primary work, *al-Shifā': Avicennae Metaphysices compendium*, ed. Nematallah Caramé (Rome, 1926), liber 1, pars 1, tract. 8, cap. 1, pp. 56-58.

text calls the *natura nuda*,¹³ is in and of itself neither universal nor particular. It is particularized in the individual and has a universal character as it exists as a concept in the mind and is thereby used in mental acts. Aquinas picked up this distinction and used it in his own doctrine of universals. The primary expression of it is in *De ente et essentia*,¹⁴ but the same position is found in many other places as well.¹⁵ Humanity as such is neither one nor many; it neither possesses nor does not possess either unity or multiplicity. If it possessed unity, the nature of Socrates and Plato would be identical, and we could not speak of many human beings, since in speaking of many human beings, we imply that humanity is multiplied in many individuals; if it possessed multiplicity, it could not be one in Socrates, which is false. Furthermore, Aquinas holds that humanity (or any such nature) only has universality in so much as it exists in a mind, as it is 'rational'. There is, however, something in the various, different individuals that can be naturally represented by the universal concept of humanity in an act of mind. So universality is not *simply* a matter of mental acts.

All this is identical to Ferrer's stated doctrine both in the *questio* and in *Tds*. Another similarity between his position and Thomistic doctrine can be noted. In his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* Aquinas remarks (2.20) that one can talk about the universal as one apart from the many on the basis of a consideration of the appropriate act of mind, but in this sense it is one and the same, not numerically, but by reason of the species in question, say, humanity in Socrates and Plato. Ferrer was not the first to talk about non-numerical oneness. And the emphasis in this Thomistic point is also on the fact that this oneness of the universal is a matter of the mind (*secundum considerationem intellectus*).

In spite of all this similarity, one might detect in Ferrer's presentation of his doctrine a slight shift in emphasis. Ferrer's fundamental starting point is the firm conviction that there can be no real unity or sameness that is not numerical and that there can, correspondingly, be no real diversity that is not numerical. From there one can go on to distinguish different ways of talking about oneness, sameness and difference. Aquinas' treatment of the subject seems rather more freewheeling. Perhaps this is owing to the fact that he was more directly preoccupied with the universal as such, while Ferrer was constantly

¹³ This is Ferrer's expression. The Latin of Avicenna uses expressions like *humanitas tantum*, *humanitas inquantum humanitas*.

¹⁴ *De ente et essentia* 3; cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le 'De Ente et Essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris, 1948), pp. 24-25; and Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, translated with introduction and notes by Armand Maurer, 2nd revised edition (Toronto, 1968), pp. 46-48.

¹⁵ Cf., e.g., 1 *Sent.* 2.1.3c; 1 *Sent.* 19.5.1c; 2 *Sent.* 3.3.2 ad 1.

looking over his shoulder, as it were, responding to Ockham. He might not have been entirely fair in what he explicitly attributed to Ockham, but he and almost every later scholastic incorporated much that was characteristically Ockhamistic into their own philosophies. This accounts for his building on the insistence that numerical unity and diversity are the only real unity and diversity.

The pervasive influence of Ockham is something that colours all later medieval and 'renaissance' Thomism. Most of these later Thomists (like Ferrer) were, of course, far from admitting such influence, and, indeed, generally maintained that they were combatting Ockhamism.¹⁶ Nevertheless, their acceptance of characteristically Ockhamistic positions as presuppositions tended at least to give their philosophies a different emphasis and in some cases to lead them to doctrines that are incompatible with authentic Thomistic teaching. Whether these later deviations were improvements or not is not here in question, but it is interesting to notice that we might detect a beginning of this process in Ferrer, who was, he tells us, so insistent on following Aquinas to the letter.

We see the process much more obviously developed in Suarez, and it should be noted that Ferrer's position in this *questio* can be as easily identified with Suarez as with Aquinas. Suarez also emphasized the fact that universality is a matter of minds and their actions and that the only real unity is numerical. He too did not leave it at that (which would be pure Ockhamism) but agreed that the universalization of mental acts has some basis in extra-mental reality; it goes on *cum fundamento in re*. All this, apart from the expression *cum fundamento in re*, which we may leave to Suarez, is in complete accord with Ferrer's position as it is worked out in this text. It is interesting to notice, however, that another expression which is generally associated with Suarez is also found in the *questio*. This is the use of *objective* as in *conceptus obiectivus*. The objective concept is a notion that has traditionally been associated with Suarez, although most modern students of philosophy first encounter it in Descartes and have to be warned not to get it confused with the nearly opposite meanings of the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' in modern usage. Ferrer in this text (III.50) describes the rational unity of the universal as existing in *intellectu obiective*. So here we find a point of continuity between Ferrer and later scholasticism. *Obiectivus* and *objective*, as they are used in this sense, qualify the content of mental acts and signify that this content is a thought or concept that can be shared by many thinkers; it is rather like Frege's *Gedanke*. Although the idea is generally

¹⁶ Cf. John A. Trentman, 'Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century' in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 818-38.

attributed to Suarez, we see that it was not invented by him. Nor was it invented by Ferrer. Indeed, *objective* and cognate expressions can be found used in the same sense in various places in Aquinas.¹⁷ We see here a rather common phenomenon in late scholasticism. A concept with deep roots in the medieval tradition takes on special significance as a technical term in later scholasticism owing to important shifts of emphasis. Given his perhaps unconscious Ockhamistic presuppositions together with his opposition to Ockhamistic conclusions, Suarez felt obliged to give stronger emphasis to the 'objectivity' of some thoughts, to the fact that they could not be reduced without remainder to particular acts of mind or dispositions to perform such acts but were the kind of thing that had a sort of independent existence in that they could be discovered and shared by many minds. Ferrer again seems to occupy something of an intermediate position in this historical process.

Before going on to a description of the manuscript and to the text itself, I wish simply to note three more or less disconnected additional points of comparison between this text and Ferrer's *Tds*. There is no need to demonstrate further that there is a unity of doctrine between this *questio* and the *Tds*. It has already been pointed out that this text amplifies certain aspects of the theory of universals enunciated in the *Tds*. These additional comparisons will be briefly noted to indicate some of the other sorts of continuity and congruence of logical and philosophical doctrine to be found in the two treatises.

One of the more interesting things about Ferrer's logic is his attempt to develop what he took to be Aquinas' doctrine of predication along lines that make it look very similar to the modern position of Frege.¹⁸ Central to this endeavour is his use of words like *convenire* and *competere* to express the relation between subjects and predicates. Thus the predicate is said to fit together with, to come together with, the subject to make the whole utterance which can be said to be true or false. The same terms, *convenire* and *competere*, are used in this sense at various points in this text, notably at I.12.17, II.3.28 and IV.12.80.

Another interesting similarity between this text and the *Tds* can be seen at I.9.14 and in the response to this argument in IV.9.75-76. This concerns the problem of intentionality that was so often discussed by medieval logicians in terms of the sentence *equus promittitur* or some variant of it. Here Ferrer introduces another of his examples from *Tds*, the intentional verb *appeto*, and

¹⁷ Two good examples of this use are 'Anima nihil cognoscit, nisi praesens ei sit objective...' and 'Anima non cognoscit semper se et Deum, quia non semper sunt ei praesentia objective' (1 *Sent.* 3.1.2.3^m).

¹⁸ Cf. *Tds*, pp. 29-30, and John A. Trentman, 'Predication and Universals in Vincent Ferrer's Logic', *Franciscan Studies* 28 (1968) 47-62.

has the argument raise the usual sort of conundrum with reference to the sentence *asinus appetit cibum*. The donkey desires food and can have his desire satisfied independently of any act of mind (indeed, he wants eatable food, not the thought of food), but he does not desire any particular bit of food rather than another; therefore, (the argument here goes) he must desire *cibum in communi*, a kind of universal food. Ferrer thinks this plainly will not do. If we have read the *Tds*, we know Ferrer's full logical analysis of the proposition, in which he takes a remarkably hard line on the failure of reference in intentional contexts. In this text we might detect a hint of the sort of problem that logicians have discussed recently concerning reference and the possible failure of Leibniz's law in such contexts.¹⁹ Ferrer does not develop this theme here, however, and restricts himself in his reply to the objection to an argument based on the Avicennian position outlined earlier.

Finally, we might note an interesting point of comparison in Ferrer's use of the technical term *suppositum*. It would often be convenient to translate occurrences of *suppositum* in *Tds* by 'instance'; thus the *supposita* of a general term are those individuals whose names are substitution instances of the term, the things to which the term can be applied. This all fits well with Ferrer's doctrine of predication and his use of these ideas in *Tds*.²⁰ A particularly clear case of this sort of usage is found here in II.9.42, where Ferrer argues that if there is a real unity of the universal, it might be said that all human nature is saved *in uno supposito*, e.g., Peter. On this assumption, he contends, the proposition 'All human nature is saved' would be verified if one instance of the subject, Peter, is saved.

So far as is known, this text now exists in only one manuscript: Vienna, Dominikanerkonvent 49/271. I have described this manuscript more fully in the introduction to *Tds*.²¹ It is evidently of Italian origin and dates from the early fifteenth century. As I have already remarked, the *questio* is doubtless written in the same hand as the *Tds* found before it in the same codex. *Tds* appears on fols. 169v-207v and this *questio* is found on fols. 237r-241v. The *questio*, like the *Tds*, apparently has appeared in only one printed edition before now, the collected works edited by Fages in 1909.²² Historians of logic and philosophy owe a great debt to Fages for reviving these texts and publishing

¹⁹ *Tds*, pp. 152-54; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 41-49. For modern discussion, see P. T. Geach, *Logic Matters* (Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1972), pp. 39, 93-94, 128 ff.

²⁰ For some discussion of this idea, see *Tds*, especially pp. 66 ff.

²¹ Pp. 84-85. Cf. Felix Czeike, *Verzeichnis der Handschriften des Dominikanerkonventes in Wien bis zum Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna, 1952; typewritten).

²² *Œuvres de saint Vincent Ferrier*, ed. H.-D. Fages (Paris, 1909).

them in modern editions. His edition is not now, however, readily accessible; worse, his text of both treatises contains some rather serious mistakes, and he seems not always to have followed his author's thought.²³ In fact, he was not particularly interested in logic or philosophy and set out in his long work simply to make available all that the saint had written.

This edition is intended as a kind of companion to *Tds*, and further information about the author's life and philosophy can be found there.²⁴ Since this text exists in only one manuscript, however, I have provided a rather more complete *apparatus criticus*, aiming at giving as much information as possible about the readings of the codex. Nevertheless, I have followed the same conventions regarding such matters as spelling and punctuation as those observed in *Tds*. I have expanded all abbreviations and generally regularized the spelling according to the conventions of modern 'classical' Latin. Two exceptions might be noted. Here as well as in *Tds*, I have consistently retained the *e* of the manuscript in all contexts where classical spelling would distinguish from among a variety of classical diphthongs. It seemed to me artificial to introduce, by means of reconstructing the classical diphthongs, distinctions that Ferrer is unlikely to have recognized. On a similar point, I have not expanded *Sortes* because, judging from his use of the example *Sortes est bisyllabum*, I have concluded that Ferrer pronounced it thus.²⁵ In this text, unlike *Tds*, there are few occasions of a word being mentioned rather than used; in each case the *li* before the relevant word may be allowed to do its work, and we need not worry about problems concerning the introduction of modern quotation marks. There is a certain amount of punctuation in the manuscript, but here the punctuation and division of the text into paragraphs are entirely my own

²³ There are many small errors in particular words. Some affect the sense more than others; some that do affect the sense may possibly have been typographical, e.g., Fages, p. 11, l. 27, has *eum* for *cum* in '... quam non habet cum aere', IV.5.70. What is much more serious and significant is a large number of critical omissions that make nonsense of Ferrer's train of thought and make one wonder whether Fages was following his author's argument. I shall give a few examples of this kind of deficiency in the Fages text. At I.3.7 the manuscript certainly poses problems, but after *generis* (which Fages prints as *generica*), he omits (p. 4, ll. 1-2) *ergo ... generica*, thereby leaving us with a premise, but no conclusion to the argument. At I.9.14 (Fages, p. 4, l. 40), we evidently have an instance of *saut du même au même*; after the first occurrence of *seclusa operatione anime*, Fages omits *quia ... communis*, which deprives us of the argument. At II.6.36 (Fages, p. 7, l. 12), Fages omits *essentialiter* in *Sortes et Plato sunt essentialiter indistincta*, which is, indeed, essential to the point of the argument. At IV.12.80 (Fages, p. 12, l. 29), *importatur per inferius* is omitted, which not only deprives us of the point of the argument, but makes nonsense of the text. These examples should suffice to show the sort of difficulties the philosophical reader encounters in the Fages edition.

²⁴ For a slightly longer account and further bibliography, see John A. Trentman, 'Ferrer, Vincenz' in *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, ed. H. R. Balz et al. (forthcoming).

²⁵ *Tds*, p. 164; cf. *ibid.*, p. 85.

responsibility. In order to facilitate reference to sections in the text, I have numbered all paragraphs consecutively and divided the text into numbered sections corresponding to the steps in the progress of the argument. Thus, sections I and II contain the preliminary arguments, section III Vincent's resolution of the question, and section IV his responses to the preliminary arguments in I. It did not seem to me to be necessary to mark out these obvious editorial additions by the use of pointed brackets.

QVESTIO DE VNITATE VNIVERSALIS

I

1 (f. 237r) Quod universale dicit naturam habentem unitatem de multis et
 preter multa, quod idem est quod universalitas, ideo queritur: utrum illa
 5 universalitas sive unitas sit realis.

I.1

2 Et arguitur quod sic. Si natura universalis non esset una realiter, sed
 realiter plurificaretur ad plurificationem suorum singularium, sequeretur quod
 de ea non potest esse scientia. Consequens est falsum, quia scientia est de
 10 universali et de naturis quibus convenit esse universalis.

3 Probatur consequentia, quia individua sunt contingentia corruptibilium
 et transmutabilium de quibus non est scientia; sed natura universalis, postquam
 plurificatur et multiplicatur ad multiplicationem eorum, ita desinit esse ad
 desinitionem eorum et transmutabitur ad transmutationem eorum, et per
 15 consequens erit contingens, corruptibilis, et transmutabilis; quod est falsum,
 ut habetur primo *Posteriorum*, ubi dicit quod universale est eternum et
 sempiternum. In libro *Topicorum* habetur quod scientia est eorum que vere
 sunt sui que substantiam inpermutabilem sortiuntur. Ita ergo universale est
 unum realiter et habet universalitatem realem.

20

I.2

4 Secundo arguitur sic: sicut se habet natura universalis ad entitatem, sic se
 habet ad unitatem, quod patet quia septimo *Metaphysice* dicitur quod ens et
 unum convertuntur atque eadem est dispositio in esse reali et predicato reali, ut
 animal identificatur cum re reali, puta cum Sorte. Ergo natura universalis est
 25 una realiter.

I.3

5 Tertio: si nulla unitas esset realis nisi unitas numeralis, tunc nulla
 diversitas esset realis nisi diversitas numeralis. Et sic non sequeretur: ista
 differunt specie vel genere, ergo differunt realiter.

1 Incipit questio magistri vincencij fratris ordinis predicatorum de unitate universalis *MS*.

7 universalis *corr. ex universales MS*.

23 *post* atque *canc.* lectio (*ut vid.*) *MS*.

28 nisi *corr. ex nec MS*.

17 sempiternum: *An. post.* 1.8 (75b22-35); cf. *Metaph.* 8.15 (1039b20-1040a8).

18 sortiuntur: *Top.* 1.1 (100a27 ff.).

24 Sorte: *Metaph.* 7.16 (1040b16 ff.).

30 6 Probatur quia sequitur, quia quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum tot modis et reliquum, ut habetur in libro *Topicorum*. Sed unitas et diversitas sunt opposita, et non est nisi una unitas realis per te, scilicet, unitas numeralis; ergo non est nisi una diversitas rei, scilicet, numeralis.

7 Vel potest sic probari: quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, etc.,
35 sed unitas et diversitas sunt opposita, et est triplex diversitas realis, scilicet, diversitas realis numeralis, specifica, et diversitas generis; ergo erit etiam triplex unitas realis, scilicet, numeralis, specifica, et generica.

I.4

8 Quarto arguitur: si Sortes et Plato non essent indistincta in aliquo reali,
40 tunc Sortes tantum differret a Platone quantum differt a lapide. Patet quia nihil idem est realiter in Sorte et in Platone, et sic differrent per omne illud quod est in ipsis, sed Sortes per nihil plus differt a lapide nisi per illud quod est in eo; ergo tantum differt a Platone quantum a lapide; ex quo per nihil sui identificatur cum Platone sic nec cum lapide.

45 I.5

9 Quinto sic: ignis generat ignem ex aere et corrumpit aerem, sed hoc non est per unitatem conceptus quam habet ignis cum igne, quia hoc faceret dato quod nullus conceptus esset; ergo hoc est (f. 237v) propter aliquam unitatem realem que non est universalis, ut constat.

50 I.6

10 Sexto sic: Philosophus habet septimo *Physicorum* quod operatio facit secundum speciem et non secundum genus. Et hoc est quia unitas speciei maior est quam unitas generis. Sed talis maior unitas non est unitas conceptus, quia conceptus generis est ita simplex sicut conceptus speciei, nec unitas rationis,
55 quia omnis unitas rationis est equalis alteri unitati secundum rationem; ergo

32 *post unitas² canc.* si *MS.*

33 *post una canc.* unitas *MS.* numeralis *canc. MS.*

34 unum *corr. MS.*

41 *est¹ add. s.s. MS.*

55 *post secundum canc.* ergo *MS.* ergo *add. s.s. MS.*

31 *Topicorum*: most likely *Top.* 1.15 (106b14-16); also implicit in the general discussion of opposition and contrariety in 2.7-8.

37 *generica: Top.* 1.7 (103a6 ff.). Cf. introduction above, p. 112.

52 *genus*: perhaps *Phys.* 7.1 (242a-242b), but this seems a little farfetched. A better text to make Ferrer's point would be *Phys.* 2.8 (199a7-33).

oportet quod sit aliqua unitas inter illa que sunt eiusdem speciei que sit alia ab unitate rationis et conceptus, alias non essent magis unum quam illa que sunt tantum eiusdem generis.

I.7

60 11 Septimo sic: que sunt comparabilia, seclusa operatione intellectus, habent aliquod unum, seclusa operatione intellectus, in quo comparantur ista. Patet quia comparatio respicit aliquid ad que comparabilia comparantur. Sed Sortes et Plato sunt comparabiles in humanitate, seclusa operatione intellectus, quia sunt conformes et equales in humanitate; ergo, seclusa operatione
65 intellectus, humanitas est una.

I.8

12 Octavo sic: tunc diversitas que est inter hominem et asinum in communi non erit realis, cum ipsa sit communis omnibus individuis contentis sub illis naturis in communi. Sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc esset processus in infinitum.

70 13 Quod probo, quia hec diversitas asini in communi non est una realiter cum diversitate hominis in communi, quia individua eorum realiter non identificantur in natura communi. Ergo, si hec diversitas non est idem realiter cum illa, igitur est diversa. Tunc quero de diversitatibus istis fundatis super diversitatem hominis et asini in communi, utrum sint idem in asino uno reali; si
75 sic, habes propositum; si non, ergo erunt diverse. Et tunc queritur iterum de illis diversitatibus, utrum sint idem vel diverse; et sic vel erit processus in infinitum, vel erit devenire ad aliquas duas diversitates, que erunt unum realiter et non diverse.

I.9

80 14 Nono sic: omne quod est commune, seclusa operatione anime, est unum, seclusa operatione anime, quia omne commune est unum, sed aliqua natura est communis, seclusa operatione anime. Patet, quia appetitus asini esuriit remota operatione intellectus. Vel igitur appetit istum cibum in particulari vel in communi. Non primum, quia non habet notitiam
85 qualemcumque de hoc cibo vel de illo in particulari. Ergo appetit cibum in communi.

61 seclusa *corr. ex seclusam MS.*

62 respicit *in marg. alia manus: recipit MS.*

77 *post aliquas canc. diversus MS.*

80 nono *corr. ex octo MS.*

85 *de² scripsi: in MS.*

I.10

15 Decimo sic: quod intenditur a natura debet esse unum realiter. Patet,
 90 quia si non, esset pluraliter realiter nullam unitatem habens; qua ratione natura
 intenderet unum, eadem ratione intenderet reliquum. Et cum non possint simul
 produci unica productione, sequitur quod omnis actio nature esset frustrata,
 quia semper natura deficeret ab intento. Sed natura intendit producere naturam
 specificam; patet per Avicennam, primo sue *Metaphysice*, ubi dicit quod natura
 non intendit primo naturam generis, nec individui, sed naturam specificam;
 95 ergo, etc.

I.11

16 Undecimo sic: propria passio regulariter debet habere subiectum reale,
 quod sit unum realiter; sed subiectum proprie passionis proprium et adequatum
 est natura specifica; ergo natura specifica est una; ergo, etc.

100

I.12

17 Duodecimo sic: quic(f. 238r)quid convenit inferiori realiter, si conveniat
 ei per naturam superioris, debet multo plus competere tali superiori; sed Sor-
 ti, qui est inferior ad hominem, convenit habere unam passionem realiter;
 ergo multo plus debet convenire superiori ratione cuius habet talem passio-
 105 nem.

II

II.1

18 In oppositum arguitur sic primo, quia si natura universalis esset una
 realiter, tunc sequeretur quod creatio non esset ex nihilo, quod est contra fidem;
 110 ergo, etc.

19 Patet consequentia. Ponatur quod anima hodie creetur; tunc arguo: illud
 non fit ex nihilo cuius precessit aliqua entitas, sed anime que hodie creatur
 precessit aliqua entitas, quia natura anime in communi, que est una et eadem
 similiter cum anima que hodie est creata, habeat animam in communi que
 115 precessit creationem; ergo, etc.

89 *post pluraliter canc.* et *MS.*

90 *cum corr. s.s. ex tamen MS.*

114 *habeat scripsi: habeant MS.* *que² add. s.s. MS.*

20 Si autem dicatur quod creatio fit ex mero nihilo in particulari, non ex mero nihilo in communi, contra hoc arguitur sic. Oportet, si hoc esset verum quod tu dicis, sequeretur tunc unum de duobus inconvenientibus, scilicet, quod vel nihil creatur vel quod anima sit partibilis intrinsece.

- 120 21 Probo, quia cum Deus creat animam tunc dat et communicat sibi illud esse universale et nihil aliud aut dat aliud sibi de novo preter illud esse universale. Si detur primum, sequitur quod nihil creatur, cum tota eius entitas precedat. Si detur secundum, habeo propositum, scilicet, quod anima erit partibilis intrinsece, scilicet, in illud esse universale et in esse particulare quod
125 sibi est datum de novo.

II.2

22 Item, sequitur quod duo contradictoria simul verificantur de eodem, quod patet, quia anima Antichristi que debet creari esset aliquid in universali et nihil in particulari, sed aliquid et nihil contradicunt; ergo, etc.

- 130 23 Probetur principaliter sic: tunc generatio terminaretur ad accidens. Probo, quia ex quo natura communis est eadem in omnibus realiter per te. Si generetur hodie primo, ista generatio est particularium, quia solum recipit esse particulare, sed particularitas est accidens; ergo, generatio terminatur ad accidens, quod est falsum. Immo ad substantiam terminatur, ut habetur quinto
135 *Physicorum*.

- 24 Si dicas quod falsum supponitur hic, scilicet, quod generatio terminetur ad particulare solum, sed terminatur ad materiam et formam Petri, ut solum inest particulari; contra, terminatur principaliter ad materiam et formam Petri, vel ad suam participationem vel ad utrumque, patet per sufficientem
140 divisionem.

25 Si ad materiam et formam Petri principaliter; ergo, erunt bis generata, quasi materia et forma Petri preexistebant primo, scilicet, in esse universali modo aduniunt esse de novo; ergo, idem est bis generatum.

- 145 26 Si ad particularitatem solum, cum illa sit accidens, quia individuum individuatur per aliquod accidens; ergo, generatio terminatur ad aliquod accidens.

27 Si equaliter et principaliter terminetur ad utrumque, hoc non potest propter duo. Primo, quia dicit Philosophus in septimo *Metaphysice* quod substantia precedit quodlibet accidens natura, cognitione, definitione, tempore.

124 particulare *corr.* ex particularitas *MS*.

138 *post* contra *canc.* victus (*ut vid.*) *MS*.

135 *Physicorum*: *Phys.* 5.1 (224b1-10, 225a1-19); cf. *De gen. et corr.* 1.3 (317b).

149 tempore: *Metaph.* 7.1 (1028a30-35).

150 Secundo, sequeretur quod ita principaliter generaretur accidens sicut substantia, quod est falsum et contra libro *Physicorum*.

II.3

28 Item, arguitur sic principaliter: tunc una hostia consecrata, omnes alie essent consecrate. Patet per te, quia omnes alie hostie conveniunt in uno reali.
155 Cum igitur illa hostia communis includatur essentialiter in ista hostia particulari et illa, sequitur quod, ista hostia consecrata, hostia in universali erit consecrata et per consequens omnes (f. 238v) hostie particulares erunt consecrate, cum hostia universalis nihil aliud sit preter hostias particulares.

29 Forte diceretur: illud consecratur super quo fertur intentio consecrantis,
160 et, quia intentio sacerdotis fertur super hostiam particularem et non super hostiam universalem, ideo hostia particularis tantum consecratur et non hostia universalis.

30 Contra: quod aliqua duo sunt impossibilia separari ad invicem per quamcumque potentiam, si idem realiter. Si essentia unius transmutatur in
165 essentiam alterius, patet, quia realiter esse separatur ab eo cuius est; sed hostia particularis non potest esse sine hostia in communi, etiam quacumque potentia, cum sint idem realiter, patet quia esset etiam dare inferius sine superiori suo, quod est falsum. Si ergo esse huiusmodi hostie consecratur in corpus Christi et transmutatur, igitur hostia universalis consecrabitur et transmutabitur.

170 31 Item sic sumo hanc hostiam, et tunc arguo sic: vel nunc consecrabitur hostia particularis propriissime secundum partem essentie universalis, vel secundum particularem, vel secundum utrumque. Si primum, propositum habeo, scilicet, quod hostia secundum se consecratur. Si secundo modo vel
175 tertio, habeo propositum quod accidentia transmutabuntur in corpus Christi, quod est contra fidem; immo remanent ibi accidentia, cum Deus ibi supplet vicem subiecti; ergo, etc.

II.4

32 Item sic, quia tunc sequeretur quod Sortes esset communis, quia per te habeo quod natura rei est communis et universalis.

180 33 Tunc vel talis communitas est de essentia hominis vel propria passio eius. Si sit de essentia hominis, tunc predicabitur essentialiter de Sorte, quod patet, quia continet aliquid essentialiter contentum predicamentaliter essentialiter; sed homo essentialiter continetur in Sorte, et per te esse commune

158 preter *corr. ex propter MS.*

hostias *scripsi*: hostia *MS.*

167 cum *add. s.s. MS.*

170 sic¹ *corr. ex si MS.*

175 quod *scripsi*: quid *MS.*

continetur essentialiter in homine; igitur esse commune continetur essentialiter
 185 in Sorte; igitur Sortes est communis.

34 Si dicatur quod est propria passio, tunc predicabitur de Sorte per se, licet
 non primo, ut habetur primo *Posteriorum*, propria passio predicatur per se de
 superiori et inferiori; ergo relinquitur quod Sortes sit communis sicut homo,
 quod est falsum; ergo, etc.

II.5

35 Item sic, quod est plura realiter, non est unum realiter. Patet, quia nono
Metaphysice dicitur quod unum et multa opponuntur. Sed natura universalis est
 plura realiter, ut dictum est. Nihil aliud est quam sua singularia sumpta
 secundum aliquid in quo conveniunt conformiora; igitur, etc.

II.6

36 Item, si sic, tunc sequeretur quod Sortes et Plato sunt essentialiter
 indistincta intra esse, quia quecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se sunt
 eadem, ut habetur primo *Elencorum* et *Physicorum*; sed per te Sortes et Plato
 sunt idem essentialiter; ergo, etc.

II.7

37 Item, si sic, tunc esset dare ideam separatam vel quod universalia non
 essent sempiterna. Patet, quia per te rosa est quid commune unum realiter ad
 omnes rosas, et tamen nulla rosa invenitur in autumno. Igitur, si talis rosa
 communis remaneret, habebam ideam separatam; si autem non remaneat sed
 205 corrumpatur, ergo universalia non sunt sempiterna, quod est contra Philoso-
 phum primo *Posteriorum*.

38 Confirmatur, quia ratio communis vel est essentialiter in suis inferiori-
 bus vel singularibus vel est extra. Si in suis singularibus, ergo erit singularis,
 quia, secundum auctorem (f. 239r) *De causis*, quod recipitur in alio recipitur ad
 210 modum eius et non per modum rei recepte. Si extra singularia, ergo est dare
 ideam separatam.

193 sua bis exh. MS.

209 in corr. MS.

188 inferiori: *An. post.* 1.19-29 (82a).

192 opponuntur: this is implicit throughout *Metaph.* 9 as, indeed, in all ancient philosophy,
 but the ms. may well be in error here. Explicit discussion of the opposition of the one and the
 many is found in *Metaph.* 10.3 (1054a20 ff.).

198 Physicorum: *Soph. el.* 6 (168b32-33); *Phys.* 1.2 (185b5-9).

206 Posteriorum: *An. post.* 1.8 (75b22-35).

210 recepte: *Le 'Liber de causis'*, ed. Adriaan Pattin (Montréal, 1967), 9 (10).98-99, p. 72.

II.8

- 39 Item sic, quia tunc sequeretur quod quicquid est, separaretur ab eo cuius
est, quia sumo naturam humanam tunc est tota inclusa essentialiter in Petro vel
215 est aliud extra Petrum. Si tota sit inclusa in Petro, natura humana non erit in
Guilermo. Patet, quia totum extra quod nihil, primo *Posteriorum*, in primo *Celi*
et mundi et tertio *Physicorum*. Si aliquid sit extra Petrum, quod ergo quicquid
est, separatur ab eo cuius est, quod est contra Philosophum septimo *Meta-*
physice.
- 220 40 Si autem dicitur quod quicquid est convertibile, < qua > importatur per
definitionem, non separatur ab eo cuius est, et de tali intellexit Philosophus. Sed
quicquid est inconvertibile, qua importatur per superius et inferius, bene potest
separari ab eo cuius est, et de tali non intellexit Philosophus, quia Petro mortuo
adhuc remanet homo in Guilermo.
- 225 41 Contra: quia sequeretur quod Aristoteles insufficienter increpasset
Platonem (primo *Ethicorum*, secundo *Priorum*, septimo *Metaphysice*), quia
solum increpat ipsum de quod quid est importato per superius et inferius,
dicens quod tale quod quid est non potest separari ab eo cuius est. Et tu dixisti
oppositum; ergo, etc.

230

II.9

42 Item, sequeretur quod natura non posset annullare unum individuum
quin alia individua annullaret. Patet, tota natura humana salvatur in uno
supposito, scilicet, in Petro, aliter non esset homo; ergo, quando Deus

215 Petro *corr. ex primo MS.*

225 *sequeretur scripsi: sequeretur MS.*

226 *Priorum scripsi: posteriorum MS.; vide supra app. font.*

233 in Petro aliter *corr. MS.*

216 nihil: the Latin here is rather crabbed, but there is precedent for this particular form of words. Aquinas' translation of *Phys.* 3.6 gave as a definition of *totum: cuius nihil est extra* or *cui nihil abest*; and in his commentary (*In Phys.* 3, lect. 11 [206b33-207a31]), Thomas at one point expresses this, *extra quod simpliciter nihil est*. Undoubtedly, Ferrer had this text in mind here.

217 *Physicorum: Phys.* 3.6 (207a8-14); *De caelo* 1.1 (268b8-10). The latter is generally concerned with concepts like 'all', 'whole', 'complete'. Cf. perhaps *An. post.* 1.24 (84a30-85b4).

218 *Metaphysice: Metaph.* 7.14 (1039a25-b2).

223 *Philosophus: An. post.* 2.4 (91a16 ff.).

226 *Metaphysice: Eth. Nic.* 1.6 (1096a-1096b); *Metaph.* 7.14 (1039a-1039b); *An. prior.* 2.21 (67a22-27). This passage in *An. prior.* is probably the one Ferrer had in mind, but it is only indirectly concerned with the problem of the separation of forms from particulars; it is explicitly a criticism of the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις in the *Meno*. The ms. reads *posteriorum*, but there is no appropriate source in the *An. post.* 2. On the other hand, a very good text for Ferrer's purpose is *An. post.* 1.22 (83a33-35). Perhaps this is what he has in mind.

annullabit Petrum, per necessitatem totam naturam humanam < annullabit > ,
 235 que erat in Petro. Sed tota illa natura humana etiam erat in Guilermo et in aliis;
 igitur, per necessitatem annullabit omnes homines. Et sic Deus non posset
 precise annullare unum hominem, quod dicitur esse contra fidem.

43 Si dicatur quod argumentum haberet veritatem si tota natura humana
 esset in Petro, et pro toto, sed quia non est ibi pro toto, ideo non quia annullato
 240 Petro annullarentur omnes homines; contra, istud non evacuat argumentum
 propter duo aliqua.

44 Primo, quando aliqua sunt idem realiter essentialiter et convertibiliter
 adnihilato uno adnihilatur alterum, sed natura humana communis existens est
 idem realiter et essentialiter et etiam convertibiliter in se ipsa, ut existit in
 245 Guilermo; igitur annullata ea ut est in Petro annullabitur ut est in aliis
 hominibus. Ergo non valet.

45 Propter aliud, quia nihil est pro toto in ista natura humana, vel est de
 essentia nature humane vel est accidens. Si sit de essentia, cum tota essentia
 salvetur in Petro, ergo etiam salvabitur in Petro pro toto. Si sit accidens eius,
 250 cum accidens sequetur suum subiectum secundum Boethium, et tota natura
 includatur in Petro; ergo, in Petro includetur pro toto.

II.10

46 Item, tunc unum corpus in diversis locis. Probo quod natura humana
 est corpus cum sit inferius ad corpus; bene enim dicitur 'homo est corpus', sed
 255 homo in communi unus et idem realiter est in Gregorio et Petro; modo
 Gregorius et Petrus sunt in diversis locis; ergo homo qui est in eis erit in diversis
 locis.

47 Si dicatur quod unum corpus numero non potest esse in diversis locis,
 sed bene unum corpus commune quale est homo; (f. 239v) contra, quando-
 260 cumque aliquid est tanta identitate idem sibi ipsi quanta cum altero, si cum
 altero sit idem numero et cum se ipso erit idem numero; sed homo in communi,
 si eius unitas sit realis, est tanta identitate idem sibi ipsi quanta in Gregorio, ut
 de se patet, et cum Gregorius est idem numero, igitur sibi ipsi erit idem in

253 unum *corr.* ex unus *MS.*

260 tanta *corr.* s.s. ex tota *MS.* quanta *scripsi*: quarta *MS.*

262 si *corr.* ex sic *MS.*

250 Boethius: *De topicis differentiis* 1188b.5, 1190b.3-5, and other passages as well. Boethius, however, makes this point about 'associated accidents', which he contrasts with accidents that can leave their subjects. Cf. Eleonore Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis* (Ithaca-London, 1978).

numero. Sed concessum est quod homo in communi est in diversis locis; ergo,
 265 idem numero erit in diversis locis. Sed hoc est falsum et contra Philosophum,
 quarto *Physicorum*.

II.11

48 Item, tunc una anima esset damnata et salvata simul. Patet, quia natura
 communis anime est idem realiter cum Paulo salvato et Juda damnato; ergo,
 270 salvatur et damnatur.

II.12

49 Item, sequeretur quod anima eadem ratione esset bona et mala. Patet
 conclusio mea, scilicet, quod unitas universalis non est realis.

III

275 50 Pro solutione questionis est sciendum quod unitas illa dicitur realis, que
 competit rei in esse reali ex sui natura, non prout habet esse in intellectu. Isto
 modo dicimus quod materia est apta nata suscipere et esse successive sub
 diversis formis, et idem subiectum numero habet esse sub diversis accidentibus.
 Sed unitas rationis est illa unitas que competit rei prout habet esse in intellectu
 280 obiective; sicut homo vel animal, quando est in conspectu nostri intellectus,
 intelligitur prout est obiective in intellectu.

51 Ad questionem igitur dico et respondeo per aliquas propositiones.

III.1

52 Prima, quod unitas nature universalis non est realis, vel quod non est
 285 dare aliquam unitatem realem preter unitatem numeralem, vel quod duo
 individua non sunt unicum realiter in aliquo uno realiter, quod idem est
 dictum, licet sub diversis verbis. Et probatur per argumenta in oppositum.

III.2

53 Secunda est: unitas universalis est unitas rationis, sive ipsum universale
 290 est unum secundum rationem. Patet, quia, ut dictum est, illud est unum

264 in¹ *add. s.s. MS.*

275 *post illa canc. ex sui natura MS.*

281 intelligitur *corr. in marg. ex intelligit MS.*

290 *ut add. s.s. MS.*

266 *Physicorum: Phys. 4.5 (212b-213a).*

secundum rationem cui convenit esse unum solum prout est obiective in intellectu; sed natura universalis, que nihil aliud est quam omnia sua singularia sumpta secundum illud in quo sunt conformia nature unitate actu, ut unum intelligitur.

295 54 Probatur per talem propositionem, quia quandocumque aspectus nostri intellectus fertur super aliqua ut similia sunt et conformia, semper intelligit ea ut unum. Et unitas ista patet, quia si intelligeret ea ut plura sunt, tunc oporteret quod intelligeret quia purificantur et diversificantur sed nos solum accipimus ea secundum unum precise in quo sunt similia et conformia; igitur, etc. Sed
300 omnia singularia hominis et omnia singularia animalis sunt similia in humanitate et animalia in animalitate. Ergo, quandocumque intellectus noster intelligit ea, ut sunt homines precise vel ut sunt animalia precise, intelligit ea ut unum.

55 Sed homo in communi, vel animal in communi, nihil aliud est quam
305 sua singularia sumpta secundum quod sunt homines precise vel secundum quod sunt animalia precise, nihil considerando de aliis. Igitur, quandocumque animal in communi offertur intellectui, semper offertur ut unum.

56 Secundo probatur sic: omnis (f. 240r) unitas vel est realis vel rationis; sed probatum est quod unitas universalis non est realis; ergo, est rationis.

310

IV

57 Tunc restat respondere ad rationes.

IV.1 (ad I.1)

58 Ad primum rationem dicendum quod de particularibus esse scientiam
315 potest intelligi dupliciter, uno modo accipiendo particularia secundum illud quod sunt difformia et disconveniunt et corruptibilia, et accipiendo ea ut sic, de eis scientia non potest esse, quia ut sic accipiuntur ut nulla natura communis potest ab eis abstrahi, nec sic sumendo sunt hec finita nec apud rem nec apud intellectum.

294 intelligitur *in marg.*

295 quandocumque *corr. s.s. ex quandoque MS.*

298 plurificantur et diversificantur *scripsi: plurificatur et diversificatur MS.*

299 unum *add. s.s. MS.*

304 *post communi*² *canc. vel animal in communi MS. post aliud canc. aliud MS.*

307 *post offertur*¹ *canc. in MS.*

316 *ut*² *add. s.s. MS. post ut*² *add. s.s. homo universalis (ut vid.) MS.*

317 hec *add. s.s. MS.*

59 Alio modo possunt sumi ipsa particularia secundum illud precise in quo
 320 sunt conformia et convenientia, non intelligendo corruptionem eorum nec
 infinitatem, sed solum accipiendo naturam nudam que est in eis specifica; in
 qua natura sunt omnimode conformia, sicut omnes homines, secundum quod
 homines sunt precise et ut sic accipiuntur, potest ab eis abstrahi una ratio
 communis. Et ut sic omnia particularia cuiuscumque nature de mundo sunt
 325 apud intellectum finita cum intelligantur ut unum. Et sic sumendo particularia
 de ipsis potest esse scientia. Unde dico quod de corruptibilibus potest esse
 scientia, non tamen considerando ea ut sunt corruptibilia sed solum secundum
 naturam in qua conformia sunt.

60 Et cum dicitur quod universale est corruptibile sicut sua singularia,
 330 si multiplicentur ad multitudinem eorum, respondeo quod universale esse in-
 corruptibile et sempiternum potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo per existen-
 tiam omni differentie temporis, si coexistat omni differentie temporis; et ut sic
 non est corruptibile nec coeternum. Alio modo per abstractionem omnis
 differentie temporis, quod consideretur sine omni parte vel differentia temporis;
 335 et sic potest dici sempiternum, et sempiternitas vel eternitas non repugnat
 temporis particularibus. Et sic patet solutio ad primum.

IV.2 (ad I.2)

61 Ad secundam rationem dicendum est, concedendo A, et cum dicitur in
 minore, quod natura universalis est ens realis, dico quod verum est accipiendo
 340 ens prout distinguitur contra universale reale. Et ut sic bene concedo quod est
 una realiter prout distinguitur contra universale. Non est autem ens realiter
 prout distinguitur contra entia, et ut sic dicit quod non est una realiter prout
 realiter distinguitur contra plura realiter, et ita argumentum non valet.

62 Vel dicendum aliter et melius ad A: cum dicitur, sicut se habet natura
 345 universalis ad entitatem ita ad unitatem, dico quod si unum potest determinare
 inferiora talis nature universalis, vel tamquam extrema unitatis vel tamquam
 supposita inferiora unitatis. Si tamquam extrema sic esset falsum, quia tunc
 esset sensus, cum dicitur quod animal est unum realiter, quod inferiora animalis
 essent unum realiter ad invicem.

350 63 Si autem determinat ea non tamquam extrema sed tamquam inferiora,
 sic est unum, et tunc est talis sensus cum dicitur, animal est unum realiter, id

323 *ante homines canc. homines MS.*

332 *si corr. ex sic MS.*

336 particularibus: partibus vel particularibus *glossa in marg.*

338 concedendo *corr. s.s. ex dupliciter MS.*

342 *post prout¹ canc. ens MS.*

348 sensus *add. s.s. MS.*

351 *post tunc canc. tunc MS.*

est, quod omne contentum sub animali est unum realiter in se; et sub isto sensu est verum, quia constat quod Sortes est unum realiter in se, et etiam Plato, et sic de aliis. (f. 240v) Idem dico de quacumque alia natura, sicut de animali.

355

IV.3 (ad I.3)

64 Ad tertiam rationem respondeo dupliciter ad maiorem. Concedo quod nulla diversitas est realis nisi numeralis vel nisi includat diversitatem numeralem. Constat enim secundum opinionem quod locus et superficies non distinguuntur realiter et tamen distinguuntur specificiter. Patet per Aristotelem in

360 *Predicamentis*. Et idem est de multis aliis.

65 Aliter dico quod prima consequentia est falsa, ad auctoritatem quot modis dicitur unum etc. Dico quod opposita possunt sumi dupliciter. Primo modo secundum formas secundum quas opponuntur et in quantum quod opposita sunt, et sic vera est auctoritas. Alio modo possunt sumi secundum

365 modificationes suas vel gradus suos, et sic non oportet quod unum dicatur tot modis sicut reliquum.

66 Nec sequitur quod si unum multiplicetur, quod reliquum multiplicetur; potest esse albedo sub uno gradu albedinis, nigredine existente sub decem. Sic ad propositum applicando, dico quod unum et diversum sunt opposita. Sed hoc

370 quod dico realiter vel secundum rationem sunt modificationes identitatis et diversitatis. Et ideo bene concedo, quantum multiplicetur identitas sive unitas, quod pro eodem habeo in proposito, tantum multiplicatur diversitas et e converso.

67 Unde sicut triplex unitas est, scilicet, numeralis, specifica, et generica, sic triplex diversitas, etc. Sed non sequitur quod, si sit triplex diversitas realis, quod sit triplex unitas realis, vel si non sit nisi una unitas realis, quod non sit nisi una diversitas realis, quia hoc quod dico reale est modificatio unitatis et diversitatis; ideo non valet.

357 *post vel canc.* includet *MS*.

361 *quod scripsi:* quid *MS*.

367 *si add. s.s.* *MS*.

369 *post unum canc.* est *MS*.

370 *modificationes scripsi:* modificative *MS*.

372 *post multiplicatur canc.* idemprimitas sive unitas *MS*.

377 *est corr. ex etiam MS*.

378 *ideo add. s.s.* *MS*.

360 *Predicamentis*: the point might be said to be implied by the very idea behind the *Categories*, but it is not stated as such in the text; perhaps Ferrer was thinking of 8 (10a10-17) or 4 (2a) as bases for it.

IV.4 (ad I.4)

380 68 Ad quartam rationem dicendum quod duplex est diversitas. Quedam
excludens omnem entitatem illius ad quod dicitur distinctum; et sic tantum
differunt Sortes et Plato quantum Sortes et lapis, quia sicut Sortes nullam
entitatem habet, que sit eadem realiter cum lapide, sic nullam entitatem habet,
que sit realiter eadem cum Platone.

385 69 Alia est diversitas excludens uniformitatem et identitatem specificam
illius a quo dicitur distinctum; et sic non tantum differunt Sortes et Plato
quantum Sortes et lapis, quia diversitas que est inter Sortem et lapidem excludit
conformitatem specificam, que non fuit diversitas que est inter Sortem et
Platonem. Ideo non valet.

390 IV.5 (ad I.5)

70 Ad quintam rationem dico quod falsum est quod hoc sit per unitatem
realem; immo hoc est propter conformitatem in esse specifico, quam non habet
cum aere, et etiam propter ordinem universi, quia unumquodque quantum
potest conservat se in esse specifico, nam ad hoc data est nobis virtus generativa
395 secundum Philosophum. Idem ideo non valet.

IV.6 (ad I.6)

71 Ad sextam rationem dico quod hoc non sequitur ex eo quod unitas
speciei sit maior quam unitas generis; immo est ex hoc, quia illa que sunt
eiusdem speciei sunt magis conformiora quam illa que sunt eiusdem generis.
400 72 Vel aliter (f. 241r) dicendum quod talis est maior unitas rationis. Et dico
quod est dare gradum et gradum in unitate rationis, quia illa dicuntur esse
magis unum secundum rationem que habent maiorem conformitatem et illa
minus unum secundum rationem que habent minorem conformitatem. Et quia
illa que sunt eiusdem generis habent minorem conformitatem quam illa que
405 sunt eiusdem speciei, ideo sunt minus unum. Et sic non valet argumentum.

IV.7 (ad I.7)

73 Ad septimam rationem dico quod li unum potest mihi dicere vel
extremum comparisonis vel potest mihi dicere aliquod unum in quo
comparantur et conformantur. Si autem dicat extremum comparisonis, sic

393 etiam *corr.* ex esse *MS.*

400 est *add.* s.s. *MS.*

395 Philosophum: *De gen. et corr.* 1.5 (320b20); cf. 2.10 (337a), 2.11 (338b), and *De caelo* 3.4 (305a).

- 410 vera est maior et sub isto sensu currit A. Si autem dicat mihi aliquod tertium in quo comparantur, quod sit ab eis acceptum sicut est natura universalis, sic est falsum, et sub isto sensu procedit minor. Et sic argumentum non valet.

IV.8 (ad I.8)

- 74 Ad octavam rationem dicendum: concedetur prima consequentia, et
415 cum dicitur quod hoc est falsum, negatur. Cum dicitur quod ille due diversitates distinguerentur per alias duas, dico quod se ipsis distinguuntur.

IV.9 (ad I.9)

- 75 Ad nonam rationem dico quod universale potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo pro natura absolute sumpta et absolute considerata, et sic non oportet
420 quod sit una, seclusa operatione intellectus; immo potest esse plura realiter et commune realiter et unum realiter, et super tale commune potest fieri quicumque potentia etiam alia ab intellectu. Et sub isto sensu maior est falsa et minor est vera.

- 76 Secundo modo potest accipi pro natura ipsa ut est accepta et abstracta a
425 singularibus et in qua ipsa similiter conformantur. Sic forte maior est vera et minor falsa. Et super tale commune nulla potentia fertur nisi potentia intellectiva.

IV.10 (ad I.10)

- 77 Ad decimam rationem dico quod maior est falsa. Immo non est
430 necessarium quod feratur super illo quod est commune communitate abstractionis, vel ab individuís, nec super unum tali unitate; sed dico quod fertur super naturam absolute sumptam.

- 78 Et cum dicitur quod si essent plura realiter qua ratione inesset unum et reliquum, dico quod est verum si natura intenderet illam naturam ut est plura,
435 sed solum super naturam absolute sumptam. Ideo sibi sufficit quod predicatur animal in quo illa natura salvetur.

IV.11 (ad I.11)

- 79 Ad undecimam rationem dicendum quod maior est vera, ubi propria passio esset una realiter, sed propria passio in communi non est una realiter, etc.

411 ab *add. s.s. MS.*

419 absolute¹ *scripsi*: absoluta *MS.*

423 est *add. s.s. MS.*

440

IV.12 (ad I.12)

80 Ad duodecimam rationem dico quod superius et inferius possunt dupliciter sumi. Uno modo in eodem, et sic quicquid importatur per superius importatur per inferius sumendo ipsa in eodem. Et sic maior est vera. Et ideo qua ratione convenit Sorti habere passionem unam, eadem ratione convenit

445 homini qui est Sortes.

81 Secundo modo potest sumi superius in quantum se extendit ad predicationem ad aliud, quod negatur de tali inferiori, cui habere unam propriam passionem convenit. Et sic non oportet quod quicquid convenit inferiori conveniat su(f. 241v)periori ut sic accepto. Patet ergo solutio.

450

IV.13

82 Isti arguentes multas alias rationes adducunt, sed sic quia solum adducunt vel probant quod natura universalis sit realis et non sit una realiter. Ideo non curo eis respondere, cum nihil faciant contra nos. Nos enim concedimus naturam universalem esse realem; non autem eius unitatem dicimus
455 esse realem, ut visum est; ergo, etc. Et sic est finis. Deo gratias.

McGill University.

454 eius *add. s.s. MS.*

455 *post gratias add.* Explicit sollemnis questio magistri Vincencij de unitate universalis *MS.*

FOUR GRADUATION SPEECHES
FROM OXFORD MANUSCRIPTS
(c. 1270-1310)

P. Osmund Lewry, O.P.

DESCRIPTIONS of the intricate formalities of inception at Oxford in the Middle Ages have sometimes drawn on the early testimony of William of Wheatley.¹ After studies which apparently took him to Paris as well as Oxford, William became master of Stamford School, Lincolnshire, on 12 November 1309.² His commentary on the *Philosophiae consolatio* of Boethius is known from three manuscripts; two of these, Cambridge, Pembroke College 155 and Oxford, Exeter College 28, also contain a voluminous commentary on the Pseudo-Boethius, *De disciplina scolarium*, with material of interest for the historian of medieval universities.³ In the Exeter College manuscript⁴ this work bears the unusually informative colophon (fol. 68rb-va):

Explicit liber Boecii, *De disciplina scolarium*, in hunc modum ordinatus ac compilatus per quemdam magistrum qui rexit (68va) scholas Stamfordie anno ab Incarnacione Domini millesimo trecentesimo nono. Ipso incipiente die lune post festum sancti Martini in yeme et terminante in vigilia Palmarum proxima sequente.

¹ See Strickland Gibson, ed., *Statuta antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis* (Oxford, 1931), p. xcvi n. 5; Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1936), 3.143; James A. Weisheipl, 'Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964) 164-65.

² See A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500* [= *BRUO*], 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-59), 3.2030-31, 'Wheatley, William of'.

³ This work and its author have been treated with a different interest by H. F. Sebastian, *William of Wheteley's (fl. 1309-1316) Commentary on the Pseudo-Boethius Tractate 'De disciplina scolarium' and Medieval Grammar School Education* (Diss. Columbia, 1970; University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1973).

⁴ This manuscript was consulted in the Bodleian Library, where it was temporarily deposited for my use, and is quoted here with acknowledgements to the Rector and Fellows of Exeter College, Oxford.

The text was probably intended as a satirical comment on university life at Paris in the thirteenth century in the guise of Boethius' account of education in his time, but the exposition, composed between Monday, 17 November 1309, and Saturday, 11 April 1310, may be enlightening for Oxford practice at the turn of the century.

Sometime in the spring of 1310 William must have reached the following lemma of the Pseudo-Boethius:

Cum autem dies summe professionis affuerit, ut brevi cernate compendiosoque affatu veneranda commendetur sociorum collectio sicque ad honoris initialis incrementa intrepide procedendum est decenti ornatu festivoque apparatu, si facultas suppetat, cunctis vel ad libitum eiusdem professionis splendere procuratis.⁵

William's text differed in some respects from that of the recent critical edition, as is apparent from his gloss on this elliptical sentence:

Positis quibusdam documentis scolari utilibus ante diem inceptionis sue, hic ponit quedam alia documenta utilia die sue inceptionis et anno quo inceperit. Et dicit, *autem*, pro 'quod': *quod cum dies summe promotionis*, idest dies sue inceptionis in artibus, *affuerit*, videndum est ut *veneranda collectio*, idest congregacio, *sophorum*, idest magistrorum omnium, *commendetur*, idest laudetur, *breui scemate*, idest breui ac ordinato modo loquendi – *-que* pro 'et' – *et affatu compendioso*, idest loquela breui et facunda ipsius magistri incipientis illo (*sic*) die; quasi dicens, videndum est quod magister illo (*sic*) die qua incipit habeat bonas et efficaces rationes contra suum respondentem et contra quemcumque alium; et similiter quod magister suus, sub quo incipit, habeat uerba ornata et fructuosa in sua commendacione, ne a circumstantibus blasphemetur veneranda collectio magistrorum per ipsum incipientem; nam vilipensio vnus magistri redundat in vilipensione omnium magistrorum.

Et tunc addit, dicens quod est *procedendum intrepide*, idest sine omni timore, *ad incrementa honoris initialis*, idest ad principium suum, et quod honor et honorificencia magna sibi acrescet in posterum, ita quod omnia sint in mente sigillata perfecte quecumque sunt dicenda illa die – *-que* pro 'et' – *et* est *procedendum sic*, idest modo qui dicitur, videlicet *ornatu* (*corr. ex ornata MS.*) *decenti* magistrorum et scolarium.

Et *si* sua *facultas*, idest si copia suarum diuiciarum, *suppetit*, idest paciatur, tunc est *procedendum ad incrementa honoris initialis apparatu festiuo*, idest ad modum festi, quo ad uestes videlicet ut ornate sit vestitus, et similiter magister sub quo incipit et alii magistri, si hoc commode facere possit. Hoc dico, *cunctis* magistris, cuiuscumque facultatis fuerint *procuratis*, idest festiuatis et reffectis

⁵ Pseudo-Boethius, *De disciplina scolarium* 5.9, ed. Olga Weijers, *Pseudo-Boèce, De disciplina scolarium* (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 12; Leiden-Cologne, 1976), p. 122.

splendide in cibis et potibus, *vel*, supple, si sua facultas et rerum exuberancia ad hoc (60va) sufficere non possit, tunc ad minus videat quod magistri eiusdem facultatis et sciencie qua incipit procurentur uel administrentur splendide et *ad libitum* voluntatis.⁶

His expository technique is that found in Parisian commentaries of the arts faculty in the mid-thirteenth century, with an *expositio litteralis* which even glosses the enclitic '-que' with the conjunction 'et'. The note with which he concludes this brief *lectio* turns on a reading of his text, 'sophorum' for 'magistrorum':

Nota quod olim magistri vocabantur 'sophi', discipuli vero 'sophiste'. Magistri uero indignantes quod discipuli magis nomen habebant quam ipsi, vocabant se 'philosophos', idest amatores sciencie; et sic nomine discipulorum in vna sillaba vincebant.⁷

The use of the term 'sophista' indicates that although his style of commentary owes something to the Parisian masters, he has in mind the practices of Oxford. An arts student there became a *sophista in parviso* after two years' attendance at lectures and disputations, when he began to take an active part in disputing in grammar and logic *de sophismatibus*. This terminology for a disputant continued in a less specific sense at Oxford even after the Middle Ages.⁸

The present interest of William's account of inception is his reference to a neglected feature of the ceremony, the praise of the candidate before the congregation of masters, his *commendatio*. Not only had the candidate himself to be prepared with good and effective arguments against the *respondens* and others who disputed with him at the *vesperies*, the evening ceremony, but the master under whom he incepted had to be eloquent in commending him, lest the gathering of masters should be brought into despute and treated as of little importance through despute for one of its number. This meant that the speech had to be polished in its language and edifying in its content. It was fitting to the occasion that what was said should be brief and well-ordered. After that, the inceptor could go on with confidence to his *principium*, the ceremonies of the next morning when he was invested and gave his inaugural lecture. If his means allowed, the day could be made memorable by fine attire for both candidate and speaker, if not for the rest of the masters, and a feast of good food

⁶ William of Wheatley, *In Pseudo-Boeth. De disc. scol.* 2, *lectio* 63 (ms. Oxford, Exeter College 28, fol. 60rb-va).

⁷ *ibid.*, fol. 60va.

⁸ See *Stat. ant.*, pp. lxxxix, 26, 72, 76, 115, 120, 194, 346, 356, 359, 580, 596; Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe* 3.153; Weisheipl, 'Curriculum', 154. The original usage made a contrast between *sophista* and *questionista*, one who had advanced to disputations in the three philosophies.

and drink for all the masters, or at least for those of the faculty and his own branch of learning.

William does not enlarge on the nature of this commendation, but an Oxford statute from before 1350 leads us to expect that it would be as much concerned with moral qualities as with educational attainments. A statute on the way of presenting bachelors justifies the customary formula thus:

Nullus omnino magister, cuiuscumque fuerit facultatis, quempiam ad incipiendum presentare presumat nisi quem sciencia et moribus ydoneum esse nouerit. Vnde hiis verbis vti solent presentantes, 'Domine Cancellarie, presento vobis istum bachilarium talis facultatis ad incipiendum in tali facultate, quem scio ydoneum, tam in sciencia quam in moribus, ad incipiendum in eadem facultate, in fide prestita vniuersitati.'⁹

This formula matches the earlier provision that the four masters whose duty it is to admit determiners are to select them according to their knowledge and good behaviour,¹⁰ and a further statute that the chancellor is not to grant the licence until depositions have been made by the masters of the faculty in the presence of the proctors both as to the knowledge and life of the candidate.¹¹ William of Wheatley in this connection says:

Nam magistri (60ra) examinantes scolares, quando debent licenciari in artibus, ita bene debent eos examinare in moribus sicut in scienciis, quoniam si inuenti fuerint iracundi, rixosi, luxuriosi et male morigerati, sunt refutandi sicut et illi qui in scienciis sunt minus prouecti.¹²

The ill-tempered, the trouble-makers, the wantons and those who fail to comply with university discipline are to be rejected by the examiners as much as those who fall behind in their studies.

I

In view of this insistence on the two criteria to be met by determiners and inceptors at Oxford, it was of interest to find two graduation speeches under the title, 'Qualiter bachilarii incepturi commendantur in duobus generibus virtutum'. They occur in ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 55, fols. 203ra-

⁹ *Stat. ant.*, p. 29 (13-20).

¹⁰ 'Item, magistri quatuor, prout moris est, ad determinatores admittendos de cetero eligendi admittant in sciencia et moribus ydoneos, ut tenentur' (ibid., p. 28 [21-23]).

¹¹ '... Cancellarius, qui pro tempore fuerit, nullum licenciet in aliqua facultate nisi auditis deposicionibus magistrorum ipsius facultatis in presencia procuratorum vniuersitatis, tam in sciencia quam in vita...' (ibid., pp. 28 [31] - 29 [3]).

¹² In *Pseudo-Boeth.*, *De disc. scol.* 2, *lectio* 60 (ms. Exeter Coll. 28, fols. 59vb-60ra).

204v. The description of the codex in the catalogue of the Digby manuscripts refers to this item in the following terms:

33. Oratio panegyrica quum baccalaureus quidam, qui tum Oxoniis tum Parisiis maxima laude studuerat, pro gradu magistri artium praesentaretur.¹³

The division into two speeches has been missed, and of the two candidates it is only the second who is said to have studied both at Oxford and at Paris. The catalogue notes thirty-eight items in this codex,¹⁴ but some additions and corrections have been made to the description there by the editor of Siger of Brabant's treatise, *De anima intellectiva*,¹⁵ the unasccribed item 26 of the catalogue. As a revision of the Digby catalogue is in progress, it would be out of place here to attempt a comprehensive redescription of the material in this remarkably rich manuscript, but something must be said to clarify the relation of the graduation speeches to the other items contained there.

A review of the items of known authorship, provenance or date and their place in the gatherings of the manuscript may throw some light on the make-up of this collection. The first two quires (fols. 1-11, 12-21) contain the commentary of Geoffrey of Aspill on Aristotle's *De caelo et mundo*, the work of a master active at Oxford at some time between 1243 and 1263.¹⁶ The third quire (fols. 22-37), which opens with unasccribed expositions of Aristotle's *De sensu et sensato* and *De morte et vita*, also contains what may be Geoffrey's commentary on the *De generatione et corruptione* and the beginning of an exposition of the *De anima* by James of Douai, a Parisian master who was proctor of the Picard nation in 1275.¹⁷ The fourth quire (fols. 38-49) contains summaries of and questions on Aristotle's *Metaphysica*. Since book *lambda* is still described as book '11', this material is unlikely to have been composed much later than 1271, when the translation of book *kappa* led to the re-numbering of *lambda* as book '12'. The fifth and sixth quires (fols. 50-61, 62-71) contain an unasccribed exposition of the *Physica*; the seventh (fols. 72-83) contains an exposition of the *De anima*, also found in ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16096, followed by expositions of the *Parva naturalia* which

¹³ Gulielmus D. Macray, *Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars nona, codices a viro clarissimo Kenelm Digby, eq. aur., anno 1634 donatos, complectens* (Oxford, 1883), col. 57.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, cols. 55-58.

¹⁵ B. Bazán, ed., *Siger de Brabant, Quaestiones in tertium De anima, De anima intellectiva, De aeternitate mundi* (Philosophes médiévaux 13; Louvain-Paris, 1972), pp. 9*-12*.

¹⁶ See Enya Macrae, 'Geoffrey of Aspill's Commentaries on Aristotle', *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 6 (1968) 97.

¹⁷ See Charles H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Jacobus-Johannes Juff', *Traditio* 26 (1970) 139-41, 'Jacobus de Duaco'.

continue in the eighth quire (fols. 84-95). Averroes' commentaries on the *Parva naturalia*¹⁸ are also found there, and these continue into the ninth quire (fols. 96-105). They are followed by Averroes' *De substantia orbis* and questions on natural philosophy which continue into the tenth quire (fols. 106-113). This is completed by texts of Pseudo-Seneca (Martin of Braga) and Seneca. The table of contents on fol. 252r indicates more texts than are found here. As the catalogue notes, the manuscript formerly included the Pseudo-Senecan *Epistola ad beatum Paulum*, Augustine *De disciplina christiana*, a sermon of St. Bernard, *De passione Domini*, and excerpts from Seneca, *De clementia*.

After this hiatus, the eleventh quire (fols. 114-125) contains questions on the *De anima*, further questions from modist grammar, two short pieces on physics and a question *De augmento* attributed to Adam of Buckfield, a master of arts of Oxford by 1243.¹⁹ The twelfth to the fourteenth quire (fols. 126-137, 138-149, 150-158) contain questions on *Priscianus minor* influenced by the Parisian teaching of Boethius of Dacia, which can hardly be earlier than the 1270s.²⁰ These are followed by the treatise of Siger, *De anima intellectiva*, already mentioned, a work composed at Paris around 1273-74.²¹ The fifteenth and sixteenth quires (fols. 159-169, 170-180) contain the Pseudo-Grosseteste treatise *De grammatica*, a mid-thirteenth-century Oxford work influenced by Grosseteste and criticised by Roger Bacon.²² This is followed by extracts from and notes on Aristotle's *Rhetorica*. The seventeenth quire (fols. 181-194) contains Albertus Magnus, *De intellectu et intelligibili* et *De nutrimento et nutribili*,²³ works composed in Germany in the 1250s.²⁴ The latter continues in the eighteenth quire (fols. 195-204), where it is followed by Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, generally thought to have been composed at Paris between 1252 and 1256.²⁵ The graduation speeches are found at the end of this quire. They are

¹⁸ Ed. E. L. Shields, *Averrois Cordubensis compendia librorum Aristotelis qui parva naturalia vocantur* (Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, versionum latinarum 7; Cambridge, Mass., 1949).

¹⁹ See BRUO 1.297, 'Buckfeld, Adam de'; Charles H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: A-F', *Traditio* 23 (1967) 317-23, 'Adam de Buckfeld (Bouchermefort)'.

²⁰ See Jan Pinborg, *Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter* (BGTPM 42.2; Münster-Copenhagen, 1967), pp. 93-94. The late thirteenth-century, English hand in which this work has been transcribed in the Digby manuscript is illustrated in M. B. Parkes, *English Cursive Book Hands 1250-1500* (Oxford, 1969), plate 16 (i).

²¹ See Bazán, *Siger de Brabant*, p. 77*.

²² See Karl Reichl, ed., *'Tractatus de grammatica': eine fälschlich Robert Grosseteste zugeschriebene spekulative Grammatik* (Veröffentlichungen des Grabmann-Institutes N.F. 28; Munich-Paderborn-Vienna, 1976), pp. 108-11.

²³ Ed. A. Borgnet, *B. Alberti Magni Opera omnia* 9 (Paris, 1890), cols. 476-521, 322-41.

²⁴ See James A. Weisheipl, ed., *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980* (Studies and Texts 49; Toronto, 1980), Appendix 1, pp. 568-72.

²⁵ See Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, *Opera omnia* 43 (Rome, 1976), p. 320.

followed in the nineteenth and twentieth quires (fols. 205-216, 217-227) by the *Syncategoremata* of William of Sherwood,²⁶ a work which can hardly have been composed much later than the 1230s, but whether at Oxford or at Paris is not clear, though some evidence points to Oxford.²⁷ After some further short questions on logic, the twenty-first quire (fols. 228-239) has the recently identified *De signis* of Roger Bacon, which its editors take to be a missing chapter of his *Opus maius*, composed in 1267²⁸ after his ten years under supervision in Paris. This piece continues in the twenty-second quire (fols. 240-251), where it is followed by a question on syntax and the beginning of a treatise *De fallaciis*. This is the work said to have been composed by Aquinas during his confinement at Roccasecca²⁹ around 1244-45. It continues in the twenty-third and final quire (fols. 252-256), but the ending is lacking, and the codex is completed with a fifteenth-century table of contents (fol. 252r), which indicates that the manuscript also once contained at the end 'quedam de astronomia', and some spare leaves with jottings (fols. 253-256).

The early history of this manuscript is unknown, but there are English names from the fourteenth and fifteenth century in inscriptions on some of the leaves at the end and elsewhere in the manuscript. There are notes in a feint hand on fol. 253v, with a name, 'Iohannes Wymhm' (?), at the head. Fol. 254v has a note beginning 'Willelmo Fylbecon' and a reference to the 'compotus Willelmi de Fallbyslegh'. Fylbecon's name also occurs on fol. 180v. A 'Fallyslegh' or 'Fallysley' is named in the New College, Oxford hall-books for 1402, as chaplain of the college.³⁰ The names 'Iohannes W.' and 'Wydeford' occur on fol. 226v. A Franciscan friar, William Woodford, engaged in controversy with John Wyclif in the 1370s,³¹ but the evidence is too slender to press an identification. In 1632 the manuscript formed part of the legacy of Thomas Allen to Sir Kenelm Digby. Allen's name appears on fol. 1r, together with the number '14' assigned to the manuscript by Digby; in the Allen catalogue it was recorded as '8° 11'.³² It came to the Bodleian Library with the

²⁶ Ed. J. Reginald O'Donnell, 'The *Syncategoremata* of William of Sherwood', *Mediaeval Studies* 3 (1941) 46-93; trans. Norman Kretzmann, *William of Sherwood's Treatise on Syncategorematic Words* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1968).

²⁷ See H. A. G. Braakhuis, *De 13de eeuwse tractaten over syncategorematische termen* 1 (Diss. Leiden, 1979), pp. 309-16, 514.

²⁸ See K. M. Fredborg, L. Nielsen, J. Pinborg, 'An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's *Opus maius: De signis*', *Traditio* 34 (1978) 79. The plate facing p. 80 shows an English hand, apparently the same as that of the Priscian questions in the Digby manuscript.

²⁹ See Thomas Aquinas, *De fallaciis, Opera omnia* 43 (Rome, 1976), p. 386.

³⁰ See *BRUO* 2.665, 'Fallysley'.

³¹ See *BRUO* 3.2081-82, 'Woodford, William'.

³² See A. G. Watson, 'Thomas Allen of Oxford and His Manuscripts' in M. B. Parkes and A. G. Watson, eds., *Medieval Scribes, Manuscripts and Libraries: Essays Presented to N. R. Ker* (London, 1978), p. 311.

other Digby manuscripts in 1634. It is not known where Allen acquired it, but the age of the table of contents indicates that, unlike many of his manuscripts which were in the form of loose quires, it had already assumed something like its present shape at an early stage, and has lost only a few items since the late Middle Ages and before it was rebound by Digby. Catchwords on fols. 11v, 61v, 83v, 95v, 105v, 137v, 149v, 169v, 194v, 216v, 239v are evidence of original links between quires 1 and 2, 5 and 6, 7 to 10, 12 to 14, 15 and 16, 17 and 18, 19 and 20, 21 and 22. Continuity of handwriting between quires establishes further links between 2 and 3, 11 and 12, so that the links are stronger than at first appear between the writings of the arts faculty gathered here.

The eighteenth quire (fols. 195r-204r) is a gathering of ten leaves, 205 × 150 mm., initially in double columns and in an English hand of the late thirteenth century. The signature '18' has been added at the foot of fol. 195r. The treatise *De ente et essentia* ends (fol. 202vb), '... in quo sit finis et consumpmacio huius sermonis. Amen.' It is followed after a line by dicta from Avicenna beginning, 'Auicenna 5^{to} sue *Methaphisice* dicit quod animal secundum quod animal nec est genus, nec species, nec indiuiduum, nec vnum, nec proprium, nec inproprium (203ra), set ex hoc esse est animal....' These notes, which draw upon sources used by Aquinas in his treatise, end (fol. 203ra), '... et non est aliquod de hiis. Explicit.' A later hand has then mistakenly added the colophon, 'Tomas, *De ente et essencia*'. The first graduation speech begins on the next line in a different hand, which is hard to characterise in the present state of our knowledge, but may be English and of the late thirteenth century. The title of these speeches has been added above column b in the same later hand that has added the misplaced colophon. From fol. 203v to the end of the second speech the text continues in long lines, thirty-seven lines to a page. The equivalent of eight lines has been left blank after the conclusion of the second speech on fol. 204v. The speeches have occasional corrections by the scribe himself, and attention has been drawn to some of the quotations by marginal squiggles. The nineteenth quire opens on the next leaf (fol. 205r) with the beginning of William of Sherwood's *Syncategoremata*. This is in the same hand as the Priscian questions and Bacon's *De signis*. The signature of the new gathering, '19', has been added at the foot.

The hand of the speeches also occurs on fol. 37v, where the beginning of James of Douai's *De anima* exposition fills a blank space on a verso at the end of the third quire, after the conclusion of the commentary on the *De generatione et corruptione*, thought to be by Geoffrey of Aspill. There Parisian material has been added after Oxford material. The continuation, if there was one, of James's exposition is lost, since the fourth quire opens with another work and the hand changes. Similarly, at the end of the fourth quire a question on the

anima sensitiva has been added to fill the blank verso of fol. 49; at the end of the sixth quire there are questions on fire, the *materia* of the soul, place and the possibility of several worlds on fol. 71v; at the end of the fourteenth quire there are questions on species on fol. 158v; noteworthy propositions from Aristotle's *Rhetorica* are found in the sixteenth quire, on fol. 178rb, followed by a sketch of a commentary on that work and other more disjointed jottings which continue to the verso of the last leaf (fol. 180v); logical questions are added towards the end of the twentieth quire on fol. 225r, while the verso has notes on political philosophy, and the remaining leaves are blank apart from scrawls; the twenty-second quire has a question on syntax added on fol. 244r, and the verso a scheme of valid moods of the syllogism, before Aquinas, *De fallaciis* begins on fol. 245r. The provenance of the material in these additions is uncertain. The hand of the speeches also occurs in an additional note in the tenth quire on fol. 110r, the beginning of the section devoted to Pseudo-Senecan and Senecan material. In all these instances the hand occurs in hastily written short additions filling spaces left in the gathering after the more careful transcription of longer texts.

It is more difficult to judge whether any of these longer texts are written by the same scribe, but the occurrences that can with some confidence be judged the same are enough to knit together sections of the codex which are not linked by catchwords or continuity of hands between quires. Their characteristic appearance in the spare leaves of existing material makes it likely that all or most of the other works were already transcribed and assembled as a collection when the graduation speeches were added to the eighteenth quire. From the nature of the additions and the style of hand one would suppose that it was a scholar who was adding the speeches to a collection of texts from Oxford and Paris, none of which appears to be earlier than 1230 or later than 1280. Although logic and grammar are also represented in the codex, there is a preponderance of texts from natural philosophy. An interest in all of these disciplines is evident in the additions made in the hand of the speeches, but there is less stress on the *trivium* than on more advanced studies. The fact that part of a work by James of Douai is transcribed in the same hand shows that whoever copied the speeches also had access to Parisian teaching in natural philosophy from a master active around 1275.

II

The speeches in ms. Digby 55 had at least received some note in the nineteenth-century catalogue; those in ms. Oxford, Merton College 292 escaped

attention in Coxe's description of the codex, where seventeen items are listed.³³ Sir Maurice Powicke, who thought this 'one of the most interesting of the Merton mss', corrected the earlier description in some respects,³⁴ following Pelster,³⁵ who described twenty-one items. It may be useful to rehearse the contents with the fuller information now available about these items, in order to establish a context for the graduation speeches.

The manuscript contains Duns Scotus' questions on the *Metaphysica* of Aristotle, the *De principiis naturae* of John Seccheville, an English master who was rector of the University of Paris in 1256 but probably composed his treatise in England around 1265,³⁶ the same master's *De excellentia philosophiae* and a treatise, *De praedicamento relationis*, which, though attributed to him too, is almost certainly by the Dominican, Robert Kilwardby, and composed in all probability during his regency in theology at Blackfriars, Oxford in the late 1250s.³⁷ Then follow some of the questions of Simon of Faversham on the *Praedicamenta* and *Perihermeneias* of Aristotle,³⁸ his *Quaestiones novae* on *De sophisticis elenchis* and his questions on the *Analytica priora*. His questions on the *Analytica posteriora* are preceded by a short question on whether the relation of God to creatures is mental or real, displaying the same interest as Kilwardby's treatise. There is a marginal reference here to the position of Henry of Ghent, a regent master in theology at Paris from 1276 to 1292. Next comes the exposition of the *Analytica posteriora* of Robert Grosseteste, probably composed at Oxford towards 1230, then questions of Simon on the *Physica*, reported by Robert de Clothale.³⁹ Clothale was an M. A. by 1290, and

³³ H. O. Coxe, *Catalogus codicum MSS. qui in collegiis aulisque Oxoniensibus hodie adservantur* 1 (Oxford, 1852), pp. 115-16.

³⁴ F. M. Powicke, *The Medieval Books of Merton College* (Oxford, 1931), pp. 154-56, no. 518.

³⁵ F. Pelster, 'Handschriftliches zur Überlieferung der *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum* und der *Collationes* des Duns Scotus', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 43 (1930) 478-82.

³⁶ See R.-M. Giguère, ed., *Jean de Sècheville, De principiis naturae* (Université de Montréal, Publications de l'Institut d'Études Médiévales 14; Montréal-Paris, 1956), pp. 9-27. The Merton manuscript is described there (pp. 12-13). See too *BRUO* 3.1661-62, 'Seccheville, John de'.

³⁷ See P. Osmund Lewry, 'Robertus Anglicus and the Italian Kilwardby' in *Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 November 1980*, forthcoming; L. Schmücker, ed., *Robert Kilwardby O.P., De natura relationis* (Brixen, 1980).

³⁸ See P. Osmund Lewry, 'The Commentaries of Simon of Faversham and ms. Merton College 288', *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 21 (1979) 73, where the extent of the material on the old logic in ms. 292 is described. The *Quaestiones super libro Praedicamentorum* and *super libro Perihermeneias* have been edited by P. Mazzarella, *Magistri Simonis Anglici sive de Faverisham Opera omnia* 1 (Padua, 1957), pp. 71-145, 151-70, from ms. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana C 161 inf.

³⁹ See A. Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250-1350* 1 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 9; Leiden-Cologne, 1971), pp. 32-33, 190-96.

functioned as an arbitrator at Oxford in 1314.⁴⁰ Simon was chancellor of Oxford from 1304 until shortly before his death in 1306,⁴¹ but his arts teaching is more likely to belong to Paris in the 1270s or early 1280s than to Oxford.⁴²

The next item is certainly Parisian. Powicke thought it was by Simon, but in fact it is Peter of Auvergne's questions on the *Metaphysica*.⁴³ Peter was rector of the University of Paris in 1275,⁴⁴ and so may have been teaching when Simon was a student there. Three unasccribed works follow. Powicke correctly identified the second as by Albertus Magnus, and thought the others were by Simon. In fact all three are by Albert, as Pelster had noted, *De somno et vigilia*, *De spiritu et respiratione* and *De intellectu et intelligibili*,⁴⁵ and belong to his series of writings on the *Parva naturalia* composed in Germany in the 1250s.⁴⁶ Next come questions by Siger of Brabant and Simon of Faversham on the third book of the *De anima*. The scribe has seen the common interest of the two works and included the ascription of the former in the title of the latter, 'Incipiunt questiones super 3^m *De anima* disputate a magistro Symone de Faverisham, et precedentes sunt magistri Sigeri super eodem 3^o' (fol. '364', actually 353, rb). This is the sole copy known of Siger's questions. Their editor thinks it is likely that they were composed in 1269-70, that is, immediately before the Parisian condemnation of 1270.⁴⁷

Simon's questions on the *De anima* end, as Powicke noted, on the folio numbered '374' (actually 363)rb with the words, 'de ferro quantum ad substantiam suam ante malleacionem et post'. Pelster's description (here depending on information from Powicke) is misleading as to the foliation and content at this point: he refers to questions occupying fols. 372r-376r and a list of questions to the first four books of the *Ethica* on fol. 376r-v, and says that fols. 377-388 are lacking.⁴⁸ Powicke described this section of the manuscript thus:

f. 375^v, in quite a different hand, an extract, 'Tullius 3^o rethorice sue', followed in another hand by a table of contents of questiones on the Ethics 'Incipiunt

⁴⁰ See BRUO 1.446, 'Clothale, Robert de'.

⁴¹ See BRUO 2.672, 'Faversham, Simon de'.

⁴² See Charles H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Robertus – Wilgelmus', *Traditio* 29 (1973) 141-46, 'Simon de Faversham'.

⁴³ See Zimmermann, *Verzeichnis* 1.18-19, 80-88. The partial edition by A. Monahan, 'Quaestiones in *Metaphysicam* Petri de Alvernia' in J. R. O'Donnell, ed., *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers* (Studies and Texts 1; Toronto, 1955), pp. 145-81, was made without knowledge of the Merton manuscript.

⁴⁴ See Charles H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Narcissus – Richardus', *Traditio* 28 (1972) 334-46, 'Petrus de Alvernia'.

⁴⁵ Ed. Borgnet, *B. Alberti Magni Opera omnia* 9.121-207, 213-51, 477-521.

⁴⁶ See above, p. 143 n. 24.

⁴⁷ See Bazán, *Siger de Brabant*, pp. 67*-74*.

⁴⁸ 'Handschriftliches zur Überlieferung'. 481.

questiones librorum ethicorum'. These end at f. 376^v, with the fortieth questio on Book iv, which has been cut off by the binder. Simon of Faversham is said to have written on the Ethics.

ff. 377-388 of the old foliation are missing.⁴⁹

Neither has noted a short piece following Simon's *De anima* questions on fol. '374'(363)va, in brown ink, in an English hand of the early fourteenth century, beginning, '*Accidens est ens. Probatur sic: diuisum predicatur de diuidentibus; set ens diuiditur in substantiam et accidens; ideo, etc...*' Five questions are raised about *accidens*:

Circa idem queruntur quinque: primo, quia accidens est terminus communis, utrum terminus communis quicumque per unam rationem dicatur de suppositis preteritis et futuris; secundo, utrum accidens per unam rationem dicatur de omnibus nouem generibus accidentium; 3^o, de ueritate propositionis illius, '*Accidens est ens*'; quarto, utrum inherencia sit de esse accidentis; 5^{to}, utrum aliquod accidens suscipiat magis et minus.

The discussion proceeds with an interest which is both logical and metaphysical, though the proposition discussed is not a lemma of either the *Isagoge*, *Topica* or *Metaphysica*, any one of which might provide a context for such a discussion. The first question reflects preoccupations which are current at Oxford in the last third of the thirteenth century, and the common English names 'Robertus' and 'Willelmus' are used to exemplify present realities. This piece ends on fol. '375'(364)rb with the words, '*differencia sunt propter temporis defectum siue breuitatem*'.

The text noted by Powicke begins on fol. '375'(364)va, '*Tullius 3^o Rhetorice sue...*', without title. It is written in a cursive English hand of the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, in double columns of fifty-three lines, and continues to fol. '376'(365)rb47, where it ends with the words, '*ita sit desinendi modus*'. It proves to be a pair of graduation speeches of very unequal length, the second of which is introduced by a paragraph sign and occupies only thirty lines of the last column, on a page 292 × 215 mm., of which the written area is 242 × 170 mm. The speeches have been extensively corrected in the same hand in a way which might suggest that this is the speaker's draft. However, the formulaic character of the references to 'dominus N.' in each speech may tell against this suggestion; the speaker would be more likely to include the names of his candidates. The rest of fol. '376'(365)rb is occupied by the table of contents of the *Ethica*, in a different hand, which actually begins, '*Incipiunt conclusiones libri Ethicorum...*', and continues on the verso. Fols. '373'-'376'

⁴⁹ Powicke, *The Medieval Books*, pp. 155-56.

make up a gathering of four leaves, apparently used to complete the questions of Simon on the *De anima*. The provision was generous, and as with the Digby manuscript, blank leaves at the end of a quire seem to have invited the addition of extraneous material.

With the next quire the foliation goes from '376' to '389'. The text of Simon of Faversham's questions on the *De somno et vigilia* is acephalous, and begins (fol. '389'[366]ra), 'Vnde odor propter alicam materialem condicionem et propter alicam infeccionem poterit inficere aerem....' This ends (fol. '393'[370]va), 'dupliciter ex parte anime et corporis. Expliciunt questiones *De sompno et vigilia* reportate post dominum Symonem de F.' Pelster has correctly described what follows on fols. '393'(370)va-'401'(378)va.⁵⁰ The colophon at the end of this section refers only to 'questiones *De iuuentute et senectute, De inspiracione et respiracione* disputate a Domino Symone de Faverisham', but these are preceded by questions on *De motu animalium* and *De longitudine et breuitate vitae*. In the blank column, fol. '401'(378)vb, there is the librarian's inscription, 'Liber de philosophia. Liber aule de Merton' in Oxonia.' There is no record of the acquisition of this codex by the college, but Powicke judges that it was acquired early in the fourteenth century.

Like the Digby manuscript, with which it has many points of comparison, ms. Merton College 292 affords an interesting witness to the circulation of continental material in England, with works of Albert and Siger as well as of Peter of Auvergne. Of English authors the one most extensively represented is Simon of Faversham, of whom it has preserved in part, or as a whole, twelve works on logic and natural philosophy, with a similar interest in the *Parva naturalia* to that of the Digby manuscript. Both Siger and Peter belong to the generation in which one would look for Simon's teachers, and Albert's name occurs frequently in his writings. The colophon of Simon's questions on the *De anima* suggests that they were transcribed to complement those of Siger. No authentic questions of Simon on the *Metaphysica* have yet been found, and those of Peter may supply a lacuna in his writings. Simon's questions on the *Analytica posteriora* are followed by the exposition of Grosseteste, to whom Simon refers by name no less than thirteen times and whose influence is pervasive throughout the questions.⁵¹ Two of the works of Albert on the *Parva naturalia* are matched by similar works of Simon. There is, then, a certain unity in much of the manuscript around the writings of Simon and those who influenced him. Whether the English, secular, Averroist master, John Secche-

⁵⁰ 'Handschriftliches zur Überlieferung', 481-82.

⁵¹ See J. L. Longeway, *Simon of Faversham's 'Questions on the Posterior Analytics': A 13th Century View of Science* (Diss. Cornell, 1977; University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1978), pp. 142-43.

ville, a man of an earlier generation whose career also spanned England and France, is to be brought into this ambit is not clear, but his work, *De principiis naturae*, was still available from the Parisian stationers in 1275.⁵² Duns Scotus became a priest while at Oxford in 1291, a year after Simon was ordained deacon, and died two years after Simon, in 1308, so it is not unlikely that they were in Oxford at the same time. But whatever the case with the works of Seccheville and Scotus, found at the beginning of the Merton manuscript, it is clear that the immediate context into which the graduation speeches have been inserted is a major collection of the writings of Simon of Faversham and works which influenced him, transmitted in one instance, and perhaps in more than one instance, by Robert Clothale, and circulating in Oxford, where Simon was chancellor early in the fourteenth century.

III

The two pairs of speeches demand separate treatment. Those in the Digby manuscript are of particular interest in view of what they say about the studies of the inceptors. The first opens with a reference to Aristotle's *Rhetorica* (1.1-2),⁵³ in the version of William of Moerbeke, which suggests that it was not composed before 1269-70, when that version makes an occasional appearance in the *De malo* of Aquinas.⁵⁴ It may be that that source was only recently available to the speaker, and the use of a citation in William's version may assume more significance since extracts from it are found in the same hand as the speeches, beginning (fol. 178rb) under the title, 'Incipiunt propositiones magis notabiles *Rethorice* Aristotilis extracte'. These begin with the opening of the work, 'Rethorica assecutiua (assecutam *MS.*) dialectice...', and continue almost to the end of the first chapter, the final words being, 'Sophistica non in potencia set in eleccione est, dialeticus et rethor in potencia'.⁵⁵ The extracts appear to be a not wholly successful effort to assimilate a new text. A similar impression is created by what follows (fols. 178va-179rb), a sketch of a commentary, with an initial division of the text beginning, '*Rethorica*. In prohemio 2 facit: primo, ostendit qualis; secundo, eam utilis...', leading to further

⁵² See H. Denifle and É. Chatelain, eds., *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* 1 (Paris, 1889), p. 644.

⁵³ In references to the speeches, the first number indicates the speech according to the order of the appended texts; subsequent numbers refer to lines within that speech.

⁵⁴ See B. Schneider, ed., *Rhetorica, translatio anonyma sive vetus et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka* (Aristoteles Latinus [= AL] 31.1-2; Leiden, 1978), p. xxviii.

⁵⁵ Cf. Arist., *Rhet.* 1.1 (1355b18-22) (AL p. 163 [1-5]): 'sophistica enim non in potentia, sed in electione est ... ille autem secundum electionem rethor ... dialeticus autem non secundum electionem, sed secundum potentiam.'

extracts and lemmata with introductory forms for *lectiones* of a literal commentary, ending with the lemma, '*Quoniam autem sepe confitentes*', the opening words of book 1, chapter 7 (1363b5). Compared, say, with the exposition of Giles of Rome, which may have been composed before 1282,⁵⁶ it is a very jejune exposition, and may thus represent an earlier stage in the assimilation of the material. when it first began to circulate in the 1270s. The speaker's *thema* might, then, have the freshness of a newly discovered source, rather than being a cliché of university oratory.

The description in the *Rhetorica* of praise as language extolling virtue leads the speaker to distinguish moral and intellectual virtue, drawing on Aristotle's *Ethica* (1.2-4). He refers to the practice of commending inceptors in the various faculties under these two heads in terms which evoke Wheatley's account and the provisions of the Oxford statutes (1.4-8). With a strong sense of what is already traditional in university life, he gives four reasons why the custom of commending knowledge and moral qualities was introduced: to reward the candidate for what he has done, and to spur him on to continue with even greater vigour; to make his teaching more acceptable to his students and to encourage the audience to imitate his attainments (1.9-23). The task has fallen to him of commending this unnamed bachelor, and though the one who is to incept under him is reluctant and has persistently asked him to refrain, he has no wish to appear to despise the former custom or recklessly to introduce something new (1.24-28). When he cites the *Ethica* to the effect that truth is to be preferred to friends, at the risk of destroying what is close to us, the implication of the word '*familiares*' may be that there are even closer ties than those of friendship between the speaker and the inceptor; perhaps he is a kinsman (1.28-33).

The praise of the bachelor's good life is accomplished in a few elegant references to the *Rhetorica* and to Seneca's moral epistle 67. The speaker excuses himself from going into detail, in order to hasten the promotion (*expeditio*) of the candidates (1.34-43). The word '*expeditio*' is that used in an Oxford statute from before 1350.⁵⁷ Very likely, then, there were others incepting in arts besides his two bachelors, and he had in mind the importance of brevity, stressed by the Pseudo-Boethius and his expositor. In fact, the two speeches in their present form could be delivered comfortably in about twenty minutes. But he spends longer over the candidate's learning than his good life,

⁵⁶ See James Jerome Murphy, 'The Scholastic Condemnation of Rhetoric in the Commentary of Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle' in *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge. Actes du Quatrième Congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada, 27 août - 2 septembre 1967* (Montréal-Paris, 1969), p. 836.

⁵⁷ See below, p. 163 n. 85.

indicating his sharpness of mind, constant study and regular performance in public exercises before able masters (1.44-46). His progress through logic, grammar and natural philosophy is praised in passing, but what the speaker enlarges on is his application to mathematical studies. The speaker dwells on the certitude of such knowledge with a phrase from Averroes, and the citations that follow, from Boethius, Virgil and Bernard Silvester, show that among those studies of the *quadrivium* he excelled in the study of astronomy. Apparently too he had a bent for astrology, being curious about the influence of the heavenly bodies on events in the natural order, with some of the primitive wonder that Aristotle mentions at the beginning of the *Metaphysica* (1.46-68). There is nothing to represent astronomy in the Digby manuscript now, but it once contained at the end some unspecified material from that discipline.

The first speech closes with a paralipitic allusion to the candidate's connections, wealth and political influence.⁵⁸ Evidently he comes from noble stock, but philosophy takes no account of that, and Seneca neatly evokes the humility of the first philosophers (1.69-79). Finally, the bachelor is presented in a brief peroration as one who has made good progress and already proved himself in learning, and thus can safely be promoted to the ranks of those who teach (1.79-83). The commendation according to the two kinds of virtue is both elegant and succinct.

The second speech takes its *thema* from Aristotle in the *Ethica*, telling us to disregard those who would limit our inquiry to what is human and mortal, and to strain after what is immortal. The same work is the source for the speaker's second authority, insisting on the greater certitude of the abstract studies of philosophy, wonderfully pleasurable, pure and solid. Lower things, however, and what is human become a point of departure for the knowledge of what is higher (2.1-10). The reference here to Simonides (2.8-9) may depend on a particular reading preserved now in only one manuscript of the revised text of Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethica*, though it has a parallel in Aquinas' commentary on this passage and Walter Burley's account of Simonides in his *De vita et moribus philosophorum*.⁵⁹ The point that is being made is aptly illustrated by an image from Boethius of the variable stature of Philosophy, sometimes adapting herself to the common measure of men, sometimes piercing the heavens (2.10-15). The citations from Seneca and Aristotle on the usefulness of philosophy stress its moral value and edifying character, making a

⁵⁸ Paralipsis is the figure called 'occultatio' in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, where it is described in the following terms (4.27.37): 'Occultatio est cum dicimus nos praeterire aut non scire aut nolle dicere id quod nunc maxime dicimus....'

⁵⁹ See below, p. 171 n. 29.

man God's friend (2.16-28), anticipating the emphasis on ethics and metaphysics in the second candidate's studies.

This bachelor's aptitude for study of the liberal arts – something apparent from his childhood – is related to a divine instinct rather than to his own efforts or choice. He thus fits the description of those who enjoy advantages of birth and good fortune, in passages from book 2, chapter 8, of the *Magna moralia* and book 7, chapter 14, of Aristotle's *Ethica Eudemia*, which circulated in the Middle Ages as the *Liber de bona fortuna*⁶⁰ (2.29-37). This natural aptitude for knowledge was in time actualised through studiously attending to good teachers, carefully repeating what he had learnt and committing it to memory, and frequently discussing it with his companions (2.37-41). An arts education then laid stress not only on attendance at lectures, but also on rehearsal of what was taught by the masters, in afternoon sessions of *repetitio* with a bachelor, and on active exercise of knowledge acquired in public disputations as well as private discussions.

The speaker goes on to narrate the candidate's progress through the schools. He first went (*se transtulit*) to a place where logic flourished and grammarians laid the first foundations of wisdom with their teaching of congruous speech (2.42-46). Since the twelfth century, many English students had gone to Paris to begin their arts studies with the two major subjects of the *trivium*, logic and grammar. Men like John of Salisbury, Adam of Balsham, John of Garland and Robert Kilwardby had even made their reputations in arts there rather than in England. 'Sophistica' (2.45) in a narrow sense might express a concern with fallacious reasoning, as in Kilwardby's exposition of the *De sophisticis elenchis* from around 1240, or the treatise of Aquinas from a slightly later period, which eventually reached Paris and is preserved in the Digby manuscript. It might be connected too with those exercises in the elucidation of ambiguous propositions known as *sophismata*, of which examples by Kilwardby are known both in logic and in grammar. Such a concern and such exercises were not unknown in England, but there is a dearth of material for the period before 1270. Some Oxford *sophismata* by Peter of Cornwall and others have survived in ms. Worcester Cathedral Q. 13,⁶¹ but to my knowledge no material of this kind and from this period has yet been linked with Cambridge, or Northampton, at times a rival centre of studies, particularly during the Barons' Wars in the 1260s.⁶²

⁶⁰ See Arist., *Magna moralia* 2.8 (1207a35-39), *Eth. Eud.* 7.14 (1248a30-32).

⁶¹ See Jan Pinborg, 'The English Contribution to Logic before Ockham', *Synthese* 40 (1979) 28, and P. Osmund Lewry, 'Grammar, Logic and Rhetoric, 1200-1320' in *History of the University of Oxford* 1, ed. R. J. I. Catto. forthcoming.

⁶² See C. H. Lawrence, 'The University of Oxford and the Chronicle of the Barons' Wars', *English Historical Review* 95 (1980) 99-113.

Sermo congruus (2.45-46) is the normal way of characterising the object of grammatical study at this period. It is clear from the context that the student went first to a place other than Oxford. Against the supposition that it was to Paris is the fact that his Parisian 'exile' is a point which the speaker dwells on later with some feeling. Certainly logic and grammar 'flourished' there, and at present we are too poorly informed to know whether the same could be said of any centre of studies in England apart from Oxford. But wherever he studied, the speaker makes little account of such linguistic arts and has found some suitably depreciatory phrases from Seneca (2.46-52); his preference is for higher things than captious debates over the meanings of words.

Turning to Oxford – 'se diuertit' (2.53) may imply travel within England rather than a return from France – the student found those higher things in natural philosophy, ethics and metaphysics. There too he became a determiner (2.53-55), a stage normally reached after four years' residence at Oxford or elsewhere, 'ubi viget (artium) facultatis studium generale'.⁶³ An Oxford statute of 1268 required that depositions should be made before Lent regarding the necessary preliminary studies for determination.⁶⁴ Presumably, the obligation of having heard at least two courses on the required texts of the old and new logic and *Priscianus minor* (on which there are Parisian questions in the Digby manuscript) could have been met by two years' study at Paris, but exceptions could be made. Perhaps the reference to 'sophistica' means that the student also took part in disputes *de sophismate* before coming to Oxford. The Oxford requirement, for those who undertook it, was for a full year of responding *de sophismate* in logic and grammar, before responding *de questione* on natural philosophy, etc., at least in the summer before *determinatio*.⁶⁵ At Oxford, the student could have heard the texts from natural philosophy required for determination, Aristotle's *Physica*, *De anima* and *De generatione et corruptione*,⁶⁶ all of which are represented in the Digby manuscript by expositions or

⁶³ *Stat. ant.*, pp. lxxxix-xc.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 25 (17) - 27 (9).

⁶⁵ 'Et sciendum quod si prius responderint in scolis, publice de sophismatibus per annum integre debent respondisse, ita quod nulla pars illius anni in quo de questione responderint in dicto anno integro computetur. De questione debent respondisse ad minus in estate precedente quadragesimam in qua sunt determinaturi' (*Stat. ant.*, p. 26 [10-15]). See Weisheipl, 'Curriculum', 154-56.

⁶⁶ '... bachilarii anno eodem determinaturi, qui, si fuerint pro seipsis determinaturi, iurabunt, tactis sacrosanctis, quod omnes libros veteris logice ad minus bis audierint, exceptis libris Boecii, quos semel sufficiat audiuisset preter quartum librum *Topicorum* Boecii, quem audiuisset non astringantur. De noua autem logica librum *Priorum*, *Topicorum*, *Elencorum*, bis, librum autem *Posteriorum*, saltem vna vice iurent se audiuisset. De gramatica autem *De construccionibus* Prisciani bis, *Barbarismum* Donati semel, tres eciam libros naturales, scilicet librum *Phisicorum*, librum *De anima*, librum *De generatione et corrupcione*, iurent se audiuisset' (*Stat. ant.*, pp. 25 [32] - 26 [10]).

questions, the last by the Oxford work attributed to Geoffrey of Aspill. Lenten exercises would have given him an experience of determining in disputations as well as responding and opposing in the disputes of other bachelors. Some time before 1350 the practice was established that logical disputations should take place in the afternoon, except on the first and last Friday.⁶⁷ Subsequently, as a bachelor who had determined, the candidate could have satisfied the further requirement of lecturing cursorily on certain texts before incepting. A statute of 1340, in addition to two texts in logic, required inceptors to have taught in natural philosophy either Aristotle's *De caelo et mundo*, *De anima*, *Meteorologica* or *De generatione et corruptione*, or the *De sensu et sensato* with the *De memoria et reminiscencia* and *De somno et vigilia*, or the *De motu animalium* with two other treatises of the *Parva naturalia*.⁶⁸ The *De caelo et mundo* is represented in the Digby manuscript by the exposition of Geoffrey of Aspill, the *Parva naturalia* by unascribed material and the compendium of Averroes. A statute from before 1350 required that inceptors, in addition to those texts required for determining, should have heard *Priscianus maior* if it was being lectured on – the surviving literature suggests this was rarely the case – or the *Politica*, or the *De animalibus*, the *Meteorologica* and other books of natural philosophy and the *Ethica*.⁶⁹ At the same time it was stipulated that the course on the *Ethica* should last four full months, counting feastdays,⁷⁰ and a term devoted to *De caelo et mundo*.⁷¹ The amount of time devoted to the *Ethica* in advanced studies is reflected, perhaps, in the fact there are no less than nine

⁶⁷ 'Item, statutum est quod omnes determinatores singulis diebus quantum possunt disputationes faciant logicas quantum possunt, exceptis diebus primo et ultimo Veneris' (ibid., p. 27 [19-22]).

⁶⁸ 'Item, ordinatum est quod nullus licenciatur post annum presentem ad incipiendum in artibus, videlicet incipiendo annum in festo sancti Dionisii anno Domini millesimo ccc^o quadragesimo, nisi prius iuret se legisse cursorie duos libros logicales ad minus, vnum de veteri logica, et alterum de noua, vel ambos de noua, et vnum de libris naturalibus, videlicet libros quatuor *Celi et mundi*, vel tres libros *De anima*, vel quatuor libros *Metheororum*, aut duos libros *De generatione et corrupcione*, vel librum *De sensu et sensato*, cum libris *De memoria et reminiscencia* et *De sompno et vigilia*, vel librum *De motu animalium* cum duobus libris *De minutis naturalibus*; et hoc rite et debite in forma taxata superius, et hoc proclamacione per scholas publice precedente' (ibid., p. 32 [2-14]). Gibson read 'de minutis naturalibus' as the title of a work, but as Weisheipl indicates ('Curriculum', 159 n. 51), this is merely a way of referring to the *Parva naturalia*.

⁶⁹ 'Presentati ad incipiendum in artibus, si prius honus determinancium subierunt, supponimus eos formam determinatoribus indictam audiendo complesse, ac insuper Priscianum Magnum, si eum legi contigerit, vel librum *Poeticorum* vel libros *De animalibus* connumerando libros *De progressu et de motu animalium*, *Metheoricam*, librosque alios naturales, et *Ethica* Aristotelis audisse complete' (*Stat. ant.*, pp. 32 [33] - 33 [7]).

⁷⁰ 'Ordinatum est, pro forma audiendi libros, quod liber *Ethicorum* audiat per quatuor menses integre, connumerando dies festos' (ibid., p. 33 [28-30]).

⁷¹ 'Item, libri *Celi et mundi* audiantur per vnum terminum anni' (ibid., p. 34 [9-10]).

allusions to this work in these two speeches. No mention is made in the early statutes of the *Metaphysica*, but the summaries in the Digby manuscript indicate an effort to master this difficult text, probably from a period before 1271, and the speaker witnesses to the candidate studying *divina scientia* during his period at Oxford. There are works of Adam of Buckfield and Geoffrey of Aspull on the *Metaphysica*, probably from before 1260, and, from a time closer to that of the speeches, questions by Richard de Clive, a fellow of Merton College and M. A. by 1276.⁷²

Not content with what he learnt in his own country, the candidate's enthusiasm for philosophy then led him to risk the perils of the Channel crossing and go to Paris to complete his education in arts. Good reports have come back from the English nation there of his diligence in study and reliability in teaching those cursory lectures which belonged to the bachelor in arts. The picture of tireless labour over the texts is finished with a few more citations from Seneca's letters, and the narrative section is over (2.56-63). That the bachelor has come a second time to Oxford for his inception seems to be implied by the expression, 'omnes de natione fama referente bene norunt' (2.59); it is said explicitly that his second place of study was Oxford, and now after a period of further study in Paris reports of his progress there have come back to Oxford from members of the English nation. If his place of initial study in the *trivium* was also Paris, he had also been there twice, but against that supposition is the absence of any reference to the perils of the sea when he went there. It is a complex history, but not implausible at a time of much travel between the two university cities. This reading would confirm in a striking way the pointers in the arts literature of the thirteenth century which indicate that the strength of Oxford at that time was in the three philosophies, and particularly in natural philosophy rather than in logic and grammar, for which Paris might offer a better education. It seems too that Paris had something to offer as a complement to those more advanced studies. If 'flourished' is not a rhetorical exaggeration, the difficulty is to know where logic and grammar flourished outside of Oxford and apart from Paris.

The speaker evidently regards this orderly progress as something noteworthy, and enlivens his account with the image of Philosophy's garments from the first *prosa* of Boethius. The audience is meant to recall the woven design of Π on the lower border and Θ on the upper and the steps between, marking the ascent from practical to theoretical wisdom (2.64-69). The length of time spent on philosophy – and since it becomes a matter for comment, it may have been seven or eight years at least, rather than the minimum of six – was not due to

⁷² See *BRUO* 1.444-45.

lack of natural wit, shortage of textbooks or poor financial support from his friends. He had sufficient to get by on; too much money can be a hindrance for the young. Seneca strikes a note of moderation which seems to fit this candidate (2.69-78), doubtless of more modest means than the subject of the first speech. This patient approach has been rewarded by an excellent outcome, the acquisition of the precious pearl of knowledge. Reverting to the image from Boethius, the speaker says that, unlike those who have torn shreds from the garments of Philosophy with violent hands, the candidate has carried them off whole and entire, and made them his own clothing (2.79-87).

Finally, the speaker turns to the candidate's moral qualities. That moral virtues dispose towards intellectual is alleged with the authority of Eustratius (2.88-90), whose commentary on Aristotle's *Ethica* had been translated by Grosseteste, along with the text, by 1246-47.⁷³ A commonplace based on a passage in Aristotle's *Physica* and the commentary of Averroes on that work are the unlikely authorities adduced to argue the contribution made by emotional restraint, and most of all by chastity, to the studious life, and the candidate is praised particularly for his fortitude in the face of adversity (2.90-99). Of the two citations here attributed to Seneca (2.99-104) the first is not to be found in Seneca, nor in those works by Martin of Braga, commonly attributed to Seneca, found in the tenth quire of the Digby manuscript. However, this quotation is to be found in the twelfth letter of the pseudonymous correspondence between Seneca and St. Paul, and, as the list of contents shows, this section of the manuscript once contained an 'Epistola Senece ad beatum Paulum'.

Concluding, the speaker simply appeals to what has already been said as a sufficient testimony to the bachelor's virtues and his consequent worthiness of taking his seat amongst the masters. More could be said to commend him without offence to the truth, but again the speaker quickly excuses himself, so that others may be dealt with; what has been said may be enough to encourage the young in the audience (2.105-111). He says that the occasion makes him eloquent (2.108-109), but his eloquence is not that of the more structured and self-conscious rhetoric of Gentile da Foligno in the medical faculty at Perugia in the 1340s.⁷⁴ There is, indeed, a *thema*, an initial authority from which each Oxford speech develops (1.1-2, 2.1-4), and in both speeches the division of

⁷³ See H. P. F. Mercken, ed., *The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (†1253)* 1 (Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum 6.1; Leiden, 1973), pp. 39*-42*.

⁷⁴ See Carl C. Schlamm, 'Graduation Speeches of Gentile da Foligno', *Mediaeval Studies* 40 (1978) 96-119. To my knowledge this is the only previous study and edition of material of this kind, material which affords an interesting contrast with that studied and edited here.

moral and intellectual virtue gives a shape to the treatment, but that may be dictated as much by the conventional heads of commendation as the artifices of rhetoric, and the treatment is varied by placing moral qualities before learning in the first speech, and following the reverse order in the second. The *captatio benevolentiae* is there in the first speech in the justification of a customary practice with four reasons (1.4-33), but the introduction of candidates in pairs makes it unnecessary to enlist the audience's attention a second time. Each speech has a *conclusio*, but it is brief, as befits the occasion (1.79-83, 2.105-111). For the rest, the speaker relies on the embellishment of his remarks on good behaviour and learning with apt citations. As with Gentile, these are drawn from non-scriptural sources and show a heavy reliance on Seneca and Aristotle.⁷⁵ There are fourteen citations of Seneca himself and one Pseudo-Senecan citation, fourteen of Aristotle, predominantly the *Ethica*, four of Boethius, three of Averroes, one each of Virgil, Ovid, Vegetius, Eustratius and Bernard Silvester. The effect is richly allusive.

The interest of the first candidate in astronomy is a focus for the account of his studies; the more metaphysical turn of mind of the second colours the account there. The biographical information is limited, but there is a hint of a contrast between a high-born and influential subject in the first speech and a man of moderate means in the second. The latter is notable as an instance of the 'wandering scholar' in the mid-thirteenth century, and the narrative there gives us an insight into the relative strengths of Oxford and Paris at that time, if his places of study have been correctly identified. The impression of easy intercourse between the two centres is in line with the collection of texts that has been assembled in the Digby manuscript, though it would be hazardous to say whose interests it represents. Neither the candidates nor the speaker are readily identifiable, though the latter is clearly to be sought amongst those at Oxford who placed a higher value on the three philosophies than on logic and grammar, and perhaps, if the speeches are also in his hand, among those who made the first steps in assimilating the Aristotelian rhetoric.

IV

The first speech in the Merton manuscript opens with a reference to the Pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (3.1-2). The mention there of the endowments of fortune, the body and soul, as good things which warrant praise, provides the overall division, within which there are subdivisions: as of fortune into wealth, various kinds of power and honours; bodily endowments

⁷⁵ See Schlam, *ibid.*, 110-11.

into different capacities and strengths, keen senses, beauty and health; and of the soul into virtues and various kinds of knowledge. The last two alone make their subject satisfied, strong, worthy of respect, famous and happy (3.2-8). The endowments of fortune can make a man praiseworthy for his largeness of heart, if he is moderate in the use of what he has; those of the body too, because health contributes to pleasure, strength and size to influence over others, beauty to fame (3.8-23). Since there is a citation here in Moerbeke's version of Aristotle's *Rhetorica* (3.15-17), the speech can hardly have been composed earlier than the 1270s. Further citations from the *Ethica* are introduced to show that the advantages of fortune and bodily endowments are of no use, and even are harmful, without knowledge and virtue; then the *exordium* of the speech ends, as it began, with words from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (3.24-36).

The speaker begins to apply his remarks to the candidate, who appears like the subject of the second speech as 'dominus N.' (3.38, 4.1), perhaps because the copy of the speech was preserved as a model to be suitably adapted for similar occasions. If it was used in this way, the first speech would have been appropriate only for affluent inceptors, for what is commended first is the candidate's liberality: he has been generous with what fortune has bestowed on him, without the ostentation or vainglory which others display in their use of wealth. Some, too, give little or nothing to those who are most deserving, forgetting the benefits they have received. Such ingratitude is subversive of human society, which depends on a 'proportional requital' (3.38-47). (The expression 'contrafacere proportionale', is that of Grosseteste's version of the *Ethica*,⁷⁶ the most frequently used authority in these two speeches.) In contrast, this bachelor has been truly liberal, like fertile fields which give more than they receive, concerned to assist others, with due attention to men's conduct and social status. To Boethius' dictum that riches are more splendid in the spending than in the getting, since avarice makes men hateful while liberality makes them famous, he adds from Cicero's *De officiis*, another favoured source, that popular esteem is won by a reputation for liberality (3.47-55).

The moralising tone becomes more strident when the speaker turns to the candidate's physical endowments, and such considerations were not irrelevant as the reference to 'statura aut ceteris corporis circumstanciis' in an early statute on the conditions to be satisfied by determiners may suggest.⁷⁷ His physical attributes have not led to any irrational impulses, or anything betraying a lack

⁷⁶ See Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 5.8 (1132b33) (AL p. 462 [11-12]).

⁷⁷ 'Si uero de aliis quam de moribus uel sciencia, utpote de etate, statura, aut ceteris corporum circumstanciis, dubium quid emergat, maioris partis vniuersitatis regencium arbitrio reseruetur' (*Stat. ant.*, p. 28 [23-27]).

of seriousness or decency. His relations with those with whom he has lived and with the servants have always been governed by propriety, and he has been respectful towards his betters, avoiding anything effeminate or soft, harsh or boorish, as those can testify who have known him since he came to this university (3.56-66). As in the Digby speech, the expression, 'se transtulit', is used, perhaps with the implication that this candidate had studied elsewhere, but no account is given of any previous studies.

It is part of the speaker's technique of antithesis to contrast the candidate's good dispositions with the evil ways of others, and here a vivid sketch is drawn of those who besmirch their name and status by their shameless behaviour, like stage people making fun of everyone else, flatterers who are indifferent to immorality, voluptuaries whose inner turmoil is accompanied by affectations of expression, speech, gestures, gait and posture, all signs of an unreflective spirit; being base and effeminate, they should be excluded from the status of master (3.66-73). They should attend to what Cicero says about our not being made for play, but rather for study and graver things; and to Seneca, urging self-control, counsel observed by this bachelor in submitting his impulses to reason and comporting himself outwardly in a way which was never other than right and decent (3.73-81). The speaker's strength of feeling recalls the strictures of Roger Bacon, in the so-called *Compendium studii philosophiae*, on sins against nature, where he asserts that many theologians and lecturers in theology at Paris had been expelled from the city and from France on that account in the year he is writing, which has been taken to be 1271.⁷⁸

Having been so disposed with regard to the endowments of fortune and nature, the speaker argues that his subject is not without moral virtue; right choice underlies this direction of his desires (3.82-86). Like the author of the Digby speeches, he uses the commonplace from the *Physica* to convey the way in which moral qualities dispose to knowledge (3.87-90; cf. 2.91-93). Again, it is in the context of someone who has spent a long time in study 'here and elsewhere', though where is left to our inference. He has acquired knowledge with virtue through attentively listening to good teachers, among whom we are surely intended to count the speaker, since he testifies to the candidate's excellence, readily grasping what he was taught and retaining it with his memory, so that art and training supplied what was lacking by nature (3.90-94; cf. 2.37-41). The candidate's breadth of mind and clarity of perception suggest a

⁷⁸ '... probatum est hoc anno, quod multi theologi Parisius, et qui legerunt in theologia, sunt relegati a civitate et a regno Franciae, per multos annos, publice damnati propter sodomiticas vilitates' (*Compendium studii philosophiae* 2, ed. J. S. Brewer, *Fr. Rogeri Bacon opera quedam hactenus inedita* 1 [RS 15; London, 1859], p. 412). The date, 1271, is that for which Brewer argues (pp. liv-lv).

comparison with that of his high-minded parents, one of whom is praised for his surpassing prudence in the great matters of public life, having to do not merely with provincial or civic affairs but with an important position in the affairs of the nation (3.95-98). Clearly, then, he must be the son of some magnate who has both wealth and political influence in the land, one with a power to hurt others, who has used his power beneficently (3.98-103).

So much has been said to assure the audience that the son, this paragon, has such learning and moral qualities as have been described, and so is to receive the licence to teach in token of the perfection of his learning (3.103-106). By contrast, there are others to grieve over, who are unable to obtain the licence by themselves, and not yet having attained the due virtue and learning, have no fear of seeking many and weighty spokesmen on their behalf (3.107-110). The emptiness of their glory is summed up in some words of Euripides which the speaker found in Boethius, about inflated reputations based on popular opinion (3.110-115). To this he opposes a dictum from Ptolemy's *Almagest*, that learning is the companion of a man's mind and a spokesman before men, with the implication that his learning is the only spokesman a learned man needs (3.116-19). This seemingly improbable source is also used by Simon of Faversham in his introduction to the *Analytica posteriora* in the Merton manuscript, but the authority is different,⁷⁹ and there Simon apparently depends on Albertus Magnus, who uses the same citation in his introduction to that text.⁸⁰ The maxim from Ptolemy used in the graduation speech is one which also occurs in the commentary and questions of Albert on the *Ethica*, a work composed at Cologne between 1250 and 1252, which begins, 'Ptolemaeus in *Almagesto*: "Disciplina hominis sui intellectus socius est et apud homines intercessor".'⁸¹ There too the saying is glossed as in the speech, '... quasi dicat: non oportet, quod alius intercedat pro disciplinato nisi sua disciplina.'⁸² It is not improbable, then, that the citation with this gloss was mediated by Albert's prologue. Its application to this bachelor is that, having been presented to his examiners and heard by them, his knowledge was its own spokesman, not popular favour, which Boethius says does not come from right judgement or firmly endure (3.119-23).

⁷⁹ Simon of Faversham, *In 1 Anal. post.*, prol. (ms. Merton College 292, fol. 138ra): 'Item, utilitatem huius sciencie satis insinuat Tholomeus principio *Almagesti*, ubi dicit quod non solum probabilibus et operabilibus debet homo replere animam suam, quia non faciunt habitum firum in anima, set demonstratiuis et certis que certificant et stabiliunt intellectum.'

⁸⁰ Albertus Magnus, *In 1 Anal. post.* 1.1, ed. Borgnet, 2 (Paris, 1890), p. 2b.

⁸¹ Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica commentum et quaestiones*, prol., ed. W. Kübel, *Opera omnia* 14.1 (Münster, 1968), p. 1a.

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 1b (54-55).

The concern voiced here that the licence to teach should be granted on merit, and not solicited by those who are unworthy, is echoed in the early statutes of Oxford. In statutes from before 1350 not only were the masters forbidden to present a bachelor unless he was known to be suitable by reason of his knowledge and good behaviour,⁸³ but the eighteen regent masters who normally conducted the inquiry into the suitability of candidates were each required to make a deposition before the chancellor and proctors:

... quod fidele testimonium perhibebit, et ad interrogata fideliter respondebit, nec prece, nec precio, nec amicitia, nec odio, nec timore, nec spe propter aliquam promissionem seu remuneracionem factam uel etiam faciendam, impediēt dingnum uel promouebit indingnum, nec dicet falsum, nec celabit verum, super negocio de quo agitur.⁸⁴

The existence of such a statute suggests that it was not unknown for masters to be influenced by 'fear or favour' in their depositions. This must have been a particular risk when dealing with the sons of influential parents, like the present inceptor. To incept the candidate required the depositions of nine other masters, apart from that of the one presenting him, 'de certa scientia', and of five 'de credulitate', otherwise his *expeditio* would be deferred for a year, until he could muster a sufficient number of favourable votes. If there were only twelve, or fewer, regent masters, a unanimous vote 'de certa scientia' was required, and this stipulation was so strictly insisted on that even the chancellor could not dispense from it without the consent of the university.⁸⁵

The integrity of the deposition was further protected by a statute enjoining that no one should reveal to the inceptors what was said at his deposition:

Quia insuper aliqui, dum personis quibusdam nimium placere nituntur, aliquociens incepturis vel eorum negocia procurantibus, quoad deposicionem suam pro eis faciendam vel forsitan denegandam, patenter expriment animi sui motum, aut forte, quod absit, pro fauore captando, fingunt se dicturos aliud quam

⁸³ *Stat. ant.*, p. 29 (13-20). See above, p. 141.

⁸⁴ *Stat. ant.*, p. 30 (16-21).

⁸⁵ 'De modo perhibendi testimonium et numero magistrorum deponencium pro bachilariis in artibus licenciandis hoc teneatur. Procuratores auctoritate Cancellarii conuocabunt octodecim magistros actualiter regentes per quos ueritas melius inquiri poterit, et, si per testimonium nouem deponencium de certa sciencia, preter magistrum presentantem, et causam sciencie sue reddencium, et per testimonium quinque deponencium de credulitate, appareat presentatum esse idoneum in moribus et sciencia, admittatur, alioquin differatur eius expeditio. Et erat interpretatum quod sic deficiens expectaret per annum, quousque adeo profecerit ut sufficiens testimonium habuerit in forma prenotata. Quod si tantum duodecim regentes uel pauciores fuerint, omnium testimonium de certa sciencia requiratur: et ista forma ita stricte seruabitur quod Cancellarius contra ipsam sine vniuersitate non poterit dispensare' (*Stat. ant.*, pp. 29 [22] - 30 [11]).

intendunt, ob quam causam alii, certis forsan ex causis, quod sciunt, credunt, aut estimant consimiliter recusantes exprimere, incipiencium odium frequenter incurrunt: noscant de cetero magistri omnes cuiuscumque facultatis se artari virtute et auctoritate statuti, ne scienter ipsis incepturis aut eorum fautoribus, post suas deposiciones aut ante, suas reuelent consciencias in premissis.⁸⁶

Here there is a clear reference to an abuse that had already occurred of masters seeking to please the candidates, or those backing them, either by revealing what they intended to say or giving the impression that they would say something favourable on their behalf. Some masters had already incurred the ill-will of those incepting for refusing to express their mind. The statute forbids the giving of such information before or after the deposition.

The first speech ends with a terse indication that enough has been said in commendation of the first bachelor (3.124). The second speech continues from the first, and is notably shorter. If the speaker spends twelve or fifteen minutes over the first candidate, he spends only two or three over the second. There is no need to commend the first candidate's companion: his face is sufficient commendation, and there is general agreement among those who know him best about his placid and honest character, which is a clear proof of his goodness (4.1-5). The authority of Aristotle on popular acclaim, that is adduced here, is hardly a *thema* for this short address (4.5-6), and the speaker delays no longer over the candidate's moral qualities but goes on at once to his intellectual attainments. He is worthy of commendation because of the way in which he has acquired knowledge: swotting at nights, not daydreaming at lectures, not jumping from one thing to another but proceeding in an orderly way, his education has gradually taken shape (4.6-9).

His desire to absorb philosophy as a whole is contrasted with the disposition of those who, the speaker sadly notes, take what spoils they can. He employs the image from Boethius of the torn garments of Philosophy, used by the other speaker (2.84-87), to illustrate the way in which the finely woven fabric of philosophical argument has been rent by those who are content with a simulated or superficial knowledge of a part of one subject, rather than the whole or something of each (4.9-14). An Oxford statute from before 1350, on *questioniste*, envisages a similar case, with one 'qui ad summi loci fastigia, postpositis gradibus, per abrupta querit ascensum.'⁸⁷ It has ever been so, but the speaker reflects that this is no way to win the Lady Philosophy. She has claimed this bachelor for her own because he has followed the direct path to taste the sweetness of philosophy (4.14-17).

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, p. 31 (21-32).

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p. 24 (7-9).

The second speaker's *conclusio* serves for both candidates, and he embellishes it with a principle from Cicero, that in speaking, as there is a reason for beginning, so there is a point at which to conclude (4.18-20). True as that may be, he has given short shrift to his second candidate, and we have learnt little of him, apart from his solid application to study, to throw more light on that honest face. Probably a man from humble background, rather than a scion of a great family, social standing as much as intellectual attainment seems to have dictated the priority and close attention given to his companion. The first speaker placed the nobleman first, but he showed a more impartial interest in qualities of mind, and was less disposed to moralise over the failures of the academic system.

The speeches in the Merton manuscript give no more hint of the identity of speaker and candidates than those in the Digby manuscript, and are less specific in their local references, though, as has been seen, they could fit well with what we know of Oxford in the late thirteenth century, or early fourteenth, the time when they were transcribed. The speeches of Gentile da Foligno at Perugia regularly play on the names of the candidates.⁸⁸ There may be concealed references to the candidates' names in the speeches edited here, but the second speaker also provides with his formula, 'dominus N.', for the naming of the candidates. One would not expect much wit of this sober moralist, but the mention of *robur* in regard to the favoured first candidate (3.19, 21) could be a conventional pun on 'Robertus'. Thomas of Ireland puns in this way on the name of Robert de Sorbonne in his prologue to the *Manipulus florum*, published in 1306:

... agrum intraui Booz, quod interpretatur robur uel uirtus, scilicet Roberti utique robusti in quo uirtutis robur uigere consuevit....⁸⁹

'Robert' is amongst the most common English names of the period, and even if that is the first candidate's name and he is the son of a great magnate, we are still far from identifying him.

The sources of the speeches in the Merton manuscript indicate a *terminus a quo* for their composition by the single use of Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, circulating first around 1270 in the version used here. In all there are nine citations from Aristotle, of which six are from the *Ethica Nicomachea*. The reading 'forcus' (3.33) is found in the revised text of Grosseteste's translation, so reference has been made to that revision in noting the sources for these speeches as for those in the Digby manuscript. After Aristotle, Cicero's *De officiis* and the Pseudo-

⁸⁸ See Schlam, 'Graduation Speeches', 106-108.

⁸⁹ Ed. R. H. and M. A. Rouse, *Preachers, Florilegia and Sermons: Studies in the 'Manipulus florum' of Thomas of Ireland* (Studies and Texts 47; Toronto, 1979), p. 236.

Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* are the most used sources, with six citations. Boethius follows with five, and there is one citation each from Ptolemy and Seneca. The range is smaller than in the Digby speeches and less colourful.

The rhetorical construction here turns on the *thema* of the first speech, with the distinction of various endowments, but when these have been applied to the first candidate, the final section is shaped by the praise of his virtue and learning, and this is the rudimentary structure of the second speech, brief as it is. That, as has been seen, is in line with the expectations of Oxford at this period, though presumably it was not unknown elsewhere. It occurs, for instance, as a common *topos* of prologues to commentaries from the arts faculty at Paris in the mid-thirteenth century.⁹⁰ While at Perugia the bestowal of the insignia, a book, a ring, a kiss of peace, a blessing and a biretta, might occasion developments within the address itself,⁹¹ at Oxford the commendation at the end of the *vesperies* was separated from the investiture at the *principium* the next morning, so that one would not look for any reference to the book and master's cap that went with inception, and speakers were obliged to find other considerations to shape their addresses.

The speeches in the Merton manuscript are consonant with what is known of Oxford practice in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century. However, their insertion into a major collection of material by Simon of Faversham, whose arts studies appear to have been with the English nation at Paris, might point to another possible context. Were the speeches given in Paris and added there or in Oxford, or given in Oxford and added when Simon's writings were circulating there, perhaps shortly before he became chancellor? The hand may place a term to their composition around 1310: the cross-strokes of the loops of *d* and the contraction for syllables in *r* have that thickening associated with English hands of the turn of the thirteenth century, and the *r*'s have a marked shoulder, but the ascenders have not the forking which is often a feature of late thirteenth-century English hands. Simon has some moral reflections in his prologues,⁹² but nothing to match the heavy moralising of these speeches; then

⁹⁰ The prologue to Robert Kilwardby's *Notule super librum Porfirii*, a Parisian work from around 1240, begins: 'Cum anima quoddammodo sit omnia, et nata sit ut describatur in ea uniuscuiusque rei similitudo, et duplex sit ipsius perfectio, scilicet cognicio ueri et comprehensio boni, non solum appetit perfici scienciis, ut sic possit cognoscere uerum, set etiam uirtutibus, ut sic posset comprehendere bonum' (text edited from mss. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, fol. 33ra and Madrid, Biblioteca Universitaria 73, fol. 1ra).

⁹¹ See Schlam, 'Graduation Speeches', 108-10, 119.

⁹² Simon of Faversham warns against passing over logic and trying to be a teacher without having been a pupil: 'Logica autem est via in omnes sciencias, et ideo, si quis uult ordinate procedere in scienciis, oportet eum prius addiscere logicam. Qui ergo dimissa logica ad alias sciencias se transferunt, pervertunt ordinem et querunt facere quod est impossibile fieri. Querunt

the occasion was different. The association of the speeches with material by Simon may be contingent, but it is one of the few hints of the context in which they originated. Another possibility to consider is a connection with his reporter, Robert de Clothale.

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In editing these speeches,⁹³ I have tried to preserve the orthography of the manuscripts, but capitalization, punctuation and paragraph divisions have been freely introduced to assist the reader. Corrections to the texts have been noted, though in each case they are in the same hand as the speeches themselves. A few editorial emendations have been made, where the sense seemed to demand them; these have been noted. Angle brackets have been used to indicate additions to the text made by the editor. References to the Latin Aristotle have been made, where available, to the translations edited in *Aristoteles Latinus* (AL), the appropriate volume being indicated on the first occurrence in the apparatus of sources. For Latin authors the Oxford editions have been preferred unless otherwise noted. To give some impression of which citations may be commonplace, references have also been given when they feature in some form in the medieval florilegium, *Auctoritates Aristotelis*. Although in its edited form this is probably later than the speeches, it has been chosen for its convenience, since few works of this kind have been edited, and the speakers may well have drawn upon a collection of commonplaces with a similar range.

enim alios docere et tamen non curant addiscere, et hoc valde derrisorium est, quia, ut Boetius dicit, miserum est eum fieri magistrum, qui numquam se novit esse discipulum. Et querunt ad terminum venire, et tamen non curant per viam incedere, et tales tamquam crudi et bestiales ad verum et bonum cognoscendum omnino reputantur inutiles. Contra quos potest adduci dictum illud Commentatoris, "Ve vobis, homines, qui computati estis in numero bestiarum." Et recte dicuntur bestiales, qui enim dimissa logica ad lucrativas sciencias se transferunt, hoc est quia plus curant de bono corporis quam de bono anime. Quia enim in bonis corporis nos communicamus bestiis, in bonis autem anime similes efficimur substantiis separatis, ideo contra tales dicit Commentator, "Ve vobis, homines, qui computati estis in numero bestiarum, non percipientes bonum quod in vobis est, per quod ad superiora ascenditis et intelligenciis similes estis" (*Quaestiones super libro Porphyrii*, prol., ed. Mazarella, *Opera omnia* 1.13 [16-31]).

⁹³ I wish to offer my acknowledgements to Bodley's Librarian and the Keeper of Western Manuscripts for the material edited here from the Digby manuscript, and to the Warden and Fellows of Merton College, Oxford for allowing me to consult the manuscript used here together with the Digby manuscript in the Bodleian Library, and for their permission to obtain photographs of and to edit the graduation speeches from the Merton manuscript.

(ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 55, f. 203ra-v)

Hec autem consuetudo laudabilis propter 4 rationes specialiter³ a priscis⁴ sapientibus et discretis viris introducta est. Primo, vt commendatus per laudum titulos et honores de preteritis actibus aliquid premietur. Est enim honor 'virtutis premium et attribuitur bonis', vt Philosophus dicit in 4 *Ethicorum*.⁵ 2º, vt idem per (f. 203rb) commendacionem ad continuandum operationes virtuosas⁶ vehemencius stimuletur et magis proficiat in futuro, dicente poeta,

3^o, vt declarata perfeccione doctoris, sua doctrina, precipue in moralibus, a discipulis suis facilius admittatur. ‘Sermones’ enim ‘minus sunt credibiles operibus’, vt Philosophus dicit X^o *Ethicorum*;⁸ et in eodem X^o dicit quod
20 ‘Verum in operabilibus ex operibus et vita iudicatur.’⁹ 4^o et ultimo, ut commendacionem audientes, attendentes quam mangnum et laudabile est esse sapientem et bonum, prouocentur vt consimilem statum attingant et diligentius excerceant opera virtuosa.

⁹ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 10.9 (1179a18-19) (AL p. 581 [23-24]).

Ne igitur tam rationalis consuetudinis contemptor videar uel neglector, aut
 25 noue consuetudinis temerarius fabricator, incumbit michi ad presens istum
 bachelarium sub me incepturum, quamuis multum renitentem quamuisque
 frequenter cum magna instancia me rogauerit vt a talibus commendacionibus
 desisterem, commendare. Occurrit enim michi dictum Philosophi primo
Ethicorum, qui dicit sic, 'Videbitur autem oportere et melius esse pro salute
 30 veritatis eciam familiaria destruere. Ambobus enim existentibus amicis,
 sanctum est prehonore veritatem.'¹⁰ Quanto magis oportet, cum requirit
 consuetudo laudabilis pro salute et declaracione veritatis familiares commen-
 dare.

Dico ergo quod iste bachilarius excellenter commendandus est in moribus et
 35 sciencia. In moribus quidem quod declarant operationes eius. 'Opera' enim
 'singna habituum sunt', vt Philosophus dicit primo *Rethorice*.¹¹ Opera autem
 singularum virtutum moralium delectabiliter operatur, attendens illud Senece,
 'Nichil virtute prestancius, nichil pulcrius: et bonum et optabile est quidquid ex
 eius geritur imperio.'¹² Item, et aliud dictum Senece dicentis, 'Cape, quantum
 40 potes, virtutis pulcherime et magnificentissime ipsaque nobis nec thure nec
 sertis, sed sudore et sanguine colenda est.'¹³ Descendere autem ad mores eius
 eximios in particulari propter celeriore expedicionem dominorum preter-
 mitto.

Scienciam autem eius euidenter ostendunt ingenii perspicacitas, (f. 203v)
 45 laboris in studendo continuata diuturnitas, valencium magistrorum
 auditorium et in conferendo secum et cum aliis frequens exercicium. Bene et
 laudabiliter studuit in logicalibus, grammaticalibus et naturalibus, set diligen-
 cius in mathematicis, attendens quod sciencie speculatiue non queruntur nisi
 propter certitudinem et ingnorancie fugam. Nunc autem, sciencie 'mathematice
 50 sunt in primo ordine certitudinis', vt dicit Commentator super 2^m *Methaphi-*
sice.¹⁴ Huius et sciencie Boecius in primo *De consolacione philosophica*, inter
 multiplices relegacionis sue miseras, precipue recordatur, ad Philosophiam
 loquens sic:

55 Talis habitus talisque¹⁵ wltus erat, cum tecum secreta nature rimarer, cum michi
 siderum vias radio discriberes, cum mores nostros tociusque vite rationem ad
 celestis ordinis exemplar formares?¹⁶

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 1.4 (1096a14-16) (AL p. 379 [23-25]); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, p. 233, no. 9.

¹¹ *Arist., Rhet.* 1.9 (1367b31-32) (AL p. 193 [13-14]).

¹² Seneca, *Ad Lucilium epistulae morales* 67.16, ed. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford, 1965), p. 197 (22-23).

¹³ *ibid.*, 67.12, p. 197 (5-7).

¹⁴ Averroes, *In 2 Metaph.* (995a15), c. 3 text. 16 (Venice, 1574), 8.35vK.

¹⁵ talis ne *MS*.

¹⁶ Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 1, pros. 4.4, ed. L. Bieler (CCSL 94; Turnhout, 1957), p. 7 (10-13).

II

(ms. Oxford, Bodleian Library Digby 55, ff. 203v-204v)

Dicit Philosophus X^o *Ethicorum*, 'Oportet autem non secundum hoc suadentes humana querere hominem entem, non [in]mortalia mortalem, set inquantum contingit immortale facere et omnia facere ad vivere secundum optimum eorum que²⁶ in ipso.'²⁷ In consideracione enim abstractorum est
 5 certitudo maior, habitus firmior et delectacio purior; propter quod Philosophus dicit X^o *Ethicorum* quod philosophia, cuius inquisicio plerumque circa talia versatur, 'mirabiles' habet 'delectaciones, puritate et firmitate',²⁸ que licet quandoque de rebus tractet humilibus aut humanis, ad quod Simonides hortabatur²⁹ hoc, tamen ideo est vt, eis cognitis, facilius ad superiorem
 10 cognicionem ascendamus. Et hinc est quod Philosophia a Boecio primo *De consolacione* descripta est stature 'discrecionis ambigue', que 'nunc quoque ad communem se hominum mensuram cohibebat, nunc vero pulsare celum summi verticis cacumine videbatur; que cum alcius capud extulisset ipsum eciam celum penetrabat',³⁰ tunc videlicet cum se ad diuinorum consideracio-
 15 nem diuertisset.

Huius quidem vtilitas tanta est quod, secundum Senecam, hec 'animum informat et fabricat, vitam disponit, acciones regit, agenda et omittenda demonstrat, (f. 204r) sedet ad gubernaculum et per ancipicia fluctuum dirigit cursum. Sine hac nemo securus est.'³¹ Item, alibi Seneca,

20 Quidquid est ex hiis, Lucilli, aut si omnia hec, philosophandum est; siue nos inexorabili lege fata constringant, siue deus arbiter uniuersi cuncta disponit, siue casus res humanas sine³² ordine impellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet. Hec exortabitur vt deo libenter pareamus,³³ vt fortune contumaciter resistamus; hec docebit vt deum sequaris, feras casum.³⁴

²⁶ post que del. sunt MS.

²⁷ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 10.7 (1177b31-34) (AL p. 578 [14-16]).

²⁸ ibid. 10.7 (1177a25) (AL p. 577 [1-2]); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, p. 247, no. 206.

²⁹ Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 10.7 (1177b31-34) (AL p. 578, app. ad lin. 14, 'Symonida. dicentes Tp' [codex Toletanus, Bibl. Cap. 47.9]); St. Thomas, *Sent. lib. Eth.* 10.11 (1177b31-34), *Omnia opera* 47.2 (Rome, 1969), p. 588 (112-13), 'Et fuit hoc dictum Symonidis poetae, ut patet in principio *Metaphysicae*'; Gualter Burlaeus, *Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum* 53, ed. H. Knust (Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart 177; Tübingen, 1886), p. 244, 'Idem [Aristotiles] in decimo ethicorum reprehendit Simonidem, dicens eum persuadere hominibus pretermittendam esse diuinorum cognicionem et humanis rebus esse ingenium applicandum, dicentem humana oportere sapere hominem, et mortalia mortalem.'

³⁰ Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 1, pros. 1.1-2, p. 2 (7-11).

³¹ Sen., *Ep.* 16.3, p. 42 (11-14); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, p. 277, no. 63.

³² siue MS.

³³ pareamus corr. s.s. ex pereamus MS.

³⁴ Sen., *Ep.* 16.5, pp. 42 (21) - 43 (1).

25 Huius certe tanta est dignitas quod alumpnos suos amicos dei reuerendos efficit et felices. 'Secundum intellectum enim operans et hunc curans deo amantissimus videtur esse', sicut dicit Philosophus X^o *Ethicorum*.³⁵ Cui autem deus amicatur reuerendus est, nec infelix esse poterit.³⁶

Istas philosophie multiplices nobilitates et excellencias dominus iste non
30 frustra recogitans, liberalibus studiis, liber ipse, se totum liberaliter commenda-
dauit. Nec hoc credo factum esse ratione propria uel industria set quodam
diuino motu vel instingtu, quod ipse, adhuc puer existens, quasi ab ipsis
cunabulis ad philosophicum studium toto impetu ferebatur. Tales autem qui
35 preter omnem scienciam, consilium et ratio <ci> nacionem quodam impetu
inexistente feruntur ad bonum et dirigunt vt in pluribus 'bene nati' et 'bene
fortunati' a Philosopho capitulo *De bona fortuna* nuncupantur.³⁷ Et sic
quoddammodo aparet eius aptitudo naturalis ad sciencias acquirendas. Set quia
aptitudo non sufficit nisi reducatur in actum, dominus iste procedenti tempore
vehementer se applicuit ad veritatis consideracionem, bonos assidue audiendo,
40 audita cum magna diligencia repetendo et memorie commendando, ac de hiis
cum sociis frequenter conferendo.

Quod autem huiusmodi actus excercendo in studio profecerit non tantum ex
rei euidencia set ex processu quem hucusque tenuit in studendo et modo
procedendi satis luculenter considerantibus aparebit. Primo, illuc se transtulit
45 vbi logicalis cum sophistica floret industria, vbi gramatici docentes sermonem
congruum prima sapiencie iaciunt fundamenta. In illis tamen, vt decuit,
modicam moram fecit, aduertens illud Senece, 'Multum prioribus eripuit
verborum cauillacio, capciose disputationes que acumen irritum excercent.
Nectimus nodos et ambiguam singnificacionem verbis illigamus ac demum
50 dissoluimus.'³⁸ Et post pauca subdit, 'Tota illuc mente pergendum est vbi
prouideri debet ne res nos, non uerba decipiant. Quid enim michi vocum
significaciones distinguis, quibus nemo vnquam nisi dum disputat captus est?'³⁹
Secundo, ad Oxonie studium se diuertit, vbi plenius in naturalibus, moralibus et
diuina sciencia instructus est; ibique habitum sciencie tunc adquisitum
55 determinando, opponendo et respondendo in disputationibus illustrauit.
Deinde, tantus in eo feruor philosophandi viguit quod, propriis non contentus,

³⁵ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 10.9 (1179a23-24) (AL p. 582 [3-4]); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, p. 248, no. 218.

³⁶ cui ... poterit in marg. MS.

³⁷ Cf. *Liber de bona fortuna* (ms. Oxon., Oriel Coll. 25, fol. 80va): 'Bene fortunati uocantur qui si (post corr.) impetu faciunt, dirigunt sine ratione existentes, et consiliari non expedit ipsis'; (fol. 79ra) 'Bene fortunatus enim est sine ratione habens impetum ad bona.... In anima enim inest natura tale quo impetu feruntur...'; *Auct. Arist.*, p. 249, no. 7, 'Illi sunt bene fortunati quicumque directe agunt sine ratione ut in pluribus.'

³⁸ Sen., *Ep.* 45.5, p. 116 (20-23).

³⁹ ibid., 45.5-6, p. 116 (24-27).

quasi exul amore philosophie fieri voluit, maris pericula viarum discrimina non uitauit Parisius usque peruenit, vbi cum quanta diligencia studuerit, quam fideliter legendo docuerit, omnes de natione fama referente bene norunt. Nec
 60 eum ab hiis actibus labor terrendo retraxit; auertit enim illud Senece, 'Generosos animos labor nutrit; nec est viri timere sudorem',⁴⁰ et idem alibi, 'Ocium sine literis mors est et hominis viui sepultura';⁴¹ item, alibi, 'Gloriari ocio iners ambicio est'.⁴²

Patet ergo quo modo ab isto pulcherimus ordo in studendo seruatus, ad quem
 65 omnes volentes ad summam sapienciam prouehi cum diligencia debent attendere. Propter enim istum ordinatum processum in addiscendo modis omnibus obseruandum, primo *De consolacione* in Philosophie vestibus leguntur 'quidam (f. 204v) gradus in scalarum modum insingniti, quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset ascensus'.⁴³ Hiis adiciendum est quam mangnum
 70 tempus in philosophicis studiis occupauerit quod sibi non defuerit naturalis ingeniositas, librorum copia et exhibicio sufficiens ab amicis. Et dico, 'sufficiens', non 'superflua', quia frequenter nimia opulencia iuuenes a profitando impedit aut retardat; propter quod dicit Seneca,

75 Mangni animi est contempnere mangna ac mediocra malle quam nimia; illa enim vtilia vitaliaque sunt, at hec eo quo < d > superfluunt nocent. Sic segetem nimia prosternit ubertas, sic rami onere franguntur, sic ad maturitatem non peruenit nimia fecunditas. Idem quoque animis accidit quos inmoderata felicitas rumpit.⁴⁴

Sic igitur apparet aliquialiter quod dominus iste recta semita ad philosophandum
 80 incesserit, et quod cum summo desiderio tempore retroacto se applicuerit consideracioni veritatis, vt sibi vere competere possit illud Senece, 'vir mangnus ac prudens animum eduxit a corpore et multum cum meliore et diuina parte versabatur'.⁴⁵ Et sic manifestum est ex premissis quod non mediocriter set excellenter adeptus sit preciosam sciencie margaritam, quodque vestes
 85 Philosophie, quas violenciorum quorundam manibus scissas primo *De consolacione* queritur,⁴⁶ particulas auferendo non sciderit, set pocius quod eas totas et integras asportando, eas sibi fecerit indumenta.

⁴⁰ ibid., 31.5, 7, p. 90 (4, 23); cf. *Auct. Arist.*, p. 277, no. 66.

⁴¹ ibid., 82.3, p. 272 (7).

⁴² ibid., 68.3, p. 198 (17-18).

⁴³ Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 1, pros. 1.4, p. 2 (18-19).

⁴⁴ Sen., *Ep.* 39.4, p. 103 (19-24).

⁴⁵ ibid., 78.10, p. 251 (23-25).

⁴⁶ Cf. Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 1, pros. 1.5, p. 2 (19-21): 'Eandem tamen uestem uiolentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant.'

- Ex quo ulterius euidens est quod morum laudabilium ornatus ei non deficiat; disponunt enim virtutes morales ad intellectuales, vt Eustracius dicit supra VI
- 90 *Ethicorum*:⁴⁷ ex quo sequitur quod eas via generacionis antecedunt. Propter quod dicit Philosophus 7 *Phisicorum* quod 'In sedendo et quiescendo', quod contingit cum impetus passionum restringuntur et moderantur ad regulam rationis, 'fit'⁴⁸ anima sciens et prudens',⁴⁹ et Commentator super illum locum dicit quod 'non est remotum vt virtus moralis operetur in hoc, et maxime
- 95 castitas.'⁵⁰ Probat eciam idem Commentator in prologo super tertium *Phisicorum* quod qui est perfectus per sciencias speculatiuas, necesse est quod perficiatur omnibus modis virtutum moralium, et erit castus, verax, liberalis et fortis.⁵¹ Et sine dubio hoc specialiter isti domino conuenit quod in aduersis non frangitur, set equanimiter quandoque grauia sustinet, per omnia hobediens
- 100 consilio Seneca sic dicentis, quociens seuit aduersitas, ferendum est 'equo animo', et vtendum est 'foro quod sors concesserit, donec inuicta felicitas finem inponat.'⁵² Idem Seneca alibi, 'Philosophia inexpugnabilis murus est, quem fortuna multis machinis lacessiuit, < sed > non transit. Non habet, vt putamus, fortuna longas manus: neminem occupat nisi herentem sibi.'⁵³
- 105 Apparet igitur sufficienter ex premissis domini istius in virtutibus decus et excellencia et vltius conclusio principalis iam ex pluribus demonstrata quod videlicet ad magistralem cathedram suis meritis sit assumendus. Certe plura et maiora ad eius commendacionem sine veritatis offensa dici poterunt, nam inopem me copia < non > fecit; tamen propter celeriolem dominorum
- 110 expedicionem, causa exortacionis iuuenum, hec pauca ad presens dicta sufficient.

⁴⁷ Cf. Eustratius, *In 6 Eth.*, prol. (Basel, 1542), p. 116a: '... studeatque ex utrisque suam consequi perfectionem, ex actione inquam et contemplatione, ut illa quasi fundamentum iacta supponatur ac fulciat, haec tanquam tectum imposita absolutam perfectionem aedificio afferat. Actio enim idipsum ut fit ex contemplatione consequitur non secus ac fundamenta ex tecto.'

⁴⁸ *post fit del. sic MS.*

⁴⁹ Cf. Arist., *Phys.* 7.3 (247b9-11), *transl. Arab.-Lat.* (Averroes, *Opera* 4 [Venice, 1574], fol. 321vL-M): '... quia quiescit, residetque anima, sciens fit, et prudens'; *Auct. Arist.*, p. 155, no. 189, 'In quiescendo et cedendo, scilicet mundanis anima fit sciens et prudens.'

⁵⁰ Averroes, *In 7 Phys.* (247b9-11), c. 3 text. 20 (Venice, 1574) 4.323rC.

⁵¹ Cf. Averroes, *In Phys.*, prol., 4.1vI: 'Et cum hoc consequitur cognitionem scientiae speculativae scientia de moralitate virtuosa, quoniam scientes istam scientiam, cum erunt secundum ordinem naturalem, oportet eos de necessitate esse virtuosos in omnibus speciebus virtutum moralium, quae sunt Iustitia, Temperantia, Fortitudo, Magnanimitas, Liberalitas, Veritas, Fiducia, Mansuetudo & aliae de virtutibus hominum.'

⁵² Pseudo-Seneca, *Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum apostolum et Pauli apostoli ad Senecam* 12, ed. F. Haase, *L. Annaei Senecae Opera quae supersunt* 3 (Leipzig, 1895), p. 480.

⁵³ Sen., *Ep.* 82.5, p. 272 (14-16, 18-19).

III

(ms. Oxford, Merton College 292, ff. '375' [372]va-'376' [373]ra)

Tullius 3^o *Rethorice* sue: Omnis, inquit, humana laus ex tribus generibus bonorum enascitur, bonis uidelicet fortune, corporis et anime.⁵⁴ Bona igitur fortune sunt diuicie, potestates et honores; hec enim fortunam sicut famule dominam recognoscunt; cum ipsa ueniunt, et ea abeunte recedunt. Bona uero
 5 respiciencia corpus sunt vires et bone ualitudines, sensuum viuacitas, pulcritudo et sanitas. Set bona anime sunt uirtutes et sciencie que sola per se⁵⁵ sufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem letumque efficiunt⁵⁶ possessorem. Bona uero fortune idcirco hominem reddunt laudabilem, quia modo quodam conferunt ad magnanimitatem, dicente Philosopho 4 *Ethicorum*,
 10 'Videntur autem bone fortune conferre ad magnanimitatem.'⁵⁷ Excessus namque talium bonorum, si quidem assit, usus moderatus ipsorum magnis utentem dignificat honoribus.

Preter hec autem et bona corporis in laudes hominum assumuntur; laus enim unicuique debetur in ordine ad uirtutem. Qui uero participat predictis bonis
 15 participat quodammodo et uirtute, dicente Philosopho primo *Rethorice* sue quod 'Virtus est potencia adquisitiua et seruatiua bonorum, atque benefactiua multorum et magnorum.'⁵⁸ Bona autem corporis que superius enumeraui factiua sunt multorum et magnorum:⁵⁹ sanitas quidem delectacionis et ipsius viuere; robur autem factiuum est ualencie qua quis potest alterum mouere
 20 prout uult; pulcritudo uero celebritatis et fame. Que singula breuiter explicat Boecius secundo *De consolacione* dicens sic, 'robur magnitudoque uidentur prestare ualenciam, pulcritudo atque uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem.'⁶⁰ Igitur non inmerito bona corporis in laudes assumuntur.

Set ulterius, tanquam bona quedam⁶¹ perficiencia et complencia laudem
 25 humanam, coassumuntur in sermonibus de laude uirtutes et sciencie, sine quibus nullum aliorum bonorum racionabiliter cadit in laudem, sed inutilia existent et nosciua si non regulentur uirtute. De bonis fortune hoc plane dicit Philosophus 4 *Ethicorum*, ita inquires 'Qui sine uirtute talia bona habent, neque

⁵⁴ Cf. Pseudo-Cicero, *Rhetorica ad C. Herennium* 3.6.10, ed. F. Marx (Leipzig, 1894), p. 262 (20-21): 'Laus igitur potest esse rerum externarum, corporis, animi.'

⁵⁵ per se s.s. *MS*.

⁵⁶ efficiunt *corr. in marg. ex perficiunt MS*.

⁵⁷ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 4.8 (1124a20) (AL p. 441 [4-5]).

⁵⁸ Arist., *Rhet.* 1.9 (1366a36-37) (AL p. 189 [20-22]).

⁵⁹ post magnorum *del. tanquam existencia partes MS*.

⁶⁰ Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 3, pros. 2.10, p. 39 (33-35).

⁶¹ bona quedam s.s. *MS*.

iuste magnis se ipsos dignificant',⁶² et paulo post subdens ac causam illius
 30 reddens addit, 'sine uirtute enim non facile, moderate ferre bonas fortunas.'⁶³
 De bonis etiam corporis hoc uerum est, ut accedat quod Philosophus dicit
Ethicorum sexto, 'quemadmodum enim equo forti sine uisione moto accidit
 forcius ledi si non habeat uisum dirigentem'⁶⁴ ipsum',⁶⁵ sic habitus corporis,
 puta robur, magnitudo, pulcritudo et similia, sine intellectu existentes noscui
 35 sunt habentibus ipsos, set egregii atque decori, cum sint⁶⁶ 'honestis
 exercitacionibus et industriis comparati', ut dicit Tullius in sua *Rethorica*.⁶⁷
 (f. '375' [372]vb)

Ad hec et consimilia attendens, dominus .N. bonis fortune decenter et
 modeste usus est, sua liberaliter aliis erogando, non ostentacionis gracia set
 40 causa honestatisque proprie et utilitatis aliene. Econtra, multi qui quadam gloria
 ducti ut benefici uideantur, multa faciunt que proficisci ab ostentacione⁶⁸ magis
 quam a uoluntate uideantur. Talis filiatio uanitati est coniunctior quam aut
 liberalitati aut honestati. Sunt et alii qui sua largiendo minus uel nichil
 conferunt hiis qui plus proferunt,⁶⁹ tanquam immemores recepti beneficii. Hii,
 45 quantum in ipsis est rem perniciosissimam inducentes, tollunt et destruunt
 humanam societatem, quia non nisi per contrafacere proportionale⁷⁰ societas
 hominum coniunctioque seruabitur. Set iste dominus non sic, immo tanquam
 uere liberalis existens, imitatur fertiles agros qui multo plus efferunt quam
 acceperunt, benigne intendens aliorum profectum, circumspecte attendens
 50 mores et dignitates hominum, diligenter etiam⁷¹ aduertens dictum Boecii
 secundo *De consolacione* loquentis de largicione exteriorum bonorum: 'hec'
 inquit 'effundendo magis quam coaceruando melius nitent; si quidem auaricia
 semper odiosos, claros largitas facit.'⁷² Nam 'amor multitudinis maxime
 commouetur ipsa fama et opinione liberalitatis', ut Tullius dicit libro *De*
 55 *officiis*.⁷³

Cum hoc autem quod dominus iste sic conuenienter usus est bonis fortune,
 etiam decenter est a natura compositus in bonis corporis, quorum decencia

⁶² Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 4.8 (1124a26-27) (AL p. 441 [10-11]).

⁶³ *ibid.*, 4.8 (1124a30) (AL p. 441 [13-14]).

⁶⁴ *post dirigentem del. is- MS.*

⁶⁵ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 6.13 (1144b11-12) (AL p. 492 [10-11], *ubi legitur* 'corpori forti').

⁶⁶ *sunt MS.*

⁶⁷ Pseudo-Cicero, *Rhet. ad Herenn.* 3.7.14, p. 265 (14-15).

⁶⁸ *ab ostentacione s.s. MS.*

⁶⁹ *profuerunt ut vid. MS.*

⁷⁰ Cf. Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 5.8 (1132b33) (AL p. 462 [11-12]); v. *sup.*, p. 160.

⁷¹ *etiam s.s. MS.*

⁷² Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 2, pros. 5.4, p. 26 (8-9).

⁷³ Cic., *Off.* 2.9.32.

bonorum in hoc attenditur quod ab ipsis nullus prorumpat impetus rationem abiciens, nullusque motus leuitatem animi aut aliquam inhonestatem pretendens.⁷⁴ Quod et in isto domino satis uidetur adimpletum; hoc namque ostendit sua conuersacio honesta erga commensales et domesticos ac eciam reuerencia⁷⁵ quam adhibuit erga quoscumque maxime anime et horum optimos; sicque attentus animo ad honestatis conseruacionem, repressit corporis impetus ne quid faceret effeminatum aut molle, ne quid durum aut rusticum, ut testificari possunt qui uitam suam melius nouerunt postquam ad istam uniuersitatem se transtulit. Econtra, quibusdam qui uerecundie inimicantes, nomen suum et statum turpiter infamantes, more histrionum omnibus arrident. Multis eciam in illicitis,⁷⁶ quod proprium est blanditoris, placide⁷⁷ conuiuunt, voluptate nimia lasciuiunt, ut non tantummodo animi perturbentur sed et corpora;⁷⁸ namque⁷⁹ alterius vicibus ora, uultus, voces, motus manuum et pedum statusque inordinatissime mutantur. Hec omnia signa sunt animi nullum habentis consiliarium aut inualidum; propter quod tales tanquam seruales et (f. '376' [373]ra) effeminatos repellere deberet status magistralis. Attendere deberent isti quod dicit Tullius libro *De officiis*, 'Neque ita generati sumus a natura, ut ad ludum et iocum facti esse uideamur, set ad seueritatem potius et ad studia quedam grauiora atque maiora';⁸⁰ ut eciam⁸¹ ait Seneca in *epistula* quadam ad *Lucillum*, 'Stulta est mi Lucili, et minime conueniens litterato viro occupacio exercendi lacertos, dilatandi ceruicem ac latera firmandi. Itaque quantum potes ab hiis circumscribe animum.'⁸² Quod et⁸³ iste dominus aduertens,⁸⁴ suos corporales impetus rationi obtemperat,⁸⁵ ut quod de ipso exterius apparet a recto et honesto nequeat separare.

Cum autem quantum ad bona fortune et nature conuenienter se habuit dominus .N., relinquitur quod non sit expers uirtutis moralis; vsus namque talium bonorum secundum quod conueniens est humane uite non habetur sine direccione appetitus; direccio uero appetitus non est absque morali uirtute, dicente Philosopho 6 *Ethicorum* quod 'eleccionem rectam facit uirtus.'⁸⁶

⁷⁴ post pretendens del. iste MS.

⁷⁵ post reuerencia del. de MS.

⁷⁶ eciam in illicitis in marg. MS.

⁷⁷ post placide del. conuiuere uolunt MS.

⁷⁸ post corpora del. ita ut MS.

⁷⁹ namque in marg. MS.

⁸⁰ Cic., *Off.* 1.29.103.

⁸¹ eciam corr. in marg. ex enim MS.

⁸² Sen., *Ep.* 15.2, p. 38 (20-22, 25-26).

⁸³ Quod et corr. in marg. ex Set MS.

⁸⁴ aduertens in marg. MS.

⁸⁵ post obtemperat del. animum circumscribens MS.

⁸⁶ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 6.13 (1144a20) (AL p. 491 [16]).

Conuincitur ergo manifeste quod iste dominus uirtutes morales habuit, et quia in illo qui dat se studio sciencie uirtus est summa dispositio ad scienciam, secundum illud Philosophi 7 *Ethicorum*, quia 'anima sedando et quiescendo fit
 90 sciens et prudens',⁸⁷ ideo concludendum est quod iste dominus, qui diu stetit in studio et hic et alibi, bonos libenter audiens et attente, eciam cum uirtute scienciam adquisiuerit, precipue cum ingenium habuit excellens, sicut constat michi, facile capiendi et memoriter retinendi. Sicque quod in ipso nature defecit ars et disciplina supleuit cum eccellente ingenii magnitudine, quam quidem
 95 ingenii claritatem natura in ipso depinxit, quasi similem ingenuitati⁸⁸ suorum parentum, quorum aliquis ultra alios⁸⁹ summam habens⁹⁰ prudenciam, que de humanis est, ad maiores⁹¹ res gerendas in re publica accomodatus⁹² est⁹³ tangentes non solum prouinciam unam uel ciuitatem sed et plurimas; et hic quidem cum possit multis nocere, potencia tamen usus est benefaciens, ac si
 100 dictum Tullianum haberet promptum pre oculis,⁹⁴ quod et tale est: 'si quis uoluerit animi sui complicatam nocionem euoluere, iam se ipse doceat eum virum bonum esse, qui prosit, quibus possit, nemini noceat nisi lacessitus iniuria.'⁹⁵ Hec ideo dicta sunt ut fides habeatur maior⁹⁶ quod iste dominus talis sit in sciencia et moribus qualem descripcimus, et idcirco in signum
 105 perfeccionis sciencie collata est sibi licencia docendi, ut accedat quod dicit Philosophus primo *Methaphisice*, 'signum scientis est posse docere.'⁹⁷

Set econtra, aliqui, de quo dolendum est, ante adquisicionem uirtutum et scienciarum, quantum esset eis oportunum, licenciam procurare non metuunt; et cum non possint per se optinere quod intendunt, multos et magnos
 110 aduocant⁹⁸ pro ipsis intercessores. Quam fallax et turpis sit istorum gloria, quam per preces inuere(f. '376' [373]rb)cunde adquirunt, tragicus quidam sic exclamat:

Gloria, gloria! milibus mortalium
 nichil aliud facta est nisi aurium inflacio magna.⁹⁹

⁸⁷ Cf. Arist., *Phys.* 7.3 (247b9-11), *Auct. Arist.*, p. 155, no. 189; v. sup., p. 174 n. 49.

⁸⁸ *post ingenuitati del. parent- MS.*

⁸⁹ *ultra alios in marg. MS.*

⁹⁰ *habens corr. ex habentes MS.*

⁹¹ *maiores corr. in marg. ex magnas MS.*

⁹² *accomodatus corr. ex accomodacius MS.*

⁹³ *est corr. s.s. ex suus (?) MS.*

⁹⁴ *promptum pre oculis corr. ex pre oculis promptum MS.*

⁹⁵ *Cic., Off.* 3.19.76.

⁹⁶ *post maior del. deuia (?) MS.*

⁹⁷ *Arist., Metaph.* 1.1 (981b7) (AL p. 7 [3]).

⁹⁸ *post aduocant del. proce- MS.*

⁹⁹ *Euripides, Androm.* 313, *secundum Boeth.*, *Phil. cons.* 3, pros. 6.1, p. 45 (1-4).

- 115 'Plures enim magnum sepe¹⁰⁰ nomen falsis uulgi opinionibus abstulerunt.'¹⁰¹
 Non attendunt isti quod Tholomeus dicit in *Almagesti*, 'Disciplina hominis sui
 intellectus socius est: et apud homines intercessor',¹⁰² quasi dicens, non oportet
 quod pro disciplinato alius intercedat nisi sua disciplina, presupposita tamen
 persone noticia: sicut fuit de isto domino, quia¹⁰³ presentatus examinadoribus et
 120 ab eis auditus suam scienciam habuit pro se intercessorem, non fauorem
 popularem, attendens quod Boecius dicit libro *De consolacione*, popularis gracia
 aprecianda non est, 'que nec recto iudicio prouenit nec unquam firma
 perdurat.'¹⁰⁴

Hec de commendacione istius domini sufficiant.

IV

(ms. Oxford, Merton College 292, f. '376' [373]rb)

- Teneor similiter commendare dominus .N., socium suum, sed nulla instat
 necessitas, quia ex euidencia fac < i > ei satis redditur commendabilis. Placidam
 et honestam habet conuersacionem; hoc enim omnes generaliter clamant qui
 eius conuersacionem melius nouerunt, et hec communis forma est argumentum
 5 euidens bonitatis sue, dicente Philosopho 7 *Ethicorum*, 'Fama non omnino
 perditur, quam multi populi famant.'¹⁰⁵ Commendabilis eciam redditur ex
 sciencie adquisicione, quia non parcens uigiliis et laboribus, non fecte et super-
 ficialiter libros suos audiens, non saliens set ordinate procedens, animum
 scienciis informauit, non partem set totum uolens degustare. Set proh dolor!
 10 aliqui philosophiam in partem prede trahunt; 'vestes', idest doctrinas, quas
 Philosophia 'tenuissimis filis', idest subtilibus disputacionibus subtilique
 artificio texerat, frustratim discerpunt,¹⁰⁶ iudicantes hoc eis sufficere, ut nec de
 aliquo totum nec de quolibet aliquid sciant, set de aliquo aliquid fecte et super-
 ficialiter. Isti cum Philosophia uellent esse familiares, quos tamen ipsa

¹⁰⁰ sepe s.s. *MS*.

¹⁰¹ Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 3, pros. 6.2, pp. 45 (5) - 46 (6).

¹⁰² Ptolom., *Almagest*, praef. (Venice, 1515), fol. 1r.

¹⁰³ post quia del. autem *MS*.

¹⁰⁴ Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 3, pros. 6.6, p. 46 (17-18).

¹⁰⁵ Arist., *Eth. Nic.* 7.14 (1153b27) (AL p. 516 [18-19]).

¹⁰⁶ discerpunt *corr.* ex decerpunt *MS*. Cf. Boeth., *Phil. cons.* 1, pros. 1.3, 5, p. 2 (12-14, 19-21): 'Vestes erant tenuissimis filis subtili artificio indissolubili materia perfectae, quas ... suis manibus ipsa texuerat.... Eandem tamen uestem uiolentorum quorundam sciderant manus et particulas quas quisque potuit abstulerant.'

15 reclamans renitensque¹⁰⁷ dedignatur¹⁰⁸ habere possessores. Istum autem dominum Philosophia sibi uendicauit, quia recto tramite processit ad degustandum philosophie dulcedinem.

Hec de commendacione istorum dominorum sufficiant, animaduertens quod Tullius libro *De officiis* iubet animaduertendum, dicens sic, 'Animaduertendum
20 est quatinus in sermone ut incipiendi ratio fuerit, ita sit desinendi modus.'¹⁰⁹

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¹⁰⁷ *post* renitensque *del.* non *MS.*

¹⁰⁸ dedignatur *corr. s.s. ex* dignatur *MS.*

¹⁰⁹ Cic., *Off.* 1.37.135.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN THE EARLY WRITINGS OF BARLAAM THE CALABRIAN *

Robert E. Sinkewicz, C.S.B.

Introduction

Chronology

The Prohibition of Demonstrative Science in Theology

1. Barlaam's Antilatin Treatise 5
2. Palamas' First Letter to Akindynos

* The texts of Barlaam and Gregory Palamas will be cited according to the following abbreviated titles:

Barlaam, AL 1-21 *Antilatin Treatises* numbered according to the inventory in R. E. Sinkewicz, 'The *Solutions* Addressed to George Lapithes by Barlaam the Calabrian and Their Philosophical Context', *Mediaeval Studies* 43 (1981) 187-89; citations from Paris gr. 1278.

EG 1-8 *Barlaam Calabro. Epistole greche. I primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte esicaste*, ed. G. Schirò (Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neogreci, Testi e monumenti: Testi 1; Palermo, 1954).

Or. I-II 'Un progetto di Barlaam Calabro per l'unione delle Chiese', ed. C. Gian-nelli, *Miscellanea Giovanni Mercati* 3 (Studi e Testi 123; Vatican City, 1946), pp. 157-208.

Solutions art. cit., ed. Sinkewicz, pp. 200-17.

Palamas (Gregory) Cited according to the edition of P. Chrestou (general editor), *Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα*, 3 vols. (Thessalonica, 1962-70). The following works are cited from vol. 1.

Apodictic Treatises I-II, ed. B. Bobrinsky, pp. 23-153.

Ep 1 Ak = First Letter to Gregory Akindynos, ed. J. Meyendorff, pp. 203-19.

Ep 2 Ak = Second Letter to Akindynos, idem, pp. 220-24.

Ep 1 Bar = First Letter to Barlaam, idem, pp. 225-59.

Ep 2 Bar = Second Letter to Barlaam, idem, pp. 260-95.

Ep 3 Ak = Third Letter to Akindynos, idem, pp. 294-312.

Triads = *Grégoire Palamas. Défense des saints hésychastes*, ed. J. Meyendorff, 2nd edition (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense, Études et documents, fasc. 30-31; Louvain, 1973).

3. Barlaam's First Letter to Palamas
 - (a) The Basic Requirements of Logical Science
 - (b) Palamas' Counterargument in Ep 1 Bar
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Barlaam's Doctrine of Illumination

1. The prolegomena to the Debate
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3. Barlaam's Second Letter to Palamas
4. Barlaam's Remaining Correspondence

Conclusions

INTRODUCTION

IN an earlier article I discussed Barlaam's character as a philosopher.¹ Now it is time to consider him as a theologian. Such an undertaking, however, is immediately confronted with a serious problem, for his most important theological work has not come down to us in its integral state: by a patriarchal decree in the summer of 1341 all copies of Barlaam's treatises *Against the Messalians* were ordered to be destroyed.² Only fragments survive in the polemical works of his opponents. This is indeed unfortunate, since Barlaam's collection of writings against the practices and doctrines of the hesychast monks³ and more particularly against Gregory Palamas inspired a debate among Byzantine theologians that lasted until the end of the Empire. In the hope of eventually arriving at a better historical understanding of these fragments, I propose to examine Barlaam's theological position in the immediate prelude to his controversy with the hesychasts. Such a study is now

¹ Sinkewicz, 'The Solutions', 151-217.

² *Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi*, vols. 1-2: *Acta patriarchatus Constantinopolitani*, ed. Fr. Miklosich and J. Müller (Vienna, 1860-62) [abbr. MM], 1.95.201-202. Cf. J. Darrouzès, *Les regestes de 1310 à 1376* (Le patriarcat byzantin, Série I, Les regestes des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople, vol. 1: *Les actes des patriarches*, fasc. 5 [Paris, 1977]), N. 2211.

³ On the meaning of the terms 'hesychast' and 'hesychasm' see J. Meyendorff, 'O vizantiyskom isikhazme i ego roli v kul'turnom i istoricheskom razvitii Vostochnoy Evropy v XIV v.', *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoy literatury* [abbr. TODRL] 29 (1974) 291-305 and especially 292-95; idem, 'Spiritual Trends in Byzantium in the Late Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries' in *The Kariye Djami*, ed. P. A. Underwood, 4 (London, 1975), pp. 96-100; and G. M. Prokhorov, 'Isikhazm i obshchestvenaya mysl' v Vostochnoy Evrope v XIV v.', *TODRL* 23 (1968) 86-108.

essential, for recently published texts and related scholarly works have long since outpaced the pioneering studies of G. Schirò.⁴ Although these were valuable in their day, the conclusions reached by Schirò can no longer be followed uncritically.⁵ John Meyendorff in his many publications has opened the way towards a fuller insight into the events, but his presentation is to a large extent weighted in favour of the Palamite documents and the version of the story which these present.⁶ To permit a properly balanced historical understanding Barlaam too must be heard.

The whole affair began in 1335 with a misunderstanding on the part of some regarding Barlaam's position on the Latin doctrine of the *filioque* procession of the Holy Spirit. It was reported to Gregory Palamas on Mt. Athos that the Calabrian was advocating a dangerous doctrinal compromise. The report was mistaken, for all of Barlaam's treatises on the procession, not to mention their subsequent popularity, are an eloquent witness to his complete doctrinal orthodoxy, at least in this matter. In the late spring of 1336 Barlaam's AL 5 fell into the hands of Palamas.⁷ In that work the Calabrian had questioned the propriety of the Latin and specifically the Thomistic use of logical demonstration in theological discourse. This topic became the first real bone of contention between Barlaam and Palamas. Alongside their debate on this topic Barlaam raised the question of the nature of divine illumination and to whom it might or might not be granted. These are the two subjects that constitute the prelude to the hesychast controversy proper. The real issue at stake was the nature of man's knowledge of God.

CHRONOLOGY

The chronology of the documents which will be discussed below and of the events with which they are associated is complicated, and not all the problems

⁴ G. Schirò, 'Rapporti di Barlaam Calabro con le due chiese di Roma e Bisanzio', *Archivio storico per la Calabria e la Lucania* 1 (1931) 325-57; 'Un documento inedito sulla fede di Barlaam Calabro', *ibid.* 8 (1938) 155-66; *Barlaam Calabro. Epistole greche*, as above; 'Ὁ Βαρλαάμ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην κατὰ τὸν δέκατον τέταρτον αἰῶνα', *Ἑταιρεία Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν. Ἰδρυμα Μελετῶν Χερσονήσου τοῦ Αἵμου* 32 (Thessalonica, 1959).

⁵ Cf. P. L. M. Leone, *Niceforo Gregora. Fiorenzo o intorno alla sapienza* (Byzantina et Neohellenica Neapolitana, Collana di studi e testi 4; Naples, 1975), pp. 19-20; A. Fyrigos, *Barlaam Calabro. Epistole a Palamas* (Rome, 1975).

⁶ J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Patristica Sorbonensia 3; Paris, 1959). His most important articles on the subject are collected in *Byzantine Hesychasm: Historical, Theological and Social Problems. Collected Studies* (London, 1974) [abbr. BH]. See also the introduction to his edition of the *Triads*.

⁷ R. E. Sinkewicz, 'A New Interpretation for the First Episode in the Controversy between Barlaam the Calabrian and Gregory Palamas', *Journal of Theological Studies* N.S. 31 (1980) 489-500.

have been satisfactorily resolved. The following tentative chronology is offered as a guide.

1. c. 1330 Barlaam arrived in Constantinople, after spending several years in Arta and Thessalonica.⁸
2. In the fall or winter of 1334 two Dominican bishops, Francesco da Camerino and Richard of England, arrived in Constantinople to prepare for renewed discussions on the Union of the Churches.⁹
3. Early in the spring of 1335 Barlaam presented his two discourses (Or. I-II) before the Imperial Court and the Patriarchal Synod.¹⁰
4. During the second half of 1335 Gregory Palamas wrote his *Treatises against the Latins* (i.e., the *Apodictic Treatises*) to warn against any doctrinal compromise in the renewed discussions with the Latins, but more particularly to point out the unorthodox character of Barlaam's treatment of the *filioque* in the discourses which he had pronounced in Constantinople that spring.¹¹
5. During the second half of 1335 and perhaps into the beginning of 1336 Barlaam was writing the first edition of his *Antilatin Treatises*.¹²
6. On the feast of Pentecost, 19 May 1336, Palamas received a copy of Barlaam's AL 5 which examined the propriety of using Aristotelian logic in theological discourse. Already suspicious of Barlaam's opinions on the *filioque*, Palamas now became alarmed by the largely philosophical (rather than patristic) arguments that the Calabrian was using against the Latins.¹³
7. In late May or June 1336 Palamas wrote his *First Letter to Gregory Akindynos* (Ep 1 Ak), explaining his preliminary judgement of Barlaam's ideas and requesting further information.¹⁴

⁸ Theodore Metochites returned from exile in 1330 (I. Ševčenko, *Études sur la polémique entre Théodore Métochite et Nicéphore Choumnos* [Corpus Bruxellense historiae Byzantinae, subsidia 3; Brussels, 1962], p. 8 n. 2). Nikephoros Gregoras mentioned that Barlaam upon his arrival failed to pay his respects to Metochites who had just returned from his exile (*Florentios* 412-27, ed. Leone; cf. also the commentary, pp. 186-87 and 196).

⁹ I have reexamined the chronology for this and some of the subsequent events in my article, 'A New Interpretation', 489-500.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 489-94.

¹¹ *ibid.*, 494-98.

¹² The manuscript Vat. gr. 1110 with its autograph corrections and revisions is almost certainly the first published edition of these treatises. It contains the following: AL 1-7, 11-10; *Prayer*; *Solutions*; Or. I-II. The *Antilatin Treatises* and the *Prayer* may have existed separately for a very brief period, but then, almost immediately, the *Solutions* and Or. I-II were added on. Several other minor works including sections of Barlaam's *Logistica* were bound into the manuscript at a later date. For the complete titles of these works and a brief discussion of the manuscript see Sinkewicz, 'The *Solutions*', 185-92 and 194-95.

¹³ Sinkewicz, 'A New Interpretation', 496, 499-500. Several times Barlaam referred to the work in question as a *single* treatise: EG 1.922, 942, 945; EG 2.40.

¹⁴ Palamas seems to have written this letter also as a reply to a letter from Akindynos, now lost, which criticized the use of the term 'apodictic' in the titles to his *Treatises against the Latins* (Sinkewicz, *ibid.*, 495-96).

8. Probably during the summer of 1336 Gregory Akindynos replied to Palamas, mentioning that he had shown Ep 1 Ak to Barlaam and offering a summary of the latter's reaction.¹⁵

9. In the summer of 1336, after Akindynos had shown him Palamas' letter (Ep 1 Ak), Barlaam wrote his *First Letter to Palamas* (EG 1).

10. In the fall of 1336 Palamas replied to Barlaam's letter (Ep 1 Bar). He also sent a copy to Akindynos together with a brief note (Ep 2 Ak).

11. Sometime between the summer of 1336 and that of 1337 Barlaam completely revised AL 5 and published a new edition, AL 16, at least partially in response to the criticisms of Palamas (in Ep 1 Ak and perhaps also Ep 1 Bar). Most of the remaining *Antilatin Treatises* were also written during this period.¹⁶

12. During the second half of 1336 Barlaam wrote his reply to the philosophical questions of George Lapithes.¹⁷

13. Towards the end of 1336 Barlaam defended himself against the criticisms of Palamas (i.e., Ep 1 Ak) in a letter to Neilos Triklinios (EG 2), in which he quoted extensively from the first edition of his *Antilatin Treatises* and from the *Solutions*.¹⁸

14. By the beginning of 1337 Barlaam was already in relation with certain hesychasts in Thessalonica. His initial contacts left him favourably disposed, but he soon encountered one or several less well-tutored monks whose spiritual practices and doctrine he considered at least dangerous if not heretical.¹⁹ Sometime before the summer

¹⁵ Ambros. gr. 290 (E 64 sup.), fols. 75v-76v. The dates for this letter and the documents mentioned below in items 9-10 are dependent on the dating of Palamas, Ep 1 Ak.

¹⁶ There is a possibility that a few may have been associated with his mission to Avignon in 1339, but already by that time Barlaam was thoroughly embroiled in the hesychast controversy.

¹⁷ Sinkewicz, 'The *Solutions*', 152-53.

¹⁸ In the letter Barlaam makes reference to a number of documents in a chronological series which I interpret as follows: Barlaam, AL 5 (EG 2.40); Palamas, Ep 1 Ak (41); Barlaam, EG 1 (45); Palamas, Ep 1 Bar (49). These documents followed upon one another in rapid succession (*εὐθὺς*). Since Barlaam was still replying to the criticisms of Ep 1 Ak and made no identifiable reference to the contents of Palamas' Ep 1 Bar, it is reasonable to assume that this last letter had only recently come into his possession.

¹⁹ The first reference to Barlaam's criticisms of the practices of the hesychast monks in the letters of Palamas is Ep 2 Bar, §§ 49-50.287-89: 'In this regard therefore the philosopher [= Barlaam], being thoroughly worldly and not having received the gifts of the Spirit, declared that the visionaries who have appeared throughout this age have not seen a shadow of a shadow of God. Having become a disciple of some vagabonds, he attacked our teachers with the falsely-named knowledge and with the wisdom which has proved ignorant of God. For since they used to explain to him, in accordance with the traditional instructions of the Fathers for novices, that by certain devices the mind can be forced to return from its customary ways unto itself inasmuch as it has with difficulty been set free from externals and thus they look upon themselves even physically [lit. 'according to the external man'], because of this, he advanced against our teachers. But why do I speak of those who have just recently stripped themselves for this contest and who turn unto themselves even physically? For even among the more perfect some have used this posture in prayer, and God was ready to listen to them. Even Elias himself bent his head upon his knees, thus with greater effort concentrating his mind upon himself and upon God, and put an end to the drought of many years. But some of us counselled this noble fellow, who was subject in his mind to the fear of Cain, to retain the breath a little so as to constrict his thinking

Barlaam went to the capital and denounced these monks to the Synod.²⁰

15. In late spring or early summer of 1337 Barlaam returned to Thessalonica and replied to Palamas' Ep 1 Bar (EG 3).²¹ Although the letter is a severe attack against Palamas, Barlaam makes nothing but the briefest allusion to his association with the hesychasts (EG 3.601-602; cf. 328-31). He may have complied for a time with the patriarch's injunction to desist from his attacks.

16. In late spring or early summer of 1337 Palamas wrote a second time to Barlaam (Ep 2 Bar) and completed the criticism of the latter's EG 1. Here for the first time Palamas mentioned Barlaam's attacks against the hesychast monks and the deposition to the Synod.²²

17. Probably before the end of 1337 Barlaam had completed his remaining letters (EG 4-8) which contain the literary evidence of his views in the transition to the hesychast controversy proper.

Since a number of the above-mentioned documents can only be dated in relation to Palamas' Ep 1 Ak, the correct dating of this letter is crucial. In the introduction to his edition of the *Triads* Meyendorff pointed out a text of Palamas' dialogue, the *Theophanes*, which recounts the discussions of the Synod of 1341 where a number of Thessalonicans had testified that Barlaam had attacked the monks four years ago before knowing Palamas and before he had exchanged letters with him.²³

briefly and not to allow the eye to rove about hither and thither, but to fix it upon his breast as on some support or upon the navel and by such a posture of the body to send back within the heart the power of the mind which is dissipated externally through the faculty of vision.... When they suggested these things to this fellow, he very quickly rebelled and he did not stop at mere desertion, but he also bitterly denounced them to the Synod calling them "omphalopsychi".

In a letter dated to early spring of 1341 Akindynos referred to Barlaam's original anti-hesychast activities three or four years previously, in which he himself refused to have any part: ὅς, τριῶν ἐτῶν ἢ τεττάρων ἑμῶν ἤδη που ταῦτα νεανιευσαμένων, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἐκίνουν, οὐδὲ συνηρπαζόμεν. . . ., *Letter to Barlaam*, Ambros. gr. 290 (E 64 sup.), fol. 69v13-15. I am grateful to Dr. Angela Hero for bringing this reference to my attention.

Barlaam was much impressed by the hesychast Ignatios: 'With this intention I came to you, by your sacred person, not for the purpose of ridiculing and disparaging the views of your associates and least of all your own, as some have thought, but persuaded that you were most eminent over all in virtue I entertained the highest hopes of encountering through you the true and right way in all things. And at least for your part I was not disappointed in my expectations, for, in all the questions I asked you, you seemed to give me very precise answers, and I thought that none of the answers disagreed with the most accurate truth; for this I owe you many thanks. And I could not but be grateful to Kalothetos, Disypatos, the fine Luke and their company, with whom I often associated and by whom I was taught many good things' (EG 5.102-13).

²⁰ Darrouzès, *Regestes*, N. 2178.

²¹ Barlaam had apparently not yet received Palamas' second letter (Ep 2 Bar), for he makes no reference to it.

²² See above, n. 19.

²³ p. xiii; *Theophanes 2* (Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα 2.222.3-12 = PG 150.913bc).

But his treachery and deceit in this were so easily shown up, since there were Thessalonians present, when the origin was still being examined, who knew in what manner it became manifest four years ago, when he could hardly have known where in the world we were, nor had he been in contact with us by letters; at that moment, just so long ago, feigning obedience to a certain monk living in simplicity, he found the occasion for his accusations, just as the *Synodal Tome* sets it out clearly for those who are interested.

Meyendorff concluded that Palamas' Ep 1 Ak must have been written in spring 1337.

The basic objection to this dating is that the documents of that year, both from the pen of Palamas (Ep 1 Ak, Ep 2 Ak, Ep 1 Bar) and of Barlaam (EG 1 Pal, EG 2 Neilos), make no reference whatsoever to Barlaam's criticism of the hesychast monks.²⁴ Certainly the contacts between Palamas on Athos and his friends in Thessalonica were sufficiently close that any move against the monks on Barlaam's part would have received immediate attention from Palamas.

Furthermore, there may be some doubt about the text of the *Theophanes* at this point. In the fifteenth-century manuscript Paris gr. 1238 (fol. 225r) the copyist originally wrote *διὰ συγγραμμάτων*, but the letters *συ* were later erased (they are still clearly discernible beneath the erasure). G. Mantzarides, the most recent editor of the *Theophanes*, made no note of this reading in his apparatus.²⁵ If 'treatises', rather than 'letters', is the original reading, the text would mean that Barlaam began his attacks against the monks before exchanging *treatises* with Palamas. There would then be no objection to dating Palamas' Ep 1 Ak and the subsequent documents a year earlier.

Even with the text as it now stands, it can plausibly be argued that Palamas was fudging the facts a little. The point of the *Theophanes* text is to show that Barlaam was the one responsible for instigating the hesychast controversy proper. No mention is made of its prelude, the discussion of the *filioque*

²⁴ The passage in Ep 1 Bar § 10.230.6-17 cannot be construed as a veiled allusion to Barlaam's association with the hesychast monks (*pace* Meyendorff, *ibid.*, n. 3; *Triads*, p. xiv): 'If you call here an exemplar what we spoke of there rather figuratively as myrrh, listen now attentively: "We have left almost entirely neglected the skills of argumentation but have grasped little or nothing of the true wisdom; rather, we run as though into the odour of myrrh but without having the myrrh itself on our hands" (Ep 1 Ak § 14.219.19-24). Are not these things there explicitly? Clearly then you are wrong in claiming that we said we had attained it, when we were saying that we had not yet attained it. If you stir up this reproach against us because we said "we longed for", you are acting just as if someone were to say that the man who says he has been to school and spent a long time with the master but because of his own dullness was able to retain nothing of what was taught has an arrogant opinion of his own wisdom.' In this last sentence Palamas is referring to *himself*, not to Barlaam. He explains that his original statement was intended as a protestation of humility; thus Barlaam's reproach of arrogance was quite uncalled for.

²⁵ *Παλαμά Συγγράμματα* 2.222.

problem and the propriety of using logical demonstration in theology. Nor was Barlaam censured by the Synod of 1341 for the opinions which he held in this initial phase: all the weight fell on Barlaam's criticism of hesychast practices and doctrine. As I propose to show, the real winner of the first round of the debate was Barlaam. His *Antilatin Treatises* were soon recognized as among the best in the genre. There were few qualms about recopying them right down to the end of the Empire and even beyond. Thus, in the *Theophanes* Palamas may have conveniently forgotten about the initial phase of the debate and the first exchange of letters. In fact such a lapse of memory is almost forgivable, if one takes into consideration that after Barlaam's *Against the Messalians* and Gregory's *Triads* the earlier discussions paled in significance.

Ultimately, the *Theophanes* tells us only that Barlaam took up his criticisms of the monks on the basis of an encounter with a suspect hesychast in 1337. At that time Barlaam had not yet met Palamas and probably knew little about him. There is then no further objection to dating Palamas' Ep 1 Ak to late May or June 1336, thus allowing a more plausible span of time for the various documents and for the events that took place.

THE PROHIBITION OF DEMONSTRATIVE SCIENCE IN THEOLOGY

Although the chronological sequence of the documents presents certain complexities, the substance of the initial phase of the controversy is quite simple. The Latin question is at the head of the order of events, followed by the problem of using the methods of Aristotelian logic in theological discourse, and finally by a dispute about the nature of illumination, which formed a transition to the hesychast controversy. In another vein, these last two phases are two complementary movements, one negative and one positive, within Barlaam's teaching on the nature of man's knowledge of God. Attention will now be given to the first phase, where Barlaam sought to explain why it is that there can be no knowledge of God by the methods of human science. The context here is of capital importance and so each of the documents must be analyzed within its historical situation.

At the close of his first letter to Gregory Palamas, Barlaam defined his intentions in AL 5 as an attempt to offer a general refutation of the Latin use of syllogisms in their discussions with the Greeks,²⁶ and to this end he had devoted a treatise to the external form of syllogistic arguments.²⁷ Since Palamas had

²⁶ 'When I saw that it was impossible to examine and refute each syllogism proposed by the Latins – for the verbiage would become endless – , I considered how it might be possible to refute them all (and prove them to be sophisms) in a single treatise' (EG 1.920-23).

²⁷ 'In that treatise I was not concerned with the ascent from creatures (each conceived in itself) to the Creator. My treatise was not about such a consideration but about the external form

been making similar errors, Barlaam felt constrained to reiterate his remarks on the topic but with further developments.²⁸ Having done this, he moved on with a point-by-point reply to the remaining questions raised by Gregory's letter, but the fundamental movement of his commentary was an exposition of the epistemological ground of logical science, aimed at demonstrating the inappropriateness of its use in theology.²⁹ AL 16 contains a perfunctory repetition of the basic requirements of syllogisms, for the most part consisting of quotations from AL 5. However, it continues to probe the question of knowledge but more in the context of the theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. Such is the general direction of Barlaam's thought on the problem of demonstration in theology.

1. *Barlaam's Antilatin Treatise 5*

After the introduction, in which he summarized the conclusions of the preceding treatises and exhorted the Latins to be attentive to the truth of them, Barlaam turned to his new tactic: if he could prove that the syllogisms of the Latins were neither apodictic nor dialectic, they would necessarily be fallacious. The treatise thus falls into two sections, one concerned with apodictic argument, the other with dialectic. In order to show the impropriety of demonstrative syllogisms in discussions over the *filioque*, Barlaam took the basic requirements for such syllogisms which Aristotle laid down in the first section of the *Posterior Analytics* and showed that they could not be applied to truths concerning God.

Firstly, all demonstrable propositions are proved from premisses which are prior by nature.³⁰ Aristotle had enunciated this principle in *APo.* 1.2.³¹ However, divine truths are absolutely primary and fundamental and can never be considered as posterior to the common notions, hypotheses and definitions which enter the soul through the experience of particulars. Two remarks

of the syllogisms which we often formulate in our conversations with one another and in the works which we write' (EG 1.940-44). This is one of the best indications of the priority of AL 5, where Barlaam treated the formal characteristics of syllogisms and provided no reference to the analogical knowledge of God, whereas in AL 16 he did insert such a discussion to satisfy the sensitivities of Palamas (cf. Ep 1 Ak § 12.216-17). The references to Barlaam's discussion of the technicalities of syllogistic argument in his letter to Akindynos (Ep 1 Ak § 13.217-18) also point to AL 5. In EG 1.37-38 Barlaam was probably alluding to the title of AL 5 (*Πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς τῶν Λατίνων*) when he said he had addressed his treatises 'to the most disputatious Latins' (*πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικωτάτους Λατίνους*). And in his letter to Neilos (EG 2.129-225) Barlaam proffered several quotations from AL 5, not AL 16.

²⁸ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 11.215-16; Barlaam, EG 1.337-530.

²⁹ Barlaam, EG 1.531-825.

³⁰ *τὰ ἀποδεικτὰ πάντα ἐκ φύσει προτέρων ἀποδείκνυνται* (AL 5.77v2-3 [Paris gr. 1278]).

³¹ *APo.* 1.2 (71b22 and 71b34-72a5).

should be made here. Barlaam used the term 'common notions' (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*) as a general reference to the first principles of demonstrative science. The term does not, however, appear in Aristotle; its use in the domain of logic probably arose from the equation of Euclid's common notions with Aristotle's common principles or axioms, although the identification is not entirely justified.³² The term appears frequently in the commentaries³³ and was undoubtedly current in Barlaam's day. It should also be noted that Barlaam here referred to the mode of apprehension of these common notions as being via the experience of particulars. This is certainly a reference to Aristotle's theory in *APo.* 2.19, but Barlaam added nothing further to it for the moment.

Moving on to the next point, Barlaam remarked that the principles upon which demonstrations are based must be causes of the conclusion, but no humanly conceived axiom or definition could be cause of any reality in the Trinity.³⁴ And further, the principles must refer to the same genus as the proposition to be proved, but no being is in the same genus with the divine realities.³⁵ The universals present in the soul refer to beings, but God is beyond all being.

In his following comments Barlaam went somewhat outside the strict Aristotelian purview, at least, with respect to his terminology. He claimed that demonstration is possible only in the case of those realities of which the intellect possesses direct perception. This excludes, on the one hand, sensibles which because of their material nature possess no determination and are ever subject to change, and also, on the other hand, those realities which transcend the intellect.³⁶ This statement on sensibles should be compared with a similar one in the *Solutions* where the context is specified as Platonic:³⁷

He [i.e., Plato] believes that objects which have names derived from forms in virtue of participation share maximally in indefiniteness, infinitude, unlikeness and change. Thereby understandably no one could ever attain sure knowledge of them.

³² W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 56-57.

³³ e.g., John Philoponus, *In An. Post.* 1.2 (71b9) (*CAG* 13.3, p. 20.22-23) – the common notions are indemonstrable. On the history of the term see H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, eds., *Proclus. Théologie platonicienne* (Paris, 1968), 1.159-61.

³⁴ ἔτι, τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων πάντων αἰτιά ἐστιν οἱ ὅροι καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν ἀπεδείχθησαν. τῶν δὲ ἐν τῇ τριάδι ζητουμένων, οὐδένα ὅρον ἢ ἀξίωμα, ὅσα ἄνθρωποι νοοῦσιν, οἷον τ' εἶναι αἴτιον (*AL* 5.77v12-16).

³⁵ ἔτι, ἕκαστον τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν ἀνάγκη ἀποδεδείχθαι ἔκ τινος ἀρχῆς, ἥ καὶ ὁμογενὴς ἔσται αὐτῷ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ, καὶ καθολικωτέρα περιέχουσα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ὁμογενῇ τῷ συμπεράσματι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ ἀμήχανόν ἐστιν εὐρεῖν (*AL* 5.77v17-22); cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.2 (71b23).

³⁶ ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα, τὰ τε αἰσθητὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὕλην ἀόριστα καὶ ἐν παντοίᾳ ὄντα μεταβολῇ, καὶ τὰ ὑπὲρ νοῦν (*AL* 5.78r9-11).

³⁷ *Solutions* I.3.4-6.

In several places Proclus refers to the infinitude and indeterminacy of matter or of beings,³⁸ but it is not a common theme in Plato. The concept of direct perception, frequent in Barlaam's writings, is expressed by various technical terms, such as *ἐφάπτομαι*, *περιγίνεται* and often by the noun *ἐπαφή*.³⁹ Barlaam excluded demonstration for sensibles, since the mind perceives them indirectly through sense-perception and imagination, but surely he must mean *particular* sensibles, for elsewhere he admitted demonstration in the domain of natural science, although the demonstration is in fact conducted on the level of universals and the intelligible concepts abstracted from particular sensible objects.⁴⁰ God stands, of course, in Barlaam's second excluded category *τὰ ὑπὲρ νοῦν*, for he is in every way beyond the reach of the intellect, whether as unity or as trinity. This calls to mind the passage of Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 13.3, which Barlaam later drew upon in his response to Palamas' comments on the attribution to God of the names 'One' and 'Three'. Since there is no direct (intellectual) perception of divine truths, apodictic demonstration must necessarily be excluded from theology.⁴¹ As his authority Barlaam cited a text of Pseudo-Dionysius which affirms that no expression or conception can be referred to God apart from what has been divinely revealed in scripture.⁴²

In the next paragraph Barlaam returned to the requirement of same genus to say that divine truths cannot be submitted to the same demonstrations as those used for realities grasped by the human intellect, as in the case of natural science and mathematics. Demonstration will not allow transfer from one genus to another, and there is no common genus shared by beings and created realities on the one hand, and by superessential and divine realities on the other.⁴³ Then the Calabrian appended still another comment on the same requirement. Aristotle spoke of demonstration of fact (although he did not

³⁸ Proclus. *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1963), props. 94 and 117.

³⁹ For further discussion of Barlaam's theory of direct perception see Sinkewicz, 'The Solutions', 181-82.

⁴⁰ *Solutions* III.2.3-14; EG 1.543-99.

⁴¹ οὐκοῦν εἰ ὁ θεὸς κατὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ ὡς μονάς καὶ ὡς τριάς . . . , τῶν περὶ θεοῦ λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ οὐχ ὑπὲρ νοῦν. τῶν δ' ὑπὲρ νοῦν ὄντων οὐκ ἐφάπτεται νοῦς οὐδὲ περιγίνεται · ὧν δὲ νοῦς οὐκ ἐφάπτεται, τούτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς (AL 5.78r12-18). Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 13.3 (PG 3.980D-981A); Barlaam, EG 1.654-825 (this same passage contains frequent references to *ἐπαφή*); Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.213.26-28.

⁴² *DN* 1.1 (PG 3.588A).

⁴³ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέ, δι' ὧν ἀποδείξεων ἀποδεικνύομεν τὰ ἡμῖν καταληπτὰ πράγματα, οἷον φυσικὰ ἢ μαθηματικὰ καὶ ὅσων ἐφικνέεται ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς, διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν οἶον τ' ἔστιν ἀποδείξαι τι τῶν περὶ θεοῦ · τὰ γὰρ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀποδείξεσι δεικνύμενα ἀναγκαῖον ἐστὶν εἶναι ὁμογενῆ · οὐ γὰρ μεταβαίνουσιν αἱ ἀποδείξεις ἀφ' ἑτέρου γένους εἰς ἕτερον. τὰ δὲ περὶ θεοῦ πάντων ἐξήρηται καὶ οὐδενὶ ἐστὶν ὁμογενῆ. οὐκ ἂν ἄρα ταῖς αὐταῖς ἀποδείξεσι τοῖς οὔσι τὰ ὑπερούσια ἀποδειχθεῖν (AL 5.78v4-14). Cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.7 (75a38).

consider it true, scientific demonstration), whereby something is proved from its effect rather than from its cause, or, as Barlaam put it, prior things proved from posterior things. But in this case the fact and its effect must be within the same genus (i.e., they must fall under the same science).⁴⁴ Here again divine truths must be excluded from apodictic demonstration.

In the next section Barlaam turned to the *Prior Analytics* to show that the two principal Latin propositions cannot be demonstrated apodictically.⁴⁵ In an apodictic syllogism which is affirmative and in the first figure the middle term must exceed the last term and be lesser in extent than the major.⁴⁶ But if the middle term is equivalent to either of the extremes, the result will be *petitio principii*.⁴⁷ This is indeed what happens when the Latins try to prove either that the Holy Spirit possesses his existence also from the Son, or that the Son is a principle of the Holy Spirit. And then Barlaam added some further objections to the second of the Latin propositions. Being a principle of the Holy Spirit must be predicated of the Son either directly or indirectly. If directly, then there can be no demonstration, since, according to Aristotle, immediate attributes are indemonstrable.⁴⁸ But if the predication is indirect, it will be necessary to find a middle term that will not be convertible with either extreme and that will also be the cause of the conclusion.⁴⁹ Such a middle term is not to be found.

To conclude his treatment of apodictic demonstration Barlaam broached a more fundamental problem to which he would return on several occasions. The common notions and self-evident axioms which form the basis of all demonstration contradict many of the doctrines confessed by all Christians and clearly revealed in sacred scripture: the creation of the world, the future restoration and resurrection of the dead, the incarnation and the trinity. Here it would clearly be impious for Christians to place their faith in the common notions and axioms of human science.⁵⁰ Therefore, in the case of doctrines which are not clear and are still disputed (viz., the *filioque*), how much more ought one to distrust such human principles and the resulting demonstrations.

⁴⁴ ἔτι δὲ οὐδ' οὕτως οἷόν τε δειχθῆναι τι τῶν περὶ τριάδος ζητουμένων, ὥς δεικνύουσι τὰ πρότερα ἐκ τῶν ὑστέρων... ἦν Ἀριστοτέλη, ἀπόδειξεν τοῦ ὅτι, ἔθος ἐστὶν ὀνομάζειν (AL 5.79r2-9); Aristotle, *APo.* 1.13 (78a22). Cf. ... ὥς ἀπὸ ὑστέρων καὶ αἰτιατῶν ἐπὶ πρῶτα καὶ αἷτια ἀνεδράμομεν (John Philoponus, *In An. Post.* 1.2 (71b28) [CAG 13/3.28.11-12]).

⁴⁵ AL 5.79r15-81r10.

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *APr.* 1.4 (25b32-35).

⁴⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *SE* 1.6 (168b22-26) = *petitio principii* in general; *APo.* 2.4 (91a36-37) = resulting from convertibility.

⁴⁸ *APo.* 1.3 (72b19-20) = knowledge of immediate premisses is not by demonstration.

⁴⁹ *APo.* 1.2 (71b22) = cause of the conclusion.

⁵⁰ ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν παραδοθέντων ἡμῶν δογμάτων ὑπὸ τῶν πανιερωτάτων λογίων, ὅτι διὰ σπουδῆς ἐστὶν αὐτὰ φυλάξαι, πολλὰς ἀνάγκη τῶν κοινῶν ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἐννοιῶν (AL 5.81r23-v3).

The Calabrian adopted much the same procedure in the second half of his treatise where his concern was dialectic argumentation. He enunciated Aristotle's basic principles on the subject, this time through a series of quotations,⁵¹ and then indicated how the Latin arguments fell short of these requirements. Above all he insisted that in dialectic syllogisms it is necessary to formulate one's arguments on the basis of opinions accepted by one's interlocutor or opponent. As Barlaam pointed out, the Latins had not been following this precept, for, while the Greeks allow that the 'metadotic' or communicative procession of the Spirit is from both the Father and the Son, they insist that the 'hyparctic' or substantial procession is from the Father alone.⁵² The Greeks would not accept anything leading to a contradiction of these doctrines, nor do they hold any doctrine whereby the *filioque* could be proved.

In the remaining sections of the treatise Barlaam reviewed three possible ways of constructing dialectic syllogisms in theology. They could have all their premisses taken from scripture, or all from reason, or some from scripture and some from reason (as in the arguments of Thomas Aquinas). The second alternative can be excluded immediately since it contradicts the injunction of Pseudo-Dionysius against any theological statements not formulated on the basis of scripture.⁵³ Barlaam further emphasized this point, affirming that even the surest of mathematical axioms would have to be abandoned in theology, if they could be used to prove the *filioque*. In a syllogism with the minor premiss based on scripture and the major based on a common notion, the latter would indeed be true for the realities known to us, but there is no certainty or necessity that it would be true also for God. Otherwise the absolute distinction between God and creation might be compromised.⁵⁴ And since it is stated by the Fathers that the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone (as Barlaam showed in AL 4), the common notion in the major premiss would be false for God even though it might otherwise hold true. Thus, Barlaam concluded, the only

⁵¹ Aristotle, *Top.* 1.1 (100a29-30, b21-23) = argument from generally accepted opinions; *Int.* 11 (20b27-29) = the dialectic question; *APr.* 1.1 (24b10-12) = the dialectic premiss; *Top.* 1.2 (101a30-34) = dialectic as useful instrument in discussions.

⁵² ὡς πολλάκις καὶ ἐν τοῖς προτέροις λόγοις διωρισάμενη, τὴν μὲν μεταδοτικὴν πρόοδον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς.... παρὰ τε πατρός καὶ υἱοῦ ὑπάρχειν ὁμολογοῦμεν· τὴν δὲ ὑπαρκτικὴν πρόοδον, ἣ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτήν, ἐκ μόνου πατρός πιστεύομεν ἔχειν τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον (AL 5.83v1-9).

⁵³ DN 1.1 (PG 3.588A).

⁵⁴ ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐθ' ὅσον οὐτ' εὐσεβὲς ὑπολαμβάνειν ταῦτ' ἔπεσθαι τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ ποιήμασιν, ἢ ταῦτ' μὴ ἐγχωρεῖν τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχειν, οὕτω γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν διαφέρων, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως εὐλαβησόμεθα τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀληθεύοντας λόγους, ἀληθεῖς ἐξανάγκης καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ αὐτοὺς ἡγήσασθαι; (AL 5.85v13-20).

remaining choice for the Latins is to formulate a syllogism based entirely on scripture, but the preceding treatises have already shown this to be impossible. The Latin theses simply cannot be used in dialectic arguments because no Greek will accept them. Anticipating any objections to his own use of syllogisms, Barlaam noted that he had never claimed that his arguments were apodictic, and since he always argued from his opponents' positions he was entitled to formulate his syllogisms dialectically.

In AL 16 Barlaam repeated verbatim much of what he said on the subject of dialectic in AL 5. However, the correspondence between the two treatises soon breaks down because in AL 16 Barlaam was more concerned with criticizing Thomistic theology, at least as it had been presented to him. For example, Thomas' use of scripture is quite different from that of the Greeks. Not only does he give to it an interpretation not found in the Fathers, but he also uses elements of human reasoning in his exegesis.

In one passage Barlaam gave some examples of Thomas' arguments from reason:⁵⁵

1. 'Εὰν πολλὰ προέρχωνται ἐξ ἐνὸς αὐλως καὶ οὐσιωδῶς, ἀναγκαῖόν τινα τάξιν ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ προερχόμενα.
 2. "Ἡ ἀναγκαῖον πάντα τὰ διαφέροντα ἀλλήλων ἢ καθ' ὕλην ἢ κατὰ μίαν τῶν τεσσάρων ἀντιθέσεων διακρίνεσθαι.
 3. "Ἡ ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κοινωνοῦν τινι κατὰ τι καὶ διακρινόμενον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι τῇ καθ' αὐτὸ διαφορᾷ τοῦ κοινοῦ.
 4. "Ἡ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὰς προόδους διακρίνεσθαι ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς προβαλλούσης ἀρχῆς ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν προβαλλομένων ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐν ᾧ τὰ προϋόντα.
1. If many things proceed from one immaterially and substantially, it is necessary that those things which proceed have some order in relation to one another.
 2. Or, it is necessary that all things which differ from one another be distinguished either materially or according to one of the four oppositions (Arist., *Cat.* 10 [11b17-19]).
 3. Or, that everything which shares something in common with another thing, and which is distinct from it, must be distinguished by the essential difference of what is common.
 4. Or, that the processions must be distinguished from one another either by the principle which originates the procession, or by what is sent forth, or by the subject in which are located the things which proceed.

These propositions are paraphrases of four passages taken from the *Summa theologiae* 1-1.36.2 Resp. and *Summa contra gentiles* 4.24, the two major texts on the *filioque* which were undoubtedly the principal sources for the Thomistic

⁵⁵ AL 16.141r21-v10.

arguments of Barlaam's Latin interlocutors.⁵⁶ The corresponding passages in Aquinas are:⁵⁷

1. Nusquam enim hoc invenimus, quod ab uno procedant plura absque ordine, nisi in illis solum quae materialiter differunt (*ST* 1-1.36.2).
οὐδέποτε γὰρ εὗρομεν ἐνὸς πλείω τινὰ προϊόντα τάξεως ἀνευ, πλὴν μόνων τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην διαφερόντων.
2. Oportet igitur huiusmodi distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri. Non autem oppositione affirmationis et negationis.... Nec etiam oppositione privationis et habitus.... Neque etiam oppositione contrarietatis.... Relinquitur igitur unam personam divinam ab alia non distingui nisi oppositione relationis (*Cont. gent.* 4.24).
ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὴν τοιαύτην διάκρισιν κατὰ τινὰ ἀντίθεσιν γίνεσθαι · οὔτε δὲ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀντιφάσεως ἀντιθέσει.... οὔτε στερήσεως καὶ ἔξεως ἀντιθέσει... οὔτε τῇ τῆς ἐναντιότητος ἀντιθέσει... λείπεται τοίνυν ἀλλήλων τὰ θεῖα πρόσωπα διακρίνεσθαι τῇ τῶν πρὸς τι μόνον ἀντιθέσει.
3. Quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo communi, si distinguantur ad invicem, oportet quod distinguantur secundum aliquas differentias per se, et non per accidens, pertinentes ad illud commune (*Cont. gent.* 4.24).
ἔτι, τὰ εἰς ἓν τι κοινὸν συνιόντα, εἰ πρὸς ἄλληλα διακρίνονται, ἀνάγκη διακρίνεσθαι διαφοραῖς τισι καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ κοινὸν διαιρούσαις.
4. Duae autem origines non possunt distingui nisi per terminum, vel principium, vel subiectum (*Cont. gent.* 4.24).
δύο δὲ προόδους οὐ δυνατόν διακρίνεσθαι, εἰ μὴ τοῖς ὅροις, ἢ τῇ ἀρχῇ, ἢ τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ.

Since the doctrine in question is the procession of the Holy Spirit, Barlaam was obligated to point out that Thomas was here contravening the Fathers who always taught that divine realities escape human knowledge and that the modes of procession and generation are utterly unknowable.⁵⁸ Furthermore, in Barlaam's estimation, Thomas had fallen into the error of believing that whatever is necessary or impossible among beings must be so also for God.⁵⁹ In Thomas' mind divine truths could therefore be subjected to the axioms of human science. Then, in contrast to such a theology and in strongly Dionysian language, Barlaam affirmed the belief of the Greeks:⁶⁰

⁵⁶ A careful reading of the *Antilatin Treatises* leaves little doubt that Barlaam's acquaintance with the works and the theology of Thomas Aquinas was minimal and restricted entirely to what was provided for him by his Latin (and Dominican) opponents. I plan to treat this question in greater detail in a future article.

⁵⁷ To facilitate comparison the Greek text is given according to the translation of Demetrius Cydones: *ST* 1-1.36.2 = Marc. gr. Z. 148, fols. 331r-332v; *Cont. gent.* 4.24 = *ibid.*, fols. 163v-164v).

⁵⁸ τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τῶν θειοτέρων ἐκφεύγει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην γνῶσιν (AL 16.137r16-17).

⁵⁹ ὡσαύτως δὴ αὐτὸς [Θωμάς] μὲν πᾶν ὃ ἂν νοήσῃ ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς, ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ἀδύνατον καταλαβῶν τοῦτο ἢ αὐτόθεν ἢ δι' ἀναγκαίᾳς διαίρέσεως καὶ ἀποδείξεως, ταῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θείων προσώπων οἶεται εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀδύνατον (AL 16.137v20-138r2).

⁶⁰ τριάδα δὲ ἡμεῖς προσκυνοῦμεν καὶ σεβόμεθα ἄρρητον, ἀκατανόητον, ἀπερίληπτον, ἀνεξιχνίαστον,

But we worship and revere a Trinity which is ineffable, inconceivable, incomprehensible, unsearchable, and known to no being either with regard to the unity or the distinction or the modes of procession; which neither can be conceived, nor expressed, nor named; nor can it be likened to any being. By itself alone is it known, but it is incomparably transcendent to and removed from all intellect, reasoning and conception.

The section on apodictic argumentation in AL 16 has even less in common with the corresponding section in AL 5. Only very brief reference is made to the principles enumerated in the earlier treatise, while the attention is directed towards the fundamental problem of the epistemological ground of logical science.⁶¹

This first major document and its later revised edition have their origin within the controversy over the Latin doctrine of the *filioque*. Therefore, the context is quite specific and when they speak of the knowledge of God the reference is to knowing truths or doctrines about God, and not to some more general knowledge which might include the fuller sense of the relationship of the Christian to God in love or ultimately in spiritual union. In this light it is only to be expected that Barlaam saw the source of Christian doctrine to lie in the scriptures and the Fathers who interpreted them. The doctrines of faith are not determined or defined *ἀριστοτελικῶς*. Indeed, it is the utmost impiety to submit divine truths to the exigencies of human science. The procession of the Holy Spirit, which the Fathers always held in apophatic reverence, could never be treated in the same manner as a mathematical theorem or a phenomenon of natural science. Thus did Barlaam express his disagreement with the Latin theologians.

2. Palamas' First Letter to Akindynos

Gregory Palamas read Barlaam's AL 5 in a rather different spirit, and his consternation over its difficulties was perhaps a sign of the novelty of the Calabrian's approach. After a criticism of several points in Barlaam's theology of the procession of the Holy Spirit, Gregory questioned his absolute prohibition of apodictic demonstration for divine truths.⁶² The Athonite looked

οὐδενὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐγνωσμένην ἔχουσιν ἢ τὴν ἔνωσιν ἢ τὴν διαίρεσιν ἢ τοὺς τῶν προόδων τρόπους, ἢ οὐτε νοεῖται οὐτε λέγεται οὐτε ὀνομάζεται οὐτ' ἐκ τίνος τῶν ὄντων εἰκάζεται. ὕφ' ἑαυτῆς δὲ μόνον γινώσκεται, παντὸς δὲ νοῦ καὶ λόγου καὶ νοήσεως ἀσυγκρίτως ὑπέρεκτεται τε καὶ ἀπολέλυται (AL 16.138r20-v5).

⁶¹ This is the point where AL 16 differs most from AL 5. The common elements of the two treatises have thus been treated here, but discussion of the distinctive features of AL 16 has been left for its proper context. See below, pp. 215-18.

⁶² Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 8.211-12.

immediately to the witness of the Fathers and saw there indications of a contrary opinion. As his evidence, he cited several examples from the *Panoplia dogmatica* of Euthymius Zigabenus (twelfth century) where the term 'demonstration' (*ἀπόδειξις* or even *συλλογιστική ἀπόδειξις*) frequently appears in the superscriptions of the patristic texts quoted there.⁶³ And to avoid a possible counterargument that these titles might be interpolations (*παρεγγράπτους*) in the text, Palamas cited a passage of St. Basil from the *Panoplia* which includes the term *ἀπόδειξις*.⁶⁴ On the basis of patristic authority, the conclusion had to be that certain divine truths are demonstrable.

Palamas was willing to admit that Barlaam was justified in condemning the Latins for arguing neither apodictically nor dialectically, but not for the reasons which Barlaam had enumerated. According to Palamas, the Latin syllogisms were not apodictic because the premisses were not drawn from scripture, and, where patristic statements were used, they were interpreted incorrectly. And since the Latins began with premisses unacceptable to the Greeks, their syllogisms could not be dialectic.⁶⁵ Palamas also conceded to Barlaam that some divine truths are utterly incomprehensible and inscrutable, and among such truths he ranged the mode of the procession of the Spirit.⁶⁶ But here there is no need of demonstration since knowledge is granted through faith (*διὰ πίστεως ἐπιστημόνως ἔχομεν*).⁶⁷ Palamas compared faith with sense-perception which likewise requires no demonstration. This comparison is significant because it implies that faith involves a direct, immediate apprehension of divine truths, which is other than intellectual. Gregory thus apportioned the divine among the three categories of truths: those (already) known, those subject to enquiry and demonstration, and those which are entirely unknowable.⁶⁸

What worried Palamas most about dialectic was that this mode of argument had been advocated by the Hellenes, i.e., the pagan Greeks, who believed that there could be no sure knowledge of God and therefore considered theology as no more than a form of persuasive argumentation, *πιθανολογία*. The principles of dialectic are merely probable or plausible, but this does not accord with Christian theology in which the principles of demonstration are utterly certain

⁶³ Palamas did not at first mention his source, but he referred to it later when he took up the same topic in Ep 1 Bar § 31.243.17. There too he added the reference to 'syllogistic demonstration'.

⁶⁴ Basil, *De spiritu sancto* 18.46.1-2, ed. B. Pruche (Sources chrétiennes 17bis; Paris, 1968), p. 408 = *Panoplia dogmatica* 2 (PG 130.61B).

⁶⁵ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 8.211.3-10.

⁶⁶ Ep 1 Ak § 8.212.8-10.

⁶⁷ Ep 1 Ak § 8.212.11 and § 13.218.26-27.

⁶⁸ Ep 1 Ak § 8.212.7-8. Cf. John Damascene, *Expositio fidei* 2; I 2.1-6, ed. B. Kotter (Patristische Texte und Studien 12; Berlin, 1973).

since they are taught by God. And moreover, the Fathers had expressly forbidden the use of dialectic in statements about God.⁶⁹ This is already a thinly veiled criticism of Barlaam's reliance on the pagan philosophers.

Towards the end of his letter to Akindynos, Palamas set out in a long list the respective characteristics of apodictic and dialectic syllogisms, asking which form was the more fitting in the realm of theology. The argument is blatantly rhetorical and the reader is meant to conclude that the apodictic is by far the superior mode, and that only the best is good enough for God.⁷⁰ But apart from the formally specious character of his argument, Palamas here again revealed his real concern: that the truth be manifested more clearly than the light. If this were done, it would not matter whether the arguments were referred to as proof in a general sense or as apodictic demonstration.⁷¹

It appears that Palamas was interpreting Barlaam's statements on dialectic in too much of an absolute sense. The Calabrian had not advocated the use of dialectic as a general method in theology for the discovery or exposition of the truth. As he pointed out at the beginning of his reply, dialectic is a useful instrument for winning an opponent over to the truth.⁷²

In addition to these more general comments, Palamas aired several quite specific criticisms of Barlaam's treatise. Firstly, arguing against a hypothetical objection that there is no demonstration for singular realities (*μοναδικά*), Palamas claimed that, on the contrary, because God is a unique reality, demonstration must be even more secure than it would be in the case of universals. When it is a question of universals there is a greater degree of uncertainty because imagination is involved and because the underlying subject is difficult to grasp and comprehend. God, however, is a singular and his every attribute belongs to him alone.⁷³ The passage is a difficult one and has probably not been correctly punctuated by the editor:⁷⁴

For it is recognized and acknowledged by everyone 'that God is perfect and not irrational' from which it is demonstrated that he is a unique personal being and not a unique impersonal thing. Thus, when we say that God is perfect, the perfect is one, and when we consider that the other consequences follow in accord with

⁶⁹ Ep 1 Ak § 9.213.2-13.

⁷⁰ Ep 1 Ak § 13.217.11-218.12.

⁷¹ Ep 1 Ak § 13.217.3-6.

⁷² Barlaam, EG 1.27-53.

⁷³ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.212.20-213.2 and 213.13-23.

⁷⁴ Ep 1 Ak § 9.212.20-213.2. I would alter the punctuation of the last two sentences as follows: οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐφ' ὧν τὸ κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀποδείξεις, καὶ ἐπὶ τινος εἵδους τοῦ καθόλου καὶ ἐφ' ἑνὸς ἐκάστου γε τῶν μερικῶν ἀποδείξεις γίνονται. καθόλου μὲν οὖν, πῶς γάρ, ἀψευδεῖς δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖαι; The entire passage would receive extensive comment from Barlaam (EG 1.531-618; see below, pp. 206-207).

the Fathers with respect to how the perfect is one, if some uneducated person should object to these demonstrative arguments saying that there is no demonstration for singular realities, he will forthwith hear from us that God does not exist in the manner of a universal. How can there be demonstration for non-universals? Demonstration is not less truthful, for in the case of singular realities this demonstration is both necessary and freer from deceit. For universals the (possibility of) deceit would be greater, because such demonstration is pursued by means of the imagination and all underlying realities are difficult to grasp and comprehend. Nevertheless, in the case of those realities where the common element is nameless there would be demonstration in the same way, and there are demonstrations for a particular species of the universal and for each single individual among the particulars. How can demonstrations be not universal, on the one hand, but truthful and necessary on the other?

Palamas stated his case poorly. He began with a theological argument. Apodictic demonstrations regarding God are based on scriptural statements which are *per se* true and axiomatic. God is a singular. Therefore, there can be demonstrations for singulars. Left with a conclusion that transgressed the ordinary laws of secular logic, he desperately groped around trying to justify himself, but failed to realize that there is a difference between theological and non-theological logic. His secular justifications did not explain how there could be demonstrations for singulars.

Firstly, the language is not entirely Aristotelian, nor is it altogether in accord with Aristotle's teaching. The Stagirite would prefer to speak of particulars (*τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα*), and he would certainly hold that as such they are indemonstrable since scientific knowledge concerns only universals.⁷⁵ And with regard to universals, imagination plays no role in demonstration itself, although it does have a role in the acquisition of the universals through sense-perception, induction, memory and experience.⁷⁶ Palamas would have one believe that there is demonstration for unique realities not encompassed by any universal (i.e., the divine truths) in the same way that there is demonstration for a particular species of the universal and for each individual among the particulars.⁷⁷ Barlaam could justifiably take exception to such a dangerously misconstrued notion.

When Palamas came to examine the requirement of priority for the premisses of an apodictic syllogism, he avoided the problem simply by saying that divine truths are not subject to this requirement; they are a sort of exception to the rule.⁷⁸ In this context Palamas specified that it is not a question

⁷⁵ Aristotle, *APo.* 1.33 (88b30-31).

⁷⁶ *idem*, *APo.* 2.19 (100a3-7).

⁷⁷ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.212.32-213.1.

⁷⁸ Ep 1 Ak § 9.213.28-30. Barlaam had dealt with this requirement in AL 5.

of examining the realities inherent to God, i.e., the divine substance, but rather the realities which 'surround' him (*τὰ περι αὐτόν*).⁷⁹ References to the divine truths, 'one and three', 'a solo' and 'ad solum', are not an indication of the divine nature which remains incomprehensible, but are elements which 'surround' it. Among these latter are both the common attributes and the individuating characteristics such as generation and procession. All these realities 'around' God are not, however, external appropriations; rather, they belong to the nature.⁸⁰ This is the first appearance in the discussions with Barlaam of what would later become the Palamite distinction of essence and energies within the Godhead.⁸¹ At this early stage the doctrine is quite crude and poorly worked out, for how indeed could the generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit be considered as divine energies? More likely, what Palamas meant is that human discussion can only approach such realities without attaining their inner nature. But that is not what he actually said.

Continuing the discussion of priority, Palamas maintained that if the reference is to temporal priority, scientific knowledge of natural phenomena will clearly be impossible, since the premisses of demonstration (common notions, axioms, definitions, etc.) are all products of the intellect, the last among created things.⁸² The use of this argument here seems completely fortuitous, since Aristotle definitely excluded such a possibility,⁸³ and there is no evidence that Barlaam had ever entertained it. And if priority should be intended in some other sense, Palamas went on, divine truths are still exempt from the normal requirements of syllogisms. For in this domain the principles through which proofs are made belong among the realities 'around' God, and these are not cause of, nor greater or more eminent than, that which is their cause. In this case, even if one equates causes with things caused, and even if these surrounding realities are not preexistent, there is no obstacle to demonstration. With this, Palamas came to his fundamental contention, namely, that demonstration of divine realities is based on the teachings revealed to us through the incarnation and the coming of the Holy Spirit; the conclusions that

⁷⁹ This is a reminiscence of a text from Gregory Nazianzen which had become a theological commonplace (Or. 38.7, *In Theophania* [PG 36.317B]): *θεὸς νῶ μόνῳ σκιαγραφούμενος, καὶ τοῦτο λίαν ἀμυδρῶς καὶ μετρίως, οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατ' αὐτόν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτόν*. The passage is cited by Nilus of Ancyra, *Epistolarum liber* 1.158 (PG 79.148B) and by Euthymius Zigabenus, *Panoplia dogmatica* 4 (PG 130.156c). Cf. also Gregory Nazianzen, *Theol.* 4, Or. 30.17.11-13, ed. P. Gallay (Sources chrétiennes 250; Paris, 1978); John Damascene, *Expositio fidei* 10; I 10.7-8 (ed. Kotter).

⁸⁰ *ταῦτ' οὐ θέσει ἀλλὰ φύσει* (Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.214.3).

⁸¹ For this reason I have retained a very literal translation of *τὰ περι θεόν* and related expressions.

⁸² Ep 1 Ak § 10.214.10-18.

⁸³ Aristotle, *APo.* 1.2 (71b33-72a5).

follow upon such principles are necessary and constitute divine demonstrations (*ἀποδείξεις θείας*).⁸⁴

Palamas then produced just such a syllogism, based on two quotations from Pseudo-Dionysius: the superessential Spirit is by nature from God; that which is by nature from God has its source in God, i.e., possesses its being from the source of divinity; the Father alone is source of divinity; therefore, the Spirit is from the Father alone. According to Palamas, this fulfils all the requirements of an apodictic syllogism.⁸⁵

Gregory also criticized Barlaam's statement in AL 5 that, where a fact is proved from its effects rather than its causes, both must fall under the same genus. The criticism is somewhat more substantial in this case, for Barlaam was inexact in saying they must fall under the same genus, instead of the same science.⁸⁶ Thus, Palamas could point out that not-twinkling is not in the same genus as the moon, nor is twinkling in the same genus as the Pleiades, whereby it is proved that the nearer body wanders and the more distant one is fixed. But Palamas did allow that same genus could here be interpreted in another sense in which both what is proved and that whereby it is proved have a common reference.⁸⁷

Before concluding his letter, Gregory distinguished two principal ways to knowledge of God.⁸⁸ The first is by illumination which is granted to those who have purified their hearts. The second is accessible to those who have not yet attained this grace and involves an ascent from creation to the Creator. For example, one can proceed from things which manifest goodness to goodness itself, and similarly with wisdom, providence, life, etc. In this manner one achieves a demonstration free from deceit (*ἀψευδὴς ἀπόδειξις*) that there exists one who is all things and who is removed from and transcends all things, the many-named and unnameable superessential essence.⁸⁹

There emerges from this letter a notion of demonstration quite distinct from that advocated by Barlaam and ultimately by Aristotle. It is a notion that seeks its justification not in the Greek philosophers but in the tradition of the Fathers. However, in order to establish his position, Palamas chose his texts very selectively and read them in a literal and superficial manner. The letter raises serious doubts about whether Palamas had really understood Barlaam or even

⁸⁴ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 10.214.18-215.2.

⁸⁵ Ep 1 Ak § 11.215.3-17. The texts of Pseudo-Dionysius are *DN* 2.5 and 2.7 (PG 3.641D and 645B).

⁸⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.13 (78a22-23).

⁸⁷ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 11.215.17-216.6.

⁸⁸ Ep 1 Ak § 12.216.7-217.2.

⁸⁹ This is, of course, the language of Pseudo-Dionysius. Cf. *DN* 1.6 and 1.8 (PG 3.596AC, 597C).

Aristotle, for the Athonite took certain liberties in his use of Aristotelian terminology which did not necessarily support his cause or further his true intentions. Ultimately, his overriding concern was to affirm that man possesses a true and clear knowledge of God which is free from the uncertainties of human science since it is granted to man by God himself. But here the discussion was already working at cross-purposes, for Barlaam's intentions were virtually the same, as he himself took pains to point out.

3. Barlaam's First Letter to Palamas

(a) *The Basic Requirements of Logical Science*

When Gregory Akindynos received the letter sent by Palamas, he passed it on to Barlaam for his comments, and these he included in his reply to the Athonite.⁹⁰ In the second half of this letter Akindynos appears to be quoting Barlaam verbatim. With his usual insistence on the precise use of terminology, the Calabrian explained that he was talking about demonstration in the Aristotelian sense, 'by which means it is not possible to ascend to the Divine, or rather, for the Divine to be made subject to our knowledge, as Latin school children boast of doing'. Apodictic demonstration leads to conclusions which are necessary and are accepted as irrefutable by any intelligent person. But dialectic argument, Barlaam maintained, was more in the nature of rhetorical persuasion, and that which uses sacred scripture as its principles is not really demonstration at all but rather is beyond demonstration. The Latins, however, think they can use dialectic to comprehend the Divine, but this contradicts the orthodox belief that the divine nature transcends all knowledge. If someone should want to consider demonstration based on scripture as most necessary and primary, Barlaam was not opposed, for he too accorded it greater reverence than ordinary apodictic argument.⁹¹

⁹⁰ See above, p. 185, no. 8.

⁹¹ περί μέντοι τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, περί τῆς κατ' Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους τοὺς λόγους πεποιήμαι, καθ' ἣν οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς γνώσιν ἀναβῆναι τοῦ θείου, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γνώσιν τὴν ἡμετέραν τὸ θεῖον ποιήσασθαι, ὃ παῖδες Λατίνων κομπάζουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἐλαμβάνεσθαι συμβέβηκε τὴν ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἡ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ πᾶσιν ὁμολογουμένη καὶ ἀναντίρρητος Ἑλλήσι, Λατίνοις, Πέρσαις, Σκύθαις, ποιμέσι, σὺβώταις, πᾶσιν ἀπλῶς οἷς νοῦς ἐστὶ καὶ ὅστις οὖν τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῶν εἶναι πᾶσι γνωρίμων καὶ ὁμολογουμένων. ἀπόδειξις δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ῥητορικὴν πιθανότης, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρχαῖς τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένη τοῖς ἱεροῖς, ἣν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἀπόδειξιν ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἀπόδειξιν τίθεμαι. αὐτὸς μὲν περί ἐκείνης διελεγμαι ἣν ἥδεν ἐξαίρετον λαχοῦσαν τὸ καλεῖσθαι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ ἡ χρωμένους τοὺς ἡμῖν ἐναντίους ἐπὶ τὴν θεῖαν περιοπὴν εἰς κατάληψιν. καὶ οἶμαι τι χαρίεν τοῖς τῆς εὐσεβοῦς πεποικημένοι μοίρας, οἷς τολμηρὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπαιδέυτον ἐπὶ τῇ θεῇ καὶ πάσης γνώσεως ὑπερκεκμημένη φύσει τὰ τοιαῦτα νεανιεύεσθαι παρὰ τῶν θεσπεσίων καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν τῶν εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ ταύτην τὴν εὐλάβειαν πεπαιδευμένοις. εἰ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ τὴν ἐκ τῶν λόγιων νομίζεω ἀναγκασιότατην καὶ πρώτην ἀπόδειξιν, οὐκ ἀντιλέγω. καὶ τοσοῦτον οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὥστε πλέον αὐτῇ νέμω σεμνότητος, εἶναι νομίζων τὸ ταύτης κράτος ὑπὲρ ἀπόδειξιν (Gregory Akindynos, quoting Barlaam, *Letter to Palamas*, Ambros. gr. 290 [E 64 sup.], fol. 76r15-v10).

In his own letter to Palamas, Barlaam continued in a similar vein, arguing that the term 'demonstration' could be used in either of two senses.⁹² Demonstration is used in a general way to refer to universally known and undisputed truths. Such usage is current among public speakers, speechwriters and philosophers. But in a more specific way, demonstration is used of apodictic syllogisms as distinct from other forms. In the first sense there is no objection to the use of the term in theology, but if it is used in the second meaning, one must ask whether, in the case of divine truths, all the conditions for such an apodictic syllogism are in fact fulfilled.

Barlaam was convinced that this was not so, but to prove his point he took the syllogism proposed by Palamas in his letter and showed how it fell short of the requirements of demonstrative science, much as he had done for the Latins in AL 5.⁹³ Barlaam gave the syllogism in a somewhat fuller form:⁹⁴

The Holy Spirit is by nature from God. That which by nature is from God has its source in God. That which has its source in God possesses its being from the Godhead which is its source. That which possesses its being from the Godhead which is its source possesses its being from the Father alone, for he alone has been spoken of by the theologians as source of divinity. Therefore, the Holy Spirit possesses his being from the Father alone, so that it is the Father alone who sends forth the Holy Spirit.

First of all, no apodictic syllogism attempts to prove a first principle or an axiom. But in theology the declarations of the saints are used in the same way that a geometer uses principles, common notions and axioms, which are not themselves apprehended by means of demonstration. The declarations of the saints are thus superior to the results of a demonstration. And since Pseudo-Dionysius has in effect declared that the Father alone sends forth the Holy Spirit, Palamas' demonstration is both faulty and unnecessary.⁹⁵ Moreover, if one begins with this patristic text, the proof moves in a circle since the conclusion says essentially the same thing as the original statement. Palamas' syllogism also suffered from a more formal error in that it contained too many premisses, and Barlaam thus suggested a more concise formulation.⁹⁶

And as Barlaam had maintained in AL 5, he once again insisted that there can be no demonstration for immediate attributes, and surely being the sole

⁹² Barlaam, EG 1.311-26. Barlaam was probably suggesting that Gregory's arguments were thus fallacious because of homonymy. Cf. Aristotle, *SE* 1.6 (168a24-25).

⁹³ EG 1.333-478.

⁹⁴ EG 1.337-43; Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 11.215.3-10.

⁹⁵ Barlaam, EG 1.349-72. 'The Father is the only source of the superessential Godhead' (Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 2.5 [PG 3.641D]).

⁹⁶ EG 1.373-95. 'That form of demonstration is superior to the rest which depends on fewer postulates, hypotheses and premisses' (Aristotle, *APo.* 1.25 [86a33-35]).

origin of the Holy Spirit must be attributed to the Father directly; otherwise one would have to look for some middle term that would be cause of such an attribution.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the conclusions of a demonstrative proof are certain and admit no dispute. Thus, Barlaam had to note that Gregory's syllogism would hardly be accepted by Moslems or Jews who believe in a unitarian God and, of course, not by the Latins who put their faith in the *filioque*.⁹⁸

The Calabrian likewise reiterated the requirement that the premisses must be causal of the conclusion, but he made the significant addition, 'not only within the sequence of the syllogism but also in reality'.⁹⁹ In Palamas' syllogism there is no cause, nor can there be any, for the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone.

And again, the principles of an apodictic syllogism must be by nature better known than the conclusion.¹⁰⁰ The minor premiss of Gregory's syllogism¹⁰¹ is not well known by nature, because the Pneumatomachians disputed the substantial procession of the Spirit. But if it is better known to those who have been granted illumination, then it must be considered better known by grace and not by nature. Barlaam thus recognized the necessary distinction between knowledge by methods of human science and that granted by the free gift of God, a distinction which Palamas was in danger of compromising by the ambiguities of his language.

After these basic criticisms, the Calabrian went on to the fundamental problems raised by the nature of human knowledge itself. And so, in this perspective Barlaam maintained that the premiss of an apodictic syllogism must be *ἐπιστητή* and not known merely by opinion, *δοξαστή*. A premiss can be so known only when we perceive (*ἐφαπτώμεθα*) the subject and the predicate through the criterion by which each is known naturally.¹⁰² This notion calls for several comments. Although Barlaam's meaning is clear enough, the use of the term *ἐπιστητή* is a risky departure from Aristotle's vocabulary, because one is tempted to think that Barlaam considered the first principles to be scientifically knowable, whereas Aristotle held that there is no *ἐπιστήμη* or demonstration of

⁹⁷ τῶν γὰρ ἀμέσων συλλογισμὸς οὐκ ἔστιν (AL 5.81r1-2). Cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.3 (72b19-20).

⁹⁸ EG 1.403-11.

⁹⁹ οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν συλλογιστικὴν ἀκολουθίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα (EG 1.412-14). Cf. AL 5.77v12-16 (see above, n. 34). Cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.2 (71b20-22) = causal of the conclusion. Scientific knowledge depends upon knowledge of the cause, and later in the letter (EG 1.605-10) Barlaam explained that the ultimate and true reason or cause for the predication of an attribute is the concept existing in the Demiurgic Mind for which there is an image present in the soul. For a fuller explanation see Sinkewicz, 'The Solutions', 166-74.

¹⁰⁰ EG 1.420-29. Cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.2 (71b21-22).

¹⁰¹ 'That which has its source in God possesses its being from the Godhead which is its source' (EG 1.339).

¹⁰² EG 1.430-34.

them.¹⁰³ However, Barlaam's explanation of the term does agree with Aristotle's doctrine and, as already noted, he understood the first principles and immediate premisses as indemonstrable.¹⁰⁴ The definition of *ἐπιστητή* as *ἐπαφή* through the appropriate *κριτήριο* has a close parallel in *Solutions* III.2.12-13 where it is said:

For it is necessary to examine each object through that criterion by which it is known naturally, and not to transfer sensible things to the intellect or intelligible things to sense-perception.

Therefore, the criterion whereby one has direct perception of intelligibles is the *νοῦς*, and that for sensible objects is *αἴσθησις*.

Given this, it is understandably impossible to apply demonstrative science to the supreme Superessentiality of which there can be no direct perception.¹⁰⁵ Citing Dionysius as his authority, Barlaam claimed that not even by surpassing the intellectual faculties (*τὰς νοερὰς ἐνεργείας*) can one attain contact with God as he is in himself.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, Barlaam concluded that if Palamas wants to say that certain divine truths are knowable and others are unknowable, he is talking about knowledge in a very general sense 'for he fails to distinguish scientific knowledge from faith (*μὴ διαιρῶν τί διαφέρει ... τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦ πιστεύειν*): in the one there is direct perception, in the other there is another way.'¹⁰⁷ Barlaam had just explained that a premiss would be known by opinion in the case of one who had merely heard about such knowledge from another person who had attained it by direct perception. Just as do those blind from birth believe that snow is white because that is what they have been told.¹⁰⁸ But then, when Barlaam mentioned the necessary distinction between scientific knowledge and faith, he used the same analogy of the man blind from birth to illustrate the 'other way' of faith.¹⁰⁹ This suggests that his concept of faith was a rather empty one, involving simple assent to the authoritative statements of tradition.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ Aristotle, *APo.* 1.2 (71b26-28), 1.3 (72b19-20), 2.19 (100b10-11).

¹⁰⁴ Barlaam, EG 1.349-50, 398-99.

¹⁰⁵ EG 1.436-50. On direct perception see Sinkewicz, 'The *Solutions*', 181-84.

¹⁰⁶ There is a close parallel to this passage in AL 18.148v11-20 where, in arguing for the unknowability of the mode of procession, Barlaam cited Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 2.7-8 (PG 3.645bc) and added a brief commentary: *ὅπως δὲ ταῦτά ἐστιν, οὔτε εἰπεῖν οὔτε ἐννοῆσαι δυνατόν· ἀλλ' ἄχρι τοῦτου πᾶσα τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις. τουτέστι, ταῖς νοεραῖς ἡμῶν ἐνεργείαις οὐκ ἄλλη τις πρόσεστι δύναμις, ἢ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀπεριέργως τῇ παραδόσει τῶν θείων πιστεύειν· ὥσπερ ἂν οἶμαι εἰ εἶπέ τις καὶ τῷ ἐκ γενέσεως τυφλῷ μόνῃ προσεῖναι δύναμιν, ὅταν τις περὶ χρωμάτων διαλέγεται, τοῦ πιστεύειν, ἥκιστα δὲ γε τοῦ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ νοεῖν τὰ λεγόμενα.*

¹⁰⁷ EG 1.451-55: Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 12.216-17.

¹⁰⁸ Barlaam, EG 1.433-36.

¹⁰⁹ EG 1.455-61.

¹¹⁰ As also in the passage quoted above, n. 106.

In the next section Barlaam adopted a slightly different tack but one still within the perspective of the fundamental nature of knowing.¹¹¹ Looking at the second premiss of Gregory's syllogism (that which is by nature from God has its source in God¹¹²), he asked whether Palamas had just made this up himself, or whether he had drawn it from some such universal common notion as 'that which is by nature from something has its origin in that'. If the former is the case, there can be no apodictic syllogism since the premiss is not better known by nature. The second alternative would raise the further question of how such a common notion or universal concept could enter the soul: would Palamas understand this according to the Aristotelian or the Platonic schema?¹¹³

Is it from particular sensibles as Aristotle thinks? Or from above, from the mind of the Demiurge as Plato believes? But if it is from particulars, how will such a concept be either cause of, or by nature prior to, the conclusion in question, or completely of the same genus with it? If it is from above, how will those superior realities be grasped by the concepts which have emanated from them and entered the last of rational beings; or how will such concepts be either cause of, or prior to, those realities?

Lastly, Barlaam disputed the conclusion which Palamas drew from his syllogism.¹¹⁴ If it is granted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, there is no way that one can prove directly that he proceeds from the Father alone, for no syllogism proves that an attribute belongs to one particular object alone. Thus, if being sender of the Spirit is predicated of the Father, there is no necessity that this be predicated uniquely of him. If Palamas wanted to prove the *a solo*, he should first have shown that the Spirit does not proceed from the Son. Nor can one argue that the *a solo* is necessarily implied in the *a patre* by saying that, in the similar case of the generation of the Son, the *a solo* is naturally inferred by everyone. Such an inference is accepted only because no one has ever suggested that the Son is begotten from the Spirit. If that had happened, it would have been necessary to show that the Son is not begotten from the Spirit before concluding the *a patre solo*. With this counterargument the Calabrian decided that Palamas' syllogism was entirely unapodictic.

This discussion of Palamas' conclusion forms a transition to the next section of the letter which treats the possibility of demonstrations for *μοναδικά*, singular realities.¹¹⁵ In his letter to Akindynos, Palamas had argued that demonstration for singulars is not only possible; it is superior to demonstration involving

¹¹¹ EG 1.462-75.

¹¹² Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 11.215.7-8.

¹¹³ Barlaam, EG 1.469-75.

¹¹⁴ EG 1.500-30; Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 11.215.10.

¹¹⁵ Barlaam, EG 1.531-618.

universals. And since God is preeminently a singular, there is certainly scientific demonstration for truths about God.¹¹⁶ Barlaam saw this as a serious misunderstanding and set about to explain the fundamental process of the acquisition of scientifically certain knowledge and the proper application of logical demonstration. Once this secular process is properly understood, it becomes evident that it is quite inapplicable within the domain of theology.¹¹⁷

Moreover, Barlaam would not allow Palamas recourse to 'the inspired writings' in his demonstrations,¹¹⁸ for the Calabrian maintained that the correct interpretation of such statements would require sobriety, watchfulness and divine illumination (νῆψις, ἐγρήγορσις, θεία ἔλλαμψις).¹¹⁹ Historically, interpretations have often differed and have resulted in errors and heresies. Such a demonstration would also require that major premisses be introduced which are based on the knowledge naturally present in us (ἐκ τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης ἡμῶν φυσικῶς γνώσεως), and so would not be apodictic. To illustrate this problem Barlaam suggested a syllogism formulated in the best manner possible:¹²⁰

There is one energy of Father and Son. Where the energy is one, there the power also is one. Where the power is one, there the substance or nature is the same. Therefore, the substance or nature is the same in the Father and the Son.

Although the first premiss is taken from the scriptures,¹²¹ the others are based on the substantial concepts of the soul, and hence the premisses are causal of our faith in the conclusion (i.e., 'within the sequence of the syllogism', as Barlaam had said earlier) but are not causal of the conclusion itself in reality, because the concepts within us cannot be causative of the Divine Super-essentiality. In natural science proof for an attribute is made through the common notions within us which are images of the demiurgic concepts and true causes of things. This is even more true in mathematics, because the conclusion does not refer to anything external to or beyond the intellect: both the premisses and the conclusions are referred to the concepts present in the

¹¹⁶ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.212.20-213.2 and 213.13-23; see above, pp. 198-99.

¹¹⁷ For a detailed study of this section of Barlaam's letter see Sinkewicz, 'The Solutions', 166-76.

¹¹⁸ Barlaam, EG 1.619-53. τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος λόγια apparently refers to both scripture and the writings of the Fathers.

¹¹⁹ It should be noted that this alters the empty notion of faith that Barlaam elaborated in EG 1.430-61. Faith in the authoritative statements of tradition may involve, at least for some people or at certain times, a definitely spiritual dimension. However, Barlaam's understanding of illumination is very different from that of Palamas.

¹²⁰ EG 1.634-36. Cf. Pseudo-Basil, *Adversus Eunomium* 4 (PG 29.676A). On this patristic argument see G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*, 2nd edition (London, 1952, rpt. 1969), pp. 259-60.

¹²¹ Pseudo-Basil gives the two references, Gen 1:26 and Jo 5:19.

soul. But in the domain of theology God is held to be set apart from all things and thus removed even from demonstration.

(b) *Palamas' Counterargument in Ep 1 Bar*

Before examining the remainder of Barlaam's letter and in order to see the topical development of the discussion, it is necessary to digress briefly and consider the counterargument of Gregory Palamas in Ep 1 Bar. Gregory had apparently been surprised by the vehemence of all the objections that the Calabrian had raised in his lengthy and detailed refutation of the letter to Gregory Akindynos. Writing now directly to Barlaam, Palamas called it to his attention that he had merely been setting forth an alternative opinion and that Barlaam's view was equally legitimate.¹²² This is partially true, in that Palamas had said at one point in his letter that it was unimportant whether one spoke of proof in a general sense or more specifically of apodictic demonstration, so long as the truth is preserved in all its clarity.¹²³ But the rest of the first letter belies this statement, for he repeatedly insisted that apodictic demonstration was an admissible form of argument in theology. Nevertheless, in the letter to Barlaam the Athonite's real intentions became more evident. He explained that he had not meant to criticize Barlaam's refutation of the Latins for their incorrect use of dialectic and apodictic syllogisms, but rather he was troubled by the *testimonia* (τὰ μαρτύρια) that Barlaam was quoting as his authorities. In other words, his constant and almost exclusive reliance on Aristotle was suspect.¹²⁴

Furthermore, Palamas believed that Barlaam had himself failed to follow the logical principles which he vaunted so highly. But in arguing to this effect, Palamas avoided replying to the substance of his opponent's criticisms, for he had to admit, at least implicitly, that they were justified.¹²⁵ And when Gregory attempted to turn Barlaam's own arguments against him, he frequently revealed either a misunderstanding of his views or a deliberate misreading of them. The latter is more likely, since Palamas clearly preferred rhetorical to logical refutation, but in so doing he was following a longstanding Byzantine tradition, whereas Barlaam was the exception in his choice of the more systematic approach. For example, Barlaam had said that he had often tried to formulate various arguments about divine truths in the best and most correct manner but had never succeeded in attaining one that was apodictic.¹²⁶ Referring to this

¹²² Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 2.226.1-4.

¹²³ Ep 1 Ak § 13.217.3-5.

¹²⁴ Ep 1 Bar § 24.238.20-22. This criticism applies more appropriately to AL 5 and is another indication that it is prior to AL 16.

¹²⁵ 'Your arguments are subject to the same dangers as mine' (Ep 1 Bar § 30.243.7).

¹²⁶ Barlaam, EG 1.327-32.

passage in his reply, Palamas denigrated the Calabrian's dialectic syllogisms as completely lacking in the necessary requirements. They are so far from being dialectic that they cannot even be classed as sophistic syllogisms; they are beyond any form of syllogism.¹²⁷ In a subsequent letter Barlaam replied to these remarks, saying that Palamas had taken his statement in an absolute sense to mean that his syllogisms were indeed the very best and the most correct, whereas he had in fact indicated that they were formulated to the best of his ability and even then were not apodictic. Moreover, Palamas had been unwittingly supporting Barlaam's view, for, by maintaining that such syllogisms were lacking proper form and were thus not syllogisms at all, he had in fact acceded to Barlaam's contention that they were not apodictic.¹²⁸

Palamas also addressed himself to the question of demonstration for singulars which he had raised in his earlier letter.¹²⁹ Instead of replying directly to the criticisms set forth by his correspondent, he said, in effect, 'If my arguments are invalid under these circumstances, then yours are equally invalid and for the same reasons.' Palamas argued that, if one grants that God is singular and cannot be placed under any universal, the syllogism which Barlaam proposed cannot be properly syllogistic, since a universal is there applied to God.¹³⁰ This would also mean taking universals as they are applied to beings and predicating them of God, but that would range the transcendent realities and the uncreated nature on a level with created beings.¹³¹ Once again, the Athonite ended up supporting and furthering the arguments of his opponent. Since Barlaam had already set out to prove this syllogism unapodictic, Palamas was merely adding more arguments to the same effect.¹³² In addition, these were arguments that Barlaam had himself already presented in his AL 5, while discussing syllogisms with some premisses taken from the scriptures and others from reason.¹³³ Gregory went on to propose other criticisms, but they exhibit the same character and need not be reviewed in detail.

It was not until the close of this section that Palamas revealed the goal to which he was leading the reader. He was laying down a warning not only to Barlaam but to anyone who would try to apply logical science to God and divine things.¹³⁴ The pagans had tried as much but were proved foolish in their

¹²⁷ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 25.238-39.

¹²⁸ Barlaam, EG 3.373-404.

¹²⁹ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.213.13-23.

¹³⁰ Ep 1 Bar § 26.239.20-240.1 and § 28.240.27-241.4.

¹³¹ Ep 1 Bar § 28.241.4-12.

¹³² This was precisely Barlaam's comment in EG 3.433-56.

¹³³ See above, pp. 193-96.

¹³⁴ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 30.242-43. Here Palamas goes back somewhat on his own earlier position in Ep 1 Ak where he held that arguments in theology could be apodictic in the Aristotelian sense, even though he did justify his position also by reference to patristic usage.

reasonings because they sought to apply mortal rules to the Immortal. Barlaam held too great an admiration for such pagan sages, and so Palamas determined to do his best to free him from this danger, counselling him to devote his attention to the particular character of the Fathers rather than to Plato and the son of Nicomachus:

With the folly of the Gospel the Fathers are secure masters in the school of theology, for the Spirit of true wisdom inhabits their spirits and renders taught by God those who turn to them as teachers. And if an element of profane learning is not discordant, they incorporate it and harmonize it with the melody of the Spirit.¹³⁵

Therefore, although the Fathers condoned the use of the Greek philosophers, they did not hesitate to alter their speculations to harmonize with the theology of the Church. And thus, they were able to refer to their own arguments in theology as demonstrations, as one frequently finds in the *Panoplia dogmatica* of Euthymius Zigabenus.¹³⁶ Palamas was apparently implying here that the Fathers could use such philosophical terminology without being in any way constrained by the restrictions imposed upon its usage by the pagan Greeks. Barlaam, on the contrary, relied almost exclusively on such dubious authorities (according to Palamas) and was thus in danger of the error of Hellenism. For this reason the Athonite had entitled his letter *Καθ' Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐποψίας*, *Against the Hellenic Point of View*.

(c) *The Realities 'around' God*

The next major section of Barlaam's first letter to Palamas was a discussion of a statement made by the latter in his letter to Akindynos: 'For the "one and three" and the "a solo" and the "ad solum" do not indicate the nature but are realities indicated around it.'¹³⁷ Early in his treatment of demonstration in theology Barlaam had dealt with the formal mechanics of reasoning. This was followed by an examination of the underlying theory of knowledge, and finally, he turned here to a consideration of the object of knowledge. The Calabrian began with the second half of Gregory's statement, phrasing it in his own version: 'Yes, he says, according to substance, for it is not demonstrable; but we do formulate demonstrations for the realities around it.' Looking at this from an Aristotelian perspective, Barlaam took Palamas to be stating the obvious, since demonstrations are made for essential attributes (τὰ καθαντὸ ταῖς οὐσίαις προσόντα) and not for substances. Thus, probably a little puzzled by the

¹³⁵ Ep 1 Bar § 31.243.10-15.

¹³⁶ Ep 1 Bar § 31.243.15-26.

¹³⁷ Barlaam, EG 1.654-825; Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 9.213.26-28.

expression 'realities around the substance', he decided to interpret it in the sense of *τὰ περὶ αὐτῆς*. But this posed for him the same problem that he had noted before, namely, that there can be no scientific knowledge or demonstration where there is no direct perception. There are three faculties which provide direct perception of substances. Firstly, there is sense-perception by which singulars and particular sensibles are grasped. Secondly, there is opinion (*δόξα*) and discursive reasoning (*διάνοια*) for the perception of universals and mathematical notions. And finally, there is intellect (*νοῦς*) whereby one refers to the indivisible concepts of beings (i.e., the images of the concepts in the Demiurgic Mind). Only by one of these modes is it possible to apprehend essential attributes by means of demonstration. Given such conditions, Barlaam affirmed, there could be no demonstration for the realities surrounding the Superessential Entity.¹³⁸

Barlaam was not unaware of the difficulties posed by his terminology. He interpreted the realities around God as corresponding to the essential attributes among beings, since God's attributes could in no way be looked upon as incidental and transitory.¹³⁹ But he was still wary of the risk of compromising the divine simplicity, for in the *Solutions*, while allowing his opponent to consider the power of creation as eternally attendant upon God, he admitted that this worried him lest he be forced to introduce composition into the most simple Entity.¹⁴⁰ Because of these hesitations, Barlaam wanted to know whether Palamas thought that these realities around God had no real existence (*ἀνυπόστατα*), or whether he believed that they participated in some existence; and if the latter, did he consider them as substances or accidents.¹⁴¹

Analyzing the problem further, Barlaam pointed out that speaking about warmth and feeling warm were not the same thing, nor were speaking about whiteness and seeing it. Such realities are known scientifically only through direct experience of them and not merely through familiarity with their names. Thus, if Palamas would speak of God as one and three and insist that this is subject to apodictic demonstration, Barlaam would pose the question whether he was in contact with the reality indicated by these names through one of the three criteria, or whether the discursive reasoning declared that God is one and three simply by regarding the reality but without uttering the vocables. In other words, had Palamas attained contact with the reality itself distinct from the vocables, or did he use such vocables intending that they be without significance and void of content in reality? If the latter was the case,

¹³⁸ Barlaam, EG 1.654-67; Sinkewicz, 'The *Solutions*', 171-72, 181-82.

¹³⁹ EG 1.667-70.

¹⁴⁰ *Solutions* V.3.4-5.

¹⁴¹ EG 1.671-73.

demonstration is ruled out because it refers only to realities and not to mere vocables.¹⁴²

In his usual systematic manner Barlaam continued the subdivision of the problem.¹⁴³ If Palamas still insisted that there was demonstration for God, *ἐπαφή* was required, but of what? In speaking of God as one and three, Palamas could have been referring to one and three as these are known among creatures (through direct perception), and with this in mind he could have made his declaration about God. Or alternatively, Palamas could have been referring to contact with the idea itself of one and three as it is proper to God alone. That, however, would be in contradiction with Pseudo-Dionysius who maintained that God is not known in his substance nor in his oneness or threeness.¹⁴⁴ Therefore, on the basis of his favoured patristic authority, the Calabrian concluded that it is impossible even for the most penetrating intellect to attain direct perception of anything proper to God. In speaking of God as three, there is no more contact with the reality itself than when reference is made to God as substance. The realities around God are incomprehensible and inconceivable and as such are clearly beyond all demonstration.

Because of the Aristotelian perspective which dominated his understanding of scientific demonstration and the nature of predication, Barlaam was driving himself into a cul-de-sac. In his criticism of Gregory's affirmation of demonstration for the realities around God, he had to exclude the possibility that these were mere accidents, and so he considered them as essential attributes. But such could only be known scientifically or demonstrated apodictically, if the substance admitted direct perception. However, the substance of God was proclaimed by the Areopagite (and by most of the patristic tradition) to be utterly unknowable. For this reason, Barlaam was forced towards the conclusion that even God's attributes, or the realities around God, were unknowable. Although he does not seem to resolve the fundamental problem occasioned by his Aristotelianism in this regard, he does leave himself a way of escape by implying that the divine attributes are unknowable only in the sense that they are not *ἐπιστητά* or scientifically knowable by means of apodictic demonstration.¹⁴⁵ This allowed him to grant elsewhere a knowledge of God's attributes and God's existence by an ascent through creation.¹⁴⁶ It must not be forgotten that the specific context is still Barlaam's refutation of Gregory's

¹⁴² EG 1.674-89.

¹⁴³ EG 1.689-720.

¹⁴⁴ EG 1.704-706; Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 13.3 (PG 3.980D). Barlaam refers again to this text in a very similar context in AL 16 (see below, p. 217 and n. 166).

¹⁴⁵ EG 1.715-20.

¹⁴⁶ EG 1.291-95, 940-44; and also in AL 16 (see below, p. 218 and n. 169).

contention that God and divine truths can be subjected to the laws of demonstrative science. Thus, on the one hand, any suspicion of agnosticism on Barlaam's part should not be seriously entertained, but, on the other hand, he cannot be entirely extricated from the dangers of his Aristotelianism.

Barlaam next concentrated on the first half of Palamas' statement regarding the predication of one and of three to God, in an attempt to determine what sense this could have in each case, and then whether this was accessible by demonstration.¹⁴⁷ There are only three possibilities whereby God could be called 'one'. First of all, there is participation. In this case the one itself would be superior to God, and God would be one by participation in this superior reality. But that would mean that he would not be cause of all things and that he would share something in common with beings. Thus, the mode of participation would have to be excluded. Secondly, God could be one by existence, i.e., his being would be the one itself. But then it would not be possible to speak of 'one' as around God's substance; nor could there be demonstration in this situation, because the statement 'God is the one itself' would be equivalent to 'God is God' or 'the one itself is the one itself'. Thirdly, there is the mode of cause whereby God would be called one, because he is cause and creator (*ὑποστάτης*) of the one itself, and beings are one by participation. Here, God's oneness could not be demonstrable, because oneness does not constitute his being, and therefore it would be better to refer to him as more not-one than one.¹⁴⁸

This is merely a particular instance of the general Dionysian principle that negations are more applicable to God than affirmations. Barlaam then pointed out that this is a basic difference between divine realities and realities that are subject to demonstration by human science. The latter can never be more not-*x* than *x*: they must be either *x* or not-*x*. Barlaam illustrated his point with an example from Euclid's *Elements*. When an essential attribute is proved of a geometric figure, the negation is not equally or more applicable.¹⁴⁹ Since Pseudo-Dionysius indicates that such a restriction does not apply to God, Barlaam concluded that God transcends the boundaries of logical demonstration. Finally, he added that being cause of the one itself is an immediate attribute of God, and this likewise precludes demonstration.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ EG 1.723-825.

¹⁴⁸ EG 1.723-64.

¹⁴⁹ 'In the case of demonstrable realities, whenever we demonstrate some attribute, it is not more not-*x* than *x*. But whenever, let us say, that it is proved that, "when the side of a cube is cut with respect to extreme and mean ratio, the larger segment is the side of a dodecahedron", when each of the figures is encompassed by the same sphere; therefore, when this has been proved, it will be true and it will not also be not-true' (EG 1.765-70). The citation is from Euclid's *Elements* 13.17 *porisma*, ed. J. L. Heiberg and E. S. Stamatis, 5 vols., 2nd edition (Leipzig, 1969-77), 4.180.15-17.

¹⁵⁰ Barlaam, EG 1.771-78.

Again Barlaam's underlying intention was to deny any possibility of demonstration in any of these three modes, but it is not immediately clear whether he accepted one of the modes as proper to God. He explicitly rejected the first mode but not the other two. However, in treating the mode of cause, he used a thoroughly Dionysian vocabulary, and this mode was the one accepted by the Areopagite.¹⁵¹ Elsewhere Barlaam stated his opinion in a manner that leaves no room for doubt:¹⁵²

Wherefore, as it has been said, it [the Divine] receives the names of all things, being called life and light and good and substance and wisdom and *one* and being, since it is the *cause of all* and brings forth all, *but is none of these*.

Barlaam completed his study of Palamas' statement with a similar commentary on the predication of 'three' to God.¹⁵³ If three or trinity were predicated of God by participation, he would not then be creator, cause and principle of the threeness more eminent than himself and in which he participates. The mode of existence raises the problem that the idea of threeness is accessible to direct perception, whereas the substance of God is incomprehensible. Cause must likewise be rejected because God is equally cause of all things, and yet he is called triad but not a 'tetrad' or 'pentad'. Finally, Barlaam referred to these three modes as the sole ones possible and then made the statement, 'We did not make these laws but we have received them from those who have touched the heights of theology.'¹⁵⁴ Although this doctrine goes back to Proclus,¹⁵⁵ there can be little doubt that Barlaam acquired it from his reading of the Areopagite. In the ninth letter Dionysius says:¹⁵⁶

But one must understand the same image of fire in one way when it refers to God who is beyond intellection, and in another way when it refers to his intelligible providences and words, and in another way in the case of angels. In the first instance it is by the mode of *cause*, in the second by the mode of *existence* and lastly by *participation*, as is required by the consideration of each case and its place in the order of knowing.

In this way, Barlaam came to the conclusion that God's threeness is entirely beyond the capacities of knowledge.

¹⁵¹ Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 13.3 (PG 3.980B). Cf. *DN* 11.6 (PG 3.953BC), where God is called *αὐτοζωή* and *αὐτοσοφία* in that he is their cause and *ὑποστάτης*; Barlaam had stated that God is one in the same manner as these (EG 1.761-63).

¹⁵² διὸ καὶ τὰς πάντων, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐπωνυμίας δέχεται, ζωὴ καλούμενον καὶ φῶς καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐσία καὶ σοφία καὶ ἐν καὶ ὄν, ὡς πάντων αἴτιον καὶ πάντα παράγον μὲν, οὐδὲν δ' αὐτῶν ὄν (AL 16.140r8-12).

¹⁵³ EG 1.779-815.

¹⁵⁴ EG 1.810-11.

¹⁵⁵ Proclus, *Elements of Theology*, prop. 65; cf. Dodds's commentary on pp. 235-36.

¹⁵⁶ Pseudo-Dionysius, *Ep.* 9.2 (PG 3.1108D), *DN* 4.21 (724A).

Except for a short but very important passage on illumination, which will be discussed later, that was all that Barlaam had to say for the moment about man's knowledge of God in the context of demonstrative science. The letter ended with some comments on dialectic which are simply elaborations on what he had said elsewhere.

4. *Barlaam's Antilatin Treatise 16*

It has already been mentioned in passing that the first section of this tract repeats, often verbatim, certain of Barlaam's statements on dialectic from AL 5.¹⁵⁷ The remainder of this section is a tirade against Thomas Aquinas for his arrogant claims to a full and absolute knowledge of God as he is in himself. In contrast, the second half of this treatise is especially significant in that it seems to represent a development in the Calabrian's thought beyond what appeared in AL 5 and EG 1. The movement is now away from the Aristotelian perspective of formal logic¹⁵⁸ towards a more theological approach grounded in the teachings of Dionysius the Areopagite.

At the close of his comments on dialectic argument, Barlaam criticized an element of Thomas' Aristotelianism.¹⁵⁹ According to Barlaam, Aquinas was looking at God too much in terms of the distinction between substance and accidents among created beings, but realizing the danger of considering anything as accidental to God, he drew the mistaken conclusion that the divine names refer to God's substance. Barlaam rejected this outright, affirming that neither was there anything accidental to the eternal realities nor did the divine names indicate their substance. Certain divine names such as incorruptible or immortal indicate what God is not, while others are affirmations (truth, life, light) which mean that God receives these names in that he is cause of all things but he is not himself these things by the mode of existence, for he remains distinct from and beyond all things.¹⁶⁰ In this manner, Barlaam also manifested his own detachment from the Aristotelianism which he professed in certain aspects of his teaching. For the Calabrian, Aristotle's philosophy concerned

¹⁵⁷ See above, p. 194.

¹⁵⁸ Barlaam, EG 1.940-44.

¹⁵⁹ ἔτι ὑμεῖς μὲν οἴεσθε ἅπαν τὸ ἐπὶ θεοῦ λεγόμενον οὐσίαν δηλοῦν · ἀναγκαίαν γὰρ ὑπολαβόντες τὴν εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συμβεβηκὸς τῶν ὄντων διαίρεσιν, ὡς πάντα καὶ τὰ ὑπερουσία περιλαμβάνουσιν καὶ μὴδὲν ἔξω ἑαυτῆς ἔωσαν. εἴτα εὐλαβοῦμενοι ἐπὶ τῶν θείων συμβεβηκέναι τι φάσκειν, ἅπαντα οὐσίας εἶναι δηλωτικὰ τὰ θεῖα ἀποφαίνεσθε ὀνόματα (AL 16.138v11-19).

¹⁶⁰ καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν τι συμβεβηκέναι τοῖς αἰδίοις ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' εἶναι ὄνομα δηλωτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν · ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τι οὐκ ἔστι δηλοῦν, ὡς τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα · τὰ δὲ λέγεσθαι κατ' αἰτίαν, ὅσον σοφὸν λέγεται τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ ζωὴ καὶ φῶς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ ταῦτ' ἔστι καθ' ὑπαρξιν ἀλλ' ὡς αἰτίον ποιητικὸν αὐτῶν, δέχεται τὰς τούτων ἐπωνυμίας, ἕτερον πάντων ὄν καὶ ἐπέκεινα πάντων (AL 16.138v20-139r8).

created beings and not the God who is beyond all being. For his doctrine of the divine names, he turned, not surprisingly, to Pseudo-Dionysius.¹⁶¹

Barlaam opened the discussion of apodictic argument here, not by listing Aristotle's basic precepts as he had done in AL 5 and EG 1 Pal, but with an exposition of the mode of apprehension for the first principles.¹⁶² First of all, there is introversion of the intellect; that is, the process takes place on the level of intelligibles. The mind then chooses a particular being and by an abstraction of its attributes arrives at a conception of the being as it is in itself according to its proper existence and its proper concept (e.g., life itself, light itself). This process of thought is called the intellect in actuality and is the term and beginning of all demonstration and scientific knowledge, for 'the primary and immediate synthesis or distinction of such thoughts constitutes the so-called common axioms and common notions from which apodictic syllogisms are primarily constructed'. This is Barlaam's version of Aristotle's explanation of the 'knowledge' of first principles (*APo.* 2.19). But to this, Barlaam added the further precision that such principles or axioms derive ultimately from the Principle of all things to which nothing is prior and which is inconceivable and unlike any object of thought. Therefore, in the case of God no premiss could be prior to, or cause of, what is proved from it, thus excluding all possibility of apodictic demonstration.

Barlaam then adduced further elements to distinguish God from beings and thus divine from apodictic science.¹⁶³ According to the latter, an object of thought can be only what it is and not something else: life itself is just that and not light itself. And also, such an object is one thing only and not many things.

¹⁶¹ e.g., *DN* 1.5 (PG 3.593cd).

¹⁶² λέγω δὴ ὅταν ὁ νοῦς ἐν ἑαυτῷ γενόμενος, εἴτα προχειρισάμενος ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων, ἀφελόμενος αὐτοῦ καὶ ὅσα αὐτῷ καὶ οἷς αὐτὸ συμβέβηκε, νοήσῃ αὐτὸ ἢ αὐτὸ κατὰ τε τὴν οἰκείαν ὑπαρξίν καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον λόγον, οἷον ζωὴν αὐτὴν, φῶς αὐτό, ἀρμονίαν αὐτὴν, ἰσότητά αὐτὴν, καὶ τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον οὕτως. τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον νόημά ἐστιν, ὃ φασιν ἐνεργεία νοῦν, καὶ ὅρον καὶ ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης. ἡ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων νοημάτων πρώτη καὶ ἄμεσος σύνθεσις ἢ διάκρισις ποιεῖ τὰ λεγόμενα κοινὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ κοινὰς ἐννοίας, ἐξ ὧν πρώτως οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συντίθενται συλλογισμοί· ἃ καὶ φύσει πρότερα καὶ αἷτια τυγχάνει ὄντα τῶν δι' αὐτῶν δεικνυμένων, τῆς δὲ γε τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς πάντως ὕστερα· οἱ γὰρ ὅροι ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἀξιώματα ἐξ αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν, αὐτὴ δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐστίν, οὐδὲ τι τούτων αὐτῆς κατηγορεῖται καθ' ὑπαρξιν. οὐ γὰρ προσήκει τῆς πάντων ἀρχῆς ἕτερον τι προεπινοεῖσθαι· οὔτε γὰρ νοεῖται ὅλως, οὔτ' ἐστὶν οἷόν τι τῶν νοουμένων (AL 16.139r20-v18).

¹⁶³ ὅταν γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων νοῇ, ὡς εἵπομεν, ἡ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ τὰξιν αὐτὴν ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν ἢ ὁποιοῦν ἕτερον ἢ αὐτό, ἕκαστον τούτων αὐτὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ὅπερ νοεῖται, ἕτερον δὲ οὐκ ἐστίν· οἷον ἢ αὐτοζωή, αὐτοζωὴ μὲν ἐστίν, αὐτοφῶς δὲ οὐκ ἐστίν, οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ ἐν μὲν ἐστὶ, πολλὰ δ' οὐκ ἐστίν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὃ οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ἂν τις ὀνομάσειεν εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε πρῶτον, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὅπως δήποτε νοούμενα καὶ ὑφeszτηκότα εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρήχθη. **οὐ τότε μὲν ἐστὶ, τότε δ' οὐκ ἐστίν**, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς οὐδὲν καὶ πάντα· οὐδὲν μὲν καθ' ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τῷ ἐξηρησθαι πάντων, πάντα δὲ κατ' αἰτίαν τῷ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ παράγεσθαι (AL 16.139v18-140r8). Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 5.8 (PG 3.824AB). For the continuation of the passage see above, n. 152.

The Divine, however, is not one particular thing excluding all others. It is absolutely nothing and everything; nothing by transcendence because it is removed from all things, and everything by cause because all things are brought forth from it. For his authority, the Calabrian looked once again to the Areopagite, citing a passage from the *Mystical Theology*.¹⁶⁴ These remarks are almost certainly a development of the statement in EG 1 Pal:¹⁶⁵

Each of these [sensibles] is a particular object and a substance, but God is not something particular and a substance. Each of these is one and not numberless, but God is no less all things than he is one. Or rather, he transcends the one itself and the many itself.

The next section likewise seems to be a development of some statements in this letter, for it concerns 'one and three', 'monad and triad'. This time Barlaam began with a quotation from Pseudo-Dionysius but added certain appendages of his own:¹⁶⁶

[Wherefore, although the Godhead is referred to mystically as one and three] and is hymned as monad and triad, it is neither monad nor triad as these are known to us or some other being but is set apart in inaccessible reaches, [being unknowable to all similarly with respect to the oneness, the threeness and the modes of the processions.]

Such transcendence as this excludes all scientific demonstration, and all statements made of God must be accepted 'mystically'. There is nothing common to God and creation, not even being conceived in itself, for this, too, was brought forth from God. If those brought forth from him are beings, then by transcendence he is not being; and if he is being, nothing else can be.¹⁶⁷ Aquinas transgressed this fundamental principle of God's transcendence by including within his syllogisms two utterly distinct orders of reality: created and

¹⁶⁴ Pseudo-Dionysius, *MT* 1.5 (PG 3.1048AB).

¹⁶⁵ Barlaam, EG 1.537-42.

¹⁶⁶ διὸ μυστικῶς ἐν καὶ τρία λεγόμενη, καὶ μονὰς καὶ τριάς ὕμνουμένη, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ μονὰς οὐδὲ τριάς, οἷα ἢ πρὸς ἑμῶν ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς διεγνώσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀβάτοις ἐξήρηται, ἄγνωστον πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἔχουσα καὶ τὸ μοναδικὸν καὶ τὸ τριττὸν καὶ τοὺς τῶν προόδων τρόπους (AL 16.140r18-v1). The citation is Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 13.3 (PG 3.980D-981A).

¹⁶⁷ πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οὐδὲ μεταβαίνειν οἶόν τε τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἐφ' ἕτερον γένος ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ἀποδείξεως. ἔτι δεῖ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀπόδειξιν κοινωνίαν τινὰ ἔχειν ἢ γένει ἢ ἀναλογίᾳ, καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δείκνυσθαι ἀρχῶν · θεοῦ δὲ καὶ κτίσεως, οὐδὲν κοινόν, οὐδ' ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρχή. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ νοούμενον κοινόν ἐστιν · ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ ἀπλῶς τὸ ὄν ἐξ αὐτοῦ παρῆται, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παράγον τοῦ παραγομένου · ὥστε εἰ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ παρηγμένα ὄντα, ἐκείνο καθ' ὑπεροχὴν οὐκ ὄν · εἰ δὲ ἐκείνο ὄν, ταῦτα οὐκ ὄντα. ἔτι ὅταν τι ἀποδεικτικῶς δειχθῇ τῶν ἡμῶν ἐργασμένων πραγμάτων, δεῖ τινὰ τοῦ δεικνυμένου εἰληφθαι οἰκείαν ἀρχήν · ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδύνατον καὶ τινος τῶν περὶ θεοῦ ζητουμένων ἀρχὴν εἶναι · ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται κάκεινου ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπόδειξις · ὃν γὰρ αἱ αὐταὶ ἀποδείξεις, τούτων καὶ ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταὶ (AL 16.140v15-141r10). Cf. Aristotle, *APo.* 1.7 (75a38-39).

uncreated, material and immaterial, being and not-being, substance and super-substantial, the most primary principle of all things and the last of the things that proceed from it.¹⁶⁸

The treatise ends with a sort of appendix in which Barlaam replied to the question whether it is forbidden to investigate the divine realities by means of an ascent from creatures to the Creator. In response he reiterated that the nature of God, the generation and the procreation, and also the *a solo* cannot be comprehended in this manner. Then, with a pastiche of quotations from the Areopagite, Barlaam indicated that through creatures God is known only as the transcendent cause.¹⁶⁹

5. Palamas' Second Letter to Barlaam

Gregory's two letters to Barlaam constitute in fact a single polemical treatise written in refutation of Barlaam's first letter to him. It is in this second letter that one finds the reply to those sections of the Calabrian's letter just discussed above. Earlier, in his first letter, Palamas had said:¹⁷⁰

So then, as it is not my intention to attack you and as indeed you have now been led to this position by various necessities, I have decided to take you back to the school of the Fathers.... There you will discover that faith is different from scientific knowledge and knowledge is a way distinct from faith. And there you will know that 'what is knowable about God' is least of all to be understood with respect to faith, since the great Paul says that 'what is knowable about God' has been made manifest even to those outside the faith, and that is what we say, whereas you thought that by knowledge he meant faith.

¹⁶⁸ ἐπει οὖν οἱ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ τούτων εἰς τῶν συμπερασμάτων ὧν νοῦς περιγίνεται, καὶ ὧν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ φύσει αὐτῶν οὐσαι πρότεροι, ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ περὶ θεοῦ καὶ ἀρχικώτατα καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τῶν περὶ θεοῦ ζητουμένων ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμὸς. οὐ δεξιόμεθα ἄρα Θωμᾶν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀξιώμασι καὶ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἐννοίαις συμπεριλαμβάνοντα κτιστὸν καὶ ἄκτιστον, ὕλικόν καὶ αὐλόν, ὄν καὶ οὐκ ὄν, οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπερούσιον, τὴν πρωτίστην τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὴν καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς (AL 16.141r10-21).

¹⁶⁹ ΑΝΤΙΘΕΣΙΣ. Τί οὖν ἴσως ἐρεῖς; κελεύεις ἡμᾶς μηδόλως τὰ θεῖα ἐρευνᾶν, μηδ' ἐκ τῶν κτισμάτων ἐπὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀνάγεσθαι; καὶ ποῦ θῆσεις τό, **Ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς θεωρεῖται;**

ΛΥΣΙΣ. Φημί δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα πατρικαῖς ἐπόμενος γνώμαις, ὅτι **ἐκ τῆς πάντων τῶν ὄντων διατάξεώς τε καὶ ἐφαρμογῆς, συμπνοίας τε καὶ ἁρμονίας,** οὐ φύσιν θεοῦ καταλαμβάνομεν ἥτις ποτέ ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γέννησιν ἢ ἐκπόρευσιν, οὐδ' ὅποτέρᾳ τούτων ἐκ μόνου πατρὸς ἢ οὐκ ἐκ μόνου, καὶ <ὁ> ποίῳ τρόπῳ ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσιν. **ἄγνωστα γὰρ ταῦτα,** ὡς εἶπον πολλάκις, **καὶ πάντα λόγον καὶ νοῦν ὑπεραίροντα· ἄλλ' ἐν τῇ πάντων ἀφαιρέσει, ὁδῶ καὶ τάξει εἰς τὸ πάντων ἐπέκεινα κατὰ δύναμιν ἄνιμεν.** καταλαμβάνοντες ὡς ἐστὶ πάντων ἐξάρχονσά τις αἰτία καὶ ὑπεράρχιος ἀρχή, πάντα ποιούσα κατὰ μίαν ἀπλότητος ὑπερβολὴν ὡς αἰτία καὶ λόγος πάντων, **καὶ δεῖ πάντα ἀρμόζουσα, καὶ τὴν ἅλυστον τῶν πάντων ἐφαρμογὴν καὶ τάξιν συνέχουσα, συνάπτουσά τε δεῖ τὰ τέλη τῶν προτέρων ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τῶν ὑστέρων, καὶ τὴν μίαν τοῦ παντὸς σύμπνοιαν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καλλιεργούσα** (AL 16.142v3-143r3). The quotations in order of appearance are Sap 13:5; Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 7.3 (PG 3.869D); idem, *DN* 7.3 (869C-872A); for the intervening passage cf. idem, *DN* 5.9 (825A) and 7.3 (872B).

¹⁷⁰ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 32.243.27-244.1, 5-10.

The affirmation of a patristic perspective has already been established as the Athonite's principal concern, but the following statement is at first very surprising, since Barlaam had just accused Palamas of precisely the same error and in almost the same words.¹⁷¹ However, the remainder of the above quotation shows that their intentions were very different. Barlaam looked at knowledge through the eyes of a Platonizing Aristotle and saw it as the way of human science whereby man understands the created world around him. The God who is infinitely transcendent to such a world cannot be subjected to the same sort of knowledge. Palamas, on the contrary, approached the problem from the patristic point of view and refused to acknowledge (or perhaps never understood) the validity and the importance of his opponent's treatment of the matter. Here once again Palamas failed to recognize the Calabrian's precise use of terminology and thus the distinction between Aristotelian *ἐπιστήμη* (which was Barlaam's sole concern at the time) and *γνώσις* in a different, a more general or a theological sense (which for Barlaam was not the subject of discussion). The final comment to be made about this passage is that Palamas seems to share with Barlaam a common definition of faith which he distinguishes from knowledge of God (and later from contemplation).¹⁷² Faith would apparently mean assent to the authoritative teaching of scripture and the Fathers.¹⁷³

Palamas did not take up this topic again until his second letter. There he expressed his astonishment at Barlaam's rejection of demonstration for divine truths.¹⁷⁴ In order to argue to the contrary, he noted the principle that demonstration presupposes science, conception, opinion, imagination and sense-perception. And Pseudo-Dionysius said that God is susceptible to such modes of perception. Thus, Palamas concluded that there must be demonstration for God.¹⁷⁵ But Dionysius also said that the above-mentioned ways of knowing do not apply to God. Palamas resolved this contradiction by explaining that the affirmation and the negation are not applied in the same manner, and so one should say that some divine realities are knowable and demonstrable but others remain unknowable and indemonstrable.¹⁷⁶ According to Palamas, Barlaam was claiming that there is neither knowledge nor

¹⁷¹ Barlaam, EG 1.451-54.

¹⁷² Cf. Palamas, Ep 2 Bar § 12.267.3-4.

¹⁷³ This differs significantly from the concept of faith that Palamas developed later: e.g., *πίστιν δὲ λέγω οὐ τὴν εὐσεβῆ ὁμολογίαν* (*Triad* 2.3.40 [467.25-26]); *τὴν ἐκ πίστεως ὑπὲρ νοῦν θεωρίαν* (*Triad* 2.3.42 [473.3]); Meyendorff, *Introduction*, pp. 239-40.

¹⁷⁴ Ep 2 Bar § 9.265.

¹⁷⁵ Ep 2 Bar § 10.265-66; Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 7.3 (PG 3.872A).

¹⁷⁶ Ep 2 Bar § 11.266.

demonstration for God; faith alone must suffice. The Athonite's true concern comes to the fore in the statement:¹⁷⁷

You have neither experienced nor believed in the true contemplation of God, granted to believers who manifest their faith by deeds.... For if there is faith alone for the divine realities, this contemplation is not true.

To deny a sure knowledge of God, which Palamas equated with demonstration, was to reject the reality of contemplation. Thus, Barlaam was left only with agnosticism.¹⁷⁸ However, Gregory had yet to deal with the scriptural denial of the possibility of seeing God, but he resolved this, as he had done earlier, by asserting that some divine realities can be contemplated, others cannot.¹⁷⁹

Palamas returned to this same topic later, in § 22, after further comments on Barlaam's exclusion of demonstration from theology. This time he added some interesting precisions:¹⁸⁰

What we have said is that some divine realities are known and demonstrated but others are inconceivable and unfathomable. Therefore, it is wrong to say that there is no demonstration for any of the divine realities, for there is demonstration for some and this is how. For example, the incarnation of the Lord is both beyond nature and according to nature; it remains both ineffable in its expression and unknowable in its understanding, since some aspects are beyond nature such as conception by a virgin, but other aspects are in accordance with nature such as the distension of the womb after conception.

This example is singularly unhelpful and even quite dangerous, since it leads one to think that the known and the unknown in God are distinct parts. Only a feat of mental acrobatics could enable one to see this as the 'indivisible distinction' that Palamas wanted it to be.¹⁸¹ Such an analogy gives no insight into what might be knowable or unknowable, demonstrable or indemonstrable about the procession of the Holy Spirit, which is what Barlaam was concerned with.

A little later in the letter Palamas took up the subject of the realities around God for which he believed there was both knowledge and demonstration. His comments here are a further response to Barlaam's criticisms about which he had already stated his opinion:¹⁸²

[In the school of the Fathers] you will learn both the manner and the nature of the realities around God, and in what way you need not be forced into saying that

¹⁷⁷ Ep 2 Bar § 12.266.26-267.4.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Ep 2 Bar § 13.267.

¹⁷⁹ Ep 2 Bar § 12.267.4-6.

¹⁸⁰ Ep 2 Bar § 22.273.3-10.

¹⁸¹ ἀμερίστως μέντοι μερίζμενον τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν τρόπων (Ep 2 Bar § 22.273.11-12).

¹⁸² Ep 1 Bar § 32.244.1-5.

everything belongs to the divine substance, which is the problem you have at present, since you choose to avoid speaking of accidents for God but do not know the way of escape.

As was noted above, Barlaam did have some difficulty with this dilemma but he carefully avoided the dangers implicit in a too thoroughgoing Aristotelian view of things. Palamas wrongly concluded that since Barlaam had denied the possibility that the realities around God might be accidents, he must have understood them to be substances of God.¹⁸³ It is clear enough from his letter that this is not what Barlaam had intended but he stated his case explicitly only in AL 16.¹⁸⁴

For Palamas, these realities around God were not substances of God, but rather, God was the substance of the realities around him:¹⁸⁵

As substance, God in himself is ineffable and inconceivable; but as substance of beings and life of living things and wisdom of what manifests wisdom and generally entity for all things which participate in being and in well-being and (so to speak) a power that adorns with beauty, he is conceived of and spoken of and demonstrated, although not to a full extent. But although the realities around God participate in some existence, they do so not as substances and not as enhypostatic realities (as God is enhypostatic in the just), but as energies which belong to God. But if someone should mention the effects of the energies, they are substances derived from the energies but are not at all divine.... If the realities referred to as around God are substances of God and if created things are spoken of as around God, the substance of God will be created, as it is in Barlaam's theory.¹⁸⁶

This is the nucleus of what would become Palamas' doctrine of the essence and energies of God, and it must be noted that it appears here in its initial form, not in the midst of a discussion about the nature of the Divine Light, nor in a discussion on divinizing grace, but in the context of a debate on the nature of man's knowledge of God.¹⁸⁷ The historical development of the controversy cannot be correctly appreciated apart from a recognition of this initial perspective.

There is one further point worth noting in Gregory's response. When Palamas came to that part of his opponent's letter that dealt with the predication

¹⁸³ Ep 2 Bar § 31.278.1-3.

¹⁸⁴ Barlaam, EG 1.765-70; AL 16, see above, nn. 159-60.

¹⁸⁵ Palamas, Ep 2 Bar § 31.278.17-18.

¹⁸⁶ Ep 2 Bar § 32.278-79. Cf. *Triad* 3.1.9 (573-74) and 3.1.18 (591-92).

¹⁸⁷ Cf. contra, J. Meyendorff, 'Un mauvais théologien de l'unité au xiv^e siècle: Barlaam ie Calabrais' in *L'Église et les églises. Études et travaux offerts à Dom Lambert Beauduin*, 2 vols. (Chevetogne, 1954-55), 2.61 [BH VI].

of 'one' to God by the three modes, he understood him to be saying that God could be called 'one' in none of these ways, not even by cause.¹⁸⁸ That is not what Barlaam actually said, but his letter did leave some room for doubt, which was not cleared up until AL 16.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, at the end of that treatise, Barlaam replied to what amounts to an accusation of agnosticism by an affirmation of the knowledge of God through creation.¹⁹⁰ This might be interpreted as a reply to similar accusations voiced by Palamas in his two letters to the Calabrian. This suggests that AL 16 may have been written after Gregory's second letter (Ep 2 Bar) and Barlaam may have adopted certain of these emphases with Palamas at the back of his mind. However, the number and nature of the references to the theology of Thomas Aquinas practically exclude the possibility that the treatise was written solely for the benefit of Palamas or the Greeks in general.

BARLAAM'S DOCTRINE OF ILLUMINATION

If Barlaam enjoyed some success in showing the impropriety of using Aristotelian logical argumentation in theological discourse, his doctrine of illumination in the initial phase of the controversy reveals serious weaknesses and moves rapidly towards a confrontation with orthodox teaching. The discussion of the nature of divine illumination that went back and forth between Barlaam and Palamas can be divided into three roughly chronological episodes: the prolegomena to the debate (Palamas, Ep 1 Ak and Barlaam, EG 1 Pal); Palamas' polemic against false illumination (Ep 1 and 2 Bar); Barlaam's exposition of his own doctrine (EG 3 Pal). The Calabrian's remaining letters reveal the transition to the hesychast controversy itself.

1. *The Prolegomena to the Debate*

The origins of the discussion on the nature of illumination can be traced back to certain comments made by Palamas in his first letter to Akindynos and the reaction that these elicited on the part of Barlaam. In seeking for a definition of faultless demonstration, Palamas described two ways that lead towards a knowledge of God.¹⁹¹ First of all, to those who have achieved a certain purification of the heart God grants a spiritual illumination (*νοερά φωτοφάνεια*, *νοερά ἔλλαμψις*). Here Palamas stressed that this has the preeminent character of a free gift. Those who have received this gift of illumination possess knowledge

¹⁸⁸ Palamas, Ep 2 Bar § 26.275.

¹⁸⁹ Barlaam, EG 1.723-78; AL 16, see above, n. 163.

¹⁹⁰ AL 16, see above, n. 169.

¹⁹¹ Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 12.216.7-25.

that God exists, that he is like light, or rather, that he is a source of spiritual and immaterial light. Secondly, the ascent to God through creation provides an alternative way of knowledge for those who have not yet attained the superior contemplation, but this way too provides true demonstration that God exists as the transcendent cause of all things.

In the rhetorical coda to his letter Palamas apologized for the poverty of his style and for the lack of sophistication that might be evident in his arguments.¹⁹² He explained that he had left behind such worldly wisdom in order to pursue God's call to seek that supreme wisdom which is granted only upon the abandonment of all else, just as the Divine can be perceived transcendently only in negation. The inferior wisdom is susceptible to incongruous ideas about God, but under the influence of the superior wisdom the mind receives spiritually the divine reflections as it becomes ever more an unsullied mirror of God.¹⁹³ Since this was his goal and vocation – 'and this is what many acknowledge of us and what they testify to you' – he had renounced all the formalities of language and the skills of expression and was running 'as though towards an odour of myrrh without as yet having the myrrh itself on our hands'.

Not without a touch of mockery, Barlaam opened his letter to the Athonite by saying that, if Palamas had gone off to seek the heights of contemplation and forgotten the skills of expression, he should be more careful in his criticisms, because he has in fact failed to understand the problems in question.¹⁹⁴ Later in the letter and without any evident sarcasm, Barlaam maintained that both he and Palamas were ultimately in complete agreement; they differed only in the way in which each expressed his convictions. Both of them accepted the primacy of the authority of scripture in theology, and Barlaam had no qualms about the two ways of knowledge that Gregory had outlined in his letter to Akindynos, namely, the way of illumination and the way of ascent through creation.¹⁹⁵ At one point in his discussion of apodictic demonstration Barlaam asserted that the sort of direct perception required for scientific knowledge was not possible in the case of the supreme Superessentiality. On the authority of

¹⁹² Ep 1 Ak § 14.218-19.

¹⁹³ Ep 1 Ak § 14.219.17-19. This is a close paraphrase of Gregory Nazianzen, *De theologia*, Or. 20.1.9, 11-12, ed. J. Mossay (Sources chrétiennes 270; Paris, 1980 = PG 35.1065A), a reference not noted by the editor. A few lines earlier Palamas had spoken of his longing for the supreme wisdom (*τὴν ἀνωτάτω σοφίαν*), which is an allusion to the same passage of Gregory Nazianzen (Or. 20.1.3-4). At the opening of his first letter Barlaam referred to this section of Gregory's letter, easily recognized the allusion to Gregory Nazianzen and restored it to its original form, *τὴν ἀνωτάτω φιλοσοφίαν* (EG 1.1), again a reference not noted by the editor. Barlaam's familiarity with the patristic tradition deserves greater recognition.

¹⁹⁴ Barlaam, EG 1.1-5 (cf. Palamas, Ep 1 Ak § 14.219.6-11, 19-20). Barlaam later described these remarks as made *σκοπτικῶς* (EG 3.114).

¹⁹⁵ Barlaam, EG 1.283-310.

Dionysius he decided that not even the most contemplative, Palamas included, had ever attained the shadow of the shadow of God.¹⁹⁶

The comments on both sides appear more or less innocuous so far, but they started a chain reaction of hostility that eventually led to mutual accusations of heresy. However, in this initial exchange the only significant doctrinal statement was what Barlaam had to say near the end of his letter about the pagan sages, where he resorted to a passage from the Neoplatonist Syrianus, mentor of Proclus.¹⁹⁷ In this rather contorted text Barlaam was asking Palamas to consider that the pagan sages were in some loose sense illumined by God. The Calabrian based his conclusion on two observations. Firstly, the ancients had denied the validity of demonstration in the divine sphere because of the nature of divine transcendence and human impotence. Secondly, they allowed for two types of knowledge of the divine, direct vision and faith; and for the two corresponding categories of men, visionaries and believers. This passage became the cornerstone of Barlaam's doctrine of illumination as he developed it in his second letter to Palamas:

You appear to disparage those of the ancients who forbade demonstration for divine realities. But I cannot but consider these as remarkable men, so excellently did they understand both human weakness and divine transcendence. Whenever I think about these men who included within the middle concepts of the soul the methods of demonstration and analysis, as well as those of definition and distinction, and too, all science of divisible and changing realities, and who declared that the fitting concept should preside in the case of material and natural realities, but in the case of the realities beyond us they affirmed that 'whoever has received a vision from on high and has been illumined by an intellectual light whereby it is possible to join with the divine realities' enjoys contemplations of the superior realities in a manner better than that of demonstration and those who were not such as these men but who nevertheless listened to them and believed their declarations about those realities have no experiential knowledge of them but are better off than those who have neither seen for themselves nor believe those with such a vision and who on this account think that there exists nothing beyond visible realities: whenever I listen to the ancients saying these things I cannot but understand that they too were sometimes illumined by God and surpassed ordinary men.

2. *Palamas' Polemic against False Illumination*

When he first addressed himself directly to the Calabrian, Palamas took exception to the false attributions which Barlaam had made at the beginning of

¹⁹⁶ EG 1.440-43. No particular passage of Pseudo-Dionysius seems to be intended.

¹⁹⁷ EG 1.826-45; Syrianus, *In Arist. Metaph.* 14.4 (1091b4) (CAG 6/1.182.26-28).

his letter.¹⁹⁸ Barlaam had suggested that Palamas had already attained the Exemplars, and so, Gregory now replied that if the reference was really to the myrrh mentioned at the end of his letter, he had expressly stated that he had not yet attained it.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, since he was speaking of the myrrh as the goal towards which he was striving, he was in fact witnessing to his own imperfection.²⁰⁰ On this account Palamas accused his opponent of manufacturing falsehoods. If he had so little respect for the truth in these matters, why should anyone trust him in discussions regarding the ultimate Truth?²⁰¹ This is one of many incidents that indicate the deteriorating tone of the discussions between the two men.

The more serious problem can be recognized in Gregory's criticisms of Barlaam's remarks on the illumination of the pagan sages. Palamas agreed that Barlaam was right in admitting that it was not possible for him to say that 'God is like light, or rather, a source of spiritual and immaterial light'.²⁰² But in spite of this admission Barlaam was still calling the pagan sages (τοὺς ἔξω σοφούς) marvellous, illumined and possessed of the vision of God (θεόπτας); and those who put their trust in the sages he saw as modest, and worthy of admiration and emulation. Barlaam was revealing his true allegiance in calling the sages 'ancients' (παλαιούς) and not pagans (ἔξω).²⁰³ Moreover, the Calabrian had disparaged the true hesychasts, both those living today and those of long ago whom Dionysius praised for having surpassed the intellectual faculties.²⁰⁴ At this point Palamas dropped this line of argument and did not return to it until later in the letter.²⁰⁵

When he did come back to the topic of the illumination of the sages, Palamas began by giving a slightly expanded version of what Barlaam had said.²⁰⁶ His presentation underlines the principal claims made by Barlaam. However,

¹⁹⁸ Barlaam, EG 1.1-5.

¹⁹⁹ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar §§ 9-10.229-30 (cf. Ep 1 Ak § 14.219.23-24). § 10 is partially translated above, n. 24.

²⁰⁰ Ep 1 Bar § 11.230-31.

²⁰¹ Ep 1 Bar § 12.231.

²⁰² Ep 1 Bar § 22.237.7-9 (cf. Barlaam, EG 1.287-90). Palamas altered the meaning of Barlaam's statement.

²⁰³ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 22.237.9-13 (cf. Barlaam, EG 1.831-45). Here too Palamas was expanding Barlaam's statements.

²⁰⁴ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 22.237.14-§ 23.238.10.

²⁰⁵ In the following paragraphs Palamas mentioned his concern over Barlaam's sources (§ 24); Barlaam, like the pagans, had been applying mortal rules to the Immortal and was admiring the authors of the pagan doctrines for having comprehended the divine transcendence which is incomprehensible even to the Cherubim (§ 30); the Fathers are the only secure source of theology (§ 31); Barlaam would have to go back to the school of the Fathers to learn the difference between knowledge and faith (§ 32).

²⁰⁶ Ep 1 Bar § 34.245 (cf. Barlaam, EG 1.826-45).

Palamas' following comments make it clear that he understood the Calabrian to mean that the pagan philosophers should be placed in the category of those who had received the vision from above and the illumination by an intellectual and immaterial light.²⁰⁷ Thus, in a series of rhetorical questions Palamas in effect denied that these philosophers had any participation in a spiritual and divine Light; they had not seen and experienced (*ἑπαθόν*) the radiance of God; they had not conversed with God beyond wisdom, reason and intellect. Quoting the pagan tenet well known from Gregory Nazianzen, 'God is difficult to know but impossible to express',²⁰⁸ Palamas pointed out that these Greeks had not said that the divine transcendence surpasses human intellection, and furthermore, they claimed to possess direct experience of the divine realities by the vision within them. Thus, when they say that God is beyond demonstration, they are referring to a very limited transcendence. Palamas concluded from this that what Christians hold to be beyond demonstration is incomparably transcendent to what the pagans treat as such. The implication here is that Barlaam's use of the philosophers to exclude demonstration from theology is thereby disqualified.

The remainder of the letter is an eloquent refutation of Barlaam for his veneration of the false illumination experienced by the pagans. In the course of his refutation Palamas expressed his views on the nature of true illumination. The contrast between the two pictures presented by Palamas and Barlaam is striking and reveals a fundamental and irreconcilable difference in their approach to theology.

According to Palamas the visions of the pagans by which they 'join with' (*συνυγερῖν*) the divine lead them astray from the truth. The intellectual light which grants them illumination draws them not to a place of radiant light but condemns them to eternal darkness; it is a trap and an ambush invented by the prince of darkness.²⁰⁹ Since he who is darkness can feign the appearance of an angel of light, it is not surprising that some have been outwitted by the false light and have taken it wholly within themselves. And so they simulate the voices of the servants of the true Light.²¹⁰ Palamas, therefore, insisted on the falsity of Barlaam's claims for these philosophers. St. Paul had said that 'the world did not know God through wisdom' (1 Cor 1:21), but Barlaam believed that the followers of Socrates and Plato had attained the vision of God, that is, the highest degree of knowledge of God.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 35.245-46.

²⁰⁸ Gregory Nazianzen, *Theol.* 2, Or. 28.4.106.27-28, ed. Gallay (= PG 36.29c); cf. Plato, *Tm.* 28c.

²⁰⁹ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 36.246.

²¹⁰ Ep 1 Bar § 37.247.

²¹¹ Ep 1 Bar § 38.247.

The Athonite maintained that anyone who had not learned to converse *with* God could not with any certainty discourse *about* God. That is granted only to those who have been rendered perfect in the spiritual faculty of the soul by the true Light and who have undergone the first resurrection.²¹² In the case of the pagan philosophers the false light enters the soul through the discursive activity of thoughts and reasonings. This is inevitable when one seeks the mystery of vision without first silencing the intellect (*ἄνευ νοητῆς σιγῆς*) through the introversion of the mind upon itself, which leads unerringly to the divine.²¹³

In speaking of the accomplishments of the 'ancients' Barlaam had noted their contention that illumination by an intellectual light was necessary in order to join with the divine realities (*τοῖς θεοῖς συζυγεῖν*).²¹⁴ Palamas understood Barlaam to be speaking of an almost physical union like the bond of marriage. However, for Palamas union with God meant much more than that and much more than any purely intellectual knowledge of God. No summary could do justice to Palamas' own words:²¹⁵

The abounding greatness of God's love for us is most clearly manifest through this mingling [*ἀνάχρasis* of the light with the soul], for making the many one is the special characteristic of love.... The union of the marriage bond seems to have something more than the others but it is not a true union [*σύμψυσις*] or mingling; it is rather by a certain concourse and cleaving, according to scripture, that the many become one. For it says, 'A man shall leave his father and mother and shall cleave to his wife and the two shall become one flesh'. One flesh but not one spirit. But the union of God with the worthy surpasses every way of union ... and renders present the surpassing love of God and this which alone is truly love, for it alone supernaturally folds together and gathers lovers closely into one. But now is not the time to speak of the way in which the Light transfers this grace through the soul to the body which is united with this pure and graced soul.

In this last statement Palamas announced one of the themes that he would return to again and again in the *Triads*. The following paragraphs make it clear that Palamas considered the pagan 'syzygy' to be nothing less than demonic possession.²¹⁶

When he wrote again to the Calabrian, Palamas took up many of the same themes. Seeing Barlaam's claim that not even the visionary Fathers attained the shadow of a shadow of God, Palamas replied that even inanimate creation presents clear types of God. Dionysius referred to fire, air, water and earth as

²¹² Ep 1 Bar § 41.248-49.

²¹³ Ep 1 Bar § 42.249-50. Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, *DN* 4.9 (PG 3.705A).

²¹⁴ Barlaam, EG 1.837.

²¹⁵ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 44.250-51; cf. § 43.250.

²¹⁶ Ep 1 Bar §§ 45-46.251-52.

such, and St. Paul spoke of visible creation as a sort of impression of God (*χαρακτῆρά τινα*). If that can be said even of inanimate creation, how much more should it be true of those who possess a rational intellectual soul?²¹⁷ And further, it is quite unjust to call *θεοπτία* and the great gifts of the Holy Spirit merely vague shadows of the divine reality. Surely, the deiform possess not only knowledge but experience of the divine.²¹⁸ This is just one more example of Palamas' insistence that the Christian's relationship with God goes beyond the intellectual to a level that is profound and all encompassing.

Moreover, Palamas was convinced that Barlaam was depriving man completely of all participation in God. The Athonite denied any validity to such a claim, for nothing is entirely deprived of participation in the Good. Even those who live their lives according to the passions participate in the Good according to an obscure echo, and so, those who strive for the true Good must surely possess more than a shadow.²¹⁹ In the same context Palamas also called attention to man's creation in the image and the likeness of God. And when throughout his life man devotes himself to God by immaterial, pure and unceasing prayer and by an irrevocable striving towards God, he is raised to angelic dignity.²²⁰ Clearly, Palamas was not merely refuting some idle philosophical speculations; he was defending the very foundations of the monastic tradition.

By this time Barlaam had already begun to call into question not just the doctrine but also the practices of the hesychast monks. Palamas referred to this in his letter, describing how Barlaam had become a disciple of some itinerant monks who had spoken to him about certain practices and bodily postures which would aid the mind in turning inwards. Palamas approved of these because he knew that they were being used even by those advanced in prayer, and indeed even Elias had adopted such a posture. Barlaam, on the contrary, saw such things as serious aberrations and went off to denounce the monks to the Synod in Constantinople.²²¹ But this is the dividing line which marks off the initial period of the controversy from the later episodes relating to the hesychast practices and the doctrines which Palamas associated with these.

3. *Barlaam's Second Letter to Palamas*

The Calabrian opened his rejoinder much as Palamas had his, refuting the false or sophistic accusations and claims of his opponent. In the course of these

²¹⁷ Ep 2 Bar § 45.285.

²¹⁸ Ep 2 Bar § 46.286 (19-20: *τοιούτοι οἳ γε θεοειδεῖς καὶ μὴ γνόντες μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ παθόντες τὰ θεῖα*).

²¹⁹ Ep 2 Bar § 47.286-87.

²²⁰ Ep 2 Bar § 48.287.

²²¹ Ep 2 Bar § 49-50.287-89.

remarks Barlaam defended what he had said about Gregory's arrogance and presumption. According to him, even though Palamas may not have expressly made any great claims for himself, it seemed from his writings that he at least thought very highly of himself. 'And many of those who have read your writings will agree with me', Barlaam added. In the domain of human science Palamas had said that he had abandoned every form of expression, as if he had previously enjoyed some considerable competence. In theology he apparently had doubts about nothing and was prepared to speak on any topic, thus giving people the impression that there was nothing he did not know. In the realm of spirituality, when discussing what the intellect might experience, Palamas was boldly proclaiming, 'This is purification of the intellect', 'This is illumination', 'This is perfection', and giving detailed explanations of what could only be known by someone who had experienced the phenomena in question. Barlaam explained that it was this sort of thing that led him to use a slightly mocking tone in his original letter to Palamas.²²² In fact, it is very likely that these statements, arrogant or not, led Barlaam to seek further information on what Palamas and those who shared similar views (in Thessalonica?) meant by illumination and related phenomena.

After such opening comments Barlaam went on to treat some of the more directly doctrinal statements made by Palamas in his letter (Ep 1 Bar). Quoting the passage of that letter where Palamas had paraphrased what he had said about knowing God as light, Barlaam noted a distortion of his words that had crept into the paraphrase. It had never been his intention to deny the possibility of speaking of God as light. Such an interpretation was unjust because he had always accepted that God could be named light, but only according to the mode of cause, never according to that of existence. That is the teaching of Dionysius which he had often expounded in his writings.²²³ In other words, God is light in that he is its transcendent cause.

Gregory's version of the claims made by Barlaam for the pagan sages also came up for detailed rebuttal.²²⁴ First of all, he objected to the identification of his first class of theologian with the pagan Greeks and to the accompanying implication that these pagans were granted a vision from on high and were illumined by an intellectual light. His sole intention was to note the distinction that the ancients made between one who is a theologian by direct experience and one who is a theologian by faith.²²⁵ Barlaam expressed admiration for those

²²² Barlaam, EG 3.89-121.

²²³ EG 3.158-78 (cf. Palamas, Ep 1 Bar §§ 22-23.237.7-26). Barlaam's teaching on the subject is found in EG 1.756-64 and in AL 16 (see above, n. 163).

²²⁴ EG 3.203-50 (Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 34.245.16-27).

²²⁵ *ὁ κατ' ἐπιστήμην θεολόγος* (EG 3.228), *ὁ κατὰ πάθος θ.* (246), *ὁ κυρίως θ.* (315), and *ὁ κατὰ πίστιν θεολόγος* (229), *ὁ κατὰ δόξαν θ.* (246).

who made this distinction only to the extent that the distinction itself is correct. He had never referred to the ancients as theologians of any kind. The first class properly refers to the apostles, prophets and those like them who received illumination regarding the words of providence and were led to simple and indivisible contemplations. The second class consisted of those who without this experience of vision and illumination nevertheless accepted in the most pure bosom of their intellect (*διάνοια*) the divine declarations made by the former. These too are praiseworthy and admirable but they have no direct experience of the intelligible.

At first glance Barlaam might seem to have exonerated himself, but upon closer examination his language reveals his true intentions. The light 'by which it is possible to join with the divine realities' here becomes the light 'by which the intellect can apprehend the intelligibles beyond demonstration'.²²⁶ This sense of 'syzygy' is further developed later in the letter.²²⁷ Since Barlaam said that his second class of theologians has no experience of the intelligibles,²²⁸ one can legitimately conclude that the illumination of the apostles and prophets involved precisely such a direct knowledge of the intelligible sphere. This is also suggested by his statement that the illumination was in reference to 'the words of providence',²²⁹ i.e., the scriptures.

In regard to the philosophical doctrines of the Greeks Barlaam held to the view that he had expressed elsewhere in his writings.²³⁰ He would accept their teachings only in those cases where he could confirm them by his own demonstrations and where direct perception is possible. In theology no declaration of theirs can be considered trustworthy if it contradicts any Christian doctrine, and in that domain scripture enjoys primacy of authority.²³¹ Barlaam considered the philosophers illumined by God because they distinguished, on the one hand, the expert in natural science and opinion, the expert in mathematics, both of whom examine beings by means of demonstration; and, on the other hand, the theologian who has attained the primary intelligibles through an intellectual light. Wherever the philosophers made correct statements about God, his processions, providence and virtues, they can be considered illumined in the sense that they received wisdom from God. But when they erred the cause was either human weakness or the deceit of demons.²³²

²²⁶ δι' οὗ τὸν νοῦν ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν ὑπὲρ ἀπόδειξιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι (EG 3.224-25; cf. EG 1.837).

²²⁷ EG 3.523-50.

²²⁸ οὐ μὴν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπιστήμονας (EG 3.244).

²²⁹ τοὺς τῆς προνοίας λόγους (EG 3.238).

²³⁰ Cf. EG 2.71-101 (quotation from AL 1); *Solutions* V.2.

²³¹ EG 3.251-62. Barlaam quoted EG 1.354-58.

²³² EG 3.263-77. God's 'processions' here probably do not refer to those of the Trinitarian

One should note here that Barlaam has altered his version of the distinction made by the philosophers. Previously, it was between the theologian of experience and the theologian of faith, but here the natural philosopher (*τὰ ὄντα μεταδιώκων*) is contrasted with the theologian. According to the pagan sages the illumination of the theologian has as its object the primary intelligibles (*τὰ πρῶτα νοητά*). This is interesting because Barlaam said later on that these philosophers placed the primary divine realities (*τὰ πρῶτα θεῖα*) beyond human knowledge.²³³ If he meant by 'beyond human knowledge' that the aid of illumination was required, then he would seem to be equating, or at the very least comparing, the primary intelligibles and the primary divine truths. It is possible, however, that he was using the phrase in an absolute sense.

In saying that the pagan sages were illumined by God, Barlaam took as his authority the text of scripture, 'God made manifest to them' (Rom 1:19).²³⁴ To establish his case he used the analogy of the sun and the faculty of vision: that the sun illumines the faculty of vision means the same thing as the sun makes visible objects manifest to the faculty of vision.²³⁵ In the same way receiving wisdom from God can be equated with being illumined by God.²³⁶ Thus the philosophers could be considered illumined to the extent that they participated in the wisdom granted to them by God.

Barlaam also wanted to clarify that in his letter to Palamas he had been referring to light only in the sense of knowledge.²³⁷ 'If there is another light which is not taken in the sense of knowledge, such was not the subject of my letter.' If the philosophers grasped the truth in any way, the cause must be the Supersensual Light and the Supreme Wisdom. And that they did perceive the truth is confirmed by the fact that Christian theologians recognized this and adopted some of their doctrines as correct. In summary then, Barlaam held that illumination of the soul by God means that under his influence it becomes such as to be able to conceive some truth.²³⁸

The Calabrian took pains to distinguish his doctrine on illumination and the light from that of Palamas.²³⁹ In his view the light was understood in relation to

hypostases, but rather to the processions of the One unto beings. This would not necessarily be unorthodox, since Pseudo-Dionysius had also used the term in this sense.

²³³ EG 3.316-17; cf. 655-57 (*τὰ γὰρ πρῶτα θεῖα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἀμέσως οἰκονομούμενα ὑπὲρ ἀπόδεξιν εἶναι*).

²³⁴ EG 3.277-88.

²³⁵ Barlaam may have had in mind the passage from Plato, *Rep.* 508A-509B.

²³⁶ *τὸ λαμβάνειν παρὰ θεοῦ σοφίαν = τὸ παρ' αὐτοῦ φωτίζεσθαι* (EG 3.284-85).

²³⁷ EG 3.289-307. In line 289 *ἐπὶ γνώσεως* is the correct reading as the manuscripts indicate.

²³⁸ EG 3.289-307 (305-307: *τὸ φωτίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ θεοῦ = τὸ γίνεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην, οἷαν δύνασθαι ἀληθὲς τι νοεῖν*).

²³⁹ EG 3.321-35.

the gnostic power of the intellect and being illumined by God meant receiving knowledge from God:²⁴⁰

... ἐμοῦ φῶς ἐκλαμβάνοντος ἐπὶ τῆς γνωστικῆς τοῦ νοῦ δυνάμεως, πεφωτισθαι παρὰ θεοῦ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλληφέναι παρὰ θεοῦ γινῶσιν εἰρηκότος

Barlaam believed (mistakenly) that Palamas was talking about some sort of luminous hypostasis (*οἰονεῖ τινα φωτοειδῆ ὑπόστασιν*) that becomes entwined, mixed or joined with the soul. And he had heard others speaking of a light,

which enters a man through the nostrils and penetrates to the navel; a light which when it has become excessive and has poured forth externally illuminates the entire room although it be night; a light which is demonic if it be reddish, but divine if it be white.²⁴¹

Such descriptions of illumination and its effects as sensible experience may explain in part why Barlaam was moving in the opposite direction to emphasize the exclusively intellectual and spiritual character of the phenomenon. It does not, however, account for the lack of moderation in his attitude.

Taking up another section of Palamas' letter, Barlaam denied that he had ever said that the Socratics and Platonists had attained the vision of God, as Gregory claimed he had. But Barlaam then turned around and said that it was none the less true that such men were visionaries, because Paul states that the knowledge of God was granted to the pagans. Knowing God means nothing other than being visionary and attaining the vision of God (*τὸ γινώσκειν θεόν = θεόπτῃν εἶναι = θεοπτία προσβῆναι*). Palamas' objection thus goes against the teaching of St. Paul.²⁴²

Barlaam also turned aside Gregory's accusation that he was disparaging the Fathers. He explained that in saying, 'We have no criterion whereby we could perceive directly the subject or predicate in these things', his intention was to uphold the teaching of Dionysius who denied direct contact with the Super-essential (*τὴν πρὸς τὸ ὑπερούσιον ἐπαφήν*) even to the most contemplative themselves.²⁴³ It seems then that in the case of the Fathers Barlaam allowed no direct perception of God.

At one point in his letter Palamas had reprimanded Barlaam for attributing to the philosophers comprehension of the divine transcendence.²⁴⁴ Barlaam

²⁴⁰ EG 3.322-25.

²⁴¹ EG 3.328-31. Cf. EG 5 Ignatios 119-22. Such information was undoubtedly obtained from the inexperienced monk(s) whom Barlaam had encountered. He may also have been embellishing what he had heard in order to establish his accusation of Messalianism which first appears in EG 5.131.

²⁴² EG 3.336-42.

²⁴³ EG 3.343-52. Barlaam was quoting EG 1.438-39.

²⁴⁴ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar § 30.243.1-4.

replied that that was not at all his intention; he would maintain only that these men realized such transcendence to be beyond all comprehension and intellection.²⁴⁵ Gregory Nazianzen had spoken in similar manner when he claimed that God's infinitude is entirely understandable.²⁴⁶ As examples of philosophers who achieved this insight regarding divine transcendence, Barlaam cited Plato and a list of obscure Pythagoreans (taken probably from a text of Syrianus) and then noted the similarity of their statements on the subject with those made by Pseudo-Dionysius in the fifth chapter of the *Mystical Theology*.²⁴⁷ In spite of the reference here to the Greek philosophers and his use of Syrianus, there can be no doubt that the primary source for Barlaam's emphasis on the transcendence of God is Pseudo-Dionysius. This is abundantly clear throughout the treatise AL 16.²⁴⁸

In another passage of his letter the Calabrian had to clarify what he meant by the term *συζυγεῖν* in the context of illumination,²⁴⁹ for Palamas not surprisingly had failed to recognize Barlaam's obscure allusion and understood the word as a metaphorical reference to the union of the marriage bond.²⁵⁰ Barlaam insisted that he was not referring to any partial conjunction or to a juxtaposition of bodies; nor is the 'syzygy' in question what Palamas called 'mingling' and it is not a situation where the light is mingled with the intellect as one thing with another.²⁵¹ On the contrary, the term should be understood in the sense that a relative necessarily implies its correlative, as Aristotle indicated in the *Categories* 7 (7b15-22). A relative is thus 'joined' to its correlative. The intellect and the intelligibles in their actuality share this relationship of correlatives, for the intellect in actuality is such because it is conceiving intelligibles, and the intelligibles in their actuality are such because they are being conceived by an intellect. In this sense they are said to be 'joined' to one another. Further, the intellect in actuality is identical with the objects of its intellection and when it conceives intelligibles it is primarily conceiving itself. Thus, in the doctrine of the philosophers the intellect is an image of the transcendent divine realities and when it conceives these it conceives itself as their image. But they denied that there was any direct relationship whatsoever between the intellect and the Superessential Light itself. The intellect understands only that the Light is

²⁴⁵ Barlaam, EG 3.457-93.

²⁴⁶ EG 3.466-67: Gregory Nazianzen, *In Theophania*, Or. 38.7 (PG 36.317cd). Schirò incorrectly identified the Theologian in question as Pseudo-Dionysius.

²⁴⁷ For detailed discussion of this passage see Sinkewicz, 'The Solutions', 176-78.

²⁴⁸ Meyendorff wrongly takes Barlaam to mean that the philosophers were his true masters in this domain ('Un mauvais théologien', 59).

²⁴⁹ Barlaam, EG 3.523-50 (cf. EG 1.837).

²⁵⁰ Palamas, Ep 1 Bar §§ 43-44.250-51.

²⁵¹ Ep 1 Bar § 43.250.5-8.

absolutely transcendent to it. It should be noted that Barlaam is describing here the views of the ancient philosophers without any direct indication of how he might accommodate such ideas in his own doctrine. However, from what he has said already one can reasonably assume that he for the most part accepted these opinions.

Towards the end of his letter Barlaam set forth the effects that he would expect to be in evidence if the Light which is said to be granted to souls is divine.²⁵² There must be, first of all, a moral purification in which the Light would put to death the passionate part of the soul (*τὸ παθητικόν*) and make it a servant to reason, thereby freeing the soul from all error concerning what is just, good, fitting, virtuous, i.e., all the aspects of the practical life. Secondly, there should be an intellectual purification in which the Light awakens and brings to life the faculty of the soul which distinguishes truth and falsehood, false image and reality. The Light must purify the soul of false judgements and opinions which arise firstly from its inborn inclination towards inferior things and secondly from converse with the exterior world through the senses. The result of this purification would be to enable the soul in its contemplation of beings to contemplate through itself Being Itself,

contemplating the one Providence which proceeds from the One through all things unto the last of beings and the return and drawing together of all things unto the One.²⁵³

And on another level the soul would receive insight on each and every point in its reading of the scriptures, for it has been filled with the light of wisdom and knowledge, wise counsel and understanding. If, on the contrary, the Light does not purify the soul of passions and instil within it a knowledge of the processions of the One unto beings, then it has no value. Therefore, Barlaam concluded, illumination is a term used figuratively (*τροπικῶς*) for God's gift of wisdom, knowledge, counsel and understanding. That was the end of what the Calabrian had to say on the topic of illumination in his second letter to Palamas.

4. *Barlaam's Remaining Correspondence*

Among Barlaam's letters there are several more which are dated to this period and are roughly contemporary with the second letter to Palamas. A brief look at these will provide some idea of the new direction which Barlaam was taking. His first letter to Ignatios the Hesychast is closely related to the second letter to Palamas, for it contains many close, almost verbatim parallels. Ignatios, who had just recently been elected to the episcopate by popular acclamation,

²⁵² Barlaam, EG 3.553-614.

²⁵³ EG 3.568-70.

was quite distressed over some recent events. These should probably be identified with Barlaam's denunciation of the hesychasts before the Synod in Constantinople. The letter indicates that Ignatios has yielded to pressure, probably from Palamas' friends in Thessalonica, to end his formerly close association with the Calabrian. The first part of the letter is devoted to a criticism of those practices of hesychast spirituality in which bodily posture and brief retention of the breath are used to restrict the activity of the mind and centre it inwards within the heart.²⁵⁴ Barlaam believed that this would mean associating the intellect with the folly of the body and its denseness (τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνῃ τε καὶ παχύτητι);²⁵⁵ better to separate the intellect from everything bodily that it may become united with itself and with God. The association of the divine in us (i.e., the soul or the mind)²⁵⁶ with the body by means of the imagination²⁵⁷ and the faculty of passion results in various evils for the rational soul (folly, ignorance, false opinions, deceit, and forgetting)²⁵⁸ and hinders its progress towards likeness with God. And here as an aside Barlaam added that 'among our faculties that alone is naturally like unto God which concerns practical and theoretical knowledge'.²⁵⁹ Nevertheless, God's aid is required²⁶⁰ if one is to master the faculties of judgement and practical wisdom by annihilating the passionate part of the soul, by removing the soul from return to inferior things and assuring its return unto itself and the superior reality. Then, without being adversely affected, the soul can make use of the lower realities which it must never avoid entirely.

As he had done in his second letter to Palamas, Barlaam here again referred to the complete mortification of the passions and the vivification of that faculty of the soul which discerns truth and falsehood, image and reality. The same effects that accompany the Light which is granted to souls must also proceed from the much vaunted sobriety (νηψις) of the hesychasts. It must put to death the passionate part of the soul in which reside rejoicing and mourning, and then bring to life, raise up and bolster the divine in us.²⁶¹ Any sobriety which does not produce these effects should be abandoned immediately.

²⁵⁴ Cf. Palamas, Ep 2 Bar §§ 49-50.287-89.

²⁵⁵ Barlaam, EG 4.13. Cf. Plato, *Phd.* 65A-67D.

²⁵⁶ EG 4.16. Cf. Plato, *Tm.* 41c.

²⁵⁷ EG 4.17. Cf. EG 3.567 (φαντασίας χωρίς).

²⁵⁸ EG 4.18-19. Note the presence of λήθη in this list, which suggests the Platonic notion that the soul's association with the body results both in its forgetfulness of the realm of truth and in the accompanying doctrine of learning as anamnesis. False opinion, error and folly also appear in the list of EG 3.561-65.

²⁵⁹ EG 4.21-22.

²⁶⁰ θεὸν ἡγούμενος συλλήπτορα (EG 4.23-24). Note that the aspect of grace is still present at this point.

²⁶¹ EG 4.36-39, 77-79. Note the almost verbatim similarities with EG 3.556-61.

According to Barlaam, any spiritual practice must relate somehow to the intellectual sphere; it must purify the soul from the sources of error and end in a likeness to God which has a pronounced gnoseological character (*περὶ ὃ τὸ φρονεῖν τε καὶ εἰδέναι γίνεται*). At the source of these views is a Platonizing anthropology which sees the body as a hindrance and an obstacle to the knowledge of reality. But yet, this anthropology is neither completely Platonic nor truly dualist because it allows for a use of the realities here below, probably as a ladder to be used in the ascent to the plain of true knowledge, as Gregoras had suggested.²⁶² The most striking feature about the asceticism that Barlaam outlined is that there is nothing in it that can be identified as specifically Christian. The only reference to Christ in the letter is attributed to Ignatios: 'When you taught me, you used to say that the goal of hesychia is to free the soul from every earthly affection and to make oneself a lover for Christ alone'.²⁶³

Barlaam's second letter to Ignatios was much more defensive in tone and was an attempt to justify his attacks against the hesychasts by citing their most outstanding abuses. In the opening paragraph Barlaam compared his plight with the unjust accusations made against Socrates.²⁶⁴ This was followed by a lengthy description of the twofold aspect of truth and falsehood that runs through all of human experience.²⁶⁵ On the ontological level there are beings and the deceptive images that accompany them; on the level of knowledge there are true conceptions and false ones, depending on whether one has attained the realities themselves (*αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τῶν ὄντων ἐφάπτεται*) or merely their *εἰδῶλα*; in morality there is true virtue and the false appearance of virtue. Finally, in the theological sphere there is a race of mundane angels intimately associated with (*συνουσιωμένον*) true conceptions and virtues. The true philosopher makes all haste to liken his soul to these. There is another race of demons associated with deceitful thoughts and seeming virtues. Men who have become influenced by these are characterized by arrogance and consider those who disagree with them to be deluded. The purpose of this excursus was to emphasize the importance of correct discernment. Here Barlaam remarked how he had often sought the advice of his fellow hesychasts whose discernment he trusted:

²⁶² Cf. Florentios 951-54 (ed. Leone). Meyendorff was correct in recognizing the Platonic character of Barlaam's thought at this point, although it would be best to avoid reference to his views as dualist. However, contrary to Meyendorff's suggestion, there is no clear evidence of any influence from the Evagrian or Maximian tradition of spirituality, at least, not in any of Barlaam's letters (*Introduction*, pp. 200-201). The influence is more likely to be directly Platonist, or, in part, Dionysian.

²⁶³ Barlaam, EG 4.71-75.

²⁶⁴ EG 5.1-38 with numerous references to Plato's *Apology*.

²⁶⁵ EG 5.39-80.

Ignatios, Kalothetos, Disypatos, Luke.²⁶⁶ Only after all this did Barlaam come to the real point of his letter, the accusation of Messalianism. He described his encounter with certain hesychasts who had introduced him to an assortment of absurd doctrines. After listing these he concluded that he was apparently dealing with the heresy of the Euchites.²⁶⁷ Up to this point he had refrained from using the term openly and as a result had been unjustly accused of speaking against all hesychasts. The final phase of the controversy which led to Barlaam's downfall was now well under way.

There is one more text worth mentioning because it indicates the new direction taken by Barlaam's doctrine of knowledge in this final phase. At the beginning of his letter to Disypatos, Barlaam described his two ideals in life:²⁶⁸

Marvellous fellow, there is for me nothing better or more eminent than these two things: the accurate comprehension of beings, the highest form of which is the knowledge of God as this is permitted [to men], and the benevolent disposition (with knowledge) towards men according to the imitation of the true Good in so far as this is possible.

The ascetic virtues and practices have value only to the extent that they are oriented towards one of these two ends.²⁶⁹ It seems that Barlaam has here begun to consider knowledge of God as an adjunct of purely natural philosophy. The character of gift or grace of God is absent. The statement is admittedly brief, but the interpretation seems justified by the fragments from his later writings where any supernatural aspect has either disappeared or been severely compromised.²⁷⁰ Barlaam has thus taken the progression of his thought to its ultimate extreme.

CONCLUSIONS

A careful historical analysis of each of the documents that played a role in these initial discussions between Barlaam and Gregory Palamas has been necessary because that alone can provide an explanation for the differences that divided the two men. The remote context was Barlaam's refutation of the *filioque* position of the Latins as it was presented to him in the Thomistic

²⁶⁶ EG 5.81-113.

²⁶⁷ EG 5.114-37. The complicated questions involved in these accusations can only be dealt with adequately in conjunction with Palamas' *Triads* and various other documents, some of them unpublished.

²⁶⁸ EG 6.1-5.

²⁶⁹ EG 6.5-14. Barlaam gave the list: chastity, courage, endurance in trials, continence, fasting, vigils, sleeping on the ground, the entire mortification and asceticism of the body.

²⁷⁰ e.g., Palamas, *Triad* 2.1.5 (235.12-16): 'The philosophical sciences lead naturally and of themselves to this truth given by God to the apostles and contribute to raising infallibly the greatest of the sacred symbols to their immaterial archetypes.'

formulations of the two Dominican bishops, Francesco da Camerino and Richard of England. One small part of Barlaam's refutation was AL 5 in which he demonstrated the acuity of his perception of the problem by attacking the fundamental character of the Latin arguments: they were subjecting the transcendent divine truths to the rational methods of human science. Placing his expertise in Aristotelian logic at the service of patristic apophaticism, the Calabrian defended the traditional reverence for divine truths which placed them beyond the confines of human knowledge. The problem at hand was the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit and the exposition of this doctrine by Thomas Aquinas according to the tenets of Aristotelian science. Thus, the 'knowledge' that came under examination was knowledge of doctrines about God. For Barlaam, this was the one and only form of knowledge under discussion. In full accord with the tradition of the Church, Barlaam professed that the sole source of Christian doctrine is the revelation divinely and mystically granted to men in the holy scriptures and interpreted by the Fathers. The doctrines of the Christian faith are not discovered and defined like theorems of geometry. Their reality is wholly other.

This monk from Italy was already under suspicion in the eyes of Gregory Palamas because of certain inaccurate reports that had reached him concerning the Calabrian's speech before the two Latin bishops in Constantinople. When AL 5 was delivered to him on Mt. Athos, his suspicions were compounded by the novelty of Barlaam's tactics. All the evidence points to the fact that this was the only one of the *Antilatin Treatises* that Palamas ever saw. If he had seen the remainder of the collection, he would probably have been much less troubled over Barlaam's orthodoxy, for the rest of the treatises exhibit a wholly traditional defence of the Greek tradition, based upon an extensive acquaintance with the patristic texts. Barlaam's writings on the procession of the Spirit can be distinguished from Gregory's *Treatises against the Latins* only by their style and by Barlaam's more extensive knowledge of the Latin position. Once it is recognized that Palamas had no more than the fifth treatise, it is easy to understand why he challenged the *testimonia* advanced by Barlaam: it was not the traditional and proper way to refute the Latins. In this regard Palamas, and not Barlaam, was the conservative and docile adherent of the patristic tradition. He was also a successor to the same monastic tradition that viewed everything Hellenic as a danger to the Christian faith.

In this first phase of the controversy Barlaam maintained that man could not know God in the same way as he possesses knowledge of the created world around him. The Divine, ever beyond created being, is revealed in Holy Tradition. However, in the manner of Pseudo-Dionysius, Barlaam also believed that God's existence is known through creation, but here God is known only as cause, and the divine names are given to him because he is cause of goodness,

life, light, wisdom and so forth. God's inner being remains inaccessible to human knowledge. God's oneness is known in the unity that passes through all things, because God is the cause of all things. But in another sense, God's oneness and, even more so, his triune reality are utterly unknowable and unnameable. In this last sense 'one' and 'three' are mystical names, divinely revealed to man in scripture, but the realities behind these names are forever beyond the direct apprehension of the unaided human faculties of perception and knowledge. According to Meyendorff, Barlaam was here confessing a formal nominalism, but under these terms one would have to consider the entire patristic tradition as nominalist, for Barlaam was merely witnessing to the doctrine of the Church in this regard.²⁷¹ The use of the term nominalism in a broad sense can lend itself to misunderstandings, or, at the least, it is an inadequate description of the facts. Barlaam's thought is Platonizing in its epistemological foundations and Dionysian in its theological expression. The label of nominalism only confuses the issue.

For Meyendorff, Barlaam's nominalism led him to exalt all the more the authority of scripture and the Fathers, sources of an incomprehensible revelation *ex machina*. Scripture was for Barlaam only a source of citations and references and not a means of living communion of the mind with God.²⁷² Meyendorff here accepts the point of view expounded by Gregory Palamas, but for this initial period of the controversy it can in no way be justified by what Barlaam had actually said. On the Latin question Palamas' own adherence to the traditional authorities is hardly distinguishable from Barlaam's. The aspect of tradition as living communion with God is not always evident in Gregory's writings. Moreover, Palamas at times tended toward a formal, patristic fundamentalism: apodictic demonstration can be justified in theology because the term is used by the Fathers.

In Meyendorff's understanding 'the Palamite controversy, in its origins, constituted essentially an opposition between the humanist nominalism of Barlaam and the theology of grace among the hesychast monks'.²⁷³ Analysis of

²⁷¹ 'Le Calabrais en arrive ainsi à confesser un nominalisme formel qui explique bien son relativisme dogmatique' (Meyendorff, 'Un mauvais théologien', 55). Meyendorff may have failed to recognize here the dialectical character of Barlaam's argument. The Calabrian states his opponent's position and its implications, and then shows that the conclusions that follow therefrom are unacceptable. 'Par contre, en ce qui concerne la connaissance purement théologique, Barlaam trouve dans la théologie apophasique du Pseudo-Denys un moyen pour rejoindre, presque exactement, le nominalisme de son contemporain, Guillaume d'Okham' (Meyendorff, 'Humanisme nominaliste et mystique chrétienne à Byzance au xiv^e siècle', *Nouvelle revue théologique* 79 [1957] 910 [BH VI]).

²⁷² *Introduction*, pp. 173-74.

²⁷³ 'Un mauvais théologien', 61. The description of Barlaam as a humanist is unhelpful. Humanism has become a word which requires ten pages of explanation before it can be used

the documents has made it clear that the central point at issue was knowledge and not grace. Grace did not become a major question until later when Barlaam began to criticize the practices and experiences of the hesychasts. The transition between these two phases was marked by a debate over what Barlaam had meant in speaking of the illumination granted to the pagan philosophers. The first enunciations of the Palamite distinction between God's essence and his energies occur even at this early stage where the context is the nature of man's knowledge of God. Here began the great debate of fourteenth-century Byzantium.

The discussion of demonstration in theology constitutes the first phase in the progressive, although not necessarily consistent, development of Barlaam's thought. This can be considered as his orthodox period, *pace* Palamas who never really understood what Barlaam was talking about. In the *Tome* of July 1341 there is no explicit reference to Barlaam's views on demonstration in theology. He was censured for his opinions on the Light of Thabor and for having called the prayer of the hesychasts Messalian or Bogomil. The only statement in the *Tome* that might possibly be applied to this early period is the following:²⁷⁴

But coming from Calabria, the monk Barlaam, having set out upon the sea of presumption from utter folly and self-reliance, held a high opinion of the science of profane philosophy and attacked the true, supernatural Philosophy, setting against the teaching of the Spirit the natural philosophy censured in the past, which is completely incapable of comprehending the things of the Spirit.

However, what follows this passage indicates that 'the things of the Spirit' is a reference to Barlaam's encounters with the hesychast monks, which resulted in his bringing an accusation of heresy against them. Therefore, Barlaam was never officially condemned for his criticism of the Latins' use of demonstration in theology.

It is even possible to go one step further and say that Barlaam's views on this subject received a sort of semi-official approbation in the writings of Neilos Kabasilas. Ironically, Neilos succeeded Gregory Palamas as metropolitan of Thessalonica. In a treatise entitled 'That it is not possible for the Latins to demonstrate that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son' Neilos attacked the Latin, Thomistic theology, just as Barlaam had done, by criticizing the use of Aristotelian logic in theological arguments.²⁷⁵ Unlike Barlaam, Neilos began

without inviting misunderstanding. Cf. J. Verpeaux, *Nicéphore Choumnos. Homme d'état et humaniste byzantin (ca 1250/1255-1327)* (Paris, 1959), pp. 193-201.

²⁷⁴ *Tome* 1.2 (PG 151.679B-680A = MM 1.96.202). Cf. Darrouzès, *Regestes*, N. 2213.

²⁷⁵ Ed. E. Candal, *Nilus Cabasilas et theologia s. Thomae de processione spiritus sancti* (Studi e Testi 116; Vatican City, 1945), pp. 188-384.

with a lengthy introduction on the vanity of profane wisdom, drawing on commonplaces of scripture and the Fathers.²⁷⁶ But later in the treatise he adopted Barlaam's arguments regarding Aristotelian demonstration, plagiarizing them almost verbatim not from his *Antilatin Treatises* but from his first letter to Palamas.²⁷⁷ Neilos even went so far as to incorporate those passages that Barlaam had directed specifically against Palamas. These included the arguments on singulars where Barlaam was relying on Syrianus and Barlaam's criticisms of Palamas' claims regarding 'the realities around God', one of the foundations of the essence-energies distinction.²⁷⁸ In using Barlaam's letter to Palamas, could Neilos have been unaware of the significance of his plagiarisms? Was he not indirectly criticizing Palamas?

In his letters to Barlaam, Palamas had attacked the Calabrian both for his overly enthusiastic Hellenism and for his acceptance of the illumination of the pagan philosophers. Already in his first letter Barlaam had referred to the 'ancients', as he called them, as illumined by God in that they had recognized the reality of the divine transcendence and in the domain of the superior realities had distinguished two types of knowledge, that by illumination and that by faith. On the surface, there is nothing particularly shocking in this, at least not to the modern reader. Palamas, however, perceived that there was something suspicious behind these statements and attacked Barlaam regarding them. In fact Barlaam had taken a part of this passage directly from Syrianus' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, but it is doubtful that already at this time he held the views on illumination which he expressed later in his second letter to Palamas. There is no way of being certain but those later views have the aspect of being developed on the spur of the moment in reaction to Palamas' attacks.

The second letter to Palamas and the theories expressed there on illumination represent the second phase in the progression of Barlaam's thought which now begins to move away from the sure ground of orthodoxy. Here, Barlaam's doctrine of the knowledge of God is characterized by a pronounced intellectualist emphasis. It is no longer a question of the knowledge of Christian doctrines but of the experience of illumination which Barlaam considers exclusively as a gift of knowledge, granted not only to the prophet and the apostles but even to the Greek philosophers. Barlaam has here launched out on

²⁷⁶ *ibid.*, prooemium §§ 1-10.188-94.

²⁷⁷ G. Schirò, 'Il paradosso di Nilo Cabasila', *Studi bizantini e neoellenici* 9 (1957) 362-74.

²⁷⁸ On singulars: Neilos, *De processione* §§ 51-53.228-30 = Barlaam, EG 1.531-59, 605-14. On the 'realities around God': Neilos, *ibid.*, § 54.230 = Barlaam, EG 1.655-69, 700-20. Cf. also on the twofold meaning of the term 'demonstration': Neilos, *ibid.*, § 71.242-44 = Barlaam, EG 1.311-26.

his own in reaction to the attacks of Palamas and to what he had discovered about the hesychast monks and their beliefs. In so doing, he had left behind even his own favoured authority, the Areopagite. But nevertheless, Barlaam still considered illumination as a gift granted by God and not accessible to man by natural means. The experience also produced a certain transformation in the recipient, albeit an intellectual one. This was the theory that Barlaam had already set in opposition to the hesychast teaching on illumination.

In the beginning Barlaam had stated the traditional views on the limitations of philosophy with respect to knowledge of God. In the end he made an apparently complete volte-face. The Calabrian's gnoseological understanding of illumination is the link between these two stages in his theological thinking. Although he seems at first to have understood illumination as God-given and requiring ascetic purification, emphasis on the gnoseological character of the experience eventually led the Calabrian to understand philosophy as a legitimate way to God. This conclusion must of course remain tentative and await a full study of the surviving fragments of Barlaam's writings against the hesychasts and against Palamas.

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ST. THOMAS' USE OF AL-GHAZĀLĪ'S *MAQĀṢID AL-FALĀSIFA*

Terry Hanley

AḅŪ Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111), one of the most important religious figures and thinkers in medieval Islam, was primarily a jurist, theologian (*mutakallim*) of the Ash'arite school, and mystic (*ṣufī*).¹ During the period from 1091 until 1095 while he held the chair of law at the Nizāmiyya College in Baghdad, al-Ghazālī undertook a private study of the Islamic philosophers, particularly Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) (d. 1037). This resulted in important works relating in one way or another to philosophy.

The historical significance of al-Ghazālī and of what he contributed to Islam was almost wholly unknown to scholars in the medieval West, including St. Thomas,² because the only work of al-Ghazālī to circulate widely in the West in Latin translation was his *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa* (*The Aims of the Philosophers*) (1094).³ Al-Ghazālī wrote the work as an impartial exposition of the views of

¹ For the career of al-Ghazālī, see W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al-Ghazālī* (Edinburgh, 1963); al-Ghazālī's autobiography has been translated by W. M. Watt under the title *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazālī* (London, 1953). A. P. Van Leeuwen has drawn up an 'Essai de bibliographie sur al-Ghazzālī', *Ibla* 21 (1958) 221-27.

² Roger Bacon (c. 1219 - c. 1292) and the Catalan orientalist Raymond Martin (c. 1220 - c. 1285) were exceptions to this generalisation; see D. Salman, 'Algazel et les Latins', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* [= *AHDLMA*] 10 (1935-36) 103-27. Salman's study is developed and corrected in a few points by C. H. Lohr, 'Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text', *Traditio* 21 (1965) 227-35 and 'Algazel Latinus: Further Manuscripts', *Traditio* 22 (1966) 444-45. One might have thought that al-Ghazālī's personal views would have become more widely known in the West with the translation in 1328 of Ibn Rushd's *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* in which al-Ghazālī's refutation of the philosophers was, in turn, refuted; but as Lohr has shown ('Logica', 224), misapprehension regarding al-Ghazālī's personal views persisted even into the present century.

³ Lohr's studies have located some 30 extant codices, 9 containing the complete work; altogether there are 17 complete mss. of the Logic, 18 complete mss. of the Metaphysics and 17 complete mss. of the Physics. (It is interesting to compare these figures with the 25 more or less complete mss. of Ibn Sīnā's *Metaphysica* and the 47 complete mss. of Ibn Sīnā's *De anima*; these figures are given by S. Van Riet in the introductions to her editions of *Avicenna latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina I-IV* [Louvain-Leiden, 1977], p. 124* and *Avicenna latinus: Liber De anima sive sextus De naturalibus I-II-III* [Louvain-Leiden, 1972], p. 105*.)

the Islamic philosophers; this was by way of prelude to his complementary study, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (*The Incoherence of the Philosophers*), which was an incisive critique of these philosophers.⁴ It was indeed 'a singular irony of history'⁵ that the medieval West should have been so misled about al-Ghazālī as to think that the *Maqāsid* (the translation of which typically circulated without the prologue) presented his *personal* positions.

The *Maqāsid* is a tripartite compendium covering logic (c. 20 percent), metaphysics (c. 50 percent), and physics (c. 30 percent). From the introduction to his *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī makes it clear that he intended to concentrate on the refutation of philosophical thought as it emerged from the writings of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā.⁶ The *Maqāsid*, as M. Alonso has shown, drew very heavily on Ibn Sīnā's *Dānish Nāmeḥ* (*Book of Science*).⁷ Early in the second half of the twelfth century the *Maqāsid* was put into Latin, as some of the oldest manuscripts tell us, by 'the archdeacon Dominic' [Gundissalinus] and 'Master John'.⁸ Though the work circulated under the general title *Liber Algazelis de summa theoricæ philosophiæ*, medieval authors typically cited it, as I shall in this study, by one of its three parts, e.g., 'Algazel in his Metaphysics'.

Why it was that only al-Ghazālī's *Maqāsid* was translated into Latin is a question to which not much attention seems to have been given. The answer to this question seems to be threefold: firstly, there was the obvious pedagogical

⁴ As far as extant Latin mss. are concerned, there is only one (of c. 1280) which contains the prologue. It is from this ms. that the prologue has been edited by Salman, 'Algazel', 124-27: '... nunc inducimus secundum viam narrationis indefinite, absolute absque perscrutatione quid rectum sit aut corruptum in hoc; quousque expediti ab hoc revertamus ad inquirendum de illa cum diligentia vehementi in libro speciali quem nominabimus Librum Controversie Philosophorum...' (126-27).

Lohr, in establishing his *stemma codicum*, has shown, against Salman, that the prologue was not *originally* translated with the rest of the *Maqāsid* ('Logica', 229). Al-Ghazālī may have been moved to adopt this approach of exposition followed by refutation by some remarks which he recorded in his autobiography: 'Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal once criticised al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī ... for his book, *The Refutation of the Mu'tazilah*. "It is a duty to refute heresy", al-Ḥārith replied. "Certainly", said Aḥmed, "but you first give an account of their false doctrines and afterwards a refutation of them"' (*Faith and Practice*, p. 44).

⁵ Salman, 'Algazel', 103.

⁶ Al-Ghazālī, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa: Incoherence of the Philosophers*, trans. S. A. Kamali (Lahore, 1958), p. 5.

⁷ M. Alonso Alonso, *Algazel: Maqāsid al-Falāsifa o Intenciones de los filósofos*, trad., prólogo y notas (Barcelona, 1963), pp. xlv-lii. The *Dānish Nāmeḥ* has been translated into French by M. Achena and H. Massé under the title *Le livre de science*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955-58).

⁸ Lohr, 'Logica', 228. The Latin version runs to about 64,000 words. A critical edition of the Logic has been provided by Lohr in the article just referred to; a deficient, though usable, edition of the Metaphysics and Physics is *Algazel's Metaphysics. A Mediaeval Translation*, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933).

usefulness of such a self-styled 'brief and succinct account'⁹ or digest of Peripatetic and Arabic philosophical teaching at this early stage of the transmission to the West of the vast and difficult writings of Aristotle and his commentators; secondly, there was in the West a general lack of interest in Islamic belief and religious thought (which formed the subject matter of almost all al-Ghazālī's *other* writings);¹⁰ thirdly, the Arabic versions of al-Ghazālī's works may not have been too readily accessible as they had been suppressed in certain quarters of the Islamic West earlier in the twelfth century.¹¹

Several scholars have presented evidence of what they regard as the considerable influence of the Latin *Maqāsid* on Western scholars.¹² D. Salman has described the work as a 'treatise from which the whole thirteenth century took inspiration – and notably St. Thomas.'¹³ More recently, R. E. Abu Shanab has claimed in two articles that 'a careful study of al-Ghazālī's works will indicate how penetrating and widespread his influence was on the Scholastics, especially on St. Thomas' and that 'the works of al-Ghazālī have played a significant role in the formulation of the philosophic ideas of St. Thomas.'¹⁴

Both of Abu Shanab's articles are loosely argued and exhibit considerable verbatim overlap. The general drift of both is that the doctrinal resemblances between Thomas and al-Ghazālī (especially as regards the *Tahāfut*) on matters such as causation, the relationship of faith and reason, and creation *ex nihilo* is evidence of the latter's influence on the former. Although it would be possible to criticize Abu Shanab's investigations on many points, it will suffice here to draw attention to some of the more noteworthy errors. Firstly, Abu Shanab claims that 'as early as the twelfth century, al-Ghazālī's books (my emphasis)

⁹ '... premittendum duxi sermonem brevem et succinctum per modum narrationis suarum intentionum...' (prologue, in Salman, 'Algazel', 125).

¹⁰ On this general lack of interest in Islamic belief and religious thought, see L. Gardet, 'Saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs arabes' in A. Maurer et al., eds., *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies* 1 (Toronto, 1974), pp. 428-31; R. W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 26-65; E. Gómez, 'Muslim Theology in Its Bearing on Scholasticism', *Clergy Review* 6 (1933) 99-109 (especially 107-108).

¹¹ This matter is discussed briefly in A. Cortabarría, 'Literatura algariziana de los escritos de San Alberto Magno', *Estudios filosóficos* (Las Caldas de Besaya) 11 (1962) 258-59.

¹² e.g., M. Alonso Alonso, 'Influencia de Algazel en el mundo latino', *Al-Andalus* 23 (1958) 371-80 and *Algazel: Maqāsid*, pp. xxvi-xliii; Lohr, 'Logica', 230-31. A point which studies such as these three do not touch upon explicitly is the *relative* influence of al-Ghazālī's work in comparison with those of, say, Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rushd.

¹³ '... ce traité dont s'est inspiré tout le xiii^e siècle et notamment S. Thomas' (review of Muckle's edition in *Bulletin thomiste* 5 [1937-39] 128).

¹⁴ 'Points of Encounter between Al-Ghazālī and St. Thomas Aquinas' in *Tommaso d'Aquino nella storia del pensiero (Atti del congresso internazionale [Roma-Napoli - 17/24 aprile 1974]: Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario)*, 2 vols. (Naples, 1975), 1.261-67 and 'Ghazali and Aquinas on Causation', *The Monist* 58 (1974) 140-50. The two citations are from pp. 261 and 262 respectively of 'Points of Encounter'.

were translated into Latin in Toledo';¹⁵ however, it is generally agreed that al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid* was his only work to be put into Latin in the twelfth century.¹⁶ Secondly, Abu Shanab tends to confuse and equate 'similarities', 'points of encounter', and 'influence' between al-Ghazālī and Thomas.¹⁷ This line of argument can be quite invalid as, in many cases, it is evident that the sources of Thomas' doctrinal positions (which may *happen* to have *some* similarity to those of al-Ghazālī in works other than his *Maqāṣid*) can be satisfactorily identified as Aristotle or some author from the Christian tradition; in any case Abu Shanab stresses minor doctrinal similarities or alleged similarities, and therefore al-Ghazālī's supposed influence, even where there are significant dissimilarities, reaches grotesque proportions when Thomas' 'occasionalism' is likened to al-Ghazālī's.¹⁸ Thirdly, one of Abu Shanab's key points is that 'Thomas Aquinas ... borrowed a number of his ideas from the *Pugio fidei*'¹⁹ of Raymond Martin, a book which quotes widely from a number of al-Ghazālī's religious works. But the *Pugio fidei* was not finished before 1278, four years after Thomas' death; so the borrowing was not Thomas' but Raymond's.²⁰ Finally, if Thomas had known and been influenced by works of al-Ghazālī other than the *Maqāṣid*, he would have been aware of the incompatibility between their doctrine and that of the *Maqāṣid*; yet there is absolutely no indication of such an awareness anywhere in Thomas' writings, as will be evident from the texts studied below. In view of the foregoing damaging criticisms, Abu Shanab's thesis must be rejected.

But having noted a claim such as that of Salman quoted above, and having rejected Abu Shanab's thesis, we are still left with a question which needs investigation: what sort of use *did* St. Thomas make of al-Ghazālī? A major contribution to the clarification of this question would be a careful study of all the passages in Thomas' writings where he refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī. This is the task that will be undertaken in the present study.

C. Vansteenkiste has conveniently assembled the passages where Thomas refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī.²¹ Taking only those works of Thomas which are

¹⁵ 'Points of Encounter', 262.

¹⁶ e.g., Alonso, Lohr and Salman in the works already referred to; also E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955), pp. 216, 641.

¹⁷ e.g., 'Points of Encounter', 261.

¹⁸ 'Ghazali and Aquinas', 144-48.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, 149; the same point is made in 'Points of Encounter', 262.

²⁰ '... Christianis computantibus nunc ab incarnatione Domini annos mille ducentos septuaginta octo...' (*Raymundi Martini Ordinis Praedicatorum Pugio fidei adversus Mauros et Judaeos*, ed. J. B. Carpzovius [Leipzig, 1687; rpt. Farnborough, 1967], p. 395; A. Berthier, 'Un maître orientaliste du XIII^e siècle', *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 6 [1936] 286-302).

²¹ C. Vansteenkiste, 'Autori Arabi e Giudei nell'opera di San Tommaso', *Angelicum* 37 (1960) 338-50. Vansteenkiste has simply collected the texts without providing any study of them.

certainly authentic, one finds that there are thirty such passages.²² The table on pp. 248-49, which is arranged in the chronological order of Thomas' writings, supplies the details of his explicit references to al-Ghazālī,²³ and presents a convenient summary of much of the material that follows.

This table can be further summarised thus:

Thomas' Explicit References to Particular Positions 'of Algazel'

Position 'of Algazel'	Number of explicit references by Thomas
1. There can be an actual infinity of souls	9
2. Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously	5
3. God knows singular things only universally	2
4. No bodily torment after death	2
5. Intellect is a power <i>of the soul</i>	2
6. There is a disposition in human nature consequent upon the blending of elements	1
7. Knowledge = imprint on intellect of knower	2
8. Knowledge = assimilation of knower to known	1
9. A thing must be immaterial in order to be known	1
10. There are separate intelligences free from matter	1
11. We understand something as it is, or not at all	1
12. Good = the perfection the apprehension of which gives delight	1
13. Mediate creation	1
14. God knows creatures by knowing his essence	1

I shall now deal in turn with the way St. Thomas uses al-Ghazālī on each of these points.

²² To the twenty-nine such passages noted by the *Index thomisticus* in Thomas' certainly authentic works, I have added one other from the *Quaestio de immortalitate animae*, the authenticity of which has also now been established. See R. Busa et al., *Index thomisticus* (Stuttgart, 1975), sectio I: indices 1.15-16; also L. A. Kennedy, 'A New Disputed Question of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul', *AHDLMA* 45 (1978) 205-206.

²³ I have followed the chronological details given in J. A. Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino* (New York, 1974); the dates assigned to some of Thomas' works are no more than conjectural. References to St. Thomas' works are to the following editions: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929); *QQ. de quodlibet*, Marietti edition (Turin, 1949); *QQ. de veritate*, Leonine edition (Rome, 1970-74); *Expos. Boeth. de Trin.*, ed. B. Decker (Leiden, 1955); *Summa contra gentiles*, Leonine edition (Rome, 1882); *Q. de immort. anim.*, ed. Kennedy (n. 22 above), pp. 209-23; *QQ. de potentia* and *Q. de spe* in *Quaestiones disputatae* 2, Marietti edition (Turin, 1949); *Summa theologiae*, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medieualium Ottaviensis, 2nd edition (Ottawa, 1953); *Q. de spir. creat.*, ed. L. Keeler (Rome, 1959); *De unit. intell.* and *De aetern. mundi*, Leonine edition (Rome, 1976).

No.	Text of Thomas	Date	Position 'of Algazel'
1	1 <i>Sent.</i> , d.36, q.1, a.1, Resp.	1252-56	God knows singular things only universally
2	1 <i>Sent.</i> , d.38, q.1, a.3, Resp.	1252-56	God knows singular things only universally
3	2 <i>Sent.</i> , d.1, q.1, a.5, ad 6 in contr.	1252-56	There can be an actual infinity of souls
4	2 <i>Sent.</i> , d.3, q.3, a.4, Resp.	1252-56	Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously
5	2 <i>Sent.</i> , d.11, q.2, a.2, ad 2	1252-56	God knows creatures by knowing his essence
6	<i>Quodl.</i> 7, q.1, a.2, Resp.	1256	Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously
7	<i>De ver.</i> , q.1, a.12, arg. 3	1256-57	We understand something as it is, or not at all
8	<i>De ver.</i> , q.2, a.1, arg. 6	1256-57	Knowledge = imprint on intellect of knower
9	<i>De ver.</i> , q.2, a.1, ad 6	1256-57	Knowledge = imprint on intellect of knower
10	<i>De ver.</i> , q.2, a.5, arg. 14	1256-57	A thing must be immaterial to be known
11	<i>De ver.</i> , q.2, a. 10, Resp.	1256-57	There can be an actual infinity of souls
12	<i>De ver.</i> , q.8, a.14, arg. 3 in contr.	1257-58	Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously
13, 14	<i>Quodl.</i> 9, q.1, a.1, Resp.	1258	There can be an actual infinity of souls
15	<i>Quodl.</i> 9, q.4, a.2, Resp.	1258	Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously
16	<i>De ver.</i> , q.21, a.2, arg. 3	1258-59	Good = the perfection the apprehension of which gives delight
17	<i>De ver.</i> , q.26, a.1, Resp.	1258-59	There is no bodily torment after death
18	<i>In Boeth. De Trin.</i> , pars deleta	1256-60	Knowledge = assimilation of knower to known
19	<i>SCG</i> 2.81	1259-64	There can be an actual infinity of souls
20	<i>SCG</i> 3.45, pars deleta	1259-64	There is a disposition in human nature consequent upon the blending of elements
21	<i>SCG</i> 3.145	1259-64	There is no bodily torment after death
22	<i>Q. de immort. animae.</i> ad 12	1261-68	There can be an actual infinity of souls
23	<i>De pot.</i> , q.3, a.4, Resp.	1265-66	Mediate creation
24	<i>ST</i> 1.7.4 Resp.	1266-68	There can be an actual infinity of souls
25	<i>ST</i> 1.46.2 ad 8	1266-68	There can be an actual infinity of souls
26	<i>Q. de spir. creat.</i> , a.1, arg. 5 in contr.	1267-68	There are separate intelligences free from matter
27	<i>De unit. intell.</i> 2	1270	Intellect is a power of the soul
28	<i>De unit. intell.</i> 5	1270	There can be an actual infinity of souls
29	<i>De unit. intell.</i> 5	1270	Intellect is a power of the soul
30	<i>Q. de spe.</i> a.2, arg. 3	1269-72	Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously

References to 'Algazel'

Ways Thomas treats Position 'of Algazel'
Rejects as inadequate
Rejects
See below, pp. 250-51
Cites, but transcends
Identifies al-Ghazālī as author of argument; introduces further refinement
Cites as a secondary authority, but then transcends
As authority for one side of thesis; distinction introduced in reply
Uses in argument for one side of thesis
Rejects as inapplicable to God
Cites as argument for one side of thesis; provides refinement in reply
Reports position, but defers judgment
As authority for one side of thesis, but transcends in reply
Disfavours
Cites but transcends
In argument for one side of thesis; distinction introduced in reply
Rejects
Approves, but subsequently deletes reference
Declares not incompatible with Aristotle
Misinterprets or wrongly attributes, then deletes
Rejects
Reports without passing judgment
Rejects
Rejects
Rejects
Cites as argument for side of thesis with which he agrees
Uses to support own position
Reports without giving personal judgment
Uses to support own position
As authority for one side of thesis, but transcends in reply

1. *There can be an actual infinity of souls.* This is the most frequent point on which Thomas refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī. It is dealt with by al-Ghazālī in the first of his five treatises on Metaphysics where he is concerned with the divisions and characteristics of being; and the sixth of al-Ghazālī's eight divisions of being is into finite and infinite being. Of four proposed instances of the infinite, only two are accepted as possible. One of these instances is that of separated human souls: not only is an infinity of such souls possible, it is necessary if time had no beginning; the simultaneous existence of an infinity of souls is not impossible 'since there is no natural ordering among them.'²⁴

As for Thomas' teaching on the question of a created infinity, his view is difficult to interpret with certainty as it *appears* to vacillate. Yet a careful study of each of the pertinent texts suggests that, although there may have been a development of Thomas' thought on this matter, his differing approaches to it can be largely explained in terms of the various contexts in which he deals with the problem and the varying weight which he attached to his arguments.²⁵ It is clear that in all nine passages Thomas uses this section of al-Ghazālī on one or other of the three issues with which it *was* fundamentally concerned: the existence of an infinite, the eternity of the world, the incorruptibility of the soul.

2 *Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5 is an unusually long article on the eternity of the world. Arguments 3 to 6 *in contrarium* point out that an eternal world presupposes an infinity, which is impossible; in the case of the sixth argument it is an actual infinity of separated souls. In his *determinatio* Thomas does not touch on this problem, but he does state that neither the eternity nor the non-eternity of the world can be demonstrated philosophically, though probable or sophistical arguments can be given for either position.²⁶ Before proceeding to reply to the arguments *in contrarium* Thomas takes the unusual step of repeating that the arguments are not demonstrative, but 'answers must be given

²⁴ '... anime humane que separantur a corporibus sunt infinite; hoc autem necessario verum est, si removeatur finitas a tempore et a motu celi quod est remocio inceptionis. ... Similiter et animas humanas que sunt separabiles a corporibus per mortem, concedimus esse infinitas numero, quamvis habeant esse simul quoniam non est inter eas ordinatio naturalis qua remota desinant esse anime, eo quod nulle earum sunt causa aliis, sed simul sunt sine prius, et posterius, natura et situ. Non enim intelligitur in eis prius, et posterius, nisi secundum tempus sue creacionis. In essentiis autem earum secundum quod sunt essencie, et anime non est ordinatio ullo modo, sed sunt equales in esse, e contrario spaciis, et corporibus, et cause, et causato' (Muckle ed., pp. 40.6-9, 30-41.10).

²⁵ A valuable study of this whole question is J. Isaac, 'Le *Quodlibet* 9 est bien de saint Thomas. L'article sur l'infini en acte est à lui seul probant', *AHDLMA* 16 (1947-48) 145-85; on points about which it is important to be philosophically sensitive, Isaac's comments on pp. 166-67, 176-77 are noteworthy.

²⁶ 'Dico ergo quod ad neutram partem quaestionis sunt demonstrationes, sed probabiles vel sophisticæ rationes....'

to them also, of the kind that philosophers themselves give, so that someone who is disputing against those holding for the eternity of the world may not be caught unprepared.²⁷ In replying to the sixth argument *in contrarium*, Thomas states that it is the strongest of the four arguments concerned with infinity, but that al-Ghazālī answered this argument by conceding 'an actual infinity of souls, but this is *per accidens*, because rational souls separated from their bodies have no dependence on each other.' This is not an unfair rendering of the somewhat cryptic Latin text of al-Ghazālī, though the term '*per accidens*' is wanting in the printed edition. (This term is used by Maimonides, to whom Thomas also refers in this reply as one who points out that the existence of an actual infinity *per accidens* has not been demonstrated.²⁸) It is clear from what he has said that Thomas considers this argument about an infinity of souls weighty, though not demonstrative; likewise, that al-Ghazālī's position regarding an infinity *per accidens* or lacking 'natural ordering' does not demonstrate the eternity of the world; but it is unclear just *how weighty* or valid Thomas considers this notion of a *per accidens* infinity to be.²⁹

De ver., q. 2 deals with God's knowledge. After a. 9 which considered 'whether God knows infinite things', a. 10 considers 'whether God can make infinite things'. In his *determinatio* of a. 10 Thomas states that 'one can find' a twofold distinction of the infinite: (1) the potentially and the actually infinite; (2) the infinite *per se* and the infinite *per accidens*. Then, after elucidating the distinction between an essential and an accidental infinity, Thomas proceeds, using his two distinctions, to give a history of the opinions as to whether God could make infinite things, in the course of which he names al-Ghazālī and gives his position regarding the infinity of souls. Thomas notes that Ibn Rushd does not allow *any* actually existing infinity, but defers judging between the two positions 'for a discussion elsewhere'. He does so because this question (a. 10) 'was raised incidentally'; all Thomas will admit is that God can make an actual infinity if this does not involve an intrinsic impossibility. For the moment, then, Thomas is being non-committal vis-à-vis al-Ghazālī's position.³⁰

²⁷ 'Et quia ad rationes in contrarium factas, quas dixi demonstrationes non esse, inveniuntur philosophorum responsiones; ideo quamvis verum concludant, ad eas etiam respondendum est, secundum quod ipsi philosophi respondent, ne alicui disputanti contra tenentes aeternitatem mundi ex improviso occurrant.'

²⁸ 'Ad sextum dicendum quod illa obiectio inter alias fortior est; sed ad hanc respondet Algazel, in sua *Metaph.*, ubi dividit ens per finitum et infinitum; et concedit infinitas animas esse in actu: et hoc est per accidens, quia animae rationales exutae a corporibus non habent dependentiam ad invicem. ... Et hanc etiam rationem tangit Rabbi Moyses, l. *De perplexis Veteris Testamenti* C. LXXIII, ostendens praedictam rationem non esse demonstrationem.'

²⁹ Thomas does not hesitate to give farfetched arguments in some of his replies to objections *in contrarium*; ad 4 *in contr.* even gives an argument which Thomas admits to be 'sophistical'.

³⁰ Though, as Isaac notes ('*Le Quodlibet* 9', 158), Thomas does seem to exclude the

In *Quodl.* 9, q. 1, a. 1 the question is 'whether God can make an actual infinity of things'. This article sets out to give an answer to the problem left unresolved in *De ver.*, q. 2, a. 10: whether an actual infinity involves an intrinsic contradiction. In the course of his *determinatio* Thomas again outlines a history of opinions on the question posed in the article. The second of the three opinions given is that of al-Ghazālī (who is named twice). According to Thomas, al-Ghazālī saw no intrinsic contradiction, whether general or particular, in an accidental infinity.³¹ There follows an elucidation of the notion of an accidental infinity which is substantially the same as that given in the *De veritate*; there is nothing here to suggest that Thomas finds anything invalid or unsatisfactory about the *notion* of an accidental infinity. But having given al-Ghazālī's position, Thomas presents the view of Ibn Rushd that there can be no actual infinity, even an incidental one, 'and this', says Thomas, 'seems to be the truer position.' The cautiousness of this statement needs to be noted carefully; Thomas was dealing with positions which he considered only more or less probable, not demonstrable.³²

Summa contra gentiles 2. 80 presents several arguments for the corruptibility of the soul. The third is that if souls were incorruptible, there would, given the eternity of the world, be an infinite number of them; but since it is impossible for there to be an actual infinity in nature, souls cannot be incorruptible. St. Thomas answers this argument in the following chapter where he points out that it presents no difficulty for Catholics who reject the eternity of the world; as for the views on this problem of those who *did* hold for the world's eternity, Thomas touches on four views, the third of which ('that of Avicenna and Algazel') finds nothing contradictory about there being an unordered or incidental infinity.³³ Here once more Thomas' assessment of this position is

possibility of an actual infinity in ad 1 *in contr.*: '... quamvis secundum naturam non possint esse infinita simul....'

³¹ This distinction between '[quod] repugnat facto in quantum facti' and '[quod] repugnat huic facto in quantum est hoc factum' is Thomas', not al-Ghazālī's, yet in making use of this distinction in presenting al-Ghazālī's position, Thomas is in no way distorting the position of the *Maqāsid*.

³² 'Sed e contra Commentator, V *Metaph.* dicit, quod in actu esse non potest neque infinitum per se, neque infinitum per accidens; in potentia vero invenitur infinitum per accidens, sed non infinitum per se. Et sic secundum eum, esse infinitum omnino repugnat ei quod est esse in actu: et hoc verius esse videtur.' The reason Thomas gives for preferring Ibn Rushd's position is that there cannot actually exist in nature anything 'unspecified'; even though the mind can conceive of things without specification or boundary, it cannot conceive of their *actually existing* in an unspecified state.

³³ Of the nine occasions on which Thomas explicitly associates al-Ghazālī with the doctrine of an incidental infinity of souls, this is the first of only three where he includes Ibn Sīnā also, though in all three cases without indicating his source. The doctrine of an incidental infinity of souls was expressly taught by Ibn Sīnā as is clear from M. E. Marmura, 'Avicenna and the

rather non-committal, though he *seems* implicitly to commend it by observing that it is not at variance with what he knew of Aristotle's teaching, but he may intend this as no more than an *ad hominem* argument.³⁴

Thomas' treatment of this matter in his *Quaestio de immortalitate animae* (arg. 12, ad 12) is quite similar to that given in *SCG* 2. 80-81. Again there is the presentation (though this time even more non-committal) of the position of 'Avicenna and Algazel' and the concluding remark: 'But the Catholic faith which does not hold for an eternal world is freed from these difficulties.'³⁵ The problem of an infinity of souls is not raised by Thomas in his *determinatio* which concentrates on the nature of human knowledge. Here the point must be made that the mere inclusion of an argument among the arguments for one side of a thesis or the other in disputed questions cannot be taken to be of any special significance as far as Thomas' thought is concerned; it is rather an indication of the *other* opinions and arguments familiar in scholastic circles and raised in the course of academic disputations. This remark is also pertinent to the seven other instances yet to be noticed where al-Ghazālī happens to be named in disputed questions merely in the arguments preparatory to the *determinatio* or in the subsequent replies to these arguments.

In *Summa theologiae* 1. 7. 4 which asks whether there can be an actually existing infinite multitude, Thomas, after reporting in his *determinatio* the position of 'Avicenna and Algazel' and explaining the notion of an incidental infinity, rejects this position for two reasons: the first is that every multitude must be in some species of multitude, i.e., number;³⁶ the second is that the creator achieves his intention by a finite multitude – to create an infinite multitude would be in vain.³⁷

Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls', *Mediaeval Studies* 22 (1960) 232-39, though the works of Ibn Sīnā on which Marmura's study was based were not available to Thomas in Latin. The Marietti edition of the *SCG* (Turin, 1961) gives as the source of Thomas' reference Ibn Sīnā, *Metaph.* 6.2 and 8.1, but Ibn Sīnā's formulation of the doctrine in *these* two passages is much less succinct than al-Ghazālī's.

³⁴ On Thomas' position here, Isaac's remarks are noteworthy: 'La distinction finale à propos d'Aristote est, on le devine, capitale. Saint Thomas pourtant ne semble pas la prendre à son compte, encore moins en tirer dès maintenant toutes les conséquences pour atténuer l'absolu de sa thèse relative à l'impossibilité de tout infini créé en acte. Il est vrai qu'ici comme au chapitre 38^e, il se place à un point de vue essentiellement catholique, et que dans ces conditions le problème ne se pose plus' ('Le *Quodlibet* 9', 169).

³⁵ 'Fides autem catholica, que mundum non ponit eternum, ab his angustiis liberatur' (ad 12) (Kennedy ed., pp. 221-22).

³⁶ This is a condensed and therefore more difficult version of the argument given in *Quodl.* 9, q. 1, a. 1, Resp. (which was outlined above in n. 31).

³⁷ That Thomas would have considered these two arguments no more than probable is suggested by his statement in the context of the 'more difficult' argument about the infinity of souls in *De aeternitate mundi* (written 1270): '... non est adhuc demonstratum quod Deus non

In *Summa theologiae* 1. 46. 2 which asks whether the non-eternity of the world is an article of faith or is demonstrable, the eighth argument proposes that since there cannot be an actual infinity of souls, the world can necessarily be known not to be eternal. In the course of his reply to this eighth argument Thomas mentions al-Ghazālī and his solution to the problem, but points out that he had refuted al-Ghazālī's solution above [in 1. 7. 4].

In the fifth and last chapter of his short polemical work *De unitate intellectus*, Thomas refutes the arguments of those who held that the possible intellect was one and the same for all human beings. To the argument that, if the intellect is incorruptible and the world eternal, there would be an infinite number of intellects if each person had his own, Thomas quotes al-Ghazālī's solution to this problem.³⁸ Thomas does not offer a personal assessment of that solution, probably because on this occasion he is more concerned to bring out al-Ghazālī's acceptance of the *individuality* of intellectual souls than to present al-Ghazālī's argument for an incidental infinity of them.³⁹ So as far as al-Ghazālī's solution to the problem of an infinity of souls is concerned, Thomas seems to be presenting it, once again, simply as an *ad hominem* argument.

To sum up the way Thomas explicitly uses al-Ghazālī on the question of an actual infinity of souls, one can say that he saw the argument about an actual infinity of souls as one of the 'more difficult' arguments against the eternity of the world, and that he regarded al-Ghazālī's solution to this problem as historically noteworthy but as neither demonstrative nor even really probable.

2. *Many things cannot be actually understood simultaneously.* On this point Thomas refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī five times. The pertinent passage occurs in the third treatise of *Metaphysics* (on the characteristics of the First Being), in

possit facere ut infinita sint actu' (Leonine ed., ll. 306-308). On the differences in authorities and in cogency of arguments, *ST* 1. 1. 8 ad 2 is of fundamental importance, especially, in the present case, the statement '... sacra doctrina huiusmodi auctoritatibus [scil. philosophorum] utitur quasi extraneis argumentis, et probabilibus' (my emphasis); on the sense of 'probable', see Th. Deman, 'Note de lexicographie – philosophie médiévale: *Probabilis*', *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 22 (1933) 260-90.

³⁸ Of all the passages where Thomas discusses al-Ghazālī and his position on an actual infinity of souls, this is the only one where he gives a long verbatim citation (chapter 5, ll. 314-33) from al-Ghazālī; it is almost identical to that given above, n. 24. This passage is cited here verbatim probably because it serves Thomas' polemical purpose more forcefully.

³⁹ This is apparent from Thomas' subsequent remark (ll. 345-48): 'Patet autem falsum esse quod dicunt hoc fuisse principium apud omnes philosophantes, et Arabes et Peripateticos, quod intellectus non multiplicetur numeraliter, licet apud Latinos non. Algazel enim Latinus non fuit, sed Arabs.'

the subsection (*sentencia quarta*)⁴⁰ which gives an account of the mode in which God knows the multiplicity of things. In the course of this account it is pointed out that God's knowledge cannot be of a discursive kind in which the forms of things known are distinguished and succeed one another in thought. This is

impossible ... because this sort of knowledge which is orderly is human, and in human knowing two pieces of knowledge do not coexist simultaneously in the soul, but one succeeds the other; this is because knowledge is like a carving in the soul, for just as we cannot imagine two carvings or two shapes simultaneously coexisting in the same wax, so we cannot imagine two discrete pieces of knowledge simultaneously coexisting in the same way in the soul.⁴¹

2 *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4 asks whether an angel can actually understand a plurality of things at the one time. In his short *determinatio* Thomas refers to al-Ghazālī's teaching and accepts that it holds in the case of an angel's knowledge 'through the many species which are in its intellect'; but as for an angel's knowledge of things in the Word – something which was not, of course, conceived of by al-Ghazālī in the passage given above – Thomas holds that this can be simultaneously of all things. Hence al-Ghazālī's position represents only one of the two parts of Thomas' teaching on the question at issue; in the second part al-Ghazālī's position is transcended or, rather, taken up into a higher synthesis.

In *Quodl.* 7, q. 1, a. 2 the question is whether a created intellect can simultaneously understand a plurality of things. In his *determinatio* Thomas distinguishes a primary and a consequent understanding. As for primary understanding, this cannot be simultaneously of a plurality of things; and to explain this Thomas draws on Aristotle's teaching in *De anima* 3 that the intellect in act is completely, that is perfectly, the *thing* understood, i.e., the intellect is completely informed by the species of the thing understood:

Therefore, for the intellect actually and primarily to understand a plurality of things simultaneously would be the same as for some one thing simultaneously to be several other things.

⁴⁰ Muckle ed., pp. 66.21-70.17.

⁴¹ 'Dicamus igitur quod homo in cognitione rerum, habet tres dispositiones. Prima est ut distinguat formas rerum scitarum in suo arbitrio ... et hec est scientia sue ordinationis. ... Impossibile est enim ut sit de maniera prime dispositionis, quoniam scientia ordinativa ipsa est scientia humana cuius due sciencie non coniunguntur in anima in uno instanti, sed una succedit post aliam eo quod scientia est quasi celatura in anima; sicut enim non possumus imaginari duas celaturas vel figuras duas in eadem cera simul eodem modo circa idem, sic non possunt imaginari in anima esse due discrete sciencie simul presentes eodem modo. ... cum anima intendit in unum discretum aliquod, prohibetur simul intendere in aliud' (Muckle ed., pp. 67.3-9, 68.12-20, 28-30).

After some further explanation and distinction, Thomas continues:

It is clear then, that just as one material thing cannot simultaneously and actually be several other things, neither likewise can one intellect have a primary understanding of several things; and this is what Algazel says, that just as one body cannot simultaneously take on several shapes, so one intellect cannot simultaneously understand a plurality of things.⁴²

It is clear that the principal source of the position just outlined is Aristotle, *De anima* 3. 4; al-Ghazālī is referred to at the end simply as someone who happens to have made explicitly the same point that is deduced from the *De anima*.⁴³ But this position is transcended by Thomas when he makes provision for a 'consequent' understanding of several things simultaneously.

De ver., q. 8, a. 14 asks 'whether angels simultaneously know many things'. In Thomas' *determinatio*, which assumes that all understanding is by way of some form, al-Ghazālī is not mentioned; he is named only in the third argument *in contrarium*. But the position represented by al-Ghazālī is, yet once again, transcended by Thomas in his *determinatio* as well as in his particular reply: in addition to the highly focused understanding of specific things, there can *also* be a simultaneous, more general understanding of a number of things provided that they can be grasped under some unified aspect.

The question at issue in *Quodl.* 9, q. 4, a. 2 is formulated in more specialised terms: whether angels can simultaneously know things in their own angelic nature and in the Word. Al-Ghazālī's teaching is explicitly referred to in the *determinatio*, but is again transcended by Thomas who points out that an angel can simultaneously know things through a species inherent in its nature and through 'the species of the Word' since these two species are not of the same kind, but the former is ordered to the latter 'as a sort of material disposition'.⁴⁴

In the *Quaestio disputata de spe*, a. 2, the question is whether hope is in the will as its subject. In argument 2, al-Ghazālī's point is mentioned merely in order to be applied by way of transference to the quite different issue under discussion here: just as the intellect cannot be simultaneously informed by

⁴² '... intellectus secundum actum est omnino, id est perfecte, res intellecta, ut dicitur in III *de Anima*. Quod quidem intelligendum est, non quod essentia intellectus fiat res intellecta, vel species eius, sed quia complete informatur per speciem rei intellectae, dum eam actu intelligit. Unde intellectum simul plura actu intelligere primo, idem est ac si res una simul esset plura. ... Unde patet quod sicut una res materialis non potest esse simul plura actu, ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere primo; et hoc est quod Algazel dicit, quod sicut unum corpus non potest simul figurari pluribus figuris, ita unus intellectus non potest simul plura intelligere.'

⁴³ On the point at issue, an *explicit* formulation of Aristotle, *Topica* 2. 10 (114b34) appears in the *sed contra*: 'Contingit plura scire, intelligere vero unum solum.'

⁴⁴ 'Species autem concreata inhaerens non repugnat unioni intellectus angeli ad Verbum, cum non sit unius rationis; et ipsa species, et quidquid est perfectionis in intellectu angelico, sit quasi materialis dispositio ad illam beatam unionem.'

different species, neither, it is argued, can one power (the will) be actually informed simultaneously by different habits (charity and hope). In his reply, Thomas applies by way of transference his now familiar argument: a power *can* be simultaneously informed by two habits when there is some unifying order among them (as there is, since hope is ordered to charity).

To sum up the way Thomas explicitly uses al-Ghazālī on the question of simultaneous knowledge of a plurality of things, one can say that at the philosophical level Thomas is influenced principally by *Aristotle's* doctrine of knowledge, but that al-Ghazālī is favoured as a secondary authority, probably on account of his striking and memorable phrase about the impossibility of two shapes being simultaneously in the same wax. Even so, Thomas introduces into this question an additional perspective by which al-Ghazālī's position is supplemented and transcended.

3. On two occasions Thomas refers to a passage where al-Ghazālī discusses *the way God knows singular things*. The passage occurs in the third treatise of *Metaphysics* (on the characteristics of the First Being), in the sixth subsection (*sentencia sexta*). Here the great preoccupation is God's immutability. It is precisely because of his immutability that knowledge of singular things is denied to God, and to illustrate this, the example of an eclipse is used:

If, then, we were to suppose that the First Being knows that an eclipse will take place, then his state [of knowledge of the future eclipse] would be of one kind; but after the eclipse has taken place, if his knowledge were to remain in the same state as before, then he would be ignorant of the fact that the eclipse had taken place. But if he were to know that the eclipse had occurred, then his state [of knowledge] is different from what it was before; there would, then, have been a change [in his state of knowledge]. Now the First Being knows particular things only in a universal manner, and he is to be thought of [as having this mode of knowledge] from eternity and without end, because he is immutable. ... there is, then, no particular thing however small which does not have a cause, and the first being knows the particular thing through its cause, but in a very universal way and one which includes no designation of time.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ 'Si igitur possuerimus quod primus est sciens quia eclipsis erit, tunc secundum hoc erit ipse unius disposicionis: cum vero fuerit eclipsis, tunc si remanserit eadem dispositio, erit ignorans quod eclipsis est. Si autem fuerit sciens quod eclipsis est, tunc hec dispositio diversa est ab illa, fit igitur permutacio; primus autem non scit particularia nisi secundum maneriam universalem, et talis intelligendus ab eterno sine fine, quoniam non permutatur. ... nullum igitur particulare est adeo minimum quod non habeat causam, et ipse scit illud per causam suam sed admodum universaliter nec est in illo designacio aliqua temporis vel hore' (Muckle ed., pp. 72.19-26, 73.1-4). This position 'of al-Ghazālī' was condemned by Giles of Rome in his *Errores philosophorum*, ed. J. Koch, trans. J. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944), pp. 40, 42; the work is to be dated between 1268 and 1274.

1 *Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1 asks whether God knows singular things. In his *determinatio* Thomas gives the position of 'Avicenna and Algazel and their followers'. But a comparison of Ibn Sīnā's *Metaphysica* 8. 6 with al-Ghazālī's passage quoted above indicates that in presenting this position Thomas was drawing on Ibn Sīnā's text rather than al-Ghazālī's, even though the latter happens to be in simpler Latin.⁴⁶ A possible reason for this is that since al-Ghazālī was commonly recognised as an abbreviator of Ibn Sīnā,⁴⁷ Thomas preferred where possible to draw his material from the more authentic and original source. In any case the position is effectively rejected by Thomas even though benignly characterised by him as inadequate (*insufficiens*) because it denies to God perfect knowledge, a knowledge to which he is entitled as the cause of things' matter, the very principle of their individuation.

1 *Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 asks whether God has knowledge of things which can be expressed in propositions ('*utrum scientia Dei sit enuntiabile*'). Thomas begins his *determinatio* by stating:

According to Avicenna's opinion and from what Algazel has said, it seems to follow that God does not know things which can be expressed as propositions – and especially where singular things are concerned – because they hold that he knows singular things only in a universal way, and not ... in the nature of their particularity.⁴⁸

But then, referring to 1 *Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, Thomas recalls that this was shown *not* to be the case. He then proceeds to discuss briefly the mode of this knowledge.

To sum up the way Thomas explicitly uses al-Ghazālī on this question, one can say that al-Ghazālī is presented as the proponent of a position with which Thomas disagrees but which he regards as of historical interest; even so, his position is presented as secondary to Ibn Sīnā's.

⁴⁶ Avicenna, *Opera philosophica* (Venice, 1508; rpt. Louvain, 1961), fol. 100rb32-va55. Thomas has remarks about (1) knowing a particular eclipse only through the senses and (2) about God's knowledge of things being through his knowing himself; these are to be found in the passage of Ibn Sīnā just referred to, but *not* in the passage from al-Ghazālī referred to in the preceding note.

⁴⁷ e.g., 'Algazel, insecutor Avicennae' (Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, ed. B. Geyer [Aschendorff, 1960], p. 217.28); 'Algazel, ut plurimum Avicennam sequens et eius abbreviator' (Giles of Rome, *Errores philosophorum*, p. 38.4).

⁴⁸ '... secundum opinionem Avicennae et ex dictis Algazelis, videtur sequi quod Deus enuntiabilia nesciat, et praecipue in rebus singularibus; quia ponunt quod scit singularia tantum universaliter, id est secundum quod sunt in causis universalibus, et non ... in natura particularitatis suae.'

4. *No bodily torment after death.* Al-Ghazālī's Physics, the latter part of which deals with psychological questions, comprises five treatises; the fifth treatise deals with the influence on the human soul of the [separate] 'agent intelligence'; the fourth subsection of this treatise deals with torment after death. The following passage summarises the teaching to which Thomas refers in two of his works:

... punishment consists in the soul's being separated from what it loves; now this separation takes place only as a result of the soul's attachment to pleasures and its total preoccupation with what the bodily nature desires; these can become so great as to develop in the soul corresponding dispositions which desire only what satisfies the body and [gives the sort of] pleasure characteristic of this base and corruptible world. So through repeated acts this disposition becomes embedded in the soul, and the desire to act accordingly becomes intense; but subsequently, as a result of death, the instrument has been lost through which this desire was satisfied, yet the desire for and love of this [pleasure] remain, and this causes unspeakable torment. And this is what prevents the soul from coming in contact with and clinging to the agent intelligence. ... And since this instrument [the body] has been lost and desire keeps reminding the soul of what it has lost, this desire prevents the soul from coming into contact with [the agent intelligence] which pertains to its nature; this is a very great, eternal punishment...⁴⁹

De ver., q. 26, a. 1 deals with how the soul suffers after it is separated from the body. In the course of his long and sophisticated *determinatio*, Thomas gives a history of the opinions on this question; one of these was that since there cannot be *passio*, in the proper sense, in the separated soul, scriptural teaching in terms of bodily punishment must be understood to refer, metaphorically, to spiritual afflictions, 'and this is the sort of opinion Origen and Algazel seem to have held.' The circumspectness of the attribution is to be noted. At least in the case of al-Ghazālī it is warranted, since his *Maqāsid* does not explicitly reject bodily punishment but rather simply omits any reference to it.⁵⁰ This position is

⁴⁹ 'Cum ... separacio fit inter eam [scil. animam], et id quod diligit, tunc punitur; non separatur autem ab ea, nisi quia sequitur voluptates, et totum eius studium est circa id quod appetit natura corporalis, in tantum quod fiunt in anima eius dispositiones obsequentes, et appetentes id solum quod competit corpori, et delectationi hujus mundi vilis, et corruptibilis. Unde illa dispositio propter usum imprimitur in anima eius et inheret vehementer desiderium eius ad illam; postea vero per mortem amisso instrumento rei desiderate remanet desiderium eius, et amor, et hic est cruciatus ineffabilis. Et hoc est quod prohibet eam applicari, et adherere intelligencie agentis. ... Et quia amissum est instrumentum, et concupiscencia revocat eam ad id quod amisit, profecto hec concupiscencia prohibet eam applicari ad id quod pertinet sue nature, et hec est pena maxima eterna...' (Muckle ed., pp. 186.31-187.8, 19-22). This is another position 'of al-Ghazālī' which Giles of Rome condemned in his *Erroris philosophorum*, p. 42.

⁵⁰ Origen seems more strongly, though still only implicitly, to rule out bodily punishment (*Peri Archōn* 2.10; PG 11.236c-237a); cf. Jerome, *Epistula 124 ad Avitum* 7 (CSEL 56; Vienna-Leipzig, 1918), pp. 104-105.

rejected by Thomas on the basis of reflection on remarks in Mt 25:41 about 'the eternal fire that is ready for the devil and his angels.'⁵¹

Far simpler than the preceding article is SCG 3. 145. Without making any distinction between separated souls and souls reunited with their bodies, he simply gives four arguments that sinners are punished not only by perpetual exclusion from beatitude but by 'experiencing something harmful'. After the four arguments which are followed by two pertinent scriptural texts, Thomas concludes somewhat brusquely:

Thus is ruled out the opinion of Algazel who held that sinners will be punished solely by the affliction of losing the ultimate end.⁵²

In the simplicity of his treatment here, Thomas abandons the circumspectness with which he attributed this position to al-Ghazālī in *De ver.*, q. 26, a. 1.⁵³

5. *Intellect is a power of the soul.* The fourth treatise of al-Ghazālī's *Physics* deals with the different kinds of souls and their activities; the fifth subsection deals with the human soul. It begins:

When it may have happened that the blending of elements was finer and of more perfect balance, one than which a more delicate and a finer could not be found, as is the case of human seed which comes to maturity in a human body, thanks to foods which are more delicate than the foods of animals and the foods of vegetables, and from powers and hidden resources which are finer than the powers and hidden resources of animals, then will it become suitable to receive from the Giver of Forms the form finer than <other> forms, which is the soul of a human being; there are, in fact, two powers of this human soul, one operative and the other knowing; the knowing power is divided indeed into a speculative power ... and into an active.... The operative power in fact ... is called 'the active intellect'....⁵⁴

⁵¹ It is noteworthy that in his *determinatio* Thomas differentiates Ibn Sinā's position on this question from al-Ghazālī's. In fact, Ibn Sinā, *Metaphysica* 9. 7 contains a passage (fol. 107va35-51) very similar to the one cited from al-Ghazālī. But after this passage Ibn Sinā embarks on a discussion of the differing rewards and punishments of the good and the evil; and it is on the basis of some of these remarks (fol. 107vb16-29), not echoed in the *Maqāsid*, that Thomas differentiates Ibn Sinā's position from al-Ghazālī's. And the distinguishing feature which Thomas discerned was that the punishment of the wicked would be by way of what they experienced through their imagination. These experiences, Thomas noted, were 'similar to bodily [punishments]'. For Thomas, then, al-Ghazālī's position was more starkly at variance with scriptural teaching than Ibn Sinā's.

⁵² 'Per hoc autem excluditur opinio Algazelis, qui posuit quod peccatoribus haec sola poena reddetur, quod affligentur per amissionem ultimi finis.'

⁵³ An explanation for this may perhaps be found in the last sentence of n. 51 above.

⁵⁴ 'Cum commixtio elementorum fuerit pulcrioris, et perfeccioris equalitatis, qua nichil possit inveniri subtilius, et pulcricus sicut est sperma hominis, cuius maturitas venit in corpus hominis ex cibis qui sunt subtiliores cibis animalium, et cibis vegetabilium, et ex virtutibus et

In his short polemical monograph *De unitate intellectus*, Thomas sets out to give a philosophical refutation of the view which many accepted⁵⁵ that the possible intellect was a substance separated from the human body and was one for all mankind. After presenting texts from Aristotle against such a position in chapter 1, Thomas proceeds similarly in chapter 2 to present texts from the teaching of 'other Peripatetics': after discussing the teaching of certain Greek commentators (Themistius, Theophrastus and Alexander of Aphrodisias), he turns to 'Arabs' such as Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī; vis-à-vis the latter, he quotes a considerable part of the passage given above, the decisive words being 'this human soul *has* two powers: a power which operates and another which knows' (my emphasis). Thomas' purpose in citing al-Ghazālī and the other four authors is clearly indicated in the second last sentence of chapter 2: he was wishing not to disprove the Averroist position by citing philosophical authorities, but simply to 'show that not only Latins (whose words certain people find distasteful), but also Greeks and Arabs have felt that the intellect is a part or faculty or power of the soul which is the form of the body.'⁵⁶ This point needed to be made against those 'Averroists' who believed that Ibn Rushd's thesis on the possible intellect was 'a principle approved among all those who philosophise, both Arabs and Peripatetics'.⁵⁷

By way of summing up in his final chapter, Thomas again refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī,⁵⁸ but in order to use him in exactly the same superficial way as he had done in chapter 2: merely as a witness within the Peripatetic tradition against the position of Ibn Rushd.

6. This is the appropriate place to discuss Thomas' use of the following point which seems to have been drawn from the opening words of the passage last

mineris que sunt pulciores virtutibus, et mineris animalium, tunc fiet apta ad recipiendum a datore formarum formam pulchriorem formis que est anima hominis; huius vero anime humane sunt due virtutes, una operans, et altera sciens; virtus vero sciens dividitur in virtutem speculativam ... et in activam. ... Virtus vero operans ... vocatur intellectus activus... (Muckle ed., p. 172.1-20).

⁵⁵ 'Inolevit ... circa intellectum error apud multos, ex dictis Auerrois sumens originem...' (chapter 1, ll. 7-9).

⁵⁶ 'Hec autem premisimus, non quasi uolentes ex philosophorum auctoritatibus reprobare suprapositum errorem; sed ut ostendamus quod non soli Latini, quorum verba quibusdam non sapiunt, sed etiam Greci et Arabes hoc senserunt, quod intellectus sit pars uel potentia seu uirtus anime que est corporis forma' (chapter 2, ll. 145-51).

⁵⁷ '... dicunt hoc fuisse principium apud omnes philosophantes, et Arabes et Peripateticos, quod intellectus non multiplicetur numeraliter, licet apud Latinos non' (chapter 5, ll. 344-47).

⁵⁸ 'Patet autem falsum esse quod dicunt hoc fuisse principium apud omnes philosophantes, et Arabes et Peripateticos, quod intellectus non multiplicetur numeraliter, licet apud Latinos non. Algazel enim Latinus non fuit, sed Arabs' (chapter 5, ll. 344-48). (Ethnically, in fact, al-Ghazālī was a Persian, but he wrote in Arabic.)

cited from al-Ghazālī ('When there ... from the Giver of Forms'): that *there is a certain disposition in human nature consequent upon the blending of elements*.⁵⁹ This teaching is attributed by Thomas to al-Ghazālī in an earlier draft of *SCG* 3. 45 which he subsequently deleted.⁶⁰ *SCG* 3. 45 argues that in the present life we are unable to understand the separated substances. Towards the end of chapter 45 Thomas points out that if the possible intellect is a 'material power which can be generated and corrupted', it would in no way be able to understand the separated substances. In the subsequently deleted words he observes that such are the implications of al-Ghazālī's and Ibn Bajja's ('Avempace's') views of the possible intellect. In fact, as a careful reading of the passage in al-Ghazālī shows, the latter was not presenting the position that the *possible intellect* is a certain preparation in human nature consequent upon the blending of elements, so St. Thomas did well to delete such an erroneous attribution.⁶¹ Why he chose also to delete the reference to 'Avempace' is another matter; but at least his deletion of the reference to al-Ghazālī is testimony to the care Thomas took to be accurate in the positions he attributed to authors.

7. *Knowledge is the imprint (sigillatio) of the knowable on the knower*. Al-Ghazālī makes this point in the third treatise of *Metaphysics* (on the characteristics of the First Being), in the first *sententia*: the First Being is living, and he is living because he knows himself. Such is the context for our next passage:

Knowledge is nothing else than the imprint of a form abstracted from matter on a thing which is immune from matter. So what is imprinted is knowledge and that on which the imprint is made is the knower.⁶²

This point is taken up in *De ver.*, q. 2, a. 1 which asks whether there is knowledge in God. Al-Ghazālī is named twice in this article: in the sixth argument and in the reply to it. Al-Ghazālī's characterisation of knowledge as

⁵⁹ This same point is made, though at greater length and more generally in *Metaphysics* 5 (Muckle ed., pp. 123.16-124.17).

⁶⁰ The text is to be found in the Leonine edition, p. 14*b (the words deleted have been italicised): '... intellectus possibilis. ... Si enim ponatur esse quaedam virtus materialis generabilis et corruptibilis sicut si ponitur praeparatio quaedam in natura humana consequens elementorum commixtionem, sicut Algazel ponit, vel virtus imaginativa sicut Avempace ut quidam posuerunt sequitur quod ex sua substantia habet obligatur determinatur ad intelligendum materialia.'

⁶¹ Vansteenkiste, 'Autori Arabi', 342 n. 1 has suggested that in writing 'Algazel' (in the deleted section) Thomas may have made a slip for 'Alexander'; if one takes into account the view of Alexander of Aphrodisias presented in *SCG* 2. 62 and 3. 42, Vansteenkiste's suggestion is very plausible. Be that as it may, the noteworthy point is that Thomas detected his mistake and removed it.

⁶² 'Sciencia vero non intelligitur esse aliud quam sigillacio forme abstracte a materiis in re que est immunis a materia. Quod igitur sigillatur in ea est sciencia, et id in quo sigillacio fit, est sciens...' (Muckle ed., pp. 63.35-64.3).

'imprinting' (*sigillatio*) is used in the sixth argument to show that there can be no knowledge or 'imprinting' in God as this implies both receptivity and composition. Al-Ghazālī had given no indication of discerning any such problems in his use of this image of 'imprinting', even though, as will be recalled, it occurs in a passage where he had been discussing *God's* knowledge.⁶³ In his reply to the sixth argument Thomas conceded that knowledge has the character of 'imprinting' in the case of humans, but, in effect, rejects such a conception of knowledge in God by transposing and reapplying in a completely different way al-Ghazālī's idea of 'imprinting'.⁶⁴

8. *Knowledge is the assimilation of knower to known.* This classical philosophical teaching is to be found at least implicitly in the third treatise of *Metaphysics* (on the characteristics of the First Being), in the second *sentencia* on the simplicity of God's mode of knowing himself. Here it is stated that:

Whatever a man knows is known by him because there is a representation of it to his soul by either the external or internal senses, or it is known by him on account of the likeness of something existing in him; for unless there were to be a likeness of a thing in man, he would not be able to know it.

And again:

... the proof that knowledge is the known thing, and that sense is the sensed thing is this: man is a knower because of what is imprinted on his eyes from the form of the thing; this form is a likeness of the thing.⁶⁵

This teaching of al-Ghazālī is referred to in the draft of a *determinatio* of *Expos. super Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3 which Thomas subsequently deleted. The article concerned asks whether mathematics considers in an immaterial way things which have their being in matter. In the first of three drafts (all of them incomplete) of his *determinatio*, Thomas begins:

It must be said that the operation of the intellect reaches its completion through the intellect's being conformed to what it understands. So it is that Algazel says

⁶³ Though it must be noted that later in the fourth *sentencia* of the same treatise (Muckle ed., pp. 66.21-70.17), any complexity or multiplicity is excluded from God's knowledge.

⁶⁴ '... sicut scientia in nobis est sigillatio rerum in animabus nostris, ita e converso formae rerum non sunt nisi quaedam sigillatio divinae scientiae in rebus' (ad 6^m).

⁶⁵ '... quidquid scit homo, vel scitur ab eo quia est representatum anime sue per sensum exteriorem, vel per sensum interiorem, vel scitur ab eo propter similitudinem alicuius existentis in eo; nisi enim in se invenerit homo similitudinem rei, non poterit eam scire' and '... probacio autem quod sciencia est scitum, et sensus est sensatum, est hec quod homo est sciens propter id quod sigillatur in oculis eius ex forma rei in se, et simulacio eius...' (Muckle ed., pp. 64.24-28, 65.5-8). The Latin at the end of this second passage is obscure and susceptible of translations other than the one I have offered.

that knowledge is the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, and the Philosopher in book 11 of the *Metaphysics* that the intellect understands by representing the intelligible thing.⁶⁶

But Thomas abandons this idea of assimilation as the starting point for his *determinatio* and chooses instead the different ways in which the intellect abstracts. However, even if he had retained the passage just cited, it would be difficult to discern any major significance from the point of view of the present study of Thomas' citing al-Ghazālī on what was a commonplace of classical and medieval philosophy.

9. *A thing must be immaterial in order to be known.* The sentences which constitute the immediate context of al-Ghazālī's remarks that knowledge is an 'imprinting' (cited above, p. 262) provide a brief outline of the conditions under which knowing takes place. It will be recalled that al-Ghazālī is speaking about God's knowledge. The pertinent passage runs as follows:

... firstly we must find out what is meant when we say 'knower', 'knowledge', and 'thing known'.... Now a thing is a 'knower' if it is understood to be free from matter. And a thing is 'known' and 'understood' insofar as it is understood stripped of matter. And when we have the reception of what is stripped [of matter] into what is free from matter, then what we have is 'knowledge', and that in which it occurs is the 'knower'.⁶⁷

Al-Ghazālī and this passage are referred to in the fourteenth argument of *De ver.*, q. 2, a. 5. This article asks whether God knows singular things. The fourteenth argument, concentrating on the immaterial aspects (explicitly noted by al-Ghazālī) of knower and known, concludes that God cannot know singular things because they do not have the necessary immateriality. In his reply Thomas solves this problem by attending (as al-Ghazālī had not in the passage referred to) to the *similitudo* through which knowing takes place. Once again it is necessary to advert to the lack of significance of this reference to al-Ghazālī, and this for two reasons: the first is that the philosophical teaching referred to was by no means distinctive to al-Ghazālī; the second, and more

⁶⁶ 'Responsio. Dicendum quod operatio intellectus completur secundum hoc quod intellectus assi conformatur intelligibili. Unde dicit Algazel quod scientia est assimilatio scientis ad rem scitam, et Philosophus in XI Metaphysicae quod intellectus intelligit secundum transumptionem intelligibilis' (Decker ed., p. 231.16-20).

⁶⁷ '... prius tamen sciendum est quid intelligatur per hec que dicimus sciens, et sciencia, et scitum. ... Secundum hoc autem quod aliqua res est sciens, intelligitur esse inmundis a materia. Sed secundum quod scitur, et intelligitur, intelligitur nudata a materia. Cum autem posuerimus id quod est nudatum advenire in id quod est immune a materia, tunc id quod fit est sciencia, et id in quo fit est sciens' (Muckle ed., p. 63.25-27, 29-34).

important, is that it occurs merely in one of the arguments preparatory to the *determinatio*.

10. Not only are knowers characterised by freedom from matter, *the intelligences responsible for the motion of the heavenly bodies are stripped of matter*. This teaching is contained in the fourth of al-Ghazālī's treatises of Metaphysics which deals with the works of the First Being, and it occurs in the fourth *sententia* of the section on the heavenly bodies. The pertinent passage reads as follows:

... celestial motion indicates that there truly is an excellent, immutable substance which is neither a body nor impressed on a body. And this kind of substance is called an intelligence stripped [of matter]. But the [celestial] motion which indicates that there is such a substance, indicates that it is lacking finitude, since it was said above that this motion is eternal and unending. So it is ever in need of something to regulate it, a force which incessantly gives it its motion. Now it is impossible for there to be in a body a force which does something which is without limit. ... Therefore this celestial motion needs a mover stripped of matter. ... And this mover can only be a mutable soul, since from an immaterial intelligence which is immutable there can be no derivation of motion to a moveable thing....⁶⁸

In *De spir. creat.*, a. 1 there is a reference to al-Ghazālī and the passage just cited. Art. 1 asks whether a spiritual substance is composed of matter and form. The fifth argument *in contrarium* (the fifth of fourteen) simply refers to 'Avicenna and Algazel' as authorities for the position that 'separated substances, which are spoken of as spiritual substances, are completely stripped of matter.'⁶⁹ The main significance of this reference, both from the place where it occurs and from its being used simply as an authority, is in contributing to a history of opinions on the question at issue.

⁶⁸ 'Motus enim celi significat vere esse substantiam excellentem, non mutabilem, que non est corpus, nec inpressa corpori. Et huius modi substantia vocatur intelligencia nudata. Motus vero non significat eam esse, nisi mediante remocione finitatis tue (*sic*); predictum est enim hunc motum ab eterno esse sine fine. Eget igitur semper rectore scilicet, virtute movente illud incessabiliter. Impossibile est autem ut in corpore sit virtus ad agendum aliquid infinitum. ... Igitur motus iste eget motore expoliato a materiis. ... Et hic agens non est nisi anima mutabilis; ex intelligencia enim nuda que non permutatur, nec provenit motus mutabilis...' (Muckle ed., p. 112.2-9, 17, 23-25). That there is a *multitude* of these intelligences is argued on pp. 117.29-118.24.

⁶⁹ 'Praeterea Avicenna et Algazel dicunt quod substantiae separatae, quae spirituales substantiae dicuntur, sunt omnino a materia denudatae.' This reference seems to be echoing Ibn Sīnā rather than al-Ghazālī, since 'omnino' is to be found only in the former; see his *Metaphysica* 9. 4 (fol. 104vb26-27).

11. *Intelligence understands something as it is, or not at all.* The statement occurs in al-Ghazālī's third treatise of Metaphysics (on the characteristics of the First Being), in the eleventh *sentencia*, which is that God takes delight in himself. Al-Ghazālī makes many points to elucidate this *sentencia*, one of which is that 'the intelligible delight which we enjoy ought to be more intense than the pleasures which derive from the senses'; in the course of establishing the latter point al-Ghazālī indicates three ways in which intellectual and sensitive knowledge differ; the second is that

Sense perception is variable since sometimes what is small seems big, and what is big seems small; intellectual apprehension, on the other hand, corresponds accurately to what is apprehended, in such a way that there is no distortion, for it either apprehends the thing as it is or it does not apprehend it at all.⁷⁰

The last phrases of this passage are cited in *De ver.*, q. 1, a. 12 which asks whether there is falsehood in the intellect. The citation occurs in the third argument preceding the *determinatio*: 'Algazel says, "We either understand something as it is, or we do not understand it at all"....'⁷¹ This teaching of al-Ghazālī clearly echoes a sentence from Aristotle's *De anima* which had been referred to in the first argument. In his *determinatio* Thomas concedes that there cannot be error in the understanding of quiddities or the first principles of reasoning, but that there can be error when the intellect wrongly 'puts together or divides' concepts. Again we have a reference to al-Ghazālī which is of meagre significance so far as the purposes of this study are concerned.

12. *The good is the perfection the apprehension of which gives delight.* This dictum is to be found in al-Ghazālī's fifth treatise of Metaphysics which deals with the derivation of all things from the First Being, and it occurs towards the end of the last section which discusses the problem of evil:

... evil is privation, and apprehension of [this] privation brings grief; whereas good is the perfection the apprehension of which gives delight.⁷²

The dictum appears in *De ver.*, q. 21, a. 2 which asks 'whether being and good are interchangeable as to their real subjects'. It is cited in the third argument which, taking 'perfection' as a middle term, points out that prime

⁷⁰ 'Item apprehensio sensus variatur quoniam aliquando parvum videt magnum, et magnum videt parvum; apprehensio vero intelligencie coequatur apprehenso, ita quod nec plus nec minus; aut enim apprehendet rem sicut ipsa est, aut non apprehendet eam' (Muckle ed., p. 83.19-23).

⁷¹ 'Item. Algazel dicit "Aut intelligimus aliquid sicut est aut non intelligimus"....'

⁷² '... malum est privacio, sed apprehensio privacionis est dolor; bonum vero est perfectio cuius apprehensio est delectacio' (Muckle ed., p. 129.3-5).

matter has being but no perfection and that, therefore, not every being is good. In his reply Thomas remarks that prime matter is potentially perfect in just the same way as it is potentially being. The characterisation of 'good' given in this dictum is not among those which Thomas himself chooses to use most frequently.

13. *Mediate creation.* This doctrine is to be found, though without the word 'creation', in a number of passages throughout al-Ghazālī's treatises on Metaphysics. One such passage occurs in the second treatise which deals with the characteristics of the being necessary in itself; the tenth of the twelve characteristics begins:

From the necessary being there is immediately derived only one other [being]. But through the mediation of others, many [beings] are derived in an orderly way from the necessary being. Now it has been shown that the necessary being is one and that there is no multitude in him. ... and from the one only one is derived, because what the one produces is not diversified except through the diversity of the thing in which the production occurs, or through the diversity of an instrument, or from something else which is outside the essence of the one maker.⁷³

Thomas refers to this teaching of al-Ghazālī in *De pot.*, q. 3, a. 4 which asks whether the power or act of creating can be communicated to a creature. Thomas begins his *determinatio*:

It was the view of certain philosophers that God created inferior creatures through the mediation of superior ones, as is clear in the *Liber de causis* and in the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna and Algazel.⁷⁴

Thomas' attribution of the doctrine of mediate creation to these works does no injustice to their thought.⁷⁵ But such a position is rejected by Thomas as stemming from the misconception that things derive from God as if by a necessity of his nature, rather than through his knowledge and wisdom.

⁷³ '... ex necesse esse non provenit nisi unum quid, nullo mediante. Aliquibus vero mediantibus multa proveniunt ex eo, et secundum ordinem. Ostensum est autem ipsum esse unum in quo nullo modo est multitudo. ... ab uno autem non provenit nisi unum eo quod opus unius non fit diversum, nisi vel diversitate eius in quo fit, vel diversitate instrumenti, vel ex aliquo alio quod est preter essenciam unius factoris' (Muckle ed., pp. 56.31-34, 57.7-10). A second passage (Muckle ed., pp. 119.6-123.10) deals with this question at greater length and in much more detail, though part of this second passage (pp. 119.22-120.2) is similar to the one just cited. There is also a brief statement of this doctrine on p. 117.32-35. This is another position of al-Ghazālī which was condemned in Giles of Rome, *Errores philosophorum*, p. 38.

⁷⁴ 'Respondeo. Dicendum, quod quorundam philosophorum fuit positio quod Deus creavit creaturas inferiores mediantibus superioribus ut patet in lib. *de Causis*; et in *Metaphys.* Avicennae, et Algazelis....'

⁷⁵ The word 'created' does occur in Ibn Sīnā, *Metaphysica* 9. 4 (fol. 104va49).

14. *God knows creatures by knowing his essence.* This teaching is presented in al-Ghazālī's third treatise on Metaphysics (on the characteristics of the First Being), in the third *sentencia*. Here it is argued that the First Being

is most certainly manifest to himself just as he is. ... So if he knows himself to be the principle of [things], then the knowledge of [things] is included in his knowledge of himself.⁷⁶

St. Thomas draws on this line of reasoning in 2 *Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 2 which asks whether lower angels are enlightened by higher ones. It is used in the second argument which claims that angels, in seeing the divine essence, must see its effects and therefore have no possibility for further enlightenment by higher angels. In his reply to this second argument Thomas, after identifying al-Ghazālī as its source, points out that a vision of the divine essence entails a complete knowledge of things only if that essence is grasped perfectly, which is not the case with angels.⁷⁷ Hence, in extending to angelic knowledge the line of reasoning presented by al-Ghazālī, Thomas introduces a further refinement by attending more closely to the limitations on the part of the knowers.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In his certainly authentic works St. Thomas refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī thirty times.

2. This is a far smaller number than Thomas' explicit references to Ibn Sīnā (443) or Ibn Rushd (531),⁷⁸ both of whom exercised quite a significant influence on Thomas' philosophical thought.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ 'Sentencia tertia est quod primus scit omnes species et genera omnium que sunt. Unde nichil deest sciencie ipsius ... predictum est enim quod ipse scit se ipsum. Unde oporteret ut ipse sciat se sicut est quoniam ipse nudus, et apertus, et certissime manifestus est sibi ipsi secundum quod ipse est; certitudo vero eius est hec, quod ipse est purum et verum ens, fons essendi substancias, et accidencia, et quicquid ipsa sunt secundum ordinem suum. Si ergo scit se ipsum esse principium eorum, tunc sciencia eorum includitur in sciencia sui; si vero non scit se ipsum esse principium eorum, tunc non scit se sicut est; quod est absurdum. ... Continetur igitur sciencia omnium, sub sciencia sui, secundum continenciam sine dubio' (Muckle ed., p. 66.1-12, 19-20).

⁷⁷ '... non tamen sequitur quod videns essentiam ejus omnia sciat, nisi ipsam perfecta cognitione comprehendat; et hoc angelis non convenit' (ad 2^m).

⁷⁸ These figures are derived from the *Index thomisticus*, sectio I: indices 1, s. vv. 'Avicenna', 'Averroes', 'Commentator'. I have treated the *Q. de immort. anim.* as authentic.

⁷⁹ On the influence of these two philosophers on Thomas' thought, see G. C. Anawati, 'Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne' in *Commemorative Studies* 1 (n. 10 above), 449-65; Gardet, 'Saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs arabes' (n. 10 above), 441-47; A. Judy, 'Avicenna's "Metaphysics" in the *Summa contra gentiles*', *Angelicum* 52 (1975) 340-84, 541-86 and 53 (1976) 184-226; E. Gilson, 'Avicenne en Occident au moyen âge', *AHDLMA* 36 (1969)

3. All thirty of Thomas' references can be located in a single work, the Latin version of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāsid*. The thirty references cover only fourteen topics or passages in the *Maqāsid*: eleven in the treatises on Metaphysics, and three in the treatises on Physics; there are no explicit references to the Logic. Of the passages referred to in the Metaphysics, the majority occur in the third treatise on the characteristics of the First Being and have to do with the nature of knowledge.

4. Not once in his commentaries on Aristotle does Thomas refer explicitly to al-Ghazālī.⁸⁰

5. Of Thomas' explicit references to al-Ghazālī, many occur in arguments which precede the *determinatio* or in replies to such arguments; especially in the case of disputed questions, these references are owing rather to the circumstances of scholastic disputation than to Thomas' personal initiative. Furthermore, even when Thomas refers to al-Ghazālī in *determinationes* or elsewhere, this is often simply a part of his presentation of the history of opinions on a topic. In only a very few cases does Thomas refer to al-Ghazālī with complete approval, but in these cases there is nothing distinctive about al-Ghazālī's position; indeed he is referred to along with other thinkers. On several other occasions when al-Ghazālī is presented in company with thinkers such as Aristotle or Ibn Sīnā, his significance is secondary to theirs. In the majority of cases where he refers to al-Ghazālī, Thomas either rejects the position presented by al-Ghazālī or introduces some further refinement to it. To none of the positions presented by al-Ghazālī did Thomas give as much attention as to that on the existence of an infinity of souls, yet he regarded the argument given by al-Ghazālī on this matter as neither demonstrative nor even really probable. Thus, regarding the *influence* of al-Ghazālī on Thomas' thought, which might be expected to be discernible from the thirty places where Thomas refers explicitly to al-Ghazālī, it is clear that, with the possible exception of al-Ghazālī's position on an infinity of souls, his influence was altogether negligible or even non-existent. This is a conclusion which is at variance with the claims of authors such as Salman and Abu Shanab. Whether al-Ghazālī influenced Thomas' thought in passages where the former is not explicitly referred to is a matter which still remains to be investigated, but, in view of the foregoing results, it would be surprising if a significant influence were to be demonstrated.

104-109; C. Vansteenkiste, 'San Tommaso d'Aquino ed Averroè', *Rivista degli studi orientali* 32 (1957) 621-23.

⁸⁰ This is in contrast with Albert the Great's practice as can be seen by consulting the indices of Albert's commentaries on Aristotle in the critical edition of his works being published by the Albertus-Magnus-Institut of Cologne (1951 -).

6. Scholars have drawn attention to the gradual variation in the way St. Thomas drew on or referred to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd.⁸¹ The extent to which Thomas' *tacit* use of al-Ghazālī may have changed over the years still remains to be studied, but in the thirty texts investigated in this study there does not seem to be any comparable variation in the way Thomas refers to al-Ghazālī; that his explicit references to al-Ghazālī are slightly more frequent in his earlier than in his later works is probably not significant. That Thomas did not feel the need in his later writings to distance himself from al-Ghazālī as he did from Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd may well be because he considered al-Ghazālī to be of negligible stature as a philosopher in his own right.

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⁸¹ On the disappearance of favourable references to Ibn Sīnā in Thomas' later works, see Judy, 'Avicenna's "Metaphysics"', 376-83; on Thomas' progressively more severe judgments on Ibn Rushd, see Vansteenkiste, 'San Tommaso ed Averroè', 621.

VERNACULAR AND LATIN VERSIONS OF A SERMON FOR LENT: 'A LOST PENITENTIAL HOMILY' FOUND¹

Helen L. Spencer

I

INTRODUCTION

OXFORD, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 343, a codex dating from the second half of the twelfth century, is, for its time, a conservative, even backward-looking compilation of sermons in Latin and English. The vernacular section of the book includes many items by Ælfric, and five sermons by Wulfstan, and, of the fourteen then unpublished sermons edited in 1909 by A. O. Belfour,² N. R. Ker remarked that 'six of them ... and parts of two others ... are not found elsewhere, although all probably date back to Anglo-Saxon times.'³ Sermons 5 and 6 of the texts edited by Belfour⁴ are versions of the same homily, a pre-Ælfrician sermon which is found elsewhere in Anglo-Saxon manuscripts. The occasion when it was to be preached is indicated: Sermon 5 is ascribed in the manuscript to 'Dominica in Quadragesima' and Sermon 6 to 'Dominica Secunda in Quadragesima'. It is with this pre-Ælfrician text and its Latin source that I am concerned.

¹ The title is designed to indicate my indebtedness to a previous article by J. Turville-Petre, to which I am in part replying. Her article is 'Translations of a Lost Penitential Homily', *Traditio* 19 (1963) 51-78.

² *Twelfth-Century Homilies in ms. Bodley 343. Part I* (EETS OS 137; London, 1909, rpt. 1962).

³ *Catalogue of Manuscripts Containing Anglo-Saxon* (Oxford, 1957), p. 368. The codex is described on pp. 368-75.

⁴ *Twelfth-Century Homilies*, pp. 40-49, 50-59. The presence in this late manuscript of the pre-Ælfrician material, together with sermons by Ælfric and Wulfstan, is a noteworthy illustration of the contention that the earlier vernacular homiletic tradition and the Ælfrician continued side by side, the differences between them not being generally appreciated by contemporaries (or successors); cf. M. McC. Gatch, *Preaching and Theology in Anglo-Saxon England: Ælfric and Wulfstan* (Toronto, 1977), p. 121.

The fact that, according to the titles in ms. Bodley 343, the same sermon might be used for any Sunday in Lent, or specifically the second Sunday, perhaps indicates the general nature of the sermon's content: it is not tied down by use of a pericope to any given day, but consists of a summary of those basics of Christian religion which are especially important 'on dazum þisses halzæ læncztenfestenes'.⁵ Thus in the sermon a description of the three theological virtues is followed by an account of the practices of confession, penance, vigils, fasting, prayer and almsgiving. The version of the text in Sermon 5 intersperses the account of confession with a rehearsal of eight principal sins.

In Anglo-Saxon times the sermon appears to have been thought a useful acquisition to homiliaries. The version of the text in Belfour's Sermon 5 is to be found in four other copies, all of much earlier date than ms. Bodley 343 itself.⁶ The best known and oldest of these manuscripts is the 'Vercelli Book', and I shall accordingly designate this version of the text as 'V'.⁷ The other version of the text, found in Belfour's Sermon 6, is also extant in three other copies;⁸ following Turville-Petre, I call this version B6. B6 is an inferior version of the sermon material, with some inconsistency of arrangement, omissions and three additional passages. Part of the sermon material (on fasting and almsgiving) was incorporated into another of the homilies in the 'Vercelli Book' (Sermon 20).⁹ There also exists a third and independent text of V in Old Icelandic.¹⁰

It was the independence of this version in Old Icelandic which provided for Turville-Petre (whose account of the Old English manuscripts I have summarised above) the conclusive proof that the three versions of the text (V, B6 and 'The Stockholm Book') were translations of a lost Latin original. The sermon is known to contain passages which may be traced back to a variety of Latin works. It is a patchwork compilation, which seems to have been put together from *florilegia* and other collections of useful excerpts, rather than by reference to *originalia*. The uniform length of these citations in the different

⁵ Belfour, *Twelfth-Century Homilies*, p. 40, ll. 19-20.

⁶ Vercelli, Biblioteca Capitolare ms. CXVII (s. x²), fols. 12v-16r; Cambridge, Corpus Christi College mss. 198 (s. xi¹), fols. 132v-137r and 162 (s. xiⁱⁿ), pp. 243-252; Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 340 (s. xiⁱⁿ), fols. 108r-112r. The dates ascribed to these manuscripts are taken from Ker, *Catalogue*.

⁷ Ed. M. Förster, *Die Vercelli-Homilien. I.-VIII. Homelie* (Hamburg, 1932; rpt. Darmstadt, 1964), Sermon 3. I consulted the Darmstadt edition, in which the Lent sermon appears on pp. 53-71.

⁸ ms. Bodley 340, fols. 115v-119r and C.C.C.C. ms. 198, fols. 140v-145r (these two manuscripts draw upon a common homiliary); C.C.C.C. ms. 419 (s. xi¹), pp. 308-329. All these manuscripts are, of course, described fully in Ker, *Catalogue*.

⁹ For detailed discussion, see 'A Lost Penitential Homily', 55-56.

¹⁰ 'The Stockholm Book' (Stockholm, Kungliga Biblioteket Perg. 4^o, nr. 15). For an account of this version, see 'A Lost Penitential Homily'.

vernacular versions of the sermon and the reiteration of shared passages in introduction and conclusion and in linking the citations from Latin authorities together demonstrate the existence of an intermediate Latin homily between the *florilegia* and the vernacular sermons. Turville-Petre analysed a number of surviving *florilegia* which showed affinities with the vernacular homilies. One compilation in particular is remarkably similar to long sections of the penitential homily. This compilation is the collection of Insular material relating to penance known as the *Collectio canonum Hibernensium* (hereafter *CCH*),¹¹ especially chapters 12, 13 and 14. Because there are slight divergences between *CCH* and the homily, as revealed by comparison with the vernacular versions, Turville-Petre seems to have hesitated to call it one of the sources, although she calls it 'closely connected' with them ('A Lost Penitential Homily', 62).

Because much of the material out of which the sermon was composed is identifiable from various collateral compilations (including *CCH*) and from the originals on which they drew, Turville-Petre was able not merely to prove the existence of the lost Latin version of the homily but to attempt a reconstruction of its text, using the evidence of the vernacular versions. Where there was no known Latin source or parallel to sections of the vernacular, she provided her own conjectures. Usually these conjectural passages consist of sentences linking the Latin authorities together, as well as the introduction and conclusion. I shall refer to this reconstructed text as 'T' ('A Lost Penitential Homily', 57-60; the conjectural passages appear on pp. 76-77).

However, it does not appear previously to have been noticed that Latin texts of the V version of this sermon do exist. I am aware of two Latin versions: an earlier, which corresponds closely to the vernacular V, and a later, which underwent some revision at the hands of the compiler of the collection in which it appears.

The earlier version is found in a homiliary described by H. Barré,¹² who entitles it, from the provenance of the earliest manuscript known, 'L'homélaire de Saint-Père de Chartres'. I shall designate this earlier version of the penitential homily as 'S'. The Chartres codex (Bibliothèque Municipale 25, in which the homiliary occupies fols. 119-162) dates from the tenth or eleventh century, but the date of the compilation of the homiliary itself should probably be placed, according to Barré, in the Carolingian period: '... tant par sa structure liturgique que par ses procédés de rédaction, la collection se rattache bien à l'époque

¹¹ Version A is edited by H. Wasserschleben, *Die irische Kanonensammlung* (Leipzig, 1885; rpt. Darmstadt, 1966).

¹² *Les homéliaires carolingiens de l'école d'Auxerre* (Studi e testi 225; Vatican City, 1962), pp. 17-18.

carolingienne.¹³ Turville-Petre also conjectured that the lost Latin penitential homily belonged to this time: its methods 'point to an original of the ninth, rather than the tenth century.'¹⁴ The existence of the vernacular version of the homily in the Vercelli Book makes it certain that the date of the Latin sermon cannot be later than the tenth century, while, since the homiliary draws upon the *De ecclesiasticis officiis* of Amalarius, composed c. 820, it cannot have been compiled much before the middle of the ninth century.¹⁵ This does not absolutely preclude an earlier date for the penitential homily itself outside the Saint-Père homiliary.

The later Latin version of the homily survives in a sermon collection of the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, that is, roughly contemporary with, or slightly later than, the copying of the Belfour sermons and the Old Icelandic version. This Latin compilation is a collection of sermons on the Gospels for Sundays and the greater festivals, attributed to William de Montibus (c. 1140-1213), chancellor of Lincoln Cathedral from 1191 until his death.¹⁶ The sermon collection attributed to him is usually called, from the opening of its prologue, the *Collectio 'Filius matris'*.¹⁷ I shall denominate the later Latin version of the penitential homily found in this collection 'F'. Some other Carolingian sermons

¹³ *ibid.*

¹⁴ 'A Lost Penitential Homily', 75.

¹⁵ Barré, *Les homéliaires carolingiens*, p. 17.

¹⁶ For details of William de Montibus' career, see H. MacKinnon, *The Life and Works of William de Montibus* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1959). MacKinnon considered that these sermons demonstrate in part William's fulfilment of the statutes of Lincoln Cathedral that the chancellor should preach a public sermon to the people every Sunday. If MacKinnon's supposition is correct, then the date of composition falls between 1191 and 1213 (*ibid.*, pp. 203-204); but for a tentative query concerning the authorship of the sermons, see our note following.

¹⁷ 'Viro bone fame vitæque celeberrimo domino Willelmo, Dei gratia Latisaquiensis ecclesie dispensatori fidelissimo filius matris sue' (Cambridge, Pembroke College ms. 116, fol. 69r). 'Filius matris' appears to have been a medieval title for the collection: it is given thus on the back cover of the binding of Oxford, Magdalen College ms. 81, and compare also Salisbury, Cathedral Library ms. 8, fol. 1r, 'Filia (sic) matris nomen libri ut dicitur'. 'Filius matris' is a biblical phrase; see Lc 7:12 in which the *mater* was understood by commentators to refer to the Church. This prologue appears to have been used as evidence for the identity of the author (in most manuscripts the *incipit* reads 'domino ecclesie dispensatori'). The ascription of the Willelmo. N. collection to William de Montibus was made by the early commentators, notably the monk who goes by the name of 'Boston of Bury'; see R. H. Rouse, 'Boston Buriensis and the Author of the *Catalogus Scriptorum Ecclesiae*', *Speculum* 41 [1966] 471-99). It is unclear what else the ascription to William de Montibus rests upon. The 'domino Willelmo' of the prologue is addressed in the dative by an anonymous dedicatory, in view of the following 'dispensatori', rather than being referred to as the author in the ablative. The 'Latisaquiensis ecclesie dispensatori' in the Pembroke manuscript appears furthermore to describe the house-steward ('spenser') of Lewes Priory rather than William de Montibus (I owe this information to the kindness of Dr. R. W. Hunt). For the sake of convenience, I continue to refer to the compiler of 'Filius matris' as 'William de Montibus'.

were incorporated into the '*Filius matris*' cycle besides our penitential homily, although from sources other than the Saint-Père homiliary.¹⁸ While the use of such old material is of considerable interest, it is not incongruous: the twelfth-century form and style of homiletics, to which the *Collectio 'Filius matris'* belongs, before the development of the new methods of preaching associated with the organised preaching activity of the newly-founded mendicant orders in the thirteenth century, was traditional in kind. One may compare this continued use of much older homiletic material by a late twelfth-century Latin writer with the transmission at the same date of the vernacular sermons of Ælfric and Wulfstan, along with even older vernacular material, like the translation of the penitential homily itself. ms. Bodley 343, with which we began the discussion, illustrates such activity in the vernacular.

The *Collectio 'Filius matris'* is a set of model sermons which begins with the First Sunday in Advent, and ends with the Twenty-second Sunday after Trinity.¹⁹ Within this scheme there is a certain amount of duplication of days, which is part of the original plan, and not a later accretion.²⁰ The Lent sermon F here being considered is one of these duplicates; it is an extra sermon for the First Sunday in clean Lent, followed in the manuscripts by the regular sermon on the Gospel for that day.²¹ The Lenten nature of the penitential homily is emphasised by William de Montibus' specific statement, an addition to the original, which sums up the six practices which are 'in his diebus precipue necessaria' as 'Hec sunt opera Quadragesimæ' (F l. 129).²² Indeed, the

¹⁸ Thus for the First Sunday after the Octave of Epiphany, Heiric of Auxerre's sermon was used. Cf. Barré, *Les homéliaires carolingiens*, p. 262: 'Merito in descriptione quatuor animalium Lucas evangelista in titulo'. This was also used apparently by John of Abbeville; cf. J. B. Schneyer, *Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters* 2 (Münster, 1970), p. 510. The sermon for the Fourth Sunday after the Octave of the Epiphany corresponds to that of Smaragdus; cf. Barré, *ibid.*, p. 248: 'In hac navigatione Dominus utramque unius eiusdemque suae personae naturam dignatur ostendere' (PL 102.98-100). Cf. also Bede, *In Lucae evangelium expositio* 3.8 (PL 92.434).

¹⁹ Some of the manuscripts include a small set of *Commune Sanctorum* sermons (cf. ms. Bodley 303; ms. Magdalen College 81; ms. Pembroke College 116; ms. Salisbury Cathedral 8), which may have been part of the original scheme. The Sunday series seems to be complete: I have seen no manuscript of the '*Filius matris*' which includes extra sermons for the remaining Sundays after Trinity.

²⁰ The duplication can be shown to be planned. Thus for the Third Sunday after the Octave of Epiphany the reading is divided into two to cover the two separate miracles recounted in the Gospel. Easter Sunday is specifically stated to warrant two sermons on the same reading on account of the solemnity of the festival. Trinity Sunday, like Lent 1, has a general sermon for the occasion ('De Trinitate'), and another to cover the prescribed Gospel reading.

²¹ Mt 4:1-11, 'Ductus est Ihesus in desertum ... ministrabant ei' (*The Sarum Missal*, ed. J. Wickham Legg [Oxford, 1916], p. 57).

²² Cf. the translation of 'in his diebus' in V as 'on þyssum halgum lengten-fæstenes'.

conclusion which was substituted for the original in the F version demonstrates that William de Montibus envisaged the sermon to be preached, not merely sometime in Lent, but specifically on the First Sunday of Lent. There is more evidence for this than the consistent placing of the sermon at the head of the Lent series in the manuscripts, for the substituted conclusion contains phrases from 2 Cor 6:3-4, which forms part of the Epistle reading for the First Sunday of Lent.²³ Although the order of the verses has been inverted to fit the sermon context, the wording is presumably designed to recall the lesson read shortly before in the course of the liturgy. In this respect the design for the sermon in the Saint-Père homiliary is modified: there it is assigned to the Second Sunday of Lent rather than the First, a plan which was followed by many of the Old English copies.²⁴ The only copy of any version of the sermon in which an ascription other than to Lent occurs is in the Old Icelandic sermon, which is designated for the Rogation Days. Accordingly, I have felt it justifiable to refer to the 'penitential homily' as 'a sermon for Lent'.

The Latin '*Filius matris*' cycle enjoyed some standing in the later Middle Ages, being copied until well into the fifteenth century.²⁵ It may have had something of a reputation as a standard work in view of its sober, indeed austere, exegetical character, offering to the user an exposition, according to the letter and the spirit, of the entire text of the Gospel pericopes, along with much useful dogmatic and pastoral material, such as is found in the Lent sermon. The scriptural exegesis appears often to be indebted to the *Glossa ordinaria*, already establishing itself at the time when William de Montibus was writing as the standard biblical commentary of the Middle Ages. When translation into the vernacular started to appear in quantity in the late fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, the *Collectio 'Filius matris'* was one of the works to be translated into Middle English, and the extra Lent sermon with it. This later translation, which I shall call 'H', survives in four copies from the first half of the fifteenth century.²⁶ Although the copying of the Lent sermon throughout the Middle Ages and its retranslation in the fifteenth century testify to the continuing value

²³ 2 Cor 6:1-10, 'Fratres, hortamur uos ne in uacuum gratiam Dei recipiatis ... et omnia possidentes' (*The Sarum Missal*, p. 56).

²⁴ Version V is ascribed in the 'Vercelli Book', mss. Bodley 340, C.C.C.C. 198 and 162 to Lent 2; in ms. Bodley 343 to Lent. Version B6 is ascribed in mss. Bodley 340, C.C.C.C. 419 and 198 to Lent 4; in ms. Bodley 343 to Lent 2.

²⁵ Cf. Oxford, Magdalen College ms. 81 (s. xv²); also Salisbury, Cathedral Library ms. 8 (s. xv).

²⁶ London, British Library mss. Harley 2276 (fols. 52v-54v) and Royal 18.A.xvii (fols. 61r-64r); Cambridge, University Library mss. Kk.6.2 (fols. 69r-72r) and Kk.6.28 (fols. 93rb-98rb). For an account of the Middle English translation, see H. L. Spencer, 'A Fifteenth-Century Translation of a Late Twelfth-Century Sermon Collection', *Review of English Studies* N.S. 28 (1977) 257-68.

that the text was considered to have, even though it was fossilised within a larger unit, the *Collectio 'Filius matris'*, which was felt to be a useful body of material as a whole, the *Sermo de Quadragesima* underwent some changes in its transference into '*Filius matris*' and later into Middle English. These changes seem of interest, as well as the long life of the text, and, on pp. 291-304 below, I shall give some account of the Middle English (H) version, as well as of the differences between the F version of the homily and the earlier S version. I shall also compare the reconstructed text T with the S version. As an indication that the same sermon is, in fact, represented in the various vernacular and Latin texts, I give below short *incipits* from Förster's edition of the Vercelli homily (V3) and from H.²⁷ The two Latin texts, S and F, are presented in full below on pp. 282-91.

V3

BRoðor þa leofestan, ic cyðe, þæt þreo þing synt ærest on fore-weardum æghwylcum men nyd-be-hefe to habbanne: .i. is zeleafa; oðer is hiht; þridde soð lufu. On ðam zeleafan is, þæt he zelyfe on 3oð, fæder ælmihtigne, 7 on sunu 7 þone halzan 3ast 7 on þa to-dældan þrynesse 7 on þa þurhwuniendan annysse. (Förster, pp. 53-54).

H


First among all oþer þyngs þre þyngs ben nedeful to eche man þat wole come to heuen, and þese þre þyngs ben ful faire, for it ben feiþ, hope and charite. Feiþ is ful nedeful to man þat he bileue in God, Fadir almygti, and in Ihesu Crist his Sone and also in þe Holi Goost: þre persones²⁸ and oon God.

At this point, it may be helpful to summarise the relationships between the various vernacular and Latin versions. I have adopted the pattern of family relationships worked out by Turville-Petre, with additions and modifications. For the sake of reference to Turville-Petre's argument, I use the sigla given to the Old English manuscripts by Förster, which she adopted and supplemented. They are not altogether satisfactory for the purposes of the present article, but I wish to avoid confusion. In particular, two of the arbitrary set of sigla given to the Old English manuscripts coincide with sigla that I prefer to use for the Latin texts and the Middle English version H. Since the Old English manuscripts are not referred to elsewhere in this article, I have placed their sigla in round

²⁷ I have taken transcriptions from the Harley manuscript. Modern punctuation, word-spacing, and capitalisation have been supplied. Abbreviations are expanded and italicised, except for the common forms *and*, *þat*, *wiþ*. Marks which may or may not indicate the abbreviation of final *-e* have been ignored.

²⁸ ms. *psones* (mark of abbreviation omitted).

brackets. The sigla which are of major importance in my argument have been picked out in bold type.



SIGLA

S = the Saint-Père homily. As the Latin text lying behind the vernacular V version, it is referred to by Turville-Petre as Xv.

Xb = a posited Latin text lying behind the vernacular B6 version. Turville-Petre describes Xv/S and Xb as being derived from a common ancestor, X. However, it seems to me more economical to view Xb as a derivative and inferior version of Xv/S.

V = the common ancestor of the Old English translations of the superior S version of the homily.

V3 = 'The Vercelli Book' (Vercelli, Biblioteca Capitolare ms. CXVII), ed. Förster, Sermon 3, pp. 53-71. I use the texts of V3 and B5 (see below) to stand as representatives of all the Old English translations deriving from S.

V20 = Sermon 20 in the Förster edition of the Vercelli Homilies.

B5(H) = Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 343, ed. Belfour, Sermon 5, pp. 40-49. (H) is Turville-Petre's siglum for this manuscript.

B6(Hb) = *ibid.*, Sermon 6, pp. 50-59. Turville-Petre uses the term B6 to stand for all the Old English translations derived from Xb. I use it as well to refer to the representative text in ms. Bodley 343, which she calls (Hb).

St = 'The Stockholm Book' (Stockholm, Kungliga Biblioteket Perg. 4°, nr. 15).

(S) = Cambridge, Corpus Christi College ms. 198 (Ker, *Catalogue*, no. 48, art. 19).

(Sb) = *ibid.* (Ker, *Catalogue*, no. 48, art. 21).

(O) = Oxford, Bodleian Library ms. Bodley 340 (Ker, *Catalogue*, no. 309, art. 19).

(Ob) = *ibid.* (Ker, *Catalogue*, no. 309, art. 21).

(T) = the text of S reconstructed by Turville-Petre.

F = *Collectio 'Filius matris'*, extra sermon for Lent 1.

H = the Middle English translation of F. It is found in London, British Library mss. Harley 2276 and Royal 18.A.xvii, and Cambridge, University Library mss. Kk. 6. 2 and Kk. 6. 28, 'A Sermoun on þe First Sunday of Lentoun'.

II

LATIN VERSIONS OF THE SERMON

Below I give texts of both S and F. To assist comparison between them in the light of the ensuing discussion of the history of the homily on pp. 295-304, I have set out the texts on facing pages. Both texts have been given since, although long passages correspond with only minor variation, the variation is nonetheless extensive enough to necessitate a cumbersome and complicated critical apparatus were only one of the texts to be presented. Furthermore, William de Montibus made a number of lengthy substitutions. The S version is presented for its value as the source of the early vernacular translations: the 'lost penitential homily found'. The F version is given as being the form in which the sermon was transmitted to the late Middle Ages.

I have not attempted to provide a critical edition of either of the two Latin versions of the sermon. Both S and F were transcribed from single manuscripts, although I have naturally consulted other witnesses.

S is extant in three copies: the Chartres manuscript already mentioned, Cambridge, Pembroke College 25 (fols. 42v-46r), a manuscript of s. xi, and Cambridge, St. John's College B 20 (fols. 26vb-27va, the title occurring at the foot of fol. 26va), a manuscript of s. xii.²⁹ ms. Pembroke 25 is hereafter called 'P', and St. John's Coll. ms. B 20 is termed 'J'. The oldest copy, the Chartres manuscript, already mutilated at beginning and end, was rendered practically unusable by fire in 1944.³⁰ It is now a collection of fragments in very poor condition. These fragments were carefully inspected and described in 1957 by R. Étaix, who observed of his attempt to order and decipher them: 'Avec un peu plus de temps et de patience on pourrait obtenir encore plus de précision,

²⁹ M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of St. John's College, Cambridge* (Cambridge, 1913), no. 42.

³⁰ Barré, *Les homéliaires carolingiens*, p. 18.

mais on peut se demander si ce travail ingrat serait de grande utilité'.³¹ I have as yet been unable to inspect these fragments personally. Because of the severely damaged condition of the Chartres copy, it could not in any case serve as a base text, and this duty has devolved upon the earliest undamaged witness, P, whose few lacunae have been supplied from J. Both are good copies of the text, but P is the more reliable, since J exhibits a few obvious errors. That they are independent witnesses may be easily demonstrated since the later copy J at one point contains a passage lacking in P. This passage is an original part of the 'lost penitential homily', a lacuna which, although self-evident in P, since the sense is deficient, is too long to have been supplied by an ingenious later scribe. The variant readings found in J are recorded in the textual apparatus.

F was transcribed from Cambridge, Pembroke College ms. 116, in which the sermon occupies fols. 91r-92r. This is an early manuscript of the *Collectio 'Filius matris'* (s. xiii), which appears for the most part to give a satisfactory text of William de Montibus' sermon.³² Most of the manuscripts of the 'Filius matris' cycle that I have seen contain a shared set of marginal notes accompanying all the sermons, including the extra Lent sermon.³³ The notes indicate such things as the subject currently under discussion in the sermon text (as 'De confessione ... De penitentia ... De vigiliis' and so on), the authorities cited (as 'Augustinus de laude elemosine ... Item Ieronimus ... Origenes') and sermon structure ('Conclusio'). The marginalia are an original part of the plan of the *Collectio 'Filius matris'*, not a later accretion, since they are copied by the original scribes of the manuscripts. Although they are a planned part of the text, by their nature as marginalia they have attracted a higher degree of alteration, omission and, to a lesser extent, supplementation than the main text. P has a full and early version, and I give the marginalia for the F version of the *Sermo de Quadragesima* alongside the text, as a part of the 'Filius matris' sermon, if not of the original 'lost penitential homily'.

³¹ From a letter to the then Librarian at Chartres (Lyons, 21 January 1957), copied by courtesy of the present Librarian for my benefit (personal letter, 26 June 1980).

³² Other manuscripts that I have consulted and compared are: London, Gray's Inn ms. 14 (s. xiiiⁱⁿ); Cambridge, University Library ms. Dd.4.27 (s. xiv); Oxford, Magdalen College ms. 81 (s. xv²); ms. Bodley 303 (s. xiv/xv); Salisbury, Cathedral Library ms. 8 (s. xv).

³³ Cambridge, University Library ms. Dd.4.27 lacks the commentary, although it has an unrelated set of marginalia added later. However, it was evidently copied from a manuscript which contained the original marginalia: the Lent sermon, for instance, is entitled 'De tribus summis virtutibus' rather than 'De Quadragesima'. This title is, in fact, the first entry in the marginalia associated with this sermon in the other manuscripts. As a title for the sermon as a whole, it was presumably supported in the eyes of the rubricator of the Cambridge University Library manuscript by the opening of the sermon itself. One of the Middle English manuscripts, British Library Royal 18.A.xvii, retains the original marginalia; the scribe copied them in Latin without translating them.

In the texts below I have supplied modern punctuation, and I have retained the medieval orthography, except in the case of medial *c* and *t*, which I have normalised according to modern conventions in such forms as *-tio* and *-tia*. In ms. Pembroke 116 in particular, these letter-forms are not always differentiated sufficiently clearly for the scribe's intention to be apparent. I have also regulated the use of *u* and *v* according to present custom. In treating *S*, I have retained the older orthography represented in *P*, in which the spelling *ae* is still used. Commonly, this is abbreviated *e* with cedilla, which I have silently expanded to *ae* except in the case of forms of *daemon*, which is spelled with *oe* when written in full (as at l. 100).

A few words should also be said about the policy adopted for references to quotations in the sermons. To avoid unnecessary duplication, references to sources in *F* are given only when they differ from, or are added to, those of the parallel passage in *S*. The penitential homily contains a number of references to Church Fathers. Certain sayings attributed to Jerome, Augustine and Origen have not been located in their works but are to be found in the *CCH* compilation, where they are also ascribed to these figures. Quotations from Isidore, too, may have come via intermediate collections such as *CCH* and Alcuin's *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis*. Accordingly, I have given references in the *apparatus* both to the original (where this is known) and to *CCH* and Alcuin. Because the sermon is essentially a derivative compilation of the sayings of others, parts of the text other than explicit references to the Bible and the Fathers consist almost entirely of quotations. The reader is referred to Turville-Petre's article for the identification of or parallels to these: to supply references to them here would be merely to reduplicate her work.

Cambridge, Pembroke College ms. 116, fols. 91r-92r (Version F)

SERMO DE QUADRAGESIMA

De tribus summis virtutibus
Primum omnium tria quedam unicuique homini valde sunt necessaria: fides scilicet, spes, caritas. Fides ut credat in Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum: tres in personis et unum in substantia. Spes ut certissime speret eterna premia. Caritas ut sit plenus dilectione Dei et proximi, quia omnes in baptismo filii Dei sanctificamur ut fratres simus spiritualiter in caritate perfecta secundum Deum. Manere ergo debemus in dilectione Dei et proximi ut Deus ipse semper in nobis maneat, sicut Iohannes ait: *Deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet et Deus in eo.* 5

De vi. alijs virtutibus
Sex quoque sancte religioni Christiane in his diebus precipue necessaria sunt: confessio scilicet, penitentia, vigilie, ieiunia, orationes et elemosina. 10

De octo criminalibus
In primis enim confessio facienda est de omnibus peccatis que sive in cogitatione, sive in locutione, sive in opere perpetrantur. Octo siquidem sunt vitia principalia, sine quibus vix ullus inveniri potest. Quorum primum castrimargia, hoc est, ventris ingluvies, dicitur; secundum fornicatio; tertium accidia, sive tristitia; quartum avaritia; quintum vana gloria; sextum invidia; septimum ira; octavum superbia, que est omnium malorum regina, per quam angelica creatura de celo cecidit; per quam prothoplastus deceptus primam beatitudinem amisit. 15

De confessione
Quando ergo unusquisque ad confessionem venerit, diligenter debet inquiri quomodo, aut qua occasione, perpetraverit peccatum quod fecisse se confitetur; et iuxta modum peccati debet ei penitentia iudicari. 20

Quod sacerdotes medicos imitari debent
Providendum est tamen sacerdoti ut tanto cautius erga sibi commissos agat, quanto durius a Christo iudicari formidat. Nam, sicut scriptum est, *In qua mensura mensi fueritis, remetietur vobis.* Cotidie vero omnes delinquimus et in multis dilabimur erroribus. Unde qui nobis in nostris delictis clementes sumus in alieno peccato rigorem <exercere> nequaquam debemus. Nec tamen dissimulare peccata vel fovere debemus, sed in quantum possumus cum omni sagacitate resecare. Sicut enim medici morbos imminentes curandos suscipiunt, futuros vero ne impediunt medicine obiectu quadam prescientia antecedunt, ita et doctores boni sic ea que male acta sunt resecant ut ea que admitti possunt ne perpetrari valeant doctrina succurrente preveniunt. 25 30

Confessio igitur omnibus super omnia necessaria est. Deus enim confessionem nostram desiderat, ut iustam ignoscendi causam habeat. Itaque confessio sanat;

24 vobis: Mt 7:2, Mc 4:24.

6 spiritualiter: spaliter MS.

22 sibi add. s.s. MS.

26 exercere supplevi ex cod. Magdalenensi (Oxon.) 81

Cambridge, Pembroke College ms. 25, fols. 42v-46r (Version S)

XXII OMELIA IN DOMINICA .II. IN QUADRAGESIMA

(f. 43r) Primum omnium tria quaedam unicuique homini pernecessaria sunt: fides, spes, caritas. Fides ut credat in Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum: tres personas et unam substantiam. Spes ut certe speret eterna premia. Caritas ut sit plenus in dilectione Dei et proximi, quia omnes in baptismo filii Dei sanctificamur 5 ut fratres simus spiritaliter in caritate perfecta secundum Deum. Manere ergo debemus in dilectione Dei et proximi ut ipse semper in nobis perseveret quia, sicut Iohannes ait: *Deus caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet et Deus in illo.*

Sex quoque sanctae religioni Christianae et precipue in his diebus necessaria sunt: confessio, poenitentia, vigiliae, ieiunia, orationes et aelemosina. 10

Confessio igitur facienda est de omnibus peccatis quae sive in cogitatione, sive in locutione, sive in opere perpetrantur. Octo sunt siquidem vitia principalia, sine quibus vix ullus inveniri potest. Est enim primum castrimargia, hoc est, ventris ingluvies; secundum fornicatio; tertium accidia, sive tristitia; quartum avaritia; quintum vana gloria; sextum invidia; septimum ira; octavum superbia, quae est omnium malorum 15 regina, per quam creatura angelorum mirabilis cecidit de caelo.

Quando ergo unusquisque ad confessionem venerit, diligenter debet inquiri quomodo, aut qua occasione, peccatum perpetraverit quod peregisse se confitetur; et iuxta modum illius facti debet ei poenitentia iudicari. Debet etiam ei persuaderi ut de perversis cogitationibus faciat confessionem. Debet ei (f. 43v) etiam iniungi ut de octo 20 principalibus vitiis faciat suam confessionem. Et nominatim ei debet sacerdos unumquodque vitium dicere et suam de eo confessionem accipere. Deus ergo

8 illo: 1 Jo 4:16.

- 2 quidem *J* necessaria *J*
- 4 unum substantia *J*
- 5 in¹ *om. J.*
- 6 simus fratres *J* perfecta *om. J*
- 7 quia *om. J*
- 8 illo] eo *J*
- 12 perpetratur *J*
- 13 castri- *corr. ex* gastri- *P*
- 14 avaritia] -ti- *add. s.s. P*
- 19 penitentiam *J*
- 20 etiam ei *J*

De virtute confessio Deum placat; confessio iustificat; confessio veniam peccatis donat. Omnis spes
 confessionis venie in confessione consistit. Confessio opus est misericordie, salus egroti, unicum
 peccatoribus medicamentum, secunda tabula post naufragium, quia nos aliter salvari 35
 non possumus nisi vere penitendo confiteamur quicquid inique gessimus. Unde et
 Salomon ait: *Qui abscondit scelera sua non dirigetur; qui autem confessus fuerit et
 reliquerit ea, misericordiam consequetur.*

De peniten- Post hanc igitur accipienda est penitentia, de qua salvator ait in ewangelio:
 tia *Penitentiam agite: appropinquavit enim regnum celorum*, et Iohannes Baptista *Facite* 40
 inquit *dignos fructus penitentiae*. Fructus dignus est penitentiae transacta flere peccata et
 eadem iterum non committere, sicut scriptura ait: *Ne adicias peccatum super peccatum.*
 Quomodo *Lavamini*, dicit Dominus per Ysaïam prophetam, *et mundi estote*. Lavatur itaque et
 agenda sit mundus est qui preterita plangit et iterum flenda non admittit. Lavatur et non est
 penitentia mundus qui plangit quod gessit, nec deserit, sed post lacrimas hec eadem que flevrat 45
 repetit.

Sciendum est igitur quia hec est vera penitentia que districte agitur. Penitentia enim
 vera non annorum numero (f. 91v) censetur, sed amaritudine animi, quia non
 longitudinem temporis tantum requirit Deus, sed pensat quantus sit affectus sinceritatis
 in corde penitentis. Quamvis itaque quilibet sit peccator et impius, si ad penitentiam 50
 convertatur, de misericordia Dei non diffidat, cuius gratia veniam consequetur. In hoc
 enim seculo nulli vere penitenti Dei misericordia subtrahitur.

De vigilijs Huic siquidem coniungende sunt vigilie, quia ipse fructus eius elevat ad celum.
 Unde et nos vigilare oportet, sicut Ysaïas propheta dicit: *De nocte vigilat spiritus meus
 ad te, Domine, quia lux precepta tua sunt super terram*. Item David propheta dicit: 55
Media nocte surgebam ad confitendum tibi super iudicia iustificationis tue. Et salvator ad
 vigilandum nos excitat, dicens *Beati servi illi, quos, cum venerit Dominus, invenerit
 vigilantes*, et cetera. Et iterum, *Ego diligentes me diligo, et qui mane vigilant ad me,
 invenient me. Vigilate ergo, nescitis enim quando Dominus veniat: sero, an media nocte,
 an galli cantu, an mane.* 60

Ubi notandum summopere est quod tribus de causis Dominus celavit a nobis
 adventum suum et diem mortis. Prima est quia, si sciret homo diem mortis sue, per
 mortis ig- multum tempus se peccato dedisset, et in brevi ad Deum convertisset. Secunda est quia,
 oramus si in brevi tempore ante obitum cognovisset homo diem mortis, pro magnitudine
 iniquitatum omnem vitam suam in errore et in desperatione duxisset. Tertia causa est 65
 pro qua fecit Deus ultimum diem incognitum, ut semper credamus esse proximum et

35 secunda ... naufragium: Cf. Petrum Lombardum, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, ed. 2^a (Quaracchi, 1916), 4.14.1 (2.819): 'Est enim, ut ait Hieronymus, "secunda tabula post naufragium"; quia, si quis vestem innocentiae in baptismo perceptam peccando corruerit, poenitentiae remedio reparare potest. Prima tabula est baptismus, ubi deponitur vetus homo, et induitur novus; secunda poenitentia, qua post lapsum resurgimus, dum vetustas reversa repellitur, et novitas perdita resumitur'. Cf. etiam Hieronymum, *Ep.* 30.9 *ad Demetriadem* (CSEL 56.189; PL 22.1115): 'Illa quasi secunda post naufragium miseris tabula sit'.

41 dignus: dictus *MS*.

66 esse proximum *corr. ex proximum esse MS*.

confessionem nostram desiderat, ut iustam habeat causam ignoscendi. Confessio enim sanat; confessio iustificat; confessio veniam peccatis donat. Omnis spes veniae in confessione consistit. Confessio opus est misericordiae, salus egroti, unicum est viribus nostris medicamentum cum poenitentia, quia nos aliter salvi fieri non possumus nisi confiteamur peccata nostra quae inique egimus. Unde et Salomon de confessione peccatorum dixit: *Qui abscondit scelera sua non dirigitur; qui autem confessus fuerit et reliquerit ea, misericordiam consequetur.*

Post hanc igitur accipienda est poenitentia, de qua salvator ait in aevangelio: *Poenitentiam agite: adpropinquavit enim regnum caelorum*, et Iohannes Baptista *Facite* inquit *fructus dignos poenitentiae*. Fructus dignus est poenitentiae transacta flere peccata et eadem iterum non agere, sicut scriptura ait: *Ne adicias peccatum super peccatum. Lavamini*, dicit Dominus per Isaiam prophetam, *et mundi estote*. Lavatur itaque et mundus est qui et preterita plangit et iterum flenda non admittit. Lavatur et non est mundus qui plangit quod gessit, nec deserit, sed post lacrimas haec eadem que flevit repetit.

Sciendum est igitur quia hec est vera poenitentia quae districte agitur. (f. 44r) Poenitentia enim vera non annorum numero censetur, sed amaritudine animi, quia non longitudinem temporis tantum requirit Deus, sed pensat quantus sit affectus sinceritatis in corde poenitentiam agentis. Quamvis igitur quisque sit peccator et impius, si ad poenitentiam convertatur, consequi posse veniam Dei misericordia non dubitet. In hoc enim saeculo poenitentiam facientibus Dei semper misericordia subvenit.

Huic siquidem coniungendae sunt vigiliae, quia ipse fructus eius elevat ad caelum. Unde et nos vigilare oportet, sicut Isaias propheta dicit: *De nocte vigilat spiritus meus ad te, Domine, quia lux precepta tua sunt super terram*. Item David propheta dicit: *Media nocte surgebam ad confitendum tibi super iudicia iustificationis tuae*. Unde et salvator ad

29 consequetur: Pr 28:13.

31 caelorum: Mt 4:17.

32 poenitentiae: Lc 3:8.

33 peccatum²: Ecclus 5:5.

34 estote: Is 1:16.

46 terram: Is 26:9.

47 iustificationis tuae: Ps 118 (119):62.

23 iustum *J* causa *J*

27 peccata *corr. ex* peccata *P*

30 ait *om. J*

31 appropinquabit *J*

31-32 inquit facite *J*

35-36 et preterita... qui *om. J*

36 quod *corr. ex* quo *P*

36-38 que ... hec *om. P*

40 tantum *om. J*

42 non *add. s.s. J*

43 subvenit *corr. ex* subveniet *J*

45 vigilet *J*

semper curam habeamus vigilandi, et, sanctis operibus adornati, preparemus nos semper ad presentiam omnipotentis Dei.

interrogatio
ona Queso vos igitur, fratres karissimi, semper cogitate et nolite oblivisci interrogare 'Ubi
sunt amatores mundi? Ubi reges? Ubi principes? Ubi imperatores? Ubi rebus 70
transitoriis locupletati? Ubi potentes huius seculi? Ubi sapientes huius mundi?' Hec
enim meditatio timorem generat; timor vero conpunctionem; conpunctio devotionem;
devotio bonorum operum exhibitionem. Et hee sunt vigilie quas Dominus a nobis
exigit.

de ieiunio: Post hec congrue secuntur ieiunia, de quorum laudibus dicit Ieronimus: 'Ieiunium est 75
quid sit res sancta, opus celeste, ianua celi, forma futuri seculi, quod qui sancte agit, Deo
coniungitur, mundo alienatur, spiritualis efficitur. Per hoc prosternuntur vitia,
de virtute humiliatur caro et diaboli temptamenta vincuntur.' Item Ieronimus: 'Ieiunium pandit
ieiunij misteria, excludit vitia, incitat virtutes, castigat corpus, refrenat vitia, illuminat
animam.' Ieiunia quoque fortia tela sunt adversus temptamenta diaboli, vel 80
demoniorum; cito enim per abstinentioniam vincuntur.

exempla Sciendum est etiam quantum ieiunium valet. Populus Ninive ieiunavit triduanum
predicto- ieiunium, per quod meruit accipere Dei misericordiam et indulgentiam peccatorum.
um Populus Dei ieiunavit antequam pascha comederet, per quod meruit Mare Rubrum
transire siccis pedibus, et inimicos in mari videre dimersos. Moyses ieiunavit in deserto, 85
per quod meruit audire misteria. David post peccatum suum ieiunavit, per quod absolvi
meruit, sicut ipse dicit: *Humiliabam in ieiunio animam meam*. Christus etiam ieiunavit
ommen- xl. diebus et xl. noctibus, per quod diabolum vicit, et statim angeli ministraverunt ei.
tio ieiunij Petrus ieiunavit, per quod meruit angelum videre solventem se de carcere. Iohannes
Ewangelista ieiunavit, per quod meruit divina misteria recipere. Paulus quoque 90
ieiunavit, per quod meruit sanari de cecitate et baptismum accipere. Et quid amplius
dicam de ieiunio? Quamdiu non comedit Adam, in Paradiso fuit; ut autem comedit,
statim de Paradiso expulsus est.

71 mundi: Isidorus, *Synonyma* 91 (PL 83.865C).

75 Ieronimus: Isidorus (vide S).

72 conpunctio *corr. s.s. ex conpunctio MS.*

vigilandum auditores suos excitat, dicens *Beati servi illi, quos, cum venerit Dominus, invenerit vigilantes. Amen dico vobis, super omnia bona sua constituet eos. Et iterum, Ego diligentes me diligo, et qui mane vigilaverint invenient me. Vigilate ergo, nescitis* 50 *enim quando Dominus veniat: sero, an media nocte, an galli cantu, an mane, ne cum venerit inveniat vos dormientes. Et ne solis apostolis illud preceptum esse crederetur, mox subiunxit: Quod autem vobis dico, omnibus dico, vigilate. Sciendum est itaque quod non solum verbis docuit vigilias, sed etiam suo confirmavit exemplo, namque testatur aevangelium quia erat Iesus pernoctans in oratione Dei. Vigilandum est ergo omnibus* 55 *fidelibus (f. 44v) quia vigiliarum devotio familiare bonum est omnibus sanctis. Sciunt enim quod non est vanum mane surgere ante lucem ad vigilandum, quia promisit Dominus coronam vigilantibus.*

Post haec congrue sequuntur ieiunia, de quorum laudatione dicit Isidorus: 'Ieiunium est res sancta, opus caelestae, ianua regni caelestis, forma futuri saeculi, quod qui 60 sanctae agit, Deo coniungitur, mundo alienatur, spiritalis efficitur. Per hoc prosternuntur vitia, humiliatur caro et diaboli temptamenta vincuntur.' Hieronimus dicit: 'Ieiunium castigat corpus, refrenat vitia, incitat virtutes.' Agustinus dicit: 'Ieiunium pandit misteria, excludit vitia, inluminat animam.' Ieiunia igitur fortia taela sunt adversus temptamenta demoniorum; cito enim per abstinentiam vincuntur. 65

Sciendum est itaque quod ieiunium multum valet. Populus enim Ninive ieiunavit triduanum ieiunium, per quod meruit accipere Dei misericordiam et indulgentiam peccatorum. Populus Dei ieiunavit antequam pascha comederet, per quod meruit Mare transire Rubrum siccis pedibus, et inimicos mari videre dimersos. Moyses in deserto ieiunavit, per quod meruit audire misteria. David post peccatum suum ieiunavit, per 70

49 vigilantes: Lc 12:37. constituet eos: Mt 24:47.

50 invenient me: Pr 8:17.

52 dormientes: Mc 13:35-36.

53 vigilate: Mc 13:37.

55 Dei: Lc 6:12.

59-62 Ieiunium... vincuntur: Isidorus, *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1.43.3 (PL 83.776A). Vide etiam CCH 12.4 (p. 34).

63 Ieiunium¹ ... virtutes. Non est detectum in operibus Hieronymi. Vide autem CCH (loc. cit.).

63-64 Ieiunium² ... animam. Vide CCH (loc. cit.), ubi haec dictio Augustino ascripta sententiae 'Hieronymi' coniungitur.

50 vigilaverint] ad me add. in marg. P (secunda manus)

56 scivit J

57 non add. s.s. in P secunda manus

58 Dominus] Deus J

59 laudibus J ieiunium corr. ex ieiunia J

64 animam] mentem J

65 adversus] contra J

66 Niniven PJ

67 ieiunium per quod corr. ex per quod ieiunium J

68 antequam] ante J comederet om. J

Bonum est ergo ieiunium, sed mensuratum esse debet, quia quicquid temperatum fuerit, illud salutare erit; quicquid autem nimis et ult <ra> modum est, non solum 95
 Quod ieiunium sine elemosinis parum prodest. Ieiunium autem, quod cum elemosinis fit et orationibus, elemosinis acceptum est Deo, quia celum aperit et ad tronum altissimi potenter ascendit.
 parum prodest

De oratione Hinc sequuntur orationes, de quibus Ysidorus dicit: 'Orationibus mundamur, lectionibus instruimur.' Et Apostolus: *Multum valet deprecatio iusti assidua*. Oravit 100
 enim Moyses, et avertit iram Dei a populo deprecante idolum. Oravit Helias, ut non plueret super terram, et conclusit celum per tres annos et menses sex. Et rursum oravit, et celum dedit pluviam et terra dedit fructum suum. Oravit Ionas in ventre ceti, et liberatus est. Oravit Daniel de lacu leonum, et meruit audiri. Oravit Ezechias in infirmitate sua, et adiecit ei Deus quindecim annos ad vitam. Quicumque ergo vult cum 105
 Deo semper esse, frequenter debet orare et frequenter legere. Nam, cum oramus, ipsi cum Deo loquimur; cum vero legimus, Deus nobiscum loquitur.
 Quod orationum plura sunt genera. Orant namque verbis fideles Deum deprecantes ut dimittantur (f. 92r) eis omnia peccata eorum. Orant et elemosinas largiend <o>, sicut dixit Dominus: *Date elemosinam et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis*. 110
 Et alibi scriptum est: *Sicut aqua extinguit ignem, ita elemosina extinguit peccatum*.
 De diversis Orant <etiam di> mittendo proximis que in eis deliquerunt, sicut Dominus ait: *Si*
 doctoribus *remiseritis hominibus peccata eorum, et Pater vester celestis dimittet vobis peccata vestra*. Orant nichilom <inus et> precepta caritatis servando, sicut scriptum est: *Quia*
universa delicta caritas operit. Ille igitur Deum salubriter orat <qui ma>ndata eius 115
 observat. Nichil enim prodest nobis clementiam Dei verbis implorare, et operibus irritare.

110 vobis: Lc 11:41.

111 peccatum: Ecclus 3:33.

114 vestra: Mt 6:14.

115 operit: Pr 10:12.

95 ultra: *codex mutilatus*110 largiendo: *codex mutilatus*112 etiam dimittendo: *codex mutilatus*114 nichilominus et: *codex mutilatus*115 qui mandata: *codex mutilatus*

quod meruit delictum delere; ut ille ait: *Humiliabam in ieiunio animam meam*. Christus ieiunavit quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus, per quod superavit adversarium, et statim angeli ministraverunt ei. Petrus ieiunavit, per quod meruit angelum videre solventem (f. 45r) se de carcere. Iohannes Evangelista ieiunavit, per quod meruit mysteria divina audire angelo ei annuntiante. Paulus ieiunavit, per quod meruit sanari 75 de caecitate et accipere baptismum. Hieronimus ait 'Quandiu non comedit Adam, fuit in Paradyso; ut autem comedit, statim de Paradyso expulsus est.'

Bonum est ergo, fratres karissimi, ieiunium, sed mensuratum esse debet, quia quicquid temperatum fuerit, illud salutare est; quicquid autem nimis et ultra modum fuerit, ipsum periculosum est, sicut pluvia multum distillans, quae, si nimium imbres 80 prebeat, non solum nullum usum bonum adhibet, sed etiam periculum exhibet. Hieronimus dicit: 'Sint ergo tibi cotidiana ieiunia et refectio satietatem fugiens', id est, cotidie esurire et cotidie prandere. Sciendum est igitur quod ieiunia cum bonis operibus Deo optime acceptabilia sunt, quia hoc est perfectum ieiunium quod cum aelimosinis et orationibus caelum transit et ad thronum altissimi Dei pervenit. 85

Dehinc sequuntur orationes, de quibus Isidorus dicit: 'Orationibus mundamur, lectionibus instruimur.' Sciendum est ergo quod *oratio assidua multum valet apud Deum*, Paulo Apostolo dicente. Oravit enim Moyses et avertit iram Dei a populo deprecante idolum. Oravit Helias, ut non plueret super terram, et conclusit caelum per tres annos et sex menses. Et rursum oravit, et caelum dedit pluviam et terra dedit 90 fructum suum. (f. 45v) Oravit Ionas in ventre caeti, et liberatus est. Oravit Daniel de lacu leonum, et meruit audiri. Oravit Heliseus Heliam ut spiritum eius dupliciter acciperet. Oravit Ezechias in infirmitate sua, et adiecit ei Deus quindecim annos ad vitam. Quicumque ergo vult cum Deo semper esse, frequenter debet orare et frequenter legere. Nam, cum oramus, ipsi cum Deo loquimur; cum vero legimus, Deus nobiscum 95 loquitur.

71 animam meam: Ps 34 (35):13.

76-77 Quandiu... expulsus est: Hieronymus, *Adversus Jovinianum libri duo* 2.15 (PL 23.305C). Vide etiam Alcuinum, *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis* 16 (PL 101.625A).

82 Sint... fugiens: Hieronymus, *Ep. 22.17 ad Eustochium* (CSEL 54.165, ll. 10-11; PL 22.404).

86-87 Orationibus... instruimur: Isidorus, *Sententiarum libri tres* 3.8 (PL 83.679). Vide CCH 14.3 (p. 41), sed ista sententia ibi libro de natura rerum ascripta est.

88 Deum: Jac 5:16.

71 Humiliabam... meam om. J

75 nuntiante J

76 caecitate] civitate J

78 mensaturum J

80 ipsum] istud J

81 non solum om. J

86 mundemur J

87-88 oratio ... Deum bis exh. P

88 Paulo Apostolo dicente om. J

93 Ezechiel J

De elemosi- Ad extremum <sequitur de e>lemosina que est plenitudo et perfectio bonorum
na Augusti- operum, de cuius laudibus ait Augustinus: 'Elemosin<a est> res sancta, auget
nus de lau- presentia, dimittit peccata, multiplicat annos, nobilitat mentem, dilatat terminos, 120
de elemosi- mundat omnia, liberat a morte et a pena, iungit angelis, separat a demonibus, murus est
ne inexplugnabilis circa animam, demones expellit, invitat angelos in auxilium.' De hac
Item Ieroni- Ieronimus dicit: 'Elemosina penetrat celum, precedit dantem, pulsat ad ianuam regni,
mus excitat angelos in obviam, Deum convocat in adiutorium.' Item Origenes: 'Elemosina
Origenes hebraice, *Dei mei opus* interpretatur latine.' Hoc nomen non tam humanum quam 125
De tribus divinum opus indicat. Tria vero sunt genera elemosinarum. Una corporalis: egenti
generibus scilicet dare quicquid poteris. Altera spiritualis: dimittere ei a quo lesus fueris. Tertia:
elemosina- delinquentem corrigere et errantes in viam veritatis reducere.
rum
Conclusio Hec sunt opera Quadragesime. Hic est cultus iustitie. Hec Christianorum est
disciplina. Hec redemptio peccatorum et medicina. Sine his ieiunare vel corpus 130
macerare possumus, sed parum vel nichil proficiemus. Igitur in his omnibus
exhibeamus nosmetipsos tamquam Dei ministros, ut non vituperetur ministerium
nostrum, sed per hec mente et corpore purificati ad verum paschalis agni pervenire
mereamur convivium.

132 ministros: 2 Cor 6:4.

133 nostrum: 2 Cor 6:3 (pars Epistolae pro Dominica Prima Quadragesimae)

118 sequitur de elemosina: *codex mutilatus*119 elemosina est: *codex mutilatus*

III

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE LATIN AND VERNACULAR VERSIONS OF THE SERMON

From comparison of S, the later F, the Old English V and the reconstructed T, it would appear that S is a good text of the 'lost penitential homily', although the comparison also suggests some variation among the texts of the homily which were drawn upon by the translators into the vernacular.

Sometimes variation is of such a kind that the evidence of the vernacular translations cannot assist in deciding which was the original reading: the differences will not be reflected in a different language. Such variants are to be found in differences of word-order, or the employment of alternative synonyms. In the case of variation of this kind between S and T, the fact that two extant and independent manuscripts of S agree on these readings weighs in their favour against T. When F also agrees with S, it provides confirmatory evidence of the validity of the readings in the S manuscripts. Generally, however, where variation among the Latin texts will be reflected one way or

Ad extremum sequitur de aelimosina, que est plenitudo et perfectio bonorum operum, de cuius laudibus ait Agustinus: 'Aelimosina est res sancta, auget presentia, demit peccata, multiplicat annos, nobilitat mentem, dilatat terminos, mundat omnia, liberat a morte et a poena, iungit angelis, separat a doemonibus, murus est 100 inexpugnabilis circa animam, doemones expellit, invitat angelos in auxilium.' Hieronimus dicit: 'Aelimosina penetrat caelum, preceedit dantem, pulsatur ianuam regni, excitat angelum in obviam, Deum convocat in adiutorium.' Origenis ait: 'Aelimosina aebrance, *Dei mei opus* latine interpretatur.' Hoc nomen non tam humanum quam divinum opus indicat. Tria sunt enim genera aelimosinarum. Una corporalis: aegenti 105 dare quicquid poteris. Altera spiritalis: dimittere ei a quo laesus fueris. Tertia: delinquentem corrigere et errantes in viam reducere veritatis.

Haec in nobis implere dignetur salvator mundi, qui cum Patre (f. 46r) et Spiritu Sancto vivit et regnat in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

98-101 Aelimosina ... auxilium: Cf. CCH 13.2 (p. 38).

102-103 Aelimosina... adiutorium: Cf. ibid. 13.2 (p. 39).

103-104 Aelimosina ... interpretatur: Cf. ibid. 13.1 (p. 38).

98 operum *om.* J

99 mentes J mundat *corr.* ex mundet P

102 penetrat *corr.* ex penetret P pulsatur *-t add.* s.s. J

106 fueris *corr.* ex fueri/. (littera ult. eras.) in J *secundā manus*

another in the vernacular translations, the vernacular versions agree with S against T and against F. This is the major justification for saying that S is a good text of the 'lost penitential homily'.

Differences between S and T probably reflect variation either in the copies of the original authorities drawn upon to compile the sermon, or alterations made in S in the process of fashioning a sermon out of a string of quotations, or both.

Differences between S and F reflect the reworking of the older homily by William de Montibus: there seems to be no very clear instance where F preserves a more authentic reading than S, as attested by an agreement between the Old English version and F against S. The reworking of S in the later Latin version of the sermon is of two kinds. Visible straightaway is the omission of extended passages from S and the substitution of others. The second kind is minor adaptation, clarification and amplification, also seen in the Old English texts of S and the Middle English version of F. Amplification of the source in any of these three versions F, V and H will be indicated below by italicisation.

In the following discussion, then, I shall indicate the major differences between the reconstructed T and the actual S. I wish also to compare S and F,

using the evidence of V and T to show that these confirm S's readings, to consider the extended omissions and substitutions in F and to point out the minor retouching of S in F. Finally, I shall describe the handling of F in the Middle English translation H.

1. *S compared with T*

One of the most obvious advantages that S has over T is that it contains the text of the few original parts of the sermon which owe nothing to authorities and which therefore cannot be reconstructed except by conjecture and by paraphrase of the corresponding parts of the vernacular versions into Latin. These passages are predominantly the introduction, conclusion and linking passages between the different parts of the sermon. Thus the authenticity of the introduction in S is confirmed by F, which here differs little, and by V. Differences between the Latin and Old English texts suggest amplification for the sake of clarity in the Old English, rather than differences among the copies of S. As witnessed by V3, the introduction in the Old English sermon reads as follows (as indicated above, I have italicised vernacular additions to and expansions of the Latin):

BRoðor þa leofestan, ic cyðe, þæt þreo þinz synt ærest on fore-weardum æghwylcum men nyd-be-hefe to habbanne: .i. is zeleafa; oðer is hiht; þridde soð lufu. On ðam zeleafan is, þæt he zelyfe on 3od, fæder ælmihtizne, 7 on sunu 7 þone halȝan zast, 7 on þa to-dældan þrynesse 7 on þa þurhwuniendan annysse. Þonne is hiht, þæt he wislice ze-hihte þa ecan meda. Þonne is seo soðe lufu, þæt he sie zefylled mid þære 3od-cundan lufan 7 his nehstan. Forþam-þe we sint ealle on þam fulluhte 3odes bearn ze-halȝode, to þam þæt we sien zastlice ze-broðor an fulfremedre soðe lufan æfter 3ode. Ðy we sceolon symle wunian on þære 3odcundan lufan 7 ures nehstan, þæt he symle on us þurh-wunize. Forþam, swa swa Iohannes cwæð, '3od is seo soþe lufu, 7 se-þe wunaþ on ðære soðan lufan, he wunaþ on 3ode, 7 3od wunað on him.' (Förster, pp. 53-55)

There is then the additional opening phrase 'BRoðor þa leofestan', modelled upon the Latin homiletic formula 'Fratres karissimi'. Similarly 'Broðor mine' is used to mark the changes of subject fairly consistently throughout the Old English, but not the Latin, sermon. Apart from this, V3 is much closer to S than to the ultimate source Alcuin, whose *Liber de virtutibus et vitiis* reads at this point, as stated in T, 'Tria quidem proposuit animae nostrae necessaria egregius gentium doctor'. The technical 'tres personas et unam substantiam' (S l. 4) is paraphrased, with the addition of *to-dældan* and *þurhwuniendan*. The compressed sequence 'Fides ut Spes ut Caritas ut ...' (S ll. 3-5) is expanded, 'On ðam zeleafan is, þæt Þonne is hiht Þonne is seo soðe lufu'. F and S are very close at this point; nonetheless V3 follows S rather than F in the

translations 'wislice' for 'certe' (F 'certissime': S l. 4, F l. 4) and 'Forþam, swa swa Iohannes' for 'Quia, sicut Iohannes' (F 'sicut Iohannes': S l. 7, F l. 8).

For the beginning of the next section, called in F 'De vi alijs virtutibus precipuis', Turville-Petre provided her own conjectural translation into Latin. S provides the text. Again the content is straightforward and V3 and S correspond closely. Again in the Old English, the scheme is made clearer by additional numbering:

Broðor mine, .vi. þinȝ synt nyde-be-hefe to habbanne þære halȝan cristenlican æwfæstnesse 7 ealra mæst on þyssum halȝum lenȝten-fæstenes: .i. is andetnes; oðer is hreowsunȝ; þridde is wæcce; feorþe is fæsten; .v. sint ȝe-bedu; .vi. is ælmesse. (Förster, p. 55)

The link to penance in V3 reads:

Broðor mine, æfter þære andet-nesse to under-fonne is sio hreowsunȝ. (Förster, p. 57)

Thus *post hanc* (S l. 30, F l. 39) is expanded and clarified, as it is also in the Middle English translation, 'aftir such trewe confessioun'.

The Latin link to the subject of vigils reads baldly, 'Huic siquidem coniungendae sunt vigiliae' (S l. 44, F l. 53), a formula which was used in a number of the other linking passages. This is supplemented and rendered with some freedom in the Old English as 'Þam hreowsiendan is sio wæcce witodlice to bezanne' (Förster, p. 59): 'Vigils are assuredly to be commenced by the penitent'. H, the Middle English translation, makes similar alterations, and is somewhat expanded beyond the original, 'But now ... wakyng fro bodili sleep ... musten folewe trewe penaunce þat we haue spoken of'. The rest of this linking passage shows a close correspondence between S and V3: 'quia ipse fructus eius eleuant ad caelum. Unde et nos vigilare oportet' (S ll. 44-45) agrees with:

Forþam-þe hio heofonum up-ahefð þæs hreowsiendan wæstmas. Forþam us ȝe-dafenap wacian symle. (Förster, pp. 59-60)

And the beginning of the section on almsgiving again shows close correspondence between the Old English and S (ll. 97-98) and F (ll. 118-119):

Æt þam ytemestan, broðor mine, her-æfter fylȝð sio manunȝ be þære ælmessan, sio is fylness 7 fulfremednes ealra ȝodra weorca. Be þære ælmessan lofe Aȝustinus cwaed. (Förster, p. 68)

However, for the conclusion S is the only satisfactory witness that we have. William de Montibus, as already mentioned (pp. 275-76 above), substituted another, and the Old English versions, even while they are close and evidently indebted to S, are confused. S (ll. 108-109) reads:

Haec in nobis implere dignetur salvator mundi, qui cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto vivit et regnat in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

The Old English versions erroneously list all three persons of the Trinity, forgetting that the Son, as the subject of the sentence, has already been invoked, a slip common in sermons.³⁴ V3 reads:

Pas þinȝ us zedafenað zefellan mid fæder 7 mid suna 7 mid þam³⁵ halȝa zaste a in ecnesse þurh ealra worulda woruld aa butan ende. Amen. (Förster, pp. 70-71)

B5 adds 'mid þæs fultume, þe' after 'zefellan' (Belfour, p. 48).

Conjecture was necessary in T for a few other parts of the text besides the introduction, conclusion and linking passages. Such are:

S (ll. 56-58)

Sciunt enim quod non est vanum mane surgere ante lucem ad vigilandum, quia promisit Dominus coroham vigilantibus.

V3

Forþam hie witon, þæt þæt nis idellic ær to a-risenne 7 ær leohte to wacienne; forþam Dryhten zehet þone heofonlice beah þam waciendan. (Förster, p. 62)

These passages in S supply the text where it could not be reconstructed with any authority in T. Some examples of the way in which the sources quoted in T were modified in the sermon itself are:

S (l. 11); F (l. 12)

confessio (igitur) facienda est

T (Theodulf of Orleans)

confessiones dandae sunt

V3

Sio andetnes is to donne (Förster, p. 55)

S (l. 42)

consequi posse veniam Dei misericordia non dubitet

T (Isidore and Alcuin)

consequi posse veniam se per Dei misericordiam non dubitet³⁶

V3

ne tweeȝe him for-zifenesse bezitan þurh ȝodes mild-heort-nesse (Förster, p. 59).

³⁴ For a later example, see *Middle English Sermons Edited from British Museum ms. Royal 18 B.xxiii* by W. O. Ross (EETS OS 209; London, 1940), p. 187, ll. 7-9, and Ross's note on these lines (p. 359).

³⁵ *þam* is repeated in the manuscript (and in Förster's edition: 'Das eine *þam* is natürlich zu streichen').

³⁶ T: misericordiae; cf. PL 101.623. Isidore is clearer than S: it is perhaps not surprising that in F the idea was simplified as 'de misericordia Dei non diffidat' (l. 51).

The idea that fasting ought to be tempered with discretion reveals considerable variation between T and S, S and V, as well as between S and F. S records a saying of Isidore's, differing considerably from T in form. It is not attested in F, or any of the vernacular versions except the Old Icelandic:

Sicut pluvia multum distillans, quae, si nimium imbres prebeat, non solum nullum usum bonum adhibet, sed etiam periculum exhibet.³⁷ (S ll. 80-81)

The passage is continued in both J and P by a quotation from Jerome. Again, among the vernacular versions, it appears only in the Old Icelandic, and it is not found in F:

Hieronimus dicit: 'Sint ergo tibi cotidiana ieiunia et refectio satietatem fugiens', id est, cotidie esurire et cotidie prandere.³⁸ (S ll. 82-83)

S goes on in both copies, again not in F:

Sciendum est igitur quod ieiunia cum bonis operibus Deo optime acceptabilia sunt, quia hoc est perfectum ieiunium....³⁹ (ll. 83-84)

F renders the idea that fasting properly performed is acceptable to God by the phrase '*acceptum est Deo*, quia celum aperit et ad tronum altissimi potenter ascendit' (l. 98).⁴⁰

2. *S compared with F*

Leaving aside the consideration of the value of S as a source text, judged by comparison with T and the vernacular versions, I wish now to consider the later reworking of the material in William de Montibus' sermon. Immediately apparent are the extended passages of S which have been omitted in F and others which have been substituted, notably in the treatment of confession, vigils, prayer and the conclusion. The section on confession in particular reveals some of the most striking changes in the entire sermon between the two Latin versions and, indeed, between F and the Middle English text. The significance of these will be discussed later, but their nature may be indicated here. S (and the Old English texts) give directions to the priest to make enquiry of the penitent as to the manner and occasion of the sins which he confesses,

³⁷ Cf. T, 'Sicut aqua, quae si nimium imbres praebent, non solum nullum usum sed etiam periculum exhibit (*sic*)', and Isidore, 'Sicut aqua, quae si nimios imbres praebent, non solum nullum usum adhibet, sed etiam periculum exhibet' (*Sancti Isidori ... sententiarum libri tres* 2.44.16 [PL 83.654]).

³⁸ Cf. T, 'Multoque melius est cottidie parvum quam raro satis sumere'.

³⁹ Cf. T, 'Jejunia cum bonis operibus Domino acceptabilia sunt. Perfectum est jejunium quod in eleemosynis et orationibus fit'.

⁴⁰ S, 'Caelum transit et ad thronum altissimi Dei pervenit' (l. 85).

and to apportion penance in accordance with the deed. He should persuade the penitent to confess his evil thoughts and enjoin him to make a model confession of the eight principal sins, which the priest should rehearse to him;

Debet ei etiam iniungi ut de octo principalibus vitiis faciat suam confessionem. Et nominatim ei debet sacerdos unumquodque vitium dicere et suam de eo confessionem accipere. (S ll. 20-22)

William de Montibus omits the directions for a general confession of the principal sins, and concentrates on the individual confession. The idea that the priest 'iuxta modum illius facti [= peccati] debet ei poenitentia iudicari' (S l. 19, F ll. 20-21) is accordingly expanded. The long substituted passage in F ('Providendum est tamen sacerdoti ... ne perpetrari valeant doctrina succurrente preveniunt', ll. 22-30) treats of the priest's duty to be lenient in imposing penances as he himself hopes to be judged leniently, citing Mt 7:2 ('With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again'), for 'we who show clemency to ourselves in our wickedness ought by no means to show harshness to the sin of another' (F ll. 25-26). However, the priest ought not dissemble or foster sins, but prudently cut them away. This leads into the interpolated section 'Quod sacerdotes medicos imitari debent': priests, like doctors, should anticipate and forestall future ills as well as cure present disease. It will be seen, then, that William de Montibus' alterations and additions to this subject give the exposition of confession a much more vaguely exhortatory character than the precise directions of the original.

Under vigils another long passage ('Et ne solis apostolis ... quia promisit Dominus coronam vigilantibus', S ll. 52-58) was omitted. Instead William de Montibus interpolated the passage 'Quare diem mortis ignoramus' (F ll. 61-68), giving three reasons why man remains ignorant of the day of his death and the general Judgement. This is followed by an 'Ubi sunt?' passage, the 'Interrogatio bona' (F ll. 69-74). The particular 'Ubi sunt?' passage that William used was a popular piece, found in a number of Old English homilies, albeit not in V or B6, the ultimate source being Isidore's *Synonyma*.⁴¹ 'Ubi sunt?' passages are liable to supplementation, and, during the course of transmission, or in the compilation of the *Collectio 'Filius matris'*, 'Ubi sunt amatores mundi?' (F ll. 69-70) was added to the beginning, and 'Ubi sapientes huius mundi?' (F l. 71) was substituted for 'Ubi divites mundi?' at the end.

⁴¹ See J. E. Cross, *Latin Themes in Old English Poetry* (Bristol, 1962), p. 3. Isidore's 'Ubi sunt?' passage reads:

Dic ubi sunt reges? Ubi principes? Ubi
imperatores? Ubi locupletatis rerum? Ubi
potentes seculi? Ubi divites mundi? (PL 83.865).

Under the section on prayer, William de Montibus added the consideration that 'Orationum plura sunt genera' (F ll. 108 ff.) with 'De diversis doctoribus' to authorise it. One of the varieties of prayer in action – almsgiving (F ll. 109-111) – anticipates the final section of the sermon, and is perhaps evidence of somewhat careless compilation on William's part. Finally, the conclusion, from 'Hec sunt opera Quadragesime' (F l. 129) and ending with citations from the Epistle for the day, is much fuller in comparison with the formulaic invocation of the Trinity which rounds off the Old English versions and S.

As well as these major adaptations of the older sermon, William de Montibus also introduced stylistic retouching: clarification by paraphrase, such as 'per quod diabolum vicit' (F l. 88) for S's 'per quod superavit adversarium' (S l. 72),⁴² or amplification. Sometimes the amplification is a matter of adding a single word, such as *scilicet*, or a simple phrase to point the progress of the argument. Examples of this type are:

tria ... sunt necessaria: fides *scilicet*, spes, caritas (F ll. 2-3; cf. S ll. 2-3)

ut *Deus* ipse semper in nobis maneat⁴³ (F ll. 7-8; cf. S l. 7)

sex ... necessaria sunt: confessio *scilicet* (F ll. 10-11; cf. S ll. 9-10)

In primis enim confessio facienda est (F l. 12; cf. S l. 11)

Christus *etiam* ieiunavit xl. diebus (F ll. 87-88; cf. S ll. 71-72).

Occasionally he wished to reinforce a moral:

... quicquid autem nimis et ultra modum est, *non solum vitiosum, sed etiam* periculosum est. (F ll. 95-96; cf. S ll. 79-80)

Sometimes he was moved to dilate a theological point: the compiler of S remarks of pride that it was the sin by which the angels fell from heaven (S ll. 15-16); William de Montibus added that it was also the sin of Adam 'per quam prothoplastus deceptus primam beatitudinem amisit' (F ll. 17-18). Again, in expatiating upon the virtues of confession, he described it as the 'secunda tabula post naufragium' (F l. 35), quoting from the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard. Similarly, 'confessio Deum placat' was added (F l. 33), which has no counterpart in STV, or in the source, Isidore's *Synonyma*.⁴⁴

The material was simplified and condensed as well as amplified. Examples are:

F

per quam angelica creatura de celo cecidit (l. 17)

⁴² V3, 'He ofer-swiðde þone wiðer-winnan' (Förster, p. 65).

⁴³ maneat] perseveret S.

⁴⁴ Cf. PL 83.839.

S

per quam creatura angelorum mirabilis cecidit de caelo⁴⁵ (l. 16)

F

unicum peccatoribus medicamentum (ll. 34-35)

S

unicum est viribus nostris medicamentum cum poenitentia⁴⁶ (ll. 25-26)

F

In hoc enim seculo nulli vere penitenti Dei misericordia subtrahitur (ll. 51-52)

S

In hoc enim saeculo poenitentiam facientibus Dei semper misericordia subvenit⁴⁷ (ll. 42-43)

F

per quod meruit divina misteria recipere (l. 90)

S

per quod meruit mysteria divina audire angelo ei annuntiante⁴⁸ (ll. 74-75)

A further simplification of the text of S in F is the pruning and condensation of authorities, scriptural and patristic, especially where there are long lists of them. Thus in the section on vigils there is nothing in F equivalent to Mt 24:47, *Amen dico vobis, super omnia bona sua constituet eos* (S l. 49),⁴⁹ while S also gives a much fuller citation of Mc 13:35-36, completing the sentence *Vigilate ergo, nescitis enim quando Dominus veniat ... an galli cantu with ne cum venerit inveniatis vos dormientes* (S ll. 50-52, F ll. 59-60).

The later sermon F also makes some striking errors and confusions in the patristic authorities cited. Thus in the beginning of the section on fasting a quotation from Isidore is, in F, assigned to Jerome. The quotation itself in S and V confirms the existence of an error in F which is to be suspected from the text of F alone: William de Montibus, under the influence of 'opus celeste', wrote 'ianua celi' for 'ianua regni caelestis' (V3, 'heofona-rices duru'):

F

Post hec congrue secuntur ieiunia, de quorum laudibus dicit Ieronimus: 'Ieiunium est res sancta, opus celeste, ianua celi, forma futuri seculi....' (ll. 75-76)

⁴⁵ V3, 'Ðurh þa ofer-hyʒde of heofonum ʒe-hreas þæt wundor-lice enʒla ʒesceaft' (Förster, p. 56).

⁴⁶ V3, 'Hio is læce-dom ura mæʒena mid hreowsunʒe' (Förster, p. 57).

⁴⁷ V3, 'Ðaþe on þisse worulde hreowsunʒe doð, þam simle ʒodes mild-heortnesse ʒehelpð' (Förster, p. 59).

⁴⁸ V3, 'Ða ʒod-cundan ʒerynu ʒe-hyran, swa him se enʒel bodude' (Förster, pp. 65-66).

⁴⁹ V3, 'To soðan ic eow secʒe, ofer eall is ʒod ʒeset' (Förster, p. 60).

Nor was this the only error which occurred in the transmission of the Fathers' lists of the properties of fasting from the Carolingian homily to the *Collectio 'Filius matris'*: the ensuing list under the heading 'De virtute ieiunij' ascribed in F again to Jerome is a confusion of two quotations, one from 'Jerome' and one from 'Augustine', which are clearly differentiated in S and V. S reads:

Hieronimus dicit: 'Ieiunium castigat corpus, refrenat vitia, incitat virtutes.'
 Agustinus dicit: 'Ieiunium pandit misteria, excludit vitia, inluminat animam.'
 (ll. 62-64)

F places 'Augustine's' items first and transposes 'inluminat animam' from its place in the quotation from 'Augustine' for 'incitat virtutes' in the quotation from 'Jerome':

Item Ieronimus: 'Ieiunium pandit misteria, excludit vitia, incitat virtutes, castigat corpus, refrenat vitia, illuminat animam.' (ll. 78-80)

And a similar ironing out of an authority in F is seen in the 'Commendatio ieiunij': the source for the statement that Adam is an example of the ills caused by not fasting is clearly attributed to Jerome in S and V ('Hieronimus ait' [l. 76], 'Hieronimus cwæð'), but the attribution is missing in F (ll. 92-93).

3. *F compared with H*

William de Montibus' sermon, as already mentioned, underwent further revision at the hands of the H translator. Like the Old English translators, he was ready to add explanatory sentences and phrases, and to paraphrase in order to clarify the original. He also added conspicuously to the number of scriptural authorities cited. For example, to the introduction are added three authorities, one for each of the theological virtues: 'Wiþout bileue, it is imposible to plesse God' (Heb 11:6), 'Blessid be he þat hopiþ in our Lord',⁵⁰ and 'He þat louiþ his neizbore haþ fulfillid þe lawe' (Rom 13:8). Indeed in considering charity, the translator then added more authorities in a short interpolated passage:

'He þat louiþ his neizbore haþ fulfillid þe lawe.' And no wondur, for, as Ioon seiþ in his Epistle, 'He þat loueþ not his broþer þat he seiþ, hou mai he loue God, þat he seiþ not?'⁵¹ And so whoso loueþ wel his broþer, he loueþ also his God. 'And in þese two commaundementis,' as seiþ Crist hymself, 'hangiþ al þe lawe and þe profetis wordis.' (H fol. 52v)

And a string of authorities is again added, this time from the second Penitential Psalm, to the definition of confession preceding the list of the eight principal sins:

⁵⁰ A common scriptural sentiment; cf. Pr 16:20, Ps 33(34):8.

⁵¹ 1 Jn 4:20.

First þat men knouleche wiþ hert and mouþ all her synnes þat comen to her mynde þat þei han offendid God wiþ, in herte, in mouþ and in dede. For þe profete seiþ in þe persone of synful men, 'Lord, I made my synne knowen to þee,' – þat is to sei, bi *veri* knouelechyng – 'and myn vnrihtwisnesse I hid not,' to shewe þe mekenesse of mysilf, þat knouest all maner pryueetes. 'I seide, I shal knouleche azens myself myn vnrihtwisnesse to my Lord' – and se þerfor þe profit þat folewiþ aftir – 'And þou, Lord,' seiþ þe profete, 'hast forzeue þe wickidnesse of my synne.'⁵² And for þis gret profit seiþ Iames in his Epistle, 'Knouleche 3e eiþer to oþer 3our synnes, and praiþ for eche of 3ou togider þat 3e mowe be saued.'⁵³ (H fol. 52v)

The translator added not only scriptural authorities, but on occasion also information as to the whereabouts of authorities cited. Thus at the close of the introductory section he distinguished between John's Gospel and Epistles:

As Ioon seiþ in *his Epistle*, 'God is charite, and he þat dwelliþ in charite, dwelliþ in God, and God in hym.' (H fol. 52v)

Again, at the beginning of the section 'De oratione', two authorities are cited in commendation of prayer: Isidore, followed directly by a quotation from James, *Multum valet deprecatio iusti assidua* (F l. 100). T does not give a reference for this quotation; S attributes it to the wrong apostle, '*Oratio assidua multum valet apud Deum*, Paulo Apostolo dicente' (S ll. 87-88), in which it is followed by the Old English, V3, 'Singallice 3ebed myclum fremap mid 3ode, swa-swa Paulus se apostol cwæð' (Förster, p. 67). F simply introduces the quotation with 'Et Apostolus', which H expands correctly, 'And to þis entent seyþ Seynt Iames, "Moche is worþ þe bisie preier of a rihtwis man"' (fol. 54r).⁵⁴

Not all of H's additions have this specific purpose of providing extra authorities, though, unlike William de Montibus, the Middle English translator did not add new material to the sermon; rather he elaborated occasionally on points in the original.⁵⁵ The longest of these expansions occurs in the section 'De virtute confessionis'. William de Montibus, following Peter Lombard, described confession as being the 'secunda tabula post naufragium'. H's translator is perhaps predictably prompted to supply 'the first table' as well, along with general explanation and yet another authority:

⁵² Ps 31(32):5.

⁵³ Jac 5:16.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ This is not always true of the Middle English translation. For discussion of another sermon, which was expanded considerably, see Spencer, 'A Fifteenth-Century Translation' (n. 26 above).

Such confessioun is, as it were, þe second boord þat kepīþ vs from drenchyng of þe gret depnesse of helle. For, but if we *verili forþenken* – þat is, as it were, þe first boord – and aftir knowleche treuli our synnes, aftir þe abilitie þat God grauntīþ vs, we forsaken þe wei toward heuen and rennen hedlyng toward helle. And to þis entent seiþ Salamon, 'He þat hidīþ his synnes shal not be dressid euenlich to heuenward.' (H fol. 53r)

Other straightforward expansion of this kind occurs in the translation of F's added passage 'Quare diem mortis ignoramus' in which William de Montibus considers man's ignorance not only of the day of his death but also of the Judgement. H consistently clarifies which notion is being referred to, tightens the structure and expands. As an example of the translator's method, it is worth citing in full:

And vnderstonde þat for þre causis oure Lord hidīþ his comyng fro man, and also þe hour of his deēþ. Oon cause is þat, if man knew *þe hour or þe dai* of his deþ, man wold lede þe most part of his lijf in synne, and ful late turne to God. *But, for man shuld not tarie long from his seruyce, he puttīþ hym in vncerteynte boþe of his comyng to þe doom, and of þe our of his deþ.*

Þe second cause is for man shuld not dispeire of his helpe for long contynuyng in his synne, *for þe fendis temptacioun myȝt soone ouercome a synful man* if he knew his endyng dai riȝt nyȝ, and he so long contynued in wickid lijf.

Þe þrid cause þat God hidīþ fro man *þe dai of his deþ and of his comyng*, is for man shuld alwei suppose þat *þe dai of his deþ and Cristis comyng* is ful nyȝ, and so wake *in holi pouȝtis* and make hym redi wiþ holi werkis to be presentid vp to God *whaneuer he wold vouchesaaf to come.* (H fol. 53v; cf. F ll. 61-68)

Under the section on 'Quomodo agenda sit penitentia', H added a definition of penance according to the threefold distinction of contrition, confession and satisfaction (William de Montibus had stated simply 'Sciendum est igitur quia hec est vera penitentia que districte agitur' [F l. 47]):

And so *veri* penaunce bfore God is a man to make herti sorowe for his synne, wiþ trew confessioun of his moup, wiþ satisfaccioun of good contynuyng lijf þerwiþ, pouȝ a man lyue not many ȝeris aftir. And so ech man þat is wounden in greuouse synnes turne hym to *veri* penaunce bityme. (H fol. 53r)

Although this passage has no counterpart in F, parts of it paraphrase ideas from the Latin which appear in a corresponding passage on penance omitted from H. Thus, the statement that the satisfaction made by a good life after sin is not diminished by the possible shortness of that life depends upon William de Montibus' remark 'Penitentia enim vera non annorum numero censetur, sed amaritudine animi' (F ll. 47-48).

It is apparent then that, in his revisions, the translator of H, like William de Montibus, saw fit to make omissions as well as additions. Accordingly H not

only added authorities, but also sometimes abridged long lists of them. Thus in the section 'De vigiliis', in which, in the Latin, five are cited in succession in support of vigils, the third (Lc 12:37, *Beati servi illi, quos, cum venerit Dominus, invenerit vigilantes* [F ll. 57-58]) is left out. Patristic authorities likewise suffered. Under 'De virtute ieiunii', 'Jerome's' praise of fasting was greatly curtailed. His second saying ('Ieiunium pandit misteria ... illuminat animam', F ll. 78-80) is omitted except for the last statement that 'Ieiunia quoque fortia tela sunt adversus temptamenta diaboli', 'And so fastyngs ben stronge dartis azens þe entisyngs of þe deuel' (H fol. 53v; cf. F l. 80). A quotation from 'Origen' on almsgiving was also omitted. This, however, is hardly surprising since it concerned an etymology and a Latin definition, well-nigh impossible, as one would think, to translate into the vernacular: 'Elemosina hebraice, *Dei mei opus* interpretatur Latine' (F ll. 124-125, S ll. 103-104). It was omitted from the Old English versions as well. However, in the Middle English sermon, the name 'Origen' was left and has in error become attached to the following section 'De tribus generibus elemosinarum', 'And Origen rehersiþ þre maneris of almesdedis' (H fol. 54v).

Some of the omissions in H are more considerable. The translator left out the entire passage marked 'De confessione' in F, and picks up only generally and in passing the comparison between medical and spiritual doctors: 'Perfor men þat ben of feble wit/tis, þei shulden wel be ransakid of spiritual lechis: aftir offence of dyuers synnes biforeseid, dyuerse remedies of Goddis word shulden be put to her sores' (fols. 52v-53r). The Middle English joins up with the Latin again with 'Deus enim confessionem nostram desiderat' (F ll. 31-32), 'And þus God desiriþ moche our shrifte', but substitutes 'for to forzeue vs our synne þat we han offendid hym wiþ' for F's 'ut iustam ignoscendi causam habeat' (F l. 32). The translator of H adopted William de Montibus' ensuing praise of confession, but introduced qualifications throughout:

And so, *sooþ it is*, confessioun makip a man gostli hool, and it be doon wiþ a trewe soreuful hert. Such confessioun makip a man to plesse his God bi vertuose lyuyng aftirward. Suche confessioun iustifieþ a man þat he shal not be countid gilty of trespassis bifore doon. Such confessioun getip a man ful forzeuenesse, for al hope of forzeuenesse stant þorouȝ such veri confessioun, and þus such confessioun is a ful gret werk of mercy. (H fol. 53r; cf. F ll. 32-34)

On the whole one would think that the Middle English compiler did not make such great additions or supplementations as one might perhaps expect from a writer working long after the impetus towards rudimentary catechetical instruction, provided by the Lateran IV directives, had been felt. Rather his remarks assume knowledge of penance, and read as a perfectly orthodox appraisal of the sacrament's merits, which yet places careful restraints and limitations on the high claims made for it in the source.

The Old and Middle English treatments of the discussion of confession indicate one general change which was made in both V and H. The Latin penitential homily was written as a model sermon, that is, a sermon produced for the use of other preachers less well-equipped as regards education or access to books than the author himself. Indeed William de Montibus intended his whole sermon collection to be used in this way, as he states in his prologue:

Nec solum fastidiosis lectoribus consultum ire dispo, sed simplicioribus et minus eruditis.⁵⁶

As regards the Lent sermon, the intention that it should be used as a model for preachers is made clear in the section on confession, where remarks are, in both S and F, addressed to the preacher for his private information, rather than for delivery to the congregation without adaptation. The Latin gives impersonal directions:

Quando ergo unusquisque ad confessionem venerit, diligenter debet inquiri quomodo, aut qua occasione, perpetraverit peccatum quod fecisse se confitetur. (F ll. 19-20, S ll. 17-18)

However, in both English renderings, the sermon could be delivered to a congregation as it stands. In the Middle English this is a simple matter of omission; the translator leaves out not only the directions as to what happens in confession, but also the passage peculiar to F which elaborates the idea that penance should be proportionate to the offence committed and comments on the proneness of the priesthood, in common with the rest of humanity, to sin. We cannot know why the translator left this out: perhaps because it was not directly relevant to the laity, or through a sense of tact towards his profession, or because the Latin becomes somewhat convoluted in considering 'Quod sacerdotes medicos imitari debent'. However, the result is certainly to remove any need for the preacher to alter or edit the sermon before using it. In the Old English sermon, the precise instructions on confession, cited above, are turned into a direct address to the hearers, although this is not perfectly carried out, and the passage reverts from the second to the third person:

Broðor mine, þonne 3e rihtre andetnesse to eowrum scriftum becumen, þonne sceal he eow 3eornlice ahsian, mid hwylcum 3emetete oððe mid hwylcum intingum syo syn þurh-tozen wære, þe he 3e-andette, þæt he ær 3e-fremede. (Förster, p. 56)

Again the result is to allow the sermon to be read as it stands without prior editing by another user. I do not wish to imply that the vernacular sermons, unlike the Latin texts, were not to be used as model sermons. Indeed the Old

⁵⁶ MS. Pembroke College 116, fol. 69r.

English homily, extant in two versions, copied many times and fragmented for use in other sermons, clearly was used in this way. The Middle English '*Filius matris*' may also have been produced with such an intention: there are four extant copies, a fairly high number for an ordinary Sunday collection. Thus one may postulate that all versions of the homily were produced as models, and furthermore it may be suggested that the compilers envisaged their use within the setting of the 'prone', the vernacular address delivered to the congregation in the course of the Mass. In the later Middle Ages the vernacular exposition of the Gospel was a recognised and traditional function of the prone, but, as Gatch has argued, this later state of affairs cannot be simply read back into Anglo-Saxon times, when the prone was more normally devoted to catechetical instruction than to exegetical.⁵⁷ Ælfric's work is untypical in this respect, if one takes it that the *Catholic Homilies* were intended as prones. Whereas exegesis would have been felt to be more appropriate for devotional reading, catechesis of the laity was called forth by the legislation of successive ecclesiastical councils. The prone 'must almost necessarily have been the setting in which much of the preaching called for in the canonical writing ... took place.'⁵⁸ It goes almost without saying that the Old English penitential homily is an excellent illustration of such a catechetical sermon.

IV

CONCLUSIONS

Even when we have taken account of the revisions made to this sermon by its users in later centuries, its long history remains a remarkable example of continuity. It is an anonymous and strictly utilitarian patchwork compilation, and one would guess that its simple usefulness as a model sermon for preachers to deliver to a lay congregation was the factor which recommended it to William de Montibus when he was compiling his own collection of sermons *ad populum*. The Lent sermon is a clearly structured summary, with a wealth of authorities and examples adduced in support, of the basics of Christian living, especially important in Lent, '3he, and of all oþer tymes whilis we lyuen in þis world', as the translator of H added in one of his characteristic qualifications (H fol. 54v), glossing F's conclusion 'Hec sunt opera Quadragesime'.

William de Montibus himself, writing in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century, before the Lateran IV reforms, the foundation of the mendicant orders

⁵⁷ Gatch, *Preaching and Theology*; see especially pp. 37-38, 44.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 47.

and the subsequent development of a new and complex sermon form, followed the old homiletic preaching methods. His borrowing of a sermon from a homiliary of the type popular in Anglo-Saxon times is not incongruous, and, as already mentioned, is perhaps of a piece with the continued use of the vernacular sermons of Ælfric and Wulfstan at this period.

The late fourteenth- or early fifteenth-century translator of the sermon simply rendered William de Montibus' Sunday cycle into Middle English as he found it, from Advent 1 to the end.⁵⁹ There is no indication that the extra sermon for Lent 1 was an import into F, and Lent 1 was by no means the only occasion when William de Montibus provided extra sermons for days of special importance. One would expect the penitential sermon to be included in the translation with the rest, quite apart from its intrinsic usefulness. '*Filius matris*' may have been regarded as something of a 'classic' among collections of Sunday preaching, for it continued to be copied until well into the fifteenth century, a factor which may simply have increased the chances of its availability to a would-be translator of sermons, or perhaps have influenced his choice: one can only speculate as to his motives for selecting this particular collection. Nonetheless it is noteworthy that the old homiletic manner of preaching represented by William de Montibus, which had always been felt to be especially suitable for vernacular preaching, seems to have been coming into fresh prominence at this date, when sermons, along with other kinds of writing, began increasingly to be recorded in English.

In sum, the penitential homily was old, and perhaps old-fashioned, even when it was still being copied in the Old English manuscripts of the eleventh century. It probably owed its success to the very fundamental nature of the virtues and good works expounded. William de Montibus' version of the text shows how one individual thought to revise it, and perhaps by implication, bring it up to date. The existence of the Old and Middle English texts of the sermon, so widely separated in date, provides a basis for comparison of the methods of the translators, and also perhaps a particularly good example of 'the continuity of English prose'.

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⁵⁹ He omitted the prologue, and also the small set of *Commune Sanctorum* sermons which follow the Sunday sermons in a number of the '*Filius matris*' manuscripts, although perhaps not the one he used himself.

THE EPISCOPAL APPOINTMENTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES OF 1375

R. G. Davies

THE mid-1370s were an important time of transition for the leadership of the Church in England. Whilst the laity continued to wait for the imminent passing of Edward III and, with increasing probability, that of his heir, the Black Prince, the Church took cognisance of new metropolitans in both York and Canterbury. At York Alexander Neville, a brother of John, lord Neville of Raby, the steward of the royal household and head of a prominent northern family, succeeded the veteran 'civil servant', John Thoresby, in June 1374.¹ He had been resident in the papal curia for some time and indeed had been *persona non grata* with the Crown some years before. His experience of diocesan administration was virtually none, as too of royal service or English public life generally. If his appointment was pleasing to his brother's connection at court, ostensibly complimentary to local clerical pride in the north, and a gracious enough tribute to the importance attached to work in the papal curia, yet even at the time it cannot have seemed promising of effective leadership for the Church: neither the court nor the clergy nor the pope should have entertained great hopes by the appointment. Certainly it did nothing to detract from the critical importance of the forthcoming appointment to Canterbury, where, also in June 1374, a successor was required to William Whittlesey, whose promotion in 1368 had promised much from one who was both nephew to an earlier primate and himself a scholar and ecclesiastical administrator of distinction, but who had, in the event, declined in the face of chronic ill-health to a merciful and – from his province's point of view – hardly premature death.² The bishopric of Worcester, moreover, had been vacant since

¹ For this appointment, see R. G. Davies, 'Alexander Neville, Archbishop of York, 1374-1388', *Yorkshire Archaeological Journal* 47 (1975), especially 90-93.

² For Whittlesey, see A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-59), 3.1863-64. For other early evidence of his ill-health, in March 1371, see London, Public Record Office SC 10/30/1452-53, his appointment of proctors to parliament, headed by Simon Sudbury, bishop of London, he himself being 'seriously ill'.

November 1373, as the Crown worked slowly towards the appointment of the keeper of the wardrobe, Henry Wakefield, after the frustration of his earlier nomination to Ely.³

There were, therefore, nineteen bishops in office when Whittlesey died, of whom two more were to die in the following year. Transition was the keynote of the whole bench. When these further vacancies of 1375 (in Salisbury and St. Asaph) had been filled, a bench was created of which seventeen bishops still survived a decade later. Conversely, at the end of 1375, only seven bishops had completed ten years on the bench, two of them in Wales, and seven had yet to complete six years. It was not only such inexperience, in terms of both responsibility and numbers, coinciding with the senility of the monarch, the decline of his mature heir, and the uneasy probability of a minority, that made the selection of the new archbishop of Canterbury especially important. Recent relations between the government and the clergy, and between the government and the papacy, had been and remained particularly difficult.⁴ Where the archbishop should stand in such circumstances was still a matter of especial controversy. A direct promotion was not out of the question (there had been four already in the century), but more probably the choice would fall on some established bishop. It is surely no hindsight to appreciate the likelihood of a significant series of appointments being set in train by the Canterbury vacancy, and with other sees chancing to fall vacant at much the same time, parties in both government and Church would have been very conscious that in a time of such controversial lay and ecclesiastical politics there were vital opportunities to be grasped or dangers to be warded off in the consequent re-shaping of the episcopal bench. How far such considerations played their part, and to what effect, seem questions well worth considering. The several appointments have been noticed before, of course, and even some particular attention paid to one or another of them, but a general reappraisal seems still very worthwhile. And, although other significant appointments had recently been made, and the Worcester vacancy was still in being, it is evident that Canterbury lay at the heart of the matter and, accordingly, it must have first and particular attention.

Whittlesey died at Lambeth during the night of 5-6 June 1374. On 10 June the prior and monks of Christ Church, Canterbury, sent two of their number to Edward III for the *congé d'élire*. This was granted expeditiously on 20 June, the

³ See below, pp. 326-29.

⁴ There is a considerable literature on these problems. See, especially, E. Perroy, *L'Angleterre et le grand schisme d'Occident* (Paris, 1933), chap. 1; W. E. Lunt, *Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, 1327-1534* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 103-14; W. A. Pantin, *The English Church in the Fourteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1955; rpt. Notre Dame, 1962), pp. 87-102; G. A. Holmes, *The Good Parliament* (Oxford, 1975), chap. 1.

king being then at Selborne (Hampshire). There seems little doubt that a royal nomination of Simon Sudbury, bishop of London, was enclosed. However, the monks, arranging the election for 30 June, had probably already decided their course of action in advance of Whittlesey's death. They proceeded 'by way of scrutiny', so often a sign of an independent approach, and made a unanimous postulation of Simon Langham, cardinal-bishop of Palestrina, who had actually been archbishop of Canterbury from 1366 to 1368 before joining the college of cardinals.⁵ A letter requesting the royal assent was despatched on the next day. A similar letter was sent directly to the pope asking for the translation, on 10 July.⁶

These actions of the monks illustrate a point of some general validity in this period, one that is not always appreciated. It is easy to exaggerate the exclusive influence of the king and pope over episcopal promotions. Here, for example, over Canterbury itself, the possibility of dispute was not raised between the English government and the pope in the first instance, but by a show of independence on the part of the monks. There were, indeed, several precedents at Canterbury for such capitular initiative, not all of them distant ones.⁷ In 1348, Thomas Bradwardine had been nominated, without success, in opposition to John Offord, the royal candidate. However, the following year, at the height of the Black Death, Offord died, and the monks were able to secure Bradwardine's appointment. In 1366 William Edington of Winchester, the original royal candidate, had had election only by a majority, with two rivals receiving support.⁸ He had, in the event, declined the postulation, and Simon Langham had been translated from Ely to the satisfaction of both king and pope, if not, so some scandal ran, to that of his new flock.⁹ On a purely personal note, Sudbury himself may have been an unpopular nomination to the monks in 1374. He is said to have provoked an ugly scene with some pilgrims to Canterbury in July 1370 by observing that their hopes of spiritual gain were but idle speculation.¹⁰ The same source adds that Sudbury became no real friend of

⁵ Brother Henry of Croydon, who was at the papal curia, alone failed to vote.

⁶ Canterbury Cathedral Library, Register G, fols. 170-176v contains a full record.

⁷ The several thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century examples are summarised by J. H. Denton, 'Canterbury Archiepiscopal Appointments: The Case of Walter Reynolds', *Journal of Medieval History* 1 (1975) 317-27, especially 318-319.

⁸ *Chronicon Johannis de Reading*, ed. J. Tait (Manchester, 1914), pp. 176-77; 'Stephen Birchington', *Historia de vitis archiepiscoporum Cantuariensium in Anglia sacra*, ed. H. Wharton, 2 vols. (London, 1691), 1.46; T. Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana*, ed. H. T. Riley, 2 vols. (RS 28.1; London, 1863-64), 1.303. See below, n. 20.

⁹ 'Birchington', *Anglia sacra* 1.47: 'Exultent coeli; quia Simon transit ab Ely. / Ad cuius adventum flent in Kent millia centum.'

¹⁰ 'Vita Simonis Sudbury', from *Speculum parvulorum* (London, Lambeth Palace ms. 78) in *Anglia sacra* 1.49. F. C. Marvin, *Diocesan Administration in the Late Fourteenth Century: A*

the monks, although generous enough towards the cathedral itself. Their rejection of him at the election might in itself be sufficient to explain any subsequent coolness, but the hint is there to be taken that Sudbury had been already too outspoken about Canterbury's exploitation of its famous shrine.

However, even if it was for so purely negative a reason, antagonism to Sudbury, that the monks rejected the king's advice, probably it was not just a question of personality: such could even have been the least part of it. Sudbury had, it is true, been principally in papal employ before he entered the episcopate in 1361 as bishop of London. He seems also to have been a sound enough diocesan and, by reason of Whittlesey's ill-health, had been unusually active as *ex officio* dean of the province of Canterbury. However, his principal public activity had been to serve the Crown in diplomacy and, much more damning, as recently as 1371 and especially 1373 he had played an unfortunately prominent part, by reason of Whittlesey's frailty, in obliging the clergy to yield, with quite exceptional ill-grace, to the fiscal demands of the Crown.¹¹ With this in mind, it must be recalled at this point that the appointment of an archbishop of Canterbury involved a contentious matter of principle. Whilst this had been debated more obviously in earlier times, and in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries with renewed vigour, it had not yet been resolved, and it can hardly be doubted that Sudbury's recent record would have made sure of its revival.¹² It was the king's natural inclination to have as metropolitan someone – usually, in other words, someone out of his own service – who would urge upon the clergy ready conformity in practice to the wishes of the Crown. Whilst they bore the Crown no ill-will in principle, it was the equally natural preference of the clergy as a whole to have at their head a man proven in his fidelity to the defence of ecclesiastical liberties and uncompromised in his loyalties. Even to put it in less contentious terms, there could well be incompatibility between the king's desire that the new archbishop be someone

Biographical Study (Diss. Michigan, 1976; University Microfilms International, 1979), p. 166, identifies the author as William Chartham, a monk of Christ Church, Canterbury, at the end of the century.

¹¹ London, Lambeth Palace, Register of William Whittlesey, fols. 41v-43, 64v (brief extracts in D. Wilkins, *Concilia magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae*, 4 vols. [London, 1737], 3.91, 96). See Holmes, *Good Parliament*, pp. 17-19, and J. R. L. Highfield, *The Relations between the Church and the English Crown from the Death of Archbishop Stratford to the Opening of the Great Schism* (unpublished D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1951), pp. 172-74, 241-46. Whittlesey had already had difficulties with the lower clergy in January 1370. On the clergy's reaction in convocation, specifically, in these years, see D. Weske, *Convocation of the Clergy* (London, 1937), pp. 163-66.

¹² Denton, 'Canterbury Archiepiscopal Appointments', especially 317-20; idem, 'Walter Reynolds and Ecclesiastical Politics, 1313-16: A Postscript to *Councils and Synods II*' in *Church and Government in the Middle Ages*, ed. C. N. L. Brooke et al. (Cambridge, 1976), especially pp. 247-50.

fully understanding of the government's point of view and, for preference, experienced himself in public life (especially as *ex officio* he would henceforth stand so high in it), and the clergy's belief that the metropolitan should be someone of especial reputation in the administrative and pastoral care of the Church. To meet both criteria was at least difficult.

Some understanding by each side of the viewpoint of the other, some reluctant compromising or forced concession in practice, and, perhaps most important, several archbishops of ability and personal stature, had prevented the dichotomy arousing really dangerous passions since the time of Walter Reynolds, but neither had it been resolved. Several of the elections at Canterbury already referred to suggest no *a priori* inclination on the monks' part to find the ideal candidate to please all parties. On the other side, one or two of the king's own candidates in the century had had little in their previous professional careers to excite the clergy, although, to be fair, rather more of them do suggest that the king did have some respect for the honour of the Church; his most obvious 'civil servants' were placed elsewhere. Sudbury might well, indeed, until the revival of controversy over taxation in the 1370s, have presented an excellent claim to be the welcome candidate who did meet all criteria. It would not be far-fetched to imagine that the government probably still saw him that way in 1374. In sharp contrast to this, many of the clergy probably regarded Sudbury as exactly the sort of candidate whose imposition upon the Church had been opposed in times past. They were in unusually truculent mood towards the Crown and could anticipate more of the sort of controversy that had occurred in recent convocations, when their defiance over taxation had been broken down only with increasing difficulty. Sudbury had been compromised more than anyone in their eyes and, to make his position even more invidious, at least one bishop, William Courtenay of Hereford, had even broken ranks in 1373 in their own support and, indeed, had interpreted the question explicitly in terms of church liberties.¹³ Several of the bishops most experienced in royal government were either aged or presently at odds with the Crown (William Wykeham of Winchester and Thomas Brantingham of Exeter are the two most obvious examples of the latter sort), which gave younger, less experienced, and certainly more independent members of the episcopate such as Courtenay more opportunity to make the running. For Sudbury's part, although his reputation has been defended with conviction,¹⁴ there really can be

¹³ Reg. Whittlesey (Lambeth), fol. 64v; Wilkins, *Concilia* 3.97 (*sub* 1375), prints a different account, from Matthew Parker, which seems to scan the years 1373-76 impressionistically.

¹⁴ W. L. Warren, 'A Re-appraisal of Simon of Sudbury, Bishop of London, 1361-75, and Archbishop of Canterbury, 1375-81', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 10 (1959) 139-52. See also Marvin, *Diocesan Administration*, who in his full-length biography of Sudbury seems unaware of Warren's article.

little doubt that he was and remained committed to the government's requirements and, in public at least, did little to defend the clergy in face of them. Indeed, his courage was to lie more in defending the government's cause before the clergy in humiliating and hostile circumstances. In 1374, of those bishops who might have been considered for Canterbury, he was most obviously the 'government's man'. At all events, the monks would not elect him.

Several contemporary chroniclers, some interdependent, noted the fact of the election as an independent move by the chapter. They were more particularly struck, however, by the intensity of the government's anger, forcing the monks to hard work and much expense to save some or all of their number from dispersal or exile.¹⁵ Allowing for whatever exaggeration, it is clear that the government was indeed outraged by the election. It was still not so unusual, in fact, for a cathedral chapter to elect someone of their own choosing, and even on occasion for the Crown to assent to that choice, even whilst intending that the pope should see to it that the nomination came to nothing in the end. Alternatively, the king might not give his assent but would show no ill-will to either chapter or elect. Usually on such occasions, so it seems, the elect himself was not actually trying to pursue his candidacy, and suspiciously often he was the dean, prior or a senior member of the electing chapter.¹⁶ Much probably depended upon the circumstances, especially whether the king had been particularly anxious to have his own candidate fortified by election. It is likely that when an appointment seemed already agreeably settled in the minds of the king and pope, a chapter may have been permitted at least the opportunity to make a dignified reaffirmation in principle of its freedom of election.

In the case of Canterbury, however, the government had probably been very anxious to secure the postulation of its own candidate. As has been implied, its angry response suggests, were such suggestion needed, that the monks were actually doing very much more than simply entering a formal objection in principle to royal directive or in practice to the choice of Sudbury in himself. As has been noted, the monks had contested the nomination with serious intent on past occasions, and usually the Crown had simply defeated their cause in the papal curia, without troubling to recriminate against them directly. One obvious reason for the anger this time might be that the English government would not have a cardinal as archbishop, something the monks knew well

¹⁵ *Eulogium historiarum sive temporis*, ed. F. S. Haydon, 3 vols. (RS 9; London, 1863), 3.339; *Historia Anglicana* 1.317; 'Canon of Lichfield' in *Anglia sacra* 1.120-21; *The Great Chronicle of London*, ed. A. H. Thomas and I. D. Thornley (London, 1938), p. 43; *The Brut*, ed. F. W. D. Brie (EETS OS 136; London, 1906-1908), p. 327.

¹⁶ I intend to discuss this and other aspects of the survival of capitular elections in detail at another time.

enough. In fact, though, there was even more to the matter than this. It has already been noted that they pressed their nomination upon the pope *before* obtaining (as evidently they would not) any royal assent. Indeed, they wrote to Gregory XI after nine days, when probably they knew explicitly that the Crown would not have it. They had not gracefully elected some honourable figure as a dignified formal protest of their independence or reluctance towards Sudbury. Nor even had they settled for the more pointed gesture of electing a person unacceptable in principle to the Crown. They actually intended to enter into what would obviously be a sharp contest to secure that person's appointment. The government might have accepted the first course, the dignified protest, without demur, maybe even tolerated the insult, had Langham's postulation been made but not followed up, but an active contest fully explains its angry outburst against the cathedral chapter. By the same token, it implies strongly that the Crown, like the monks, reckoned that the contest could be a severe one. It was not to be assumed that the pope would ignore the election and take his orders from the Crown. Equally, the monks evidently thought they had an interested and realistic candidate in Langham.

Only one chronicler – a Canterbury writer in all likelihood – puts the proposition explicitly that Langham was indeed ready to accept the postulation until he realised the implacability of the royal opposition: '*cardinalis non valens archiepiscopatum cum bona gratia regis habere resignavit juri suo*'.¹⁷ Nor is this idea, that Langham himself had thought the appointment could be secured, improbable. Langham had had an impressive earlier career in England.¹⁸ Even allowing that John of Reading is in this respect as unobjective a source as one could invent (he was a monk of Westminster Abbey, of which house Langham remained all his life a most generous and caring patron), the cardinal had impressed as abbot of Westminster (1349-61), bishop of Ely (1361-66), treasurer of the realm (1360-63) and chancellor (1363-67).¹⁹ Once William Edington had declined translation to Canterbury in 1366, Langham was the king's choice and was readily accepted by the pope.²⁰

¹⁷ *Eulogium historiarum* 3.339. For its Canterbury provenance, perhaps in the house of the Grey Friars, see J. I. Catto, 'An Alleged Great Council of 1374', *English Historical Review* 82 (1967) 765-66.

¹⁸ Emden, *Oxford* 2.1095-97; see also J. A. Robinson, 'Simon Langham, Abbot of Westminster', *Church Quarterly Review* 66 (1908) 339-66.

¹⁹ *Chron. J. de Reading*, pp. 176-77, dwells lovingly on this interplay of secular and ecclesiastical distinction; and see also *Historia Anglicana* 1.274.

²⁰ *Chron. J. de Reading*, *ibid.* The monks of Canterbury apparently divided among three bishops at the election, but no one entered Langham's name. However, this is not to say that he was a complete 'outsider' in the field, because, with the king's preference for Edington already expressed, the election was evidently a matter of deciding for or against that particular 'royal' candidate; the substitution of another of the same kind would have been fairly pointless.

However, two years later he accepted elevation (on 22 September 1368) to a red hat as cardinal-priest of St. Sixtus', and this seems to have proved an ill-considered move that was to cast a shadow over his last years. According to one account, Edward III claimed not to have known in advance of the creation, and Langham, whether or not he had either, had published the news, and thus implicitly accepted the offer, before consulting him.²¹ Whatever Edward's supposed particular indignation over Langham's promotion and presumptuous independence, it hardly mattered in immediate terms. The king would have taken in the temporalities of the Canterbury see *tanquam vacans*, whether or not he approved of the promotion. At this time, and for long afterwards, the red hat represented not the most honourable accolade that an English prelate could achieve but his immediate conversion into a papal legate and agent.²² As such, the Crown would not tolerate his continued tenure of an English see and indeed was reluctant to have him reside at all in the realm unless specifically appointed to fulfil some such papal commission as was acceptable to the government. Even then, some guarantees would be required regarding the exercise of his legatine authority. Urban V had probably been well aware of all this, because as early as 11 October he translated William Whittlesey to fill the see of Canterbury. The direct precedent of Robert Kilwardby in 1278 was clear enough, besides, although in that case the archbishop had been made cardinal-bishop (of Porto) at once, thereby making clear his voiding of Canterbury. Even so, Kilwardby had resigned the latter formally and after some weeks delay. Langham also resigned formally, but only on 28 November 1368, and Whittlesey did not have his temporalities until 15 January following.²³ It is just possible that Langham had reckoned to retain Canterbury whilst yet accepting the red hat: but if he did, it was a hope unsupported not only by precedent and the Crown but even by the papacy.

²¹ 'Birchington' in *Anglia sacra* 1.47; copied by the 'canon of Lichfield', *ibid.*, pp. 119-21.

²² More famous, of course, is the case of Henry Beaufort, who explicitly was not allowed to accept a red hat if he wished to retain his bishopric of Winchester in 1419-21, but achieved the breakthrough in 1427 which others were to follow up quickly enough; K. B. McFarlane, 'Henry V, Bishop Beaufort and the Red Hat', *English Historical Review* 60 (1945) 316-48, and see also W. Ullmann, 'Eugenius IV, Cardinal Kempe and Archbishop Chichele' in *Medieval Studies Presented to Aubrey Gwynn, S.J.* (Dublin, 1961), pp. 348-57.

²³ Kilwardby was created a cardinal on 12 March 1278 and resigned Canterbury c. 5 June; J. le Neve, *Fasti ecclesiae Anglicanae...* (London, 1716), rev. edition, compiled by D. E. Greenaway, *Fasti ecclesiae Anglicanae, 1066-1300* 2 (London, 1971), p. 7. F. M. Powicke, *The Thirteenth Century* (Oxford, 1953), p. 470, inclined to the view that Kilwardby was elevated by Nicholas III expressly to remove him from Canterbury, the pope not being satisfied with his exercise of the primatial office. E. M. F. Sommer-Seckendorff, *Studies in the Life of Robert Kilwardby, O.P.* (Rome, 1937), pp. 124-29, was more evasive but shared the view that Kilwardby was being extricated from a difficult position, and (p. 122) added the interesting point that he, like Langham, was at once placed in financial embarrassment.

Whilst contemporary accounts are imprecise or too consciously written with hindsight, there may, then, have been some discord about the promotion to the red hat. Quite possibly, Edward III simply disliked the loss of Langham, whose reputation and value remained considerable in the realm. It is, on the other hand, difficult to believe that the king had had no voice in the promotion of Whittlesey, even though he now delayed the restitution of the temporalities.²⁴ 'Birchington', for one, noted Langham's immediate loss of material comfort. Although allowed to remain at Otford until his departure to join the pope, in February 1369, he had only a 'modest household' and 'scarcely lived as a cardinal'. Especially, many of his servants would not go with him from the realm. Quite independently, the *Anonimale Chronicle*, which apparently had information at this time from sources in the papal curia, was particularly struck by the new cardinal's straitened circumstances during his first days there: 'he could not spend upon his office and dignity of cardinal more than one hundred marks a year, whereas before, when he had been archbishop, he could spend as much as four or five thousand marks a year'.²⁵ Although the pope eventually resolved this problem handsomely enough, and by effective preferment in England in fact, there is a consistent suggestion in all this evidence that Langham had not fully thought out or forecast all the implications of his elevation, and that his career descended abruptly from sure eminence into uncertainty.²⁶

It seems, too, that the pope had intended his elevation very much with his influence in England in mind: Langham was given no commissions of substance until autumn 1371, when he returned to England as a papal nuncio, to press for peace with France.²⁷ Again there are hints as to his frame of mind. One source, the *Anonimale*, suggested that he lingered on in England more to draw revenue from spiritual offices than to promote peace, and whilst this may be no more than a jaundiced slander upon his protracted but forlorn efforts to resolve the Anglo-French conflict, there is an interesting additional anecdote

²⁴ *The Anonimale Chronicle*, ed. V. H. Galbraith, rev. edition (Manchester, 1970), p. 57, noted that Whittlesey *fuist eslieu*, a phrase it accords to elections, properly speaking, on other occasions, but there hardly seems time for the monks to have acted, and nothing survives either from their or the royal archives of such a process. In 1278 the monks had indeed made an election, of the king's chancellor, Robert Burnell, but the pope rejected both the candidate and the election.

²⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

²⁶ Uncertainty persists over the identity and dates of tenure of his preferments. There can be some assurance that he held the archdeaconry of Wells (1369-76), a prebend in York Minster (1370-76), the archdeaconry of York (1374-76), and at least three other rectories and a moiety. Highfield, *Relations between the Church and the English Crown*, p. 67, showed that, in 1373 at least, he also held the deanship of Lincoln.

²⁷ *Anonimale Chronicle*, pp. 69-70; *Eulogium historiarum* 3.336-37.

from the *Eulogium* that the pope and cardinals were affronted by reports of his obsequious attitude to the king. The *Anonimale*, again, does actually imply that the English government gave him direct instructions regarding the conduct of his mission. Finally, even after his recall to Avignon, on 16 April 1373, he did not hasten his departure. The *Eulogium*'s note, often cited, that Langham made gifts of gold to each monk of Canterbury as he withdrew from the realm, may have the events of 1374 too much in mind, but the very fact of its being reported suggests again that contemporaries at least believed that Langham was hoping to re-establish himself in England. In this they were probably not mistaken. That Whittlesey's days were numbered can hardly have been doubted by Langham or anyone else. He was able to witness, too, at first hand the current difficulties between Crown and Church, and the disfiguring of Sudbury's reputation with the clergy. If he thought that Edward III's government might, in the circumstances, forgive and restore him as the man who could reconcile the needs of the Crown and the surly independence of the clergy, he was, of course, to be proved wrong, but it can hardly be reckoned an idle fantasy. It might even have been a very good idea, and, indeed, the monks may have been so persuaded. If they would not have Sudbury, neither did they plump for the most prominent currently of the other bishops then in office, namely, the relatively inexperienced William Courtenay of Hereford, whose credentials as an outspoken defender of ecclesiastical liberties were strong but whose unacceptability to the government at the time was surely, on the same count, very obvious.

At some point the monks at least drafted, and most probably despatched, two letters to Cardinal Langham, full of sorrow for some unspecified reason, but begging his continued favour.²⁸ It seems not unreasonable to consider this too as possible evidence that he had been a most interested candidate, and to ascribe these letters, as their tenor and their place in the cathedral register suggest, to the time when Sudbury's appointment had become an accomplished fact or at least to the time when their own hopes for Langham were seen to be altogether vain. Certainly, the cardinal's nomination appears to have received no encouragement in the papal curia, and he played no further part in the appointment. Nor did Gregory XI use him further in the renewed peace talks. In 1376, as a final point, when the pope was resolved firmly upon a return to

²⁸ Reg. G (Canterbury) [n. 6 above], fol. 211. One letter is excerpted, with a confusing commentary, in J. B. Sheppard's *Report of an Examination of the Historical Mss. belonging to the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury in Historical Manuscripts Commission, Eighth Report. Appendix, Part I* (London, 1876-84), p. 339. They are dated 10 December. It is just possible that they may refer back to 1368 and that the monks had in some way offended Langham at the time of his resignation. The theme that the monks feared Langham's displeasure is difficult to relate to the events of 1374-75.

Rome, Langham did secure formal permission to end his residence in the curia and return to England, perhaps confirmation at last by both parties that his elevation to the sacred college had proved to be an error of judgement. He died, in fact, on 22 July before he could return.²⁹

Meanwhile, the royal assent to the election had been refused, and a group of local clerks and gentry was entrusted with the keeping of the archiepiscopal temporalities from 8 August 1374.³⁰ There is no evidence that they were associated with Sudbury; indeed it seems clear that they were acting directly for the royal exchequer. Neither now nor later was Sudbury recompensed for the lost months which followed. The pope, for his part, did not hasten to complete the appointment. The delay cannot easily be attributed to any desire to clarify those other appointments which would stem from Sudbury's promotion, because, in the end at least, London was left unfilled for four months, and Bangor for ten. As to Sudbury himself, in the autumn and winter of 1374 Gregory XI clearly regarded him as the *de facto* leader of the English Church.³¹ J. H. Dahmus has detected in the eventual papal letters of translation a 'definite lack of enthusiasm' for Sudbury, but this seems all too sensitive a reaction to some routine sentiments.³² The pope appears, in the end, no more and no less concerned than usual about the candidate himself, and the Crown's interest was traditional enough: Sudbury was of good character and formerly, as has been said, a well-trusted papal official in the Curia.³³

In the following months Sudbury was to join in the talks taking place at Bruges between the Crown and papacy over questions of the latter's jurisdiction and patronage, which at last began to make progress. How Sudbury's appointment relates to the whole question of these long-standing negotiations has been a matter of some debate and, in this regard, much depends upon one's inter-

²⁹ DNB 11.540-41 (C. L. Kingsford).

³⁰ T. Rymer, ed., *Foedera, conventiones, literae...*, 20 vols. (London, 1704-35), 7.42; *Calendar of the Patent Rolls, 1374-77*, p. 3. The three laymen at least were all experienced royal commissioners in Kent, one (Simon de Burgh) being constable of Rochester Castle.

³¹ *Calendar of Papal Letters* 4.134, 136. Marvin, *Diocesan Administration*, p. 117, referring to the papal mandate to Sudbury on 31 December 1374 to levy the subsidy (which the Crown had prohibited since 1372), suggested that by this time the appointment was agreed in principle, but the evidence of further papal discontent over the matter, noted by Lunt, *Financial Relations*, pp. 107-108, seems to cast doubt upon so specific a deduction. It remains, nonetheless, a reasonable assumption that Gregory was not explicitly *opposed* to Sudbury's eventual promotion, but that the current negotiations at Bruges and the matter of the subsidy might affect its timing.

³² J. H. Dahmus, *William Courtenay, Archbishop of Canterbury* (University Park, Pa., 1966), p. 286 n. 33.

³³ In recording his appointment, the author of the *Eulogium historiarum* (3.339) still characterised him as *advocatus Curiae*, without further ado.

pretation of the issues under discussion.³⁴ Obviously, the question is too big to consider properly here. Briefly, however, it must be reflected that the precise demands of English embassies since 1373 have never been reconstructed with complete certainty. Evidently some call was made in the opening discussions for the total abolition of papal reservations and provisions, but in such a context as to suggest that even then something rather less drastic was actually in mind. Obviously, too, if the request for abolition is to be taken at face value, the matter of Sudbury's promotion would have placed the English envoys, to put it mildly, in a highly invidious position. How, in the circumstances, could they possibly have continued to argue with any conviction that the English government really did want a return to 'free elections' and an end to papal authority in matters of patronage? In such a case, the appointment of Sudbury by provision, as was now necessary, would entail the complete abandonment of their major demands. At least some historians incline to the view that this was precisely the case, so urgent was the government for a compliant metropolitan and other co-operative bishops to be papally appointed.³⁵

It seems hard to believe that the embassy had ever really been pressing for such dramatic curtailments of papal authority. Even if not the monks of Canterbury so immediately, the government knew well enough that sometime, and even frequently, chapters would fail to respond to its wishes, especially if elections became once more of real effect. The papacy, by comparison, was amenability itself. Accordingly, it might be suggested as more likely that the English objective since 1373 had been not the wholesale destruction of papal rights, notably over appointments, but their more restrained use in such circumstances as they were required by local or subordinate authorities, especially in the resolution of disputes, or, more particularly, the effecting of the Crown's wishes when it had failed to achieve these already for itself, and probably also with some moderation of the financial charge imposed by the pope for such services.³⁶ The papacy was being asked, by this interpretation, to cease its function as a patron of first or automatic recourse. This would have been to conform to earlier, always rather idealised, conceptions of how the

³⁴ Holmes, *Good Parliament*, pp. 19-20, 31-47, believed that the negotiations went far from well between 1373 and 1375. Perroy, *L'Angleterre*, pp. 18-50, and idem, 'The Anglo-French Negotiations at Bruges, 1374-1377' in *Camden Miscellany XIX* (Camden Third Series 80; London, 1952) remain indispensable. See also n. 36 below.

³⁵ In particular, Holmes, *ibid.*, sees a very complete surrender on the English part. Marvin, *Diocesan Administration*, p. 116, limits the 'exchange' more narrowly to the question of the subsidy. He is very much more doubtful of the idea of a complete papal 'victory': 'the papacy agreed to meet most of the king's grievances' (p. 118).

³⁶ R. G. Davies, 'The Anglo-Papal Concordat of Bruges, 1375: A Reconsideration', *Archivum historiae pontificiae* 19 (1981) 99-146.

pope's theoretical authority should be exercised in practice. It would, besides, have secured a very considerable reduction in the flow of money from the Church in England to the papal curia – which was probably the most contentious aspect to contemporaries – whilst yet retaining for the Crown a safeguard against disobedience by local electors and patrons. Such particular 'abuses' as the papal provision of aliens to benefices would, of course, be thereby regulated by definition.

An hypothesis of this kind would at least render unnecessary so dramatic an interpretation as has been proposed of the effect of the Canterbury problem upon the talks at Bruges. This is not to deny that there may well have been much thoughtful discussion as to the implications of, and public reaction to, Sudbury's and consequent appointments, especially in the light of the complaints about the financial aspects of papal patronage raised both by the embassy and in the parliament of the previous year, 1373.³⁷ It is certainly very likely, of course, that Gregory XI used the Canterbury appointment in some way in the negotiations at Bruges. In the crudest of terms, it would be congenial to keep some of England's leading ecclesiastical negotiators in suspense. It must, though, be a matter of serious doubt whether he really reckoned he could use the appointment as a means to 'blackmail' the English government into a complete and humiliating surrender of their position in the talks as a whole. Certainly Sudbury's entry into the Bruges negotiations for the first time, in February 1375, cannot go unnoticed in view of the pope's agreement to his translation on 4 May, but Gregory did not announce progress at these talks, that is, his own minor concessions on certain points and his own levying by permission of a reduced subsidy of 60,000 florins on the English clergy, until as late as 1 September.³⁸ Had he now had so much the whiphand over a government so desperate for Sudbury's appointment as to be prepared to make a humiliating surrender on almost everything else, he would surely have moved earlier, perhaps even in advance of making the appointment, to have the subsidy enforced, and he would not have accepted a halving of its total.

³⁷ *Rotuli parliamentorum*, ed. J. Strachey et al., 6 vols. (London, 1767), 2.320, for the complaints in parliament. Walsingham, *Historia Anglicana* 2.316, noted the protests and believed there to be a formal response to satisfy them by the Crown: '... but this statute was of no effect.' The author of the *Brut*, p. 327, however, believed that 'this statute was kept and did much good and benefit'. The roll of the parliament says nothing of a new enactment but, to the contrary, records the royal response that the outcome of the talks with the pope, already in train, should be awaited before any action was taken.

³⁸ Rymer, *Foedera* 7.58-59, for Sudbury's appointment as an ambassador to the talks with France at Bruges; London, Lambeth Palace, Register of Simon Sudbury, fol. 1r-v; and see *Camden Miscellany* XIX, pp. 4, 8, 9. Gregory's bulls of 1 September are printed in Rymer, *ibid.* 7.83-87; and see Pantin, *English Church*, pp. 88-90, for correlation of these with the envoys' requests two years earlier.

It seems unlikely that the connection between the Canterbury appointment and the outcome of the talks as a whole was so direct or so vital. Not only is the extreme view, that Sudbury and other churchmen 'sold out' the English cause for their own personal advancement, quite untenable, if only because they had not the liberty to do so, but the theory of complete English capitulation in the cause of a pliable episcopate seems almost as doubtful. What may be more feasible is that the appointments were firmly linked by Gregory to the question of the subsidy, and that the months of delay reflected the English government's reluctance both that this should be done at all and that *servitia* and subsidy should thus be imposed together on the Church in England. Both in real burden and in effect upon English opinion it was indeed an unhappy step to take. Gregory's acceptance of a reduction in the subsidy by up to a half does not easily support the idea of complete surrender by the English embassy: he would not be compensated by the *servitia* of even the most artificially extended series of translations consequent upon the Canterbury appointment, and, in any case, it will be suggested that no such deliberate complication of the series was made. The reduction in the subsidy and the intervals between the appointments suggest some specific settlement by the two sides at Bruges of these immediate questions, whilst leaving the bigger questions of principle relating to patronage still to be resolved, as indeed was intended, by further discussion. As has been suggested, the translations need not in themselves represent a collapse of the English stance over patronage: Canterbury, at least, would be no more than an example of 'proper use' of papal patronage.

Once Gregory had acted, movement towards the completion of the appointment on the domestic front was swift: the bulls were published in Canterbury on 26 May; Sudbury himself hurried back to England on 27 May, did fealty at Westminster, and had restitution of his temporalities on 5 June.³⁹ Diplomatic work hedged him round – he received a further commission on 27 June – but he devoted the 'close season' of August to a quick view, not a visitation, of his new estates in Kent and Sussex.⁴⁰

As Highfield wrote, quite simply, 'Sudbury was the obvious choice for archbishop of Canterbury, all papal influence apart.'⁴¹ Politically, he was *not* John of Gaunt's half of a *quid pro quo*, wherein William Courtenay, supposed *protégé* of the Black Prince, was to have London.⁴² In fact, he was probably no one's especial partisan, even though so many clergy might deplore his

³⁹ Reg. G (Canterbury), fol. 186v and Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fol. 5; Rymer, *ibid.* 7.66; *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1374-77*, p. 118.

⁴⁰ Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fols. 1v-2v, 78-79, 85.

⁴¹ Highfield, *Relations between the Church and the English Crown*, p. 107.

⁴² As suggested by Dahmus, *William Courtenay*, p. 107.

willingness to press the wishes of the lay authorities upon themselves. W. L. Warren has demonstrated convincingly that, whilst Sudbury, both before and after 1375, and with good reason, tried generally to prevent the clergy taking an open stand against the government, and had to contend with the belligerence of his younger colleagues (and he was on the whole successful in this), he was altogether a stronger character and stouter defender of the Church's interests than historians have generally allowed.⁴³ Even so, this does not eliminate a nagging suspicion that he was better equipped with conscientious and colourless competence than with real flair, stature, or (may one say?) 'charisma'. His anxiety to preserve stability and harmony in difficult political times may have deprived him too much of initiative, and in the end his dutiful acceptance of the chancellorship in 1380 was considered at the time an unfortunate step. At least Thomas Walsingham thought so.⁴⁴ Such caution may have been no bad thing, and in 1377 did not in fact lead him to desert William of Wykeham, when that bishop was disgraced by the government, but he seemed to some militants weak in his defence. If the luckless Whittlesey is taken into account as well, there seems little doubt that the Church had no real 'cutting edge' for over a decade. In 1381 his murder during the Peasants' Revolt seems to have been much regretted but not treated as a disaster.

There were in 1374, admittedly, few candidates for the primacy. Adam Houghton of St. David's, conceivably, might have been acceptable despite his age. The senior bishops were 'civil servants' in the main, but 'civil servants' rarely went to Canterbury; in any case, as has been said, Wykeham of Winchester and Thomas Brantingham of Exeter were not in favour with the government. Courtenay, despite his relative inexperience, must have seemed already a strong candidate, at least in the eyes of churchmen.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Sudbury did not secure the primacy by default. He had become heir-presumptive by capability, however much that role in the event placed his expectation of the succession in jeopardy. The first bishop of London ever to cross the Thames to Lambeth, Sudbury was appointed to act capably. No one, especially the government, could afford an ineffectual primate, however personally malleable. And Sudbury proved to be capable.

The archbishop's eventual successor at London was in fact none other than William Courtenay.⁴⁶ A younger son of the earl of Devon, he had risen

⁴³ Warren, 'Simon of Sudbury' (see above, n. 14).

⁴⁴ *Historia Anglicana* 1.428.

⁴⁵ He may even have considered trying for the primacy at this time; see below, p. 323.

⁴⁶ Dahmus, *William Courtenay*, offers a stimulating and imaginative appraisal of this translation. It would be fair to say that he makes it more dramatic than the present account. On the whole, the differences are of emphasis and colouring. There may, however, be reason for particular doubts, firstly, as to whether those making the decision really considered seriously the

impressively to prominence during his six years at Hereford. True, his reputation was still to improve, and assuredly he was not yet universally considered a 'most perfect man'.⁴⁷ However, to his original merits of birth and academic distinction at Oxford, he had, particularly in the convocation of autumn 1373, added wider fame as an ecclesiastical politician, not averse to controversy but not necessarily involved in faction. As was to become more obvious subsequently, his periodic involvement in secular politics derived from his resolute championing of ecclesiastical liberties, not from any political alignment as such. Accordingly, it may not be as surprising as might appear that his recent outspokenness did not prevent his further advancement at this time.

Now in his mid-thirties, Courtenay was more than a coming man. The Black Prince and Edmund of March were friends, but he kept a wider circle.⁴⁸ Among the prelates most interested in political and royal affairs, Wykeham and Brantingham, inclining towards the Black Prince's views, indeed thought well of him, but also Houghton, a close personal and political associate of John of Gaunt, was a good friend, and Ralph Erghum, Gaunt's chancellor, seems, at least in later life, to have been on amicable terms.⁴⁹ Courtenay cannot be described exclusively as a 'Black Prince's man', and, indeed, Gaunt himself seems to have had no objections to his advancement. After the violent, and in many ways misleading, events of 1376-77, the duke came round, or perhaps returned, quite quickly to friendship with the bishop. As to Courtenay's own family, the earl himself was now an old man and of a retiring nature, as also

'enthusiasm' with which the 'people of London' would greet such a translation, and whether qualms really had to be quietened by some assurance that Sudbury could keep a rein from nearby on the 'possible imprudence', which Dahmus attributes to Courtenay's 'youth' (pp. 16-19). This is not to say, of course, that there were no qualms of any sort.

⁴⁷ *Chronicon Adae de Usk, A.D. 1377-1421*, ed. E. M. Thompson (London, 1876; 2nd edition, 1904), pp. 8, 149.

⁴⁸ Courtenay was to ask for burial, explicitly, at the feet of the Black Prince. He was godfather to March's daughter, Elizabeth, in 1372, and baptized his son and heir, Roger, in March 1374; and was, like Sudbury and Bishop John Gilbert, a legate and executor of the earl's will. See Canterbury Cathedral Library, Literary ms. D xii, fol. 17v; W. Dugdale, *Monasticon Anglicanum*, 6 vols. in 8 (London, 1817-30), 6(1).354; J. Nichols, *Royal Wills* (London, 1780), p. 114.

⁴⁹ Courtenay was a legate in Houghton's will. Brantingham, although he had actually been superseded by Courtenay in his candidacy for the see of Hereford in 1369, had done much better by becoming bishop of Exeter in 1370 and was fortunately on good terms with the Courtenay family, who were preeminent in the diocese; and he had used William to perform ordinations in 1370 and 1371. Wykeham found Courtenay a stout champion in 1376 and 1377, and after years of steady political agreement was, like Erghum, a legate in the archbishop's will. See also *Registrum Willelmi de Courtenay, episcopi Herefordensis A.D. MCCCCLXX-MCCCLXXV*, ed. W. W. Capes (Canterbury and York Society 15; London, 1914), pp. 15, 30.

was the bishop's eldest brother, who eventually went blind, if he was not already so; but Sir Philip and Sir Peter Courtenay, two brothers, were doing well in royal service and spreading respect for the family's abilities. As Highfield observed, therefore, Courtenay should not be summed up as an 'anti-royal' candidate.⁵⁰ When defending the Church against heavy financial exactions, Courtenay, as he demonstrated again in 1376-77, shared the growing anger at the negligent, if not downright corrupt, financial policy of the court, but, like other critics of these years, he was entirely loyal to Edward III, and in particular to the policy of that king in France over the years.

In view of Courtenay's resistance in the 1370s, it is no surprise that, notwithstanding his unquestionable devotion to the Church, he was ambitious. Nor was there any streak of self-effacement in him when he felt an issue strongly; indeed, discretion generally seems a virtue which he took some years to acquire. He was, besides, not an independently wealthy man, especially as his family found it no easy task at the best of times to maintain its own comital rank.⁵¹ He himself had taken two years to pay off the *servitia* due for Hereford, and had even had to ask for a gracious postponement.⁵² Hereford was well known for its poverty in the next century, and the see may already have been in straits. Courtenay's performance there seems to have been at least competent, but he may have had his eyes on something better from the start.

With Sudbury presumably so clear an 'heir' to the primacy, Courtenay may have had London in mind for some time. Henry Wakefield's problems in securing Ely or Worcester may have kept the issue in some doubt, and Gaunt's chancellor, Ralph Erghum, was evidently considering his own future prospects, but otherwise there would seem to have been no rivals. Amongst the younger bishops, Henry Despenser of Norwich was well provided for, and probably already had had his measure taken by most people. Thomas Brinton of Rochester made a considerable mark as soon as he was promoted in 1373, but he was a papal *protégé*, an individualist more apt at pricking the conscience than for activity as an archiepiscopal lieutenant, and finally, to put it bluntly, lacking – even had he been covetous of promotion, which is doubtful – the political patrons needed to secure so important a translation as to London. John

⁵⁰ Highfield, *Relations between the Church and the English Crown*, p. 107.

⁵¹ It may have been in this financial, rather than any political, sense that Gaunt pointed out hotly in 1377 that the bishop's family could scarcely defend themselves, let alone him (T. Walsingham, *Chronicon Angliae*, ed. E. M. Thompson [RS 64; London, 1874], p. 120). For evidence of the family's straitened resources, and of their inability in the next century to dominate the southwest as the sole comital family, see G. A. Holmes, *The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth Century England* (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 32-35; R. L. Storey, *The End of the House of Lancaster* (London, 1966), chap. 5.

⁵² *Charters and Records of Hereford Cathedral*, ed. W. W. Capes (Hereford, 1908), p. 236.

Gilbert, now active in diplomacy, did indeed secure translation in 1375, but he also was probably still finding his feet, having arrived in Bangor only in 1372-73, and in no position to supersede Courtenay in the 'pecking-order', even though, as in Brinton's case, his being in regular orders need have been no disadvantage.

Yet if Courtenay could be sure of London and hopeful of Canterbury later, he may have wanted the primacy now. As early as autumn 1374, Gregory XI, in writing to leading English figures to urge their support for the forthcoming Anglo-papal negotiations at Bruges, selected Sudbury and Courtenay from the bishops as addressees of his letters.⁵³ However, after a winter of negotiations abroad, and following discord at home over the monks' failure to elect Sudbury, the papal nuncios at Bruges wrote to Gregory, probably in April 1375, that 'Hereford' still wanted something better than he was being offered, although they could not support him.⁵⁴ Short of the displacement of a senior bishop, unprecedented at this time for such a reason, there was nothing better for Courtenay than London, except Canterbury itself. Yet there is not the slightest sign that anyone in England was having second thoughts about Sudbury, although the appointment was still technically incomplete, nor, despite the delay, does it seem likely that Gregory XI would wish to provoke a direct confrontation. His recent policy suggested quite the opposite. In any case, Sudbury and Gaunt were with the nuncios, bringing the negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, and showing a generally friendly attitude to papal requests.⁵⁵ If Courtenay really was trying to outflank Sudbury by a curial manoeuvre, he discovered, not for the last time, that his senior was a more capable tactician than has sometimes been thought.⁵⁶ In the end, his own translation came four months after Sudbury's, the temporalities being restored six months later than the archbishop's. No doubt there was, as so often, much more to the situation than one is permitted to see.⁵⁷

With Sudbury a clear choice for Canterbury, and Courtenay for London, the accumulating series of translations, so lucrative to the curia, seems reasonable

⁵³ *Calendar of Papal Letters* 4.134.

⁵⁴ *Camden Miscellany* XIX, p. 13.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, pp. ix, xi, 16 n. 3.

⁵⁶ It seems impossible to interpret this letter as referring to Gilbert, the eventual successor to Courtenay at Hereford, either as a belated bid on his part for London, or in fact not about the translations at all but in reference to the Anglo-papal negotiations themselves.

⁵⁷ Just possibly, for example, some scheme might have been afoot to divert Wakefield to London and to fob off Courtenay with Worcester, but surely more evidence would have survived if such an idea had been mooted, especially as the pope would probably not have liked it. There cannot really be any suggestion that Courtenay himself *preferred* Worcester to London; in 1407 Richard Clifford, in an obvious promotion, moved the other way.

enough, so far as the persons involved are concerned. The third move, that of the Dominican, John Gilbert, from Bangor to Hereford, appears no less rational, even though it opened up yet a fourth vacancy. H. B. Workman, disapproving contemporary criteria for episcopal promotions, remarked how, after the Bruges conference, 'several of the chief actors were rewarded with preferments by means of the papal provisions against which they had been sent to protest.'⁵⁸ Now certainly, whilst the outcome of the talks in 1375, especially with regard to provisions, was very much to the pope's advantage, one could never say that the three bishops promoted who had taken part had 'sold out', or could have done so. Episcopal promotions, although less decisively directed from England during Edward III's dotage than at some other times, were not to be gained by such personal treachery or subterfuge; such action would have met with short shrift indeed!

Yet Gilbert certainly had his critics. Walsingham (a hostile witness) a decade later sneered that he went in for eloquence rather than integrity, and Wyclif was probably referring to Gilbert when attacking a friar who had accepted a 'fat bishopric'.⁵⁹ Workman wrote him off as Gaunt's 'henchman' in 1378,⁶⁰ yet almost everything else suggests that *if* he had a special 'protector' this must have been the Black Prince. Tout said he was the 'spiritual adviser' to the Black Prince, although his source of information is unknown.⁶¹

Undoubtedly, however, Gilbert had had something of a reputation in England before his promotion (probably by papal initiative) to Bangor in 1372, for although his career seems to have been primarily on the continent, in particular at the curia, yet within a year of his return to England he was being employed as a leading diplomat and administrator, functions he fulfilled without eclipse through several shifts of political fortune until he eased himself into retirement with honour in the mid-1390s. He seems to exemplify the dangerous artificiality of ascribing ecclesiastics to one or other faction in politics, for if he was indeed the Black Prince's adviser on the one hand, he was supposedly abetting Gaunt at Bruges on the other. Next he was an executor of the will of Edward III, was fully employed in government by the Ricardian court-party in the 1380s, and yet supplanted John Fordham, their appointee, as treasurer in the 'Wonderful Parliament' and served the Appellants. This did not

⁵⁸ H. B. Workman, *John Wyclif*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1926), 1.252, and cf. pp. 253-54.

⁵⁹ *Historia Anglicana* 2.152; *Iohannis Wyclif Tractatus de blasphemia*, ed. M. H. Dziewicki (Wyclif Society 13; London, 1893), 2.248.

⁶⁰ *John Wyclif* 1.291. Would Wyclif have criticised him if he was?

⁶¹ T. F. Tout, *Chapters in the Administrative History of Medieval England*, 6 vols. (Manchester, 1920-33), 3.315. One suspects this was an ambitious deduction from *Chronicon Angliae*, pp. 90-91.

lead, however, to his being repudiated by Richard II later on. Moreover, he was a recognised scholar, a doctor of theology, and actively engaged in opposition to Wyclif and Lollardy. So Hereford was hardly a 'fat bishopric' for such an able personality; certainly, even by 1375, his public roles made his position as mere bishop of Bangor an anomaly. Whilst Wyclif might well condemn a friar engaged in such work, yet if one accepts Gilbert's liberty to serve Crown as well as Church, as most contemporaries did, his rewards were never over-lavish.

Gilbert's translation by Gregory XI, made simultaneously with Courtenay's, left Bangor unfilled for a while. Sudbury's vicar-general committed the keeping of the spiritualities *sede vacante* to the archdeacon of Bangor on 9 December 1375, because Gregory XI showed no intention of acting in haste.⁶² It was almost a year before he filled the place. The Black Prince (and subsequently his executors) had the keeping of the temporalities in the meantime,⁶³ and in the new atmosphere of mutual accommodation it is possible that the pope also allowed him some influence over the appointment, such as he traditionally enjoyed in Wales.

The humbleness of the diocese, even lacking a cathedral at this time, did not prevent competition. An unknown correspondent petitioned the pope several times on behalf of Geoffrey Herdeby, formerly prior provincial of the Augustinian friars in England and soon to become Prince Richard's confessor, but in vain.⁶⁴ The choice fell on a Carmelite, John Swaffham, bishop of Cloyne since 1363, who was translated on 2 July 1376.⁶⁵ Originally from the friary at Bishop's Lynn, and a Cambridge doctor of theology, he had been generally resident in his Irish diocese, although on occasion doing suffragan work in England. John Bale (in the sixteenth century) attributed his success to forthright preaching at court and anti-Wyclifite activity, but there is no corroborative evidence, and such hopeful descriptions flow all too often from this writer.⁶⁶ However, it is certainly more likely that someone in England thought he deserved promotion than that Gregory XI had ever heard of him. A few straws in the wind suggest that, although Herdeby looks every inch the Black Prince's candidate, Swaffham might also have had his support. In November 1376 the latter was to have been godfather to the earl of March's second son, Edmund,

⁶² Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fol. 23.

⁶³ *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1374-77*, p. 363.

⁶⁴ *Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Relating to Wales*, ed. J. G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1935), p. 194; for Herdeby, see Emden, *Oxford* 2.xviii, 869, *sub* Hardeby.

⁶⁵ Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fols. 28v-29.

⁶⁶ London, British Library Harley ms. 3838, fol. 83v; accepted by Glanmor Williams, *The Welsh Church from the Conquest to the Reformation*, 2nd edition (Cardiff, 1976), p. 128.

and, arriving late, at least performed the confirmation.⁶⁷ In August 1387 he was with the royal household at Nottingham.⁶⁸ In 1398 he was one of the very few bishops known to have attended the controversial Shrewsbury session of parliament.⁶⁹ These points together, and the Black Prince's interest in North Wales, suggest some continuing attachment to the prince's family, but they are not much to go on.⁷⁰ One incident in 1376, reported by Walsingham, would confirm the issue, if only one could be sure that Swaffham, rather than Gilbert, was the 'bishop of Bangor', who, rather bluntly, extracted from the Black Prince a last confession for his undoubted offences.⁷¹ Whatever the bishop's political affiliation, it does not signify greatly; he took to his see, worked to build a cathedral, and set about filling up the dignities of his diocese from among his kinsmen.

Thus, over a year after Sudbury's translation, Gregory XI was still adding to the *servitia* owing to the curia, with Cloyne yet to make its modest contribution. Moreover, in the meantime, concurrent with this series of translations, he had made three other appointments, to add rather unfair fuel to the flames of criticism about money leaving the realm.

The vacancy at Worcester created by the death of William of Lynn on 18 November 1373 has a minor notoriety, because Wyclif's supposed interest in the appointment, and subsequent frustration, were said by enemies not long after the event to have been the principal reason why he turned reformer. Thomas Netter heard this in convocation from no less a man than Bishop Robert Hallum,⁷² but Hallum was, at best, a second-hand witness (perhaps through Archbishop Thomas Arundel), and it is tempting to agree with Workman that 'such gossip is worthless'. The situation was indeed curious and reached such a state of uncertainty that others besides Wyclif might have thought there was room for manoeuvre. However, on the available evidence, it would be wrong to discuss the appointment in terms of a possible candidature by 'the great heresiarch'.⁷³

⁶⁷ *Monasticon Anglicanum* 6(1).354.

⁶⁸ *Chronicon Henrici Knighton*, ed. J. R. Lumby, 2 vols. (RS 92; London, 1895), 2.240; Walsingham, *Chronicon Angliae*, p. 382.

⁶⁹ Lincoln, Diocesan Record Office, Register of John Bokyngham, *Institutions* 2, fol. 237.

⁷⁰ The Black Prince's secretary, John Fordham, had kinsmen named Swaffham, but these probably came from the Cambridgeshire villages, whereas the bishop was from the Norfolk village.

⁷¹ Walsingham, *Chronicon Angliae*, pp. 90-91.

⁷² T. Netter, *Doctrinale* 1.560, 934, cited by Workman, *John Wyclif*.

⁷³ Workman, *ibid.* 1.252. However, Highfield, *Relations between the Church and the English Crown*, p. 109, thought Wyclif was 'almost certainly a disappointed candidate'. K. B. McFarlane, *John Wycliffe and the Beginnings of English Nonconformity* (London, 1952), p. 68, wrote more cautiously that Hallum's 'insinuation (if he was the author) need not be believed...' but 'is at least credible'. In the absence of definite evidence one can say only that, if Wyclif really thought he

It had seemed quite simple at first. The monks had elected their prior, Walter Leigh, on 7 December 1373, and on Christmas Eve the king wrote to Whittlesey to assist in securing this appointment.⁷⁴ However, nearly two years of silence follow until the bishopric was filled on 12 September 1375 by the provision of Henry (de) Wakefield, the keeper of the wardrobe (*alias* treasurer of the household).⁷⁵ Wakefield had been, most probably, the victim of confusion and intrigue arising from the royal dotage. He had been elected to the see of Ely on about 27 June 1373, receiving the royal assent on 1 July.⁷⁶ He was a typical example of the 'civil servant' bishop of the time, for whom Ely would have been an equally typical promotion, a rich enhancement even for a great pluralist, but not over-difficult to administer. Yet whilst those actually running the government recognised Wakefield's claims and secured the official assent of the Crown, Edward III personally (or his court) supported his own Carmelite confessor, John Woodruff, whose promotion to so important a see would have been staggering.⁷⁷ The earl of Arundel seized his opportunity and secured the provision of his younger son, Thomas, on 13 August.⁷⁸ The success of this *coup* is not as surprising as it might seem: the government was not in decisive mood; it was not well placed to challenge the pope's decision; and, perhaps above all, the earl happened to be currently its principal lender at a time of dire need.⁷⁹

An extension of this confusion could have led to Prior Leigh losing his 'royal' support for promotion to Worcester, because Wakefield's patrons may well have insisted that such generosity could not now be implemented, and that Wakefield, although Worcester was a poor substitute for Ely, must have it. However, the election of Leigh had been made, ominously, in the immediate aftermath of the demand in parliament that 'all cathedral churches should have and enjoy free election; and that henceforth the king should not write in

had a claim, it is difficult to see on what connection or precedent he based it. On the other hand, it seems unduly harsh to debase his motives so much; his later views sprang logically from those he had held before 1375. Chronologically, his embassy to Bruges, when his claim is supposed to have materialised, came late in the affair when Wakefield's success may already have been achieved.

⁷⁴ *The Register of the Diocese of Worcester during the Vacancy of the See ... 1301-1435*, ed. J. W. Willis Bund (Worcestershire Historical Society, 1897), pp. 282-83, 290-91; *Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden*, ed. J. R. Lumby, 9 vols. (RS 41; London, 1886), 8.423.

⁷⁵ Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fol. 8r-v; Worcester, Diocesan Record Office, Register of Henry Wakefield, fol. 1r-v. He resigned his office forthwith.

⁷⁶ Cambridge, University Library ms. Dd. 3. 53, p. 78; *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1370-74*, p. 319; London, Public Record Office EP C84/50/51.

⁷⁷ *Anglia sacra* 1.664-65.

⁷⁸ Cambridge, University Library, Ely Diocesan Archives: Register of Thomas Arundel, fol. 1.

⁷⁹ Holmes, *Good Parliament*, pp. 48, 74-76.

opposition to those chosen'. The author of the *Brut* juxtaposed these remarks to his accounts of the appointments to Ely, Worcester, York and Canterbury. Only in the first of these, an election made before the parliament and very probably not 'free', as the members of parliament understood the term, was an explicitly royal candidate chosen, but, as Walsingham mournfully adds, 'the statute (*sic*) made no improvement.'⁸⁰ It is possible, therefore, that the government felt unable to oppose Leigh's election or even foist a nominee on the monks at the time, but that it quickly recovered its confidence and made clear to the prior that he should not pursue his claim. Wakefield may have been a discreet candidate from the start.

On 21 June 1374 Prior Richard of Gillingham, keeper of the spiritualities of Canterbury, *sede vacante*, appointed Leigh to the same role for Worcester. This was the agreed custom. Even so, if some real contest was on between Leigh and Wakefield, such a commission might have aroused qualms. However, by this time the problem may well have lain with the pope alone, Leigh having abandoned hope.⁸¹ Once again Gregory XI made neither favourable nor hostile response but left the matter in the air until, significantly, his agreement with England was in sight at Bruges.⁸² During 1374 Wakefield added to his existing preferment the prize (*inter alia*) of the archdeaconry of Canterbury, which no doubt helped Gregory (who had his private reasons) to decide to promote him eventually.⁸³ Gregory corresponded with Wakefield in the spring of 1375 and seems to have had no objections on principle to his candidature.⁸⁴ Wakefield secured papal provision on 12 September 1375, subsequently making the attractive gesture of receiving consecration from his earlier rival for Ely, Thomas Arundel, in the latter's manor of Hatfield on 28 October.⁸⁵ He had received the temporalities of Worcester a fortnight earlier, backdated to Michaelmas.⁸⁶

In this instance it seems reasonable to ascribe certain political connections to the new bishop. His closest friend and patron may have been Thomas of

⁸⁰ *Brut*, p. 327; *Historia Anglicana* 2.316.

⁸¹ Reg. G (Canterbury), fol. 172v.

⁸² The continuator of the *Polychronicon* said the election was 'unjustly quashed' (8.383). The pope, of course, would have no more time for the election, free or otherwise, than the government, unless it suited him.

⁸³ In September 1375 Gregory asked him to help secure the archdeaconry for his own nephew, Adamar de Ruppe (London, British Library Additional ms. 15378, fols. 184-185).

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, fols. 60-61.

⁸⁵ Reg. Arundel (Cambridge), fol. 10r-v.

⁸⁶ *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1374-77*, p. 174; Cambridge, University Library ms. Dd. 3. 53, p. 72. The keepers had been William Churchill, Roger Stanford, John Cheyne *et leurs compaignons*.

Woodstock, the youngest son of Edward III,⁸⁷ but this apparently did not mean that he was at all unwilling to work with John of Gaunt. In fact, as a royal official, he was almost by definition associated with this senior and very politically active member of the royal family.⁸⁸ Thus, in January 1377 he agreed to accept office as treasurer of the exchequer in Gaunt's reconstructed government, although, as in other cases (such as those of Bishops Buckingham, Brantingham or Erghum) and viewing his career with hindsight, it seems most probable that he had looked forward to episcopal promotion as putting a term to his service in government. Perhaps a definite agreement to this effect contributed to the supersession of the unfortunate Leigh, who might otherwise have been ostentatiously allowed his 'free' election.

Wakefield perhaps felt cheated when the rather more handsome diocese of Salisbury became available almost immediately, on the death of Robert Wyville on 4 September 1375.⁸⁹ Wyville had endured almost fifty years of political eclipse since his brief, halcyon days as Queen Isabella's secretary. He had never reconciled himself to diocesan work with any enthusiasm, but did much for the cathedral, even though his more or less constant residence in the close was not to the canons' liking. After his death the Salisbury chapter was duly granted a licence to elect, on 20 September, and yet again a candidate appeared who can have given the government little real satisfaction. After Leigh at Worcester, Neville at York, and Langham at Canterbury, Salisbury offered John Worminghall, a senior, if undistinguished, diocesan administrator.⁹⁰ The royal assent to yet another rather uninspiring choice was duly given, on 12 November.⁹¹ But this time the government probably knew how little it meant, because John of Gaunt, who had returned to Bruges to continue the French negotiations, meant also to secure the see for his chancellor, Ralph Erghum. 'Through the duke's design and by papal authority' (Malvern), Erghum was

⁸⁷ For the rather inconclusive evidence, and for aspects of Wakefield's career, see my article 'Some Notes from the Register of Henry de Wakefield, Bishop of Worcester, on the Political Crisis of 1386-1388', *English Historical Review* 86 (1971) 547-54, especially 552, and the introduction to *A Calendar of the Register of Henry Wakefield, Bishop of Worcester, 1375-95*, ed. W. P. Marett (Worcester Historical Society N.S. 7, 1972).

⁸⁸ Noteworthy also is that he was an associate, and principal supervisor of the will, of William, Lord Latimer, one of those attacked in the Good Parliament, where Lancaster defended Latimer (*Testamenta Eboracensia* 1 [Surtees Society 4, 1836], p. 115; see also *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1374-77*, p. 170 and *Calendar of the Close Rolls 1377-81*, pp. 459-60).

⁸⁹ He was indeed commissioned by the pope on the day of Erghum's provision to administer the see until the latter's consecration (London, British Library Additional ms. 15378, fols. 216-217). This, by papal injunction, was to precede his own (*Calendar of Papal Letters* 4.144).

⁹⁰ For Worminghall, see A. B. Emnden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 650.

⁹¹ *Calendar of the Patent Rolls 1374-77*, pp. 168, 201; the date of the election is unknown.

provided only too quickly by a benevolent Gregory XI on 12 October.⁹² He was indeed at Bruges, although as much in attendance on the duke as a negotiator himself. He received consecration there from Sudbury before a notable company on 9 December.⁹³ He had appointed a vicar-general on 24 November but had known of his provision, one would think, a week or two before this.⁹⁴ Most probably he had waited for assurance that the English authorities all approved the appointment.

A member of a prominent Yorkshire family, Ralph Erghum, J.U.D., had an undistinguished early career, and although it is usually assumed that he had served Gaunt for a long time, there is no preferment or other evidence to prove as much. He became the duke's chancellor, an advisory as well as a bureaucratic function,⁹⁵ around April 1372. Only two years earlier he had been admitted as an advocate in the Court of Canterbury, usually a 'shopwindow' for promising but as yet unattached young lawyers. However, even if he was no faithful veteran, he seems, like Wakefield, to have envisaged terminating his secular career by resigning his Lancastrian chancellorship at once, but, again like Wakefield, he had to postpone his final departure for a year or two, because the political troubles of 1376-78 led Gaunt to recall him as well as Wakefield from his diocese. He was to remain loyal to the duke to the end, finally acting as his executor, but otherwise of no great importance. His appointment was, of course, entirely through Gaunt's interest, exactly the kind of thing recently complained of in parliament. But, given the vacuum in the authority of the Crown and Gaunt's enhanced role, such private patronage was only to be expected.

One more vacancy occurred at this time. Before 30 November 1375 Llywelyn ap Madog ap Elis, bishop of St. Asaph, a member of the leading Welsh family of the diocese, died at a good age. His death was of no wider significance, and the Black Prince had a candidate waiting for the see in William Spridlington, who had been in his service for many years, chiefly in a financial capacity. Ap Madog's election had frustrated the prince's attempt to have Spridlington promoted as long ago as 1357, but the latter had waited patiently, was now dean of the cathedral, and was papally provided without opposition on 4 February 1376.⁹⁶ At Lambeth on 25 May the archbishop consecrated him, with Gilbert and Harwell, two old friends and fellow-

⁹² *Polychronicon* 8.383; Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fol. 22v.

⁹³ Salisbury, Diocesan Record Office, Register of Ralph Erghum 2, fol. 112.

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, fol. 1; Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fol. 22.

⁹⁵ R. Somerville, *History of the Duchy of Lancaster* 1 (London, 1953), p. 127.

⁹⁶ Reg. Sudbury (Lambeth), fol. 18. There is no evidence of either election or process of election.

associates of the Black Prince, in support.⁹⁷ Even before this he had put in a complaint about dilapidations in the diocese, but the odd later references to him suggest that he may have stayed in the connection of his former patron's widow, Joan of Kent.⁹⁸ Duties as executor of the Black Prince's will perhaps consumed much of his brief episcopate. 'A victory for the establishment' no doubt,⁹⁹ but who was the enemy?

The episcopal bench now remained entirely stable in composition until 1381, assimilating the ten new promotions of the last seven years, especially those of the recent important shuffle. The complaints in parliament had caused the government concern, but had had no great effect. Of course the appointments help confirm the dotage of Edward III and the prominence of the Black Prince and John of Gaunt, but the two princes, in the main, supported men who had served the Crown, and were not simply intriguing to build up parties.¹⁰⁰ The years immediately following the recent promotions give the impression that there had been a mounting crisis involving an undignified scramble for places, but in respect of the episcopate detailed examination of these and subsequent years gives the lie to this. The effect of Edward III's dotage on the bench had been minimal. Similarly, if Gregory XI had used vacancies as a diplomatic lever during the talks at Bruges, his inclination was to be friendly, and the vacancies had not been exploited for disreputable ends. This is not to deny that the translations and promotions may well have been associated in the minds of suspicious and critical contemporaries with the failure of the English government to achieve at Bruges anything like the concessions from the pope that had been called for in the past few years, and the grave outburst of discontent in the 'Good Parliament' of 1376 could indeed have drawn a good deal of its fervour from such dissatisfaction.¹⁰¹ Evident antagonism in some ecclesiastical circles towards the new archbishop, considerable *servitia* to be paid upon several appointments, the subsidy to the pope conceded: these could only intensify the disappointment with what had *not* been achieved and give a new lease of life to long-standing grievances on both sides with dealings between Church and state. In such circumstances, the episcopal appointments

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, fol. 20.

⁹⁸ Apart from assemblies, he is found at Oswestry, Coventry, Lyveden (Northants.) and Shrewsbury (twice), although he died within his diocese (*Reg. Stretton [Coventry and Lichfield]* 1 [William Salt Archaeological Society, 1907], pp. 181, 187; *Reg. Bokyngham [Lincoln]*, *Institutions* 1, fol. 216; *Reg. Wakefield [Worcester]*, fol. 29v; *Reg. W. Courtenay [Canterbury]*, fol. 313; London, Public Record Office SC10/32/1574).

⁹⁹ Williams, *The Welsh Church*, p. 128.

¹⁰⁰ Remembering that North Wales had long been a sphere of interest of the Black Prince.

¹⁰¹ This is a principal theme in the argument of Holmes, *Good Parliament*, made explicit, e.g., at pp. 55-56.

might acquire a controversial air. It is worthwhile, then, to appreciate that it is the circumstances that must explain the controversy, not the appointments in themselves. Given that service to secular patrons, especially to the Crown, was a normal qualification for prelacy, the Church did not suffer in these years. Even more, the new appointments and promotions might even be regarded as respectable and encouraging for the Church's future.

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A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY GLOSS ON THE *ROMAN DE LA ROSE*

Maxwell Luria

THE manuscripts of the *Roman de la Rose* have received surprisingly meager attention from literary scholars in the seven decades since Ernest Langlois published his survey of them.¹ Despite (or, perhaps, because of) the immense number of surviving mss. – Langlois knew of more than 215, and the *Roman*'s most recent editor, Félix Lecoy, speaks of some 247, with others probably remaining to be identified – there has been no Manly to render the manuscript remains of this masterpiece as fully accessible to us as those of the *Canterbury Tales*.² Recent scholarship has, however, produced a brilliant body of allegorical and iconographical analysis, thanks to which we now know a good deal more than formerly about the dynamics of the poem, including the exegetical function of some of its manuscript illustrations.³ It would seem axiomatic that significant marginalia such as glosses ought also to be surveyed for what they may have to tell us of early attitudes towards the *Roman*. In fact, virtually nothing has been reported on this subject, though that little – such as passing references by Fleming, Dahlberg, and Tuve – makes it tantalizingly clear that some, at least, of the mss. contain exegetical glosses.⁴

¹ Ernest Langlois, *Les manuscrits du Roman de la Rose* (Lille, 1910).

² Neither Langlois' great edition, 5 vols. (Paris, 1914-24), nor Lecoy's, 3 vols. (Paris, 1965-70), provides more than a selection of ms. variants. For the number of extant mss. see Lecoy 1.xxxv-xxxvi. Langlois (1.32) says that 'il en existe aujourd'hui encore au moins 300 manuscrits', and this figure has been cited by some later scholars; but Langlois does not explain what he means, and we may assume that he includes mss. he thinks likely to exist, but which have not yet been identified.

³ See D. W. Robertson, Jr., *A Preface to Chaucer* (Princeton, 1962); Rosemond Tuve, *Allegorical Imagery* (Princeton, 1966); John V. Fleming, *The Roman de la Rose. A Study in Allegory and Iconography* (Princeton, 1969); Charles Dahlberg, trans., *The Romance of the Rose* (Princeton, 1971), especially the introduction and notes.

⁴ See Fleming, *ibid.*, pp. 32, 103-105, 112, and also chap. 1, which usefully develops the idea of ms. illustrations as glosses. Dahlberg, *ibid.*, p. 373, reports interpretive glosses in two mss.: 'descri < pti>on > dam < our > folle' (London, British Library Egerton 881, fol. 29v); 'Nota Raison contre fol amor carnel' (Arras, Bibliothèque Municipale 532 [845], fol. 251v).

Neither in his edition nor in his monograph does Langlois reveal particular concern with marginalia, though he does allude *en passant* to glosses in some of the mss., as well as ex-libris inscriptions, prayers, verses, and the like, including one expression of thanks to God for deliverance from love.⁵ But Langlois' work, masterly though it is, can hardly be considered definitive with respect to *description des manuscrits*. His descriptions are sometimes more anecdotal than systematic, and they are not always accurate. He did not, of course, know all the mss., and he did not inspect many of those whose existence he records. It may well be that only a small number of the *Roman* mss. are significantly glossed, but we cannot be sure of this, nor can we estimate the value of such glosses as may exist, until a thorough survey has been made and the glosses published.⁶

An extensively glossed fifteenth-century ms. of the *Roman* in the Philadelphia Museum of Art (Collins Collection, 45-65-3) would seem to justify the undertaking of such a survey.⁷ This beautiful, richly illuminated ms. was formerly in the collection of Robert Hoe, and is described in the Hoe sale catalogue as follows: 'French ms. on vellum of the 15th century written in lettres Bâtarde, Red and Black, double columns. 202 leaves (13¼ × 9¼ inches). Ornamented with 2 large and 74 small miniatures and numerous borders composed of flowers, leaves, scrolls, etc., illuminated in gold and colors; also hundreds of illuminated initials.... "Le Roman de la Rose" occupies the first 150 leaves; on fol. 151 recto begins "Testament de Jean de Meung" ending on fol. 177 verso; the other leaves contain the rare "Songe rimé", "Le codicile maistre Jehan de Meung" ("Trésor" in most mss.), and the "Miserere defunctorum" in French and in Latin....'⁸

⁵ The glossed mss. to which Langlois, *Manuscrits*, refers (passim) are the following: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale fr. 1560, 1574, 2196, 24390, 25523, 25525, nouv. acq. fr. 9252 (all these of the fourteenth or very early fifteenth centuries); Amiens, Bibliothèque Municipale 437 (fourteenth century); Chantilly, Musée Condé 686 (fourteenth century); Montpellier, Bibliothèque de l'École de Médecine 438 (fourteenth century); Florence, Biblioteca Riccardiana 2775 (fourteenth century); Turin, Biblioteca Nazionale Universitaria L III 22 (gloss of the fourteenth or fifteenth century, ms. late thirteenth); London, British Library Harley 4425 and Additional 12042 (fifteenth century); Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 3681 (sixteenth or seventeenth century); Paris, Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal 3337 (late fourteenth century) and 2989 (an eighteenth-century copy of B. N. fr. 12594, with moralising preface). Langlois also cites (e. g., *Manuscrits*, p. 16) a number of other glosses which appear to have no substantive importance.

⁶ I hope to assemble a corpus of *Roman de la Rose* ms. glosses, and I shall be grateful to scholars who can inform me of the locations of glossed mss. or of relevant scholarship.

⁷ See *Philadelphia Museum Bulletin* 58, no. 275 (Autumn 1962), which is devoted to a description of the Philip S. Collins collection of medieval illuminated mss.

⁸ *Catalogue of the Library of Robert Hoe of New York.... To be Sold by Auction Beginning on Monday, January 8, 1912, by the Anderson Auction Company* 2 (New York, 1911), pp. 393-94. Fol. 79r is here reproduced.

The ms. is mentioned by De Ricci, and may have been known to Langlois, though he appears not to have seen it, nor does he mention its gloss.⁹ The earliest owner thus far identified is the Marquis de Courtanvaux (late eighteenth century), whose seal appears on the first and last pages.¹⁰ The single scribe has left no marks of identification. Palaeographical and iconographical analysis suggests that the ms. was produced in northern France or Burgundy, during the period c. 1445-70. The marginal gloss was added very early in the sixteenth century.¹¹

This gloss, which is written in a humanist hand, is the first comprehensive ms. commentary on the *Roman de la Rose* to be reported. It has hitherto been almost entirely ignored, and is here printed for the first time.¹² It provides a coherent and intelligible reading of the poem, in distinct contrast to the idiosyncratic allegorizations to be found in the contemporaneous printed versions of Molinet and of Marot. It is an impressive example of traditional allegorical exegesis applied to one of the consummate literary allegories of the Middle Ages, which happened to be enjoying its last great vogue at a moment when medieval allegory was still well loved if not always well understood.¹³

⁹ S. De Ricci and W. J. Wilson, *Census of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United States and Canada* 2 (New York, 1937), p. 1658; W. H. Bond and C. U. Faye, *Supplement to the Census of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United States and Canada* (New York, 1962), p. 470. Langlois, *Manuscripts*, p. 212, cites an account in *Romania* 23 (1894) 298-300 of a catalogue issued in 1893 by the London bookseller Quaritch, in which two mss. of the *Roman* – one of them possibly our Collins ms. – are described, and comments: 'Ce pourrait être le ms. du xv^e siècle, orné de 74 miniatures, provenant de d'Urfé, qui figurait à la vente de l'anglais Perkins.' Though Langlois did not include this ms. in his classification, it belongs in fact to subcategory *N* of Group II, the less reliable of his two groups of classified mss. Cf. fols. 22r, 60v, and *Manuscripts*, pp. 241-42, 287-88, 351-52, et passim.

¹⁰ According to the number of the *Philadelphia Museum Bulletin* cited above, p. 16, the provenance of this ms. is as follows: Philip S. Collins, Cortlandt Bishop, J. F. Drake, Robert Hoe, Henri Bordes, Quaritch, T. Shadford Walker, Ellis, H. Perkins, Vicomte de Morel-Vindé, Paignon-Dijonval, Baron d'Heiss, and Marquis de Courtanvaux, 1783.

¹¹ I am grateful to Professor Jeanne Krqchalis of Pennsylvania State University for examining the Collins ms. and providing me with these conclusions.

¹² Richard L. Hoffman, *Ovid and the Canterbury Tales* (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 73-74, reproduces part of the gloss on fol. 5v and a miniature on fol. 6r. This is the only scholarly acknowledgement of the Collins ms. that I have seen, and I am indebted to the late Professor Hoffman for first bringing the ms. to my attention. I have published English translations of several of these *notae* and a few paragraphs of the accompanying commentary in *A Reader's Guide to the Roman de la Rose* (Hamden, Conn., 1982).

¹³ The Philadelphia Museum of Art has kindly granted me permission to publish the Collins gloss, from Collins ms. 45-65-3. Mr. Kneeland McNulty, formerly Curator of Prints, Drawings, and Photographs, was unfailingly helpful when I was studying the precious ms. in his keeping, as were Mr. Michael K. Komanecy, formerly intern in the Department of Prints (now Assistant Curator of the Yale Art Museum), and Miss Ann Percy, Associate Curator for Drawings. I must also thank Miss Kathleen Hunt of the Alverthorpe Library, and the Rosenwald Collection of the Library of Congress, for valuable assistance to my research. Among colleagues who have

The Collins gloss attests to that strong disposition toward allegory which is now widely recognized among humanists and others of the sixteenth century. Though one sometimes discerns a shift of emphasis from the typological to the moral (a shift far from total, which varies in prominence according to where one looks), the essential continuity between medieval and Renaissance allegorism is not now likely to be questioned. Among vernacular poets, none was more profoundly admired in the sixteenth century than Petrarch, the early editions of whose works were always furnished with elaborate allegorical commentaries. Such a central intellectual figure as Erasmus was fully committed to both scriptural and literary allegory; and when he recommends Ovid as an example of the kind of reading which taught early Church Fathers to interpret the Bible, he is true to the spirit of his time.¹⁴ Indeed, the most cursory examination of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century editions of the *Metamorphoses* reveals how earnestly the Renaissance was inclined to regard that work as a didactic allegorical epic.

Viewed from within this well-known cultural context, the history of the *Roman de la Rose* in the sixteenth century is a striking instance both of the enthusiasm with which Christian allegory was still received and also of the dangers which could beset allegorists whose understanding of the traditional mode, or whose tact in deploying it, was not equal to their enthusiasm. Some may see in the immoderate extravaganzas of Molinet and Marot the impending decadence itself of Christian allegory. What cannot be doubted is that there was a great appetite for the *Roman* between 1480 and 1538, when twenty-one printed editions appeared – after which the poem disappeared for two centuries.¹⁵ Until well into the sixteenth century, as Baridon and Tuve have

answered my many calls for help, I owe thanks to Richard Brewer, Raymond Cormier, Charles Dahlberg, Ruth Dean, John V. Fleming, the late Richard L. Hoffman, Jeanne Krochalis, Morton Levitt, John Plummer, Miriam Reik, and H. Frank Thornton. Professor D. W. Robertson, Jr. untied several knots for me, but my debt to him is far more comprehensive and of longer standing. Part of the research for this paper was conducted while I was on sabbatical leave from my teaching duties at Temple University, and I am glad to acknowledge that university's support.

¹⁴ For Petrarch, see Maxwell Luria, 'Wyatt's "The Lover Compareth His State" and the Petrarchan Commentators', *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 12 (1971) 531-35. For Erasmus, see Donald Stone, Jr., 'Humanist Exegesis and Two French Commentaries on the *Metamorphoses*', *Romance Notes* 16 (1974-75) 134-43. In Stone's 'A Word about the Prologue to *Gargantua*', *Romance Notes* 13 (1972) 511-14, the point is developed that Rabelais' criticism of allegorism in the prologue to *Gargantua* dismisses a certain form of allegorism only, not all allegorism.

¹⁵ Francis W. Bourdillon, *The Early Editions of the Romance of the Rose* (London, 1906), pp. 3, 187. Thus, Silvio F. Baridon, *Le Roman de la Rose dans la version attribuée à Clément Marot* 1 (Milan, 1954), p. 11: 'Les années de 1526 à 1538 marquent en France le point culminant de la fortune du *Roman de la Rose*: elles sont comme la gerbe finale par laquelle se clôt une longue

shown, the *Roman* remained a discernible influence upon French literature.¹⁶ The printed editions of these years contain a series of some 103 sectional rubrics in rhymed verse, related to the illustrations and apparently composed for the first edition. Although most of these rubrics are free of exegetical content, at least four are not, but rather assume the accuracy of Raison's critique of Amanz.¹⁷ The matter deserves study, for it appears distinctly possible that these early printed editions casually presupposed a satirical or 'Christian' view of the protagonist of the *Roman*, and consequently of the poem itself.¹⁸

One must wonder about the assumptions regarding the *Roman* in the minds of those who read the Burgundian *rhétoriqueur* Jean Molinet's prose version, which was issued in three editions between 1500 and 1521, though composed perhaps as early as c. 1483.¹⁹ Did they really believe the curious things that Molinet says about the poem's meaning? This must be one of the oddest books of its time, and its title one of the silliest:

féerie de feux d'artifice.' There were two editions in the eighteenth century, three in the nineteenth. For a concise account of these editions, and of the later influence of the *Roman* in France and throughout Europe, see Lecoy 1.xxviii-xxxv.

¹⁶ Baridon, *ibid.*, pp. 11-82; Tuve, *Allegorical Imagery*, chap. 4.

¹⁷ Bourdillon, *Early Editions*, pp. 97-130. The rubrics are numbers 18, 24, 36, and 40:

Comment apres ce bel langage
 Lamant humblement fist homage
 Par jennesse qui le decoit
 Au dieu damours qui le recoit.
 Comment rayson de dieu aymee
 Est jus de sa tour devalee
 Qui lamant chastie et reprent
 De ce que folle amour emprent.
 Cy est la tres belle rayson
 Qui est preste en toute saison
 De donner bon conseil a ceulx
 Qui deulx sauver sont paresseux.
 Comment rayson monstre a lamant
 Fortune sa roe tournant
 Et luy dit que tout son pouoir
 Sil veult ne le fera douloir.

¹⁸ If this hypothesis is accurate, one may wonder why most of these early editions did not contain a more elaborate exegesis. Perhaps their editors thought it unnecessary; or perhaps they were less concerned with producing accurate glosses than with satisfying the popular demand for illustrated editions of the *Roman*. Similar issues arise in connection with the glossing of the mss. Bourdillon, *ibid.*, p. 23, has a suggestive remark: 'We see from the manuscripts that the work was regarded as pre-eminently a field for illustration, almost as if it had been a religious book; and the printed editions carried on the tradition.' Nearly all twenty-one early editions were illustrated.

¹⁹ Bourdillon, *ibid.*, pp. 64-68, 147, 160, 162; Baridon, *Roman*, p. 15.

Cest le romant de la rose
 Moralisie cler et net
 Translate de rime en prose
 Par vostre humble molinet.²⁰

In a rambling, effusive 'Prologue', Molinet distinguishes three kinds of love: 'amour divine, amour naturelle, et amour fatuelle'. His description of this third kind has a certain windy charm:

Amour fatuelle est fole delectation, frequente cogitacion, ardent feu sans extinction, insaciable ambition, incredible deception, dyabolicque illusion, de rage amere portion, de vray repos destruction, de melodie inuention, de dons assuefaction, de motz multiplication, de sots accumulation, de honneur retrogradacion, de sens adnichilation, de tristesse augmentacion, de famine nutricion, de salut retardation, de bonnes meurs corrupcion, de vices generation, de louenge remotion, de pourete replection, de bourse euacuation, de fraude ymagination, de couleur grant mutation, de lumiere priuacion, de force diminution, desperit perturbation, de membres dessication, de vie abreuiation, de corps humain perdition, et de lame damnation.²¹

Putting aside his humility, Molinet nourishes the wish to 'tourner et conuertir ... le viciex au vertueux, le corporel en le spirituel, la mondanite en diuinite, et souuerainement de le moraliser'.²²

Each section of his version is followed by a *moralité*, and the *moralités* are condensed and summarized at the beginning in a *table*. Although Molinet acknowledges that the *Roman* is about *fol amour*, his allegorizations treat the episodes of the poem *in bono*, with no evident concern for its coherence or its creators' intention. Thus, the lover is as if animated by diverse kinds of *amour divine*. The river at the beginning of his dream represents baptism. His homage to the God of Love is as if to a religious superior. His ultimate conquest of the rose represents the cutting down by Joseph of Arimathea of Christ's body from the cross. All this farrago has of course no accurate relation whatever to the poem itself, nor to any other known interpretation of it. Bourdillon's verdict on Molinet's allegorizing is harsh but essentially accurate: 'cheap, far-fetched, and unconvincing'.²³ Wishing to convert vice to virtue, Molinet merely succeeds in converting a great poem into a travesty; and in his zeal for morality, allegory, and rhetoric, he manages to subvert all three.

²⁰ Fol. a i^r. The book was printed by Vérard at Paris in 1500. See Noël Dupire, *Jean Molinet. La vie, les œuvres* (Paris, 1932), chap. 5.

²¹ Fol. b ii^r.

²² Fol. b iii^r.

²³ Bourdillon, *Early Editions*, p. 162.

The four editions of the poet Clément Marot's recension of the *Roman de la Rose* (1526, 1529, 1531, 1538) survive in many copies, and were evidently much in demand. A modernized version in verse (a hurried potboiler, according to Gaston Paris), it was produced by Marot in 1526 during his imprisonment for heresy, which perhaps accounts for the absence of his name from the editions.²⁴ Marot's allegorism is less ambitious than Molinet's, being confined to a three-page 'Preamble au liure' which is largely given to asserting and developing general principles of allegory. His analysis of the rose itself constitutes his chief application of these principles. With conventional scriptural hermeneutics in mind, he elicits a fourfold interpretation *in bono*. Here is a fair example of his method:

Je dis doncques premierement que par la rose qui tant est appetee de lamant est
entendu lestat de sapience bien et iustement a la rose conforme pour les valeurs
douceurs et odeurs qui en elle sont / laquelle moult est a auoir difficile pour les
empeschemens entreposez / ausquelz arrester ne me veulx pour le present.

Besides *lestat de sapience*, the rose signifies *lestat de grace*, *la glorieuse Vierge Marie*, and *le souuerain bien infini et la gloire deternelle beatitude*,

laquelle comme vrays amateurs de sa douceur et amenite perpetuelle pourrons
obtenir en euitant les vices qui nous empeschent / et ayant secours des vertus qui
nous introduiront au verger dinfinie lyesse / iusques au rosier de tout bien et
gloire qui est la beatifique vision de lessence de dieu.²⁵

Readers of today are likely to concur that Marot's interpretation, though more modest in scope than Molinet's, is not less unacceptable as a scheme for reading the *Roman*. Both allegorizations are manifest betrayals of the poem's substance and tone. We are confronted, then, with the apparent paradox that during these decades of the *Roman*'s ultimate celebrity – its *gerbe finale*, as Baridon calls it²⁶ – the great poem was often encumbered by these (to us) bizarrely inappropriate readings, classic examples of what Rosemond Tuve called 'imposed allegory'.²⁷ It is not part of my present object to try to account for this paradox. Tuve has, in any event, asked the pertinent questions, and her dense, brilliant discussion of the *Roman* and its crepuscular editors, as well as the issues they raise with respect to theory and practice of allegory in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, must be the point of departure for future speculation. Most suggestively, Tuve postulates a strong taste around 1500 for allegorical wit. 'Pleasure in ingenuity surely enters, and pleasure in recognition

²⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 157-59.

²⁵ fols. A ii^v, iii^r (Paris, 1531).

²⁶ See n. 15 above.

²⁷ Tuve, *Allegorical Imagery*, p. 227.

(both of imagery and concept) was a stronger element still.²⁸ Molinet's prose, after all, is a *tour de force* of rhetorical as it is of allegorical excess, and a taste for the one might be supposed to have accompanied a taste for the other.

Surveying this literary landscape, John Fleming concludes that by 1500 the *Roman* 'was no longer clearly understood'.²⁹ One may, of course, speculate as to whether, in principle, the survival and continued acceptance of an earlier poem does not assure at least some continuity of comprehension. (Tuve's analysis emphasizes a shift of literary priorities rather than a loss of the older *modus legendi*.) However, Fleming's assertion is sufficiently cautious, and – particularly if one has Molinet and Marot as one's chief points of reference – his conclusion seems reasonable enough. But perhaps it may now be claimed for the Collins gloss that it demonstrates (if demonstration were needed) that the authentic allegorical understanding of the *Roman* was not altogether lost by 1500; and if the gloss's very existence can be taken as evidence of a need engendered by cultural change, the fact that it could be written at all is reassuring proof of cultural continuity.

The 150 leaves of the Collins ms. which contain the *Roman de la Rose* include (apart from the sectional rubrics) well over 200 marginal inscriptions of various lengths, ranging from notes of a few words to small exegetical essays. With a few minor exceptions, they appear to be in the same early sixteenth-century hand. Most of the briefest notes serve merely to point to an episode or character, or to summarize an action or discussion. I have left these untranscribed, except for a few which have exegetical content (e.g., *notae* 22 and 23). In addition, I have omitted fourteen notes of substance because I found them illegible or because the margins were hopelessly cropped. These fourteen, most of them evidently elucidations of classical allusions, occur on fols. 5r, 14r (two *notae*), 15v, 69r, 80v, 99r, 101r, 102v, 113r, 131r, 132v, 137r, and 137v.

The 184 *notae* printed here occur throughout the text of the poem. Like the ms. itself, they make no distinction whatever between Guillaume's and Jean's contributions, and thus implicitly invite the reader to regard the *Roman* as a unity. About a third of the notes are explicitly allegorical, and seek to expose inner meanings or to make allegorical identifications. The rest, variously, explicate the text, infer general principles of conduct or experience from the

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 331. Similarly, and with equal cogency, she wishes us, in considering the *querelle* over the *Roman de la Rose*, to give greater attention to its 'jeu d'esprit quality' (p. 274 n. 19). These interesting documents of 1399-1402 are now accessible in a good edition and serviceable translation: Eric Hicks, ed., *Le débat sur le Roman de la Rose* (Paris, 1977); J. L. Baird and J. R. Kane, trans., *La querelle de la Rose. Letters and Documents* (Chapel Hill, 1978).

²⁹ Fleming, *Roman*, p. 6.

action of the poem, explain mythological allusions, cite relevant authorities, and so on. It is perhaps noteworthy that there are no grammatical or lexical notes, at a time when, as we have observed, 'modernizations' of the poem were especially in demand. Among authorities, Ovid, not surprisingly, has the most citations, four (*notae* 3, 126, 128, and the cropped *nota* on fol. 99r); Matthew has two (26, 117); Boethius, two (30, 102); Virgil, two (in the cropped *notae* on fols. 69r and 80v); and there are single citations of Ezechiel (10), Plato (cropped *nota* on fol. 132v), Aristotle (159), Juvenal (101), Servius (143), and the decretal *Omnis utriusque sexus* (113). One imagines that the glossator has used these and other sources more often than he acknowledges. Most of his mythological explications, for instance, are in fact adapted from Colard Mansion's *Bible des poètes*, an influential work which transmitted to the sixteenth century the *Ovidius moralizatus* of Pierre Bersuire (Berchorius), the fourteenth-century Benedictine. Similarly, though the gloss is thoroughly Christian in spirit and letter, it contains no references to patristic literature, and only a handful to religious texts of any sort. Such prevailing freedom from the pedantries which might betray an academic or ecclesiastical provenience perhaps suggests that our learned, humanistic, sometimes eloquent glossator, of rather conservative and orthodox disposition, may have prepared this ms. for the library of a cultivated nobleman of literary taste, traditional values, and something more than ordinary facility in understanding earlier forms of French.³⁰

Apprehending the *Roman's* protagonist as an emblematic *jouissance* under the deleterious influence of *voluptuosité charnelle* (3) or *amour desordonnée* (9), deaf to the strictures of Reason and of God, and gaining at last a Pyrrhic victory, the glossator provides dozens of diverse insights which rarely seem false to the spirit and intention of the great work which they purport to explain. The rose is, of course, *sa amoureuse* (88). Bel Accueil represents the same personage from her own perspective: *la voluptueuse fille* (36). The God of Love is sometimes a projection of the *ienne voluptueux* himself (7), sometimes an hypostatization of *concupiscence charnelle* (18), whose arrows are *temptations de la char* (8). Amis represents *delict charnel* (31), and *les barons de lost damours* symbolize *tous les vices par lesquels on chiet en amour voluptueuse* (108). Male Bouche is *mauvais renom* (43) or *ceux qui parlent et descourent la folle amour* (88). Faulx Semblant and Contrainte Abstinence represent *gens de deuotion par apparence* (106). Nature (following Servius) is *vne vertu diuine donnée aux choses par lesquelles de semblables produisent leurs semblables*

³⁰ In at least one instance, however, our glossator appears to have been sensitive to linguistic novelty: the expression *mi-figue, mi-raisin* (cf. *nota* 139) has not been recorded before the end of the fifteenth century, and is rather rare before the seventeenth. Cf. *Grand Larousse* 3 (Paris, 1973), s. v. *figue*.

(143). Genius is given both a general identification – *le dieu de nature et de delectation* (143) – and a specific, for *en amours desordonnee* *Genius est cause dacomplir amour libidineuse* (158). Within the frame of this allegorical structure, the glossator provides a reading which is as authentic and coherent as the contemporary printed commentaries of Molinet and Marot are arbitrary and artificial (and, interestingly enough, one which is altogether consonant with certain recent critical discussions of the *Roman*'s original meaning).³¹ Authenticity apart, one wonders which allegorical approach to the poem – the moral and behavioral satire of the Collins glossator or the *in bono* idealism of the printed commentators – provides the more accurate index of how the *Roman de la Rose* was likely to be read during these years of the early sixteenth century, just before the poem virtually dropped out of sight for two centuries.

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In transcribing the gloss, I have expanded abbreviations; capitalized most proper nouns and reduced some distracting capitalizations, but followed the glossator's inconsistent practice with respect to personified abstractions; modified punctuation, while retaining all virgules; separated some words which were joined and joined some others which were not; placed reconstructions of cropped material in angled brackets, and of omitted material in angled brackets within square brackets; and used ellipses to indicate words excluded because of illegibility or cropping. Words which the scribe added in the margin or above the line have been incorporated silently into the text. Where I have corrected scribal errors of spelling, I have provided the uncorrected text in footnotes. I have indicated the approximate location in the ms. of the *notae* with reference to adjacent text by giving equivalent line numbers in Lecoy's edition (L) and page numbers in Dahlberg's prose translation (D).

MARGINAL GLOSS IN THE COLLINS MS. OF THE *ROMAN DE LA ROSE*

1. fol. 2r (L 156-168, D 33)

Note / Quant lhome use de delit charnel il chiet en hayne, villennye / et aux aultres peches cy n < on > desclarres.¹

³¹ See n. 3 above.

¹ (*nota* 1) Cf. Fleming, *Roman*, p. 32: 'Though ten in number, these abstractions [i.e., the images on the wall surrounding Deduit's garden] are clearly based on the concept of the seven capital vices and, within the ironic economy of the *Roman* as a whole, form a part of the self-mocking trappings of the religion of carnal love.' This *nota*, as well as *nota* 4, supports Fleming's premise.

2. fol. 5r (L 465-475, D 37)

Note laffection des jouu <en> ceaux / instigues par l<a char>, par le monde / et par <le di> able, dentrer aux vol<uptuosites> mondaynes.

3. fol. 5v (L 580, D 38)

Le commencement de toute voluptuosite charnelle sourt par oisuiete, et pour ce dit Ouide en son liure de lart de aymer / *Ocia si tollas periere cupidinis Artes.*²

4. fol. 6r (L 603, D 39)

La fin [<de>] Deduit mondayn / est demourer avec villenye / hayne / pouurete / et les aultres ymages peyntes au mur [<de>] deduyt.

5. fol. 6r (L 629-642, D 39)

Note que oysuiete cherce tous vices / et fuyt toutes vertus, et par icelle entre le ioenne personage en amo<ur> charnelle.

6. fol. 6v (L 722, D 40)

Note / Quant lhome est comble par oysuiete en voluptuosites / il se delette coment ebete desperit a veoir danser joennes filles, ioennes homes / et repute toutes ces venntes une grant gloire.

7. fol. 8r (L 868-879, D 42)

Par le dieu damours et ces habiz est a entendre / le ienne voluptueux le quel porte habis et vestemens de diuerses faczons.

8. fol. 8r (L 925, D 43)

Par les ·V· flesches d<u> dieu damours sont entendues ·V· tempt<a>-tions de la char par lesquelles le ienne h<ome> chiet en voluptuo<site>.

9. fol. 8v (L 1016, D 44-45)

Note que en amour desordonnee sont requisez les qualites / de beaulte / richesse / largesse / franchise / courtoisie / oisuiete / et de iennesse, desquelles les descriptions sont cy apres desclarees.

10. fol. 11v (L 1299-1320, D 48)

Note / Quant le iouuenceau est au iardin mondayn et il est beau / riche / large, franc, et habandonne / avec dame oiseuse qui le gouuerne, tantost

² (nota 3) The quotation is underlined in the ms. As Hoffman, *Ovid*, p. 74, points out, the glossator has both misquoted Ovid (though in an inspired way, substituting 'Cupid's arts' for 'Cupid's bow') and incorrectly cited the *Ars amatoria*. The verse, much quoted in the Middle Ages, is *Remedia amoris* 139: '*Otia si tollas, periere Cupidinis arcus*'. According to Robertson, *Preface*, p. 92 n. 69, this verse is the *locus classicus* of Oiseuse. See also Hoffman, *ibid.*, pp. 72-77, for an excellent account of the line's medieval and Renaissance uses.

sabandonne a voluptuosite; tesmoing Ezechiel en son ·XVI· chapitre / *hec fuit iniquitas Sodonne; saturitas panis et ocium*.³

11. fol. 13r (L 1580, D 52)

Par Narcisus qui se myre / est entendu les foulz orgueilleux jouuenceaux voluptueux lesqueux se mirent en leurs faulses vanites qui les en yvre et plonge en douloureux umbre decepuable en la fontayne sophiste / en laquelle ilz cuident tousiours prendre leurs voluptuosites qui les fuyent et les conduisent jucque mort; et apres sont laues en une eau nommee Styx / coment fut Narcisus / lequel Styx est lun des palus denfer lequel est interprete douleur ou tristeresse.⁴

12. fol. 14v (L 1735-42, D 54-55)

La ·ii· temptation de voluptuosite est simplese et pusillanimité de non resister aux oisiues et impudiques paroles.

³ (nota 10) Ezech 16:49: *Ecce haec fuit iniquitas Sodoma, sororis tuae: superbia, saturitas panis et abundantia, et otium ipsius, et filiarum eius*. Cf. Jerome, *Commentariorum in Hiezechielem libri XIV* (CCL 75; Turnhout, 1964), p. 206: 'Superbia, saturitas, rerum omnium abundantia, otium et deliciae, peccatum sodomiticum est, et propter hoc sequitur Dei obliuio, quae praesentia bona putat esse perpetua et numquam sibi necessariis indigendum....'

⁴ (nota 11) Robertson, *Preface*, pp. 74-75, shows that medieval Ovidians often associated Narcissus' condition with St. Augustine's notion of the fall of man's lower reason by self-indulgence in pleasure of thought, or *delectatio cogitationis*. Our glossator deftly employs this conventional interpretation to imply that Narcissus is emblematic of the *Roman's Lover*. His account of Narcissus, like most of his explications of classical myth, is evidently adapted from Colard Mansion's influential *La bible des poetes*. (My quotations are from the Paris edition of 1523, printed by Philippe Le Noir.) This work, first issued by Mansion at Bruges in 1484, is substantially a translation into French prose of the Latin *Ovidius moralizatus* of Bersuire (Berchorius), which forms book 15 of the *Reductorium morale*. The original of Mansion's work has often been incorrectly ascribed to Thomas Waleys. For bibliographical information, see Frederick R. Goff, ed., *Incunabula in American Libraries. A Third Census...* (New York, 1964), p. 458. For general information, see Tuve, *Allegorical Imagery*, pp. 232, 285 n. 29, 294 n. 39, 300 n. 41; and Douglas Bush, *Mythology and the Renaissance Tradition in English Poetry* (New York, 1932; rev. edition, 1963), p. 48 n. 7. A comparison of the glossator's mythological notes with his originals in Mansion will, I think, reveal a discriminating hand which selects precisely those parts of his source which will illuminate the *Roman*, and leaves the rest. The following is from Mansion's discussion of Narcissus (fol. E vi^r): 'Narcisus fut beau iouuenceau <et> fut dit d <e> luy que assez viuroit sil se gardoit de luy mesmes veoir. Il se vit car il senorgueillit pour la grande beaute que tantost luy saillit. Telle gloire est vaine et deceuable / car tost passe beaulte mondaine. Si est fol celluy qui pour elle senorgueillit. ... Il enhait hommes et femmes et luy mesmes trop ayma et se trahit par le miroir de la fontaine de ce monde ou tant mira sa vaine beaulte que la mort luy vint et deuint fleur telle de quoy parle le psalmiste / que au matin fleurist et au vespre est cheuste et flestrie / tost est aneantie la vaine beaulte des gens. Qui bien veult apprendre ceste fable on peult par Narcisus entendre les folz orgueilleux des biens temporelz habondans qui se mirent dedans les faulses vanitez de ce monde que les enyure et plonge en forsennerie de douloureux bruage. ... Cest la deceuable fontaine qui fait cuyder vraye lombre muable et cuydent tousiours prendre ce qui ne fine deschapper.'

13. fol. 14v (L 1760-74, D 55)

La .iii. temptation est courtoisie de receuoir dons / atouchemens et baisers non honestes.

14. fol. 14v (L 1775-85, D 55)

La .iiii. est franchise et liberalite de soy printer a toutes la soinites.⁵

15. fol. 15r (L 1823, D 56)

La .v. temptation est / compaignye / et communication avec ce que on desire voluptueusement.

16. fol. 15r (L 1837-51, D 56)

La .vi. est beau sembl < ant > , cest a dire / que on a esperance de venir < a > la fin de sa voluptu < o > site pource que on es < t > bien recueilli de ce < lui > que on desire.

17. fol. 16r (L 1953, D 57)

Note quant le voluptueux iouuenceau est cheust en Ville Amour, il luy fait homage – cest addire il delesse toutes vertus / mesmement le seruice de dieu – et comment traire / ydolatre, et aueugle dentendement, [< se >] fait serf des creatures et des vices.

18. fol. 16v (L 2035, D 59)

Après que le voluptueux iouuenceau se met a seruir concupiscence charnelle, il ne luy suffist pas la seruir de biens et de puissance corporelle, maiz il luy donne son cuer et enfait son dieu.

19. fol. 17r (L 2086, D 59)

Les sotes cerimonies et foles obseruations vaynes vers les charnelles amours, que gardent les desordonnes amoureux.

20. fol. 18r (L 2227-34, D 62)

Note la retraction de lesperit de toute vertu / et la ydolat < erie > diceluy, par effre < nee > voluptuosite.

21. fol. 19r (L 2347-48, D 63)

La inconstance et ebetation de lamour voluptueuse.

22. fol. 19r (L 2399-2404, D 64)

De la inquietation damour desordonnee.

23. fol. 20r (L 2543-50, D 66)

De la prodigalite de pecu < ne > et perdition de temps damour voluptueuse.

⁵ (nota 14) *toutes la soinites*, which makes no sense, is perhaps a scribal corruption of *toutes les vanites*.

24. fol. 20v (L 2601-2609, D 67)

De la vayne esperance de fole amour.

25. fol. 21r (L 2657-61, D 68)

Des oiseusez paroles damour voluptueuse.

26. fol. 21r (L 2701-2708, D 68)

Du regard desor < donne > de charnelle am < our > prohibe par m < on > -
sieur Saint Pol le < quel > dit / *Si quis vid < erit > mulierem ad con-*
*c < upi > scendam eam, iam mechatatus est in c < orde > suo.*⁶

27. fol. 22r (L 2828, D 70)

Note en ce chapitre / que au commencement et a lentrete de lusage de
voluptueuse amour / Mauuais renon / avec honte de perdre chaste < te > ,
empesche la excecution dicelle amour.

28. fol. 22v (L 2891-94, D 71)

Comment on a au comencement honte de loperation de voluptueuse amour.

29. fol. 23r (L 2927-29, D 72)

Souuent aduyent lempeschement⁷ damour desordonnee par danger de laces
/ ou des amys ou diuulgation de mauuaise renommee.

30. fol. 24r (L 3068, D 74)

Quant le ienne home est ebete damour deshonneste / il repudie toute raison
et toute correction, car son ardante concupiscence sensuelle expelle toute loy
tant diuine que positue; tesmoing Boece de consolation qui dit en Latin de
son iii^e liure / ou parle de Orpheus / et de Erudice / *Quis legem det*
*amantibus / Maior lex / Amor est sibi.*⁸

31. fol. 24v (L 3129, D 75)

Par Amys / puet estre entendu delict charnel lequel instigue et contraint
lhome cheust en amour fole / toute raison omisse, paruenir a la fin
deshonneste et exquise. Apres que lhome est instigue par delict charnel, il
cuide venir trouuer moyen vers celle que il ayme dauoir ce que il desire, maiz
danger de perdre sa renommee / la fait au commencement differer

⁶ (nota 26) Mt 5:28: *Ego autem dico vobis: quia omnis qui viderit mulierem ad concupiscendum eam, iam moechatus est eam in corde suo*. The glossator's ascription of this text to St. Paul is a surprising – but, in view of its 'Pauline' sentiment, not an inexplicable – slip.

⁷ (nota 29) lempeschement ms.

⁸ (nota 30) Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae* 3, met. 12.47-48. Chaucer's use of these lines in the Knight's Tale, I (A) 1163-66, is one of many other medieval allusions to Orpheus as lawless lover in whom wisdom has been overthrown, in contradistinction to the 'true Orpheus', a type of the crucified Christ. See Robertson, *Preface*, pp. 106-107. Cf. nota 56.

32. fol. 25r (L 3191-94, D 76)

Comment delict cha < rnel > incite de rechef lh < ome > a paruenir a sa volu < nte > desordonnee.

33. fol. 25v (L 3287, D 78)

Note / Quant la ienne fille se voit poursuite daulcun honneste persone par apparence / Sa nature femenine et fraelle non meditant la fin / et precedens aucuns signes damours saneantit par iennesse qui la gouuerne; et pource que chacun ayme son semblable, successiuelement elle donne attrait a celuy quelle ayme et ne luy chault / de parens ne de renommee / Maiz elle tout danger expelle et met hors.

34. fol. 26v (L 3386, D 79)

Après que laces est seur / et que danger est expulse dauec bel acueil / cest a dire de la fille que on desire; icelle fille se printe a celuy quelle ayme, et nestoit la paour de perdre sa chaste < te > , elle lesseroit soy baisier et cueillir le bouton / cest a dire elle souffreroit que il eust son pucelage.

35. fol. 27r (L 3422, D 79)

Après danger expulse / dauec bel acueil / cest a dire de la fille amoureuse / et que illuy eust monstre la rose / cest a dire quelle a communique avec le ienne home qui est amoureux delle par son consentement en lasciuies et lubriques paroles, elle est toute embrasee du brandon de feu de Venus, cest a dire damour charnelle vers icelluy.

36. fol. 27v (L 3505, D 81)

Lamant / cest le voluptueux / après que bel acueil, cest la voluptueuse fille / embrasee de charnalite se trouua, elle se consentit que la rose fut baisée de lamant / cest a dire elle se consent par instigation⁹ charnelle a baisier impudiquement le voluptueux jouenceau.

37. fol. 28r (L 3528, D 81)

Après que lamant est veu hanter avec la fille, les parens dicelle, remplis de souspeçon et de jalousie, la chastient par menaces.

38. fol. 28v (L 3605, D 82)

Comment les parens geuleux de la ienne fille ne la veullent croire pour sa honteuse excusation.

39. fol. 29r (L 3642, D 83)

Après la recusation de la honteuse excusation de la ienne fille par les parens, elle chiet en creynte et paour diceuz et en plus grant danger que au parauant.

⁹ (nota 36) instigation ms.

40. fol. 30r (L 3778, D 84)

Comment Jalousie / cest a dire les amis souspeconneux de bel acueil, cest de la ienne fille / le mettent en la tour / cest a dire quil est garde de si pres que ces mere / ou tente / ou seur ne labandonnent de parler a home ne a femme / et luy sont prohibes dances / esbas et toutes collocutions de iennes homes.

41. fol. 31r (L 3885, D 86)

Quant la belle fille est en la tour / cest en la garde de ces amis / il ya .iiii. portiers, cest a dire / .iiii. empeschemens que son amant ne peult communiquer avec elle; le premier est le danger de laces vers elle / a loccasion de ces amys; le second est honte / que la fille pudique / et qui na encore use de operation charnelle actuelle est honteuse de auoir tel blasme de ces amys.

42. fol. 31r (L 3913, D 87)

Le tiers portier est / paour / destre veue communiquer ou faire aulcuns signes daymer pour la craynte de ces amys.

43. fol. 31r (L 3913, D 87)

Le quart portier / est Mallebouche / cest a dire Mauuaiz renom / pour lequell la ienne fille obuie a iceluy affin que ces amys ne luy puissent aucune chose reprocher.

44. fol. 31v (L 3952, D 87)

Les regres et la ebetation de sens de lamant voluptueux pour labsence et priuation de la communication de celle que il desire impudiquement.

45. fol. 32v (L 4127, D 92)

Encore de la fole ebetation et inconstance du voluptueux pour la priuation et absence de sa desideree impudiquement.

46. fol. 33v (L 4259, D 94)

Comment raison dite et instigue le voluptueux iouuenceau deuoir laisser et omettre Amour charnelle et luy monstre les perilz et dangers, les folies / les ebetations qui delle ensuyuent coment il appert par la description de voluptueuse amour icy descripte.

47. fol. 34r (L 4298, D 95)

Note que description / damours / nest aultre chose / fors explication et declaration des accide<n>s dicelle.

48. fol. 34r (L 4305-15, D 95)

Note / Que volup<tueux> desir / dompte <tous> estas, cest a di<re que> elle les rent to<us> enclins a volun<te> desordonnee et les retire <de la> vraye amo<ur> de dieu.

49. fol. 34v (L 4347-56, D 95-96)

<N>ote / que diffinition <d>amours / nest <a>ultre chose / fors
explication damours quant a son essence sans considerer les accidens.

50. fol. 34v (L 4370, D 96)

Après que lentendement du voluptueux jouuenceau / suade par raison /
considere les description / et diffinition / damour fole, pareillement / elle
luy descript / la vraye amour de dieu.

51. fol. 35v (L 4391-97, D 96)

Raison prohibe a lamant nabiter femme seulement pour le delict.

52. fol. 35v (L 4409-19, D 96-97)

<C>es demonstrations et allegations par rayson au Voluptueux des folies
et perilz de jennesse.

53. fol. 36r (L 4499, D 98)

Persuasion par raison au Voluptueux que après iennesse / il doit devenir en
viellesse.

54. fol. 36r (L 4533-38, D 98)

Reprehension et bla<sme> par Raison a lam<ant> de celles femmes
lequelles sabandonn<ent> pour dons.

55. fol. 36v (L 4596-98, D 99)

Les dommages damour voluptueuse.

56. fol. 36v (L 4617, D 100)

La repudiation et nonchallanse des parolles de raison par lamant / cest a dire
que le voluptueux / na loy ne raison qui luy soit plus grande ne plus affectee,
fors que le desir dacomplir sa ville operation.

57. fol. 37r (L 4655-57, D 100)

La description de Amytie / vertu morale.

58. fol. 37v (L 4772, D 102)

Après que Raison ot descript Amour fole / et vraye amour / a lamant / elle
luy descript et monstre les dangers de feynte amour de fortune mondayne.

59. fol. 38v (L 4874, D 103)

Demonstration par Raison / a lamant / que mondayns bien fortunes ne ont
point de vrays amys.

60. fol. 39r (L 4994, D 105)

Ostention par Raison a lamant / que Richece / fait les gens pouures / et
souffisanse les fait riches et puissans.

61. fol. 41v (L 5346, D 110)

Cy fait le voluptueux Amant / replique a raison / que il luy est fort difficile de lesser Amour desordonnee, pour prendre la Vraye Amour qui est vraye charite.

62. fol. 42r (L 5424, D 111)

Response a lamant / par Raison / en quelle manyere il pourra auoir Vraye Amour qui est charite.

63. fol. 42r (L 5463, D 112)

Ci prouue raison / par necessaires propositions a lamant voluptueux, que Amour charitable / est plus a eslire que la vertu de Justice.

64. fol. 42v (L 5537, D 113)

Note / Que Saturne ot vng filz qui ot nom Jupiter / le quel luy couppa les genitoires et les getta en la mer / De ce les poetes faignent / que Jupiter coupa les genitoires de Saturne roy de Crete / cest a dire la puissance et Justice de celuy Saturne / le quel estoit prudent et bon justicier.¹⁰

65. fol. 43r (L 5577, D 114)

Ostension par Raison / a lamant, que Justice est pou vertueuse sans amour vraye et charitable, et que puissance et vertu sont incompatibles.

66. fol. 43v (L 5665, D 115)

Cy prouue Raison par exemple de Apius, juge romain, que Justice est de petite valeur sans Amour, et que puissance et vertu sont ... incompatibles.

67. fol. 44v (L 5740-42, D 116)

La diffinition de Amour bestiale naturelle.

68. fol. 44v (L 5765-73, D 116)

Comment raison se offre a lamant, cest a dire / que raison admonnest le sperit et lentendement du voluptueux de soy desister.

69. fol. 44v (L 5816, D 117)

Ladmonition de Raison a lamant que sil la veult auoir a dame / il escouient laisser amours voluptueuses / et les amours de fortune mondayne; cest a dire que les amans¹¹ [< de >] la vertu de raison desprisent / voluptuosites / et mondanites.

¹⁰ (nota 64) For Saturn as king of Crete, see Mythographus Vaticanus III, 1.2: 'Historia quidem habet, Saturnum patrem et Iovem filium regna in Creta obtinuisse.' See also Myth. Vat. I, 2.104. These texts are in G. H. Bode, ed., *Scriptores rerum mythicarum latini tres Romae nuper reperti* (Celle, 1834), pp. 153, 34. Cf. nota 163 and footnote 55 below.

¹¹ (nota 69) aians ms.

70. fol. 45v (L 5896-5975, D 118-121)

La maison de fortune est assisse sur roche dure / cest sus orgueil et ambition
 / au myllieu de la mer / cest au cuer de lhome / les deux flos, cest bone et
 mauuaise fortune / qui incessament la font varier, sont environ elle / Quant
 Zephirus le doulx vent / cest a dire prosperite mondayne / ifait les estoilles
 flamboier / ce sont richeces apparoir; Bise / cest a dire inprosperite / coupe
 et faulche les floretes / cest a dire elle / toutes ioyes mondaynes / et richeces
 oste et anichille / de fortune viennent diuers arbres / cest a dire creatures
 raisonnables diuersement fortunees / lung est brehaigne / cest a dire quil est
 malheureux en biens mondains / laultre porte fruit / cest que il est bien
 fortune / laultre tousiors florit / cest que il a bonne fortune / maiz il ne sceit
 poursuivre / icelle. Laultre arbre tousiours defeuille est orpheline / cest que il
 na aulcun moyen de fortune pour y paruenir. Laultre en sa verdure dure /
 cest a dire que il a entretenement aulcun avec fortune / mais iamaiz ne
 paruiet aux grans biens de fortune. Lune se haulse / cest a dire que¹² aux
 biens mondains / laultre sencline a terre / cest a dire est deiecte des biens du
 monde / Et plusieurs sont que deuyennent flestries / cest a dire que
 plusieurs ilz sont malheureux / Et quant bourions a lune viennent / les
 plusieurs flestries deviennent / cest a dire / quant aulcun commence
 prosperer / a loppoite plusieurs deuyennent malheureux. La yflestrissent le
 lorier et si cesche lolive / cest a dire que toute vertu et tous gens vertueux y
 sont malheureux. Li roussignol atart y chante / cest a dire que iamaiz ny a
 ioyeuse ne soulas / maiz la chante le chanan, cest a dire quil y a toute
 paour / toute creinte, toute maladuanture. De la viennent deux fleuues / cest
 bon Eur et mal Eur.

71. fol. 46r (L 5993-6002, D 120)

Mal eur est signifie par ce fleuve et est la douleur en laquelle cheent ceuz
 lesqueux fortune priue de ces biens.

72. fol. 46r (L 6056, D 121)

La maison de fortune est ediffiee en pendant / par ce est figure la mobilite de
 fortune.

73. fol. 46v (L 6069-75, D 121)

La maison de fortune, partie dargent / et partie / de terre / et de boe /
 signifie les prosperites / et maleuretes mondaynes.

74. fol. 46v (L 6105-6108, D 121)

Lorgueil des prosperans mondayns.

75. fol. 46v (L 6119-22, D 122)

La desolation des malfortunes.

¹² (*nota* 70) cest *ado plus six minims* (?) *ms.* The text here is evidently corrupt.

76. fol. 47r (L 6190, D 123)

Note / come raison demonstre cy / a lamant que fortune donne ces biens¹³ et ces honneurs plus tost aux bons que aux mauuaiz et que les honneurs ne font pas les homes dignes de vertu / maiz les vertus font les homes dignes des honneurs / et que souuent aduyent que les homes constitues aux dignites sont tres vicieux / comme elle luy demonstre cy apres par exemple de gens constitues en grandes dignites lesquieux ont este tres vicieux.

77. fol. 48r (L 6290-96, D 124)

La probation de raiso < n > a lamant / que les homes pecheurs ne sont pas homes.

78. fol. 48r (L 6305-6309, D 124)

Aultre probation par Raison / a lamant / que les vicieux ne sont pas homes.

79. fol. 48v (L 6334-40, D 125)

Raison pour quoy les vicieux ont les grandes prosperites mondaynes.

80. fol. 48v (L 6341-47, D 125)

Admonition et priere par raison a lamant quil veuille obmettre les perilz de fortune.

81. fol. 49r (L 6458, D 126)

Aultre exemple de Noiron qui fut tant puissant / et touteffois sa grande dignite et puissance ne luy tollit point ces vices, mais fut si vicieux quil se tua.

82. fol. 51v (L 6747-57, D 131)

Reprehension de lamant par raison pource qui delaisse les escriptures pour vacquer aux voluptueux et fortunes desirs.

83. fol. 51v (L 6801, D 131)

Note que par les deux tonneaux de Jupiter sont entendus bonne fortune / et mauuaise fortune aux quelles tous homes et femmes sont subiectz.¹⁴

84. fol. 52r (L 6878, D 132)

Le refus de Raison par lamant, cest a dire / que le voluptueux na cure de raison ne densignement fors paruenir a la fin de son desir¹⁵ voluptueux / comme aliene de toute vertu.

85. fol. 52v (L 6959, D 133)

Replique par lamant a raison que dieu ne fist onc telz motz villains comment ces motz vilz couilles.

¹³ (nota 76) donne çes ces biens ms.

¹⁴ (nota 83) See *Iliad* 24.527, and Boethius, *Consolatio* 2, pr. 2.40-42. See also Dahlberg, *Romance*, p. 382.

¹⁵ (nota 84) de ms.

86. fol. 54v (L 7242, D 138)

Note / Quant Raison ot habandonne lamant, Amys / reuiet et le reconforte / en luy donnant confort / et luy donne et administre moyens de paruenir a sa voluptueuse amour. Par Amys coment est dit deuant / est entendu delit charnel / lequel, apres raison expulsee du lentendement de lamoureux voluptueux, son delit et appetit charnel desordonne le tente / et laveugle tant, qui le contraint venir a son peche par aultres diuerses manieres de peches.

87. fol. 55r (L 7303-10, D 139)

Note les amonicions cy apres / lesquelles delict charnel persuade au voluptueux pour paruenir a sa volonte desordon < nee. >

88. fol. 55v (L 7358, D 140)

Note / Que amys / cest delict charnel, admonnest lamant voluptueux pour paruenir a son appetit desordonne / de appaiser mallebouche / cest a dire ceuz qui parlent et descourent la folle amour, affin que il ait plus seur acces daler jucque a la Rose / cest jucque a sa amoureuse.

89. fol. 55v (L 7397, D 141)

Semblablement ladmonnest quil apaise Jalousie / cest que le voluptueux pour acomplir son desir soit doulx et begnin par simulation / au parans / ou au mary de celle ou il pretend.

90. fol. 56r (L 7435, D 141)

Aultre admonicion damys / a lamant, cest a dire delit charnel qui le persuade que sil vient jucque aux portiers, qui sont paour / Danger / cest quil puisse venir parler a celle qui layme / maiz elle craint ces parens pourquoy ne luy ose faire beau recueil; illuy doit donner / promettre / bailler sa foy / plorer / pour la tourner a sa voluptuosite.

91. fol. 56v (L 7481-94, D 142)

Admonition par Amys / cest par delit charnel, que se fille / oste danger / paour / et honte, et auec elle prent dons de aulcun, elle se abandonne.

92. fol. 57v (L 7639-60, D 144)

Aultre admonition a lamant par Amys, cest quant lamant aura passe Mallebouche et pourra venir jucque a belacueil / cest jucque a sa amoureuse / et sil voit quelle le recoyve ioieusement, il doit cueillir la rose / cest sa amoureuse pour faire son plaisir / Jasoit ce que danger / honte / et paour si opposent fainctement / cest a dire / que elle se deffend laschement comme vaynaie.¹⁶

¹⁶ (nota 92) *vaynaie* appears to be a scribal corruption of *vaine* or *vainete*.

93. fol. 57v (L 7712, D 145)

Aultres admonitions damys / a lamant / cest / qui conforme ces qualites a celles de sa amoureuse. Cest a dire / que le voluptueux delit / rend lhome tout subiect / a femenin¹⁷ vouloir, pour cuider acomplir sa voluptuosite.

94. fol. 58v (L 7866, D 148)

Note / que Amys conseille / a lamant que il prendra bien le chateau / oultre le vouloir de malebouche / et des aultres portiers¹⁸ / au quel est bel acueil / par folle Largesse. Cest a dire / que voluptueux desir contraint lhome prodigalement et folement despenser et dissiper ces biens, pour paruenir a lexecution de sa fole Amour, par laquelle folle largesse les iennes filles / perdent honte et crainte de pecher.

95. fol. 59r (L 7913-16, D 148)

Note / Quant ung home riche sabandonne a voluptuosite, il en yst pouure.

96. fol. 59r (L 7931-37, D 148-149)

Note / Que pouurete a grand peigne trouu<e> ces folles plaisances a excercer.

97. fol. 60v (L 8181, D 152)

Admonition par Amys a lamant quil donne dons selon son estat car par dons on decoit les prenans.

98. fol. 61r (L 8260, D 153)

Admonition par Amys a lamant quil se garde de femme qui sabandonne par dons, ja soit ce que ilz sont toutes couuoiteuses dauoir et prendre. Note que amour et couuoitise ne sont jamaiz ensemble.

99. fol. 62v (L 8481, D 156)

Note ladmonition damys a lamant / cest comment Segnieurie / et Amour jamaiz ne sont ensemble, et pource que en mariage le mari veult auoir la segnieurie du corps de sa femme, souuent en aduiennent maulx / et jalousie au mary / de laquelle jalousie Amys en parle en la persone du mari jalous.

100. fol. 63v (L 8603, D 158)

Amys raconte cy listoire / de Lucesse / et de Penelope come une choze¹⁹ merueilleuse / et singuliere, pource que il est bien difficile trouuer segnieurie / et Vraye Amour ensemble.

¹⁷ (nota 93) femenim ms.

¹⁸ (nota 94) porties ms.

¹⁹ (nota 100) choz ms.

101. fol. 64v (L 8705-18, D 160)

Note Juuenal en la ·VI· Satire qui se commence Credo pudicitiam. Aultres persuasions par experience que Amys deffend mariages, pource que Segnieurie et Vraye Amitie ne sont iamais ensemble; et en mariage / lhome veult auoir la segnieurie de la femme.²⁰

102. fol. 65v (L 8885-96, D 162)

Te pulchrum videri non tua natura / sed oculorum spectantium reddit infirmitas. Boecius 3^o libro prosa 7^o.²¹

103. fol. 69v (L 9496-9508, D 171)

Depuis que vraye <a>mour faillit, et que segnieurie vint sus terre, tous peches sont venus, lesquieux ont amene pouurete.

104. fol. 72v (L 10030, D 179-180)

Coment lamant vient a Richece / luy demander le chemin²² de trop donner / et elle luy denee / Ce est a entendre / que le voluptueux, aueugle par son delit affecte, seroit content sil auoit biens et richeces en habundance les donner prodigallement pour paruenir a son intention, de laquelle plusieurs en chieissent en pouurete et apres en larrecin. Richece luy denee, car riche auaricieux / et prodigalite sont incompatibles.

105. fol. 74v (L 10332, D 184)

Après que richesse²³ a denee / le sentier de trop donner au voluptueux amant / le dieu damours reuyent a luy / et pource quil a bien retenu ces commandemens il luy promet secours et mande ces²⁴ gens / lesquels viennent a luy. Cest a dire / Quant le voluptueux na de quoy faire dons ne banques ne enuoier a celle qui layme presens et dons pour laleicher a voluptuosite, le dieu damours reuyent a luy, cest lardant desir de voluptuosite avec ces gens / cest que il devient oizeux / franc, large, joieux, humble, iolis / chanteur, danseur / et toutes aultres iennes folies demayne / pour complaire a celle quil ayme.

²⁰ (*nota* 101) Juvenal's sixth satire, which is quoted in the *Roman* (8705-18) in Amis' monologue of the cynical husband, is a relentless attack upon women and marriage, and begins:

Credo Pudicitiam Saturno rege moratam
In terris visamque diu, cum frigida parvas
Praeberet spelunca domos ignemque Laremque
Et pecus et dominos communi clauderet umbra.

²¹ (*nota* 102) Boethius, *Consolatio* 3, pr. 8.26-28. The quotation has reference to Amis' reflections on the illusory nature of external beauty.

²² (*nota* 104) chenin ms.

²³ (*nota* 105) richesses ms.

²⁴ (*nota* 105) cès ms.

106. fol. 75v (L 10440, D 186)

Par faulx semblant et contrainte abstinence puent estre entendus gens [*<de>*] deuotion par apparence, ou gens de religion, lesquieux sont en cuer plus vicieux que les gens du siecle. Lesquieux viennent a Cupido pour le seruir, cest a dire sont cause de luxure.

107. fol. 77r (L 10657-69, D 189)

Coment Richece refuse donner secours / cest a dire / que lamant voluptueux a grant peigne veult thesaurise *<r>* pendant le temps qui pourchace la Rose.

108. fol. 77v (L 10689, D 189)

<L> a manyere de saillir *<l>* e chastel ou est bel *<a>* cueil / cest la belle fille / a laquelle on ne peult auoir acces pour les portiers²⁵ / cest a dire / pour le mauuaiz bruit lequell on craint / pour danger / creynte / et honte que les iennes ont au commencement; et pource les barons de lost damours / cest a dire / tous les vices par lesquels on chiet en amour voluptueuse, coment oizuiete / leesse / franchise / folle largesse / deduit / beaute / jennesse / folle hardiesse / sacordent / cest a dire / esmouuent le voluptueux de²⁶ saillir le chastel ou est bel acueil / cest a dire, de trouuer faczon dapaiser ceuz qui lempeschent dacomplir sa fole amour; et enuoie le voluptueux / a malebouche, premier portier, cest a ceuz qui parlent de luy / faulx semblant / et abstinence feynte, ce sont deux personages portans habitz et gestes toutes deuotes par dehors / pour le garder de plus parler. Apres que malebouche est appaise, courtoisie et largesse / assaillent la vielle qui garde bel acueil; cest quant lamant / a apaise le mauuaiz lengaige, il se montre courtois a la vielle qui garde²⁷ la belle fille / et la corromt par dons. Et quant le voluptueux a gaigne la vielle, Delict et bien celer / assaillent honte / cest que lamant requiert la belle fille de folle amour et luy promet et jure que il garde son honneur sus toutes / et auxi la fille qui se delecte a le veoir et oir / sen hardit et pert honte. Honte gaignee, restent creynte et danger / aux quelx sont enuoies franchise et pitie / Ce peult estre entendu: quant la ienne fille a perdu honte / elle souffre et escoute les requestes / les dons du voluptueux amant, par quoy elle a pitie de luy / cest que elle se consent a luy.

109. fol. 78r (L 10790, D 191)

Note la response du dieu damours, qui est / que Venus / fait grandes proesses sans luy, cest a dire que mont de luxures se font pour argent maiz elles ne durent point / pour faulte damour.

²⁵ (*nota* 108) porties ms.

²⁶ (*nota* 108) da ms.

²⁷ (*nota* 108) ~~la~~ garde ms.

110. fol. 78v (L 10865, D 192)

Par la response de lost damours / Qui est se ung riche home fait hommage a
amours, est entendu / Que quant ung riche home est ebete de fole amour, il
y consume toute sa substance.

111. fol. 79r (L 10959, D 193-194)

Note / Que faulx semblant / est par le dieu damours / fait Roy des Ribaulx;
ce puet estre entendu / que soubz habitz de deuotion et de religion remaint
Voluptuosite et deception / plus que en gens seculiers / et que par leur
moyen souuent les voluptueux viennent a leurs voluptuosites.

112. fol. 80r (L 11061-67, D 195)

Note que labit ne fait pas le Religieux.

113. fol. 81r (L 11093, D 195)

Note. De la decretal *Omnis utriusque sexus* et des priuileiges des mendiants
fon < t > les confessions.²⁸

114. fol. 82r (L 11215-18, D 197)

La raison pour quy Religieux ne veulent visiter pouures gens mallades.

115. fol. 82r (L 11229-38, D 198)

La raison feynte pour que les religieus von < t > visiter / les riches mallades.

116. fol. 82v (L 11257-64, D 198)

Que nul ne doit mandier de quelque estat quil soit / tant quil a force pour
gaigner sa vie.

117. fol. 83r (L 11345-52, D 199)

La sentence de ceste proposicion que dieu commande / ou il dit / Vendz tout
ce que tu as et me suy.²⁹

118. fol. 83r (L 11407-10, D 200)

En quel cas ung fort home peult mandier.

119. fol. 84v (L 11579-80, D 203)

Les proprietes des religieus ypocrites.

²⁸ (nota 113) The statute *Omnis utriusque sexus*, promulgated by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, authorized friars to preach and hear confessions so long as the bishop approved, and the parishioner confessed to his parish priest at least once a year. See Dahlberg, *Romance*, p. 395.

²⁹ (nota 117) Mt 19:21: *Ait illi Iesus: Si vis perfectus esse, vade, vende quae habes, et da pauperibus, et habebis thesaurum in caelo: et veni, sequere me.* (Also Mc 10:21, Lc 18:22). The allusion forms part of the hypocritical recital of Faulx Semblant.

120. fol. 88r (L 12158, D 212)

Lacez de faulx semblant / et de Abstinence constrainte / vers mallebouche / enuoyes par le dieu damours / pour assaillir yceluy / lequel coment premier portier garde belacueil. Par lacez de faulx semblant et dabstinence³⁰ constrainte enuoyes par Cupido / et ces gens / a Mallebouche, qui peult estre entendu / le voluptueux amant / lequel empesche, pour la craynte du langaige / et des mauuaises goullees que sement et donnent les voisins / et les parens de la fille quil ayme, dauoir acces / et de faire ioyeusetez / et nouuelles inuentions de folie et damour vayne pour paruenir a sa voluptuosite, enuoye / constrainte abstinence et faulx semblant; ce veult dire quil enuoye³¹ quel que home de religion / au quel a narre son cas; lequel religieux / soubz dissimulation et faulx semblant de charite / en habit et gestes humbles / feignant / le temps pendant quil est avec eulz / viure coment Saint Iohan baptiste, les corrige de leurs goullees vitables en les preschant par parolles et paraboles feyntes / pour tapir et anichiller le bruit et la fame dicelles goullees, afin que le dit voluptueux vienge a ces fins.

121. fol. 89v (L 12375, D 216)

Après / que Abstinence et faulx semblant a presche a mallebouche / faulx semblant le confesse / et en le confessant il luy coupe la langue dung coustel / Par ce puet estre entendu / que apres que le religieux enuoye aux voisins / ou aux parans / de par le voluptueux / les a corrige de leurs goullees / ilz les contraint de eulz confesser, et en les confessant ilz leur coupe la langue; ce veult dire / que il leur donne en penitence que iamaiz ilz ne parlent de lamant / pour quelque choze que ylz voyent / car tout ce fait pour bien.

122. fol. 90r (L 12451, D 217)

Quant faulx semblant a coupe la langue a mallebouche / il passent la porte / acompaigne de courtoisie et de largesse, et viennent jucquez a la vielle qui garde belacueil et luy baille faulx semblant vng chappellet pour donner au dit bel acueil. Par ce peut estre entendu / quant le feynt et ypocrite religieux a apaise lez mauuaises langaiges que on disoit de laces du voluptueux a la belle fille, lors il vient a la fame qui garde la dicte fille / avec dons / et la persuade de langage en disant que lamour est bone et sus esperance de bien / pourquoy elle fera grant peche de les empescher / et que elle oste et anichille toutes suspicions / car il a oste et anichille tous mauuaz langaiges et estaint toutes goullees diffamato <ires> pour quoy les amys nen doyuent cheoir aulcune ialousie / pour quoy vous p<re> senteres ce petit chappellet a san ... en la saluant de par le vallet que scaues / en vous priant quil vous pl... promettre que ilz puissent communiquer ensemble en toute honneste.

³⁰ (nota 120) dastinence ms.

³¹ (nota 120) quil enuoye q il enuoie ms.

Q<uelle> chose la vielle permect / tout ainsi que faulx semblant a ordonne.

123. fol. 91r (L 12583, D 219)

Après que la vielle qui garde belacueil est corrompue par dons, et trompée par le langage et banerie de faulx semblant, elle printe le chapeau de lamant a belacueil, cest a la belle fille / et linstigue et esmeult a lamour de lamant.

124. fol. 91v (L 12661, D 220-221)

Le refus du chapellet par bel acueil a luy enuoie de par lamant, pour la creynte de Jalosie. Cest a dire que la belle fille fait refutz de ce quelle prensist voluntiers pour la creynte de ces amys lesquelx ce sont apperceuz de lamant et delle.

125. fol. 92r (L 12730, D 222)

Après le refus du chapellet par la belle fille / la vielle, commise pour icelle garder de par ses parens, la persuade que elle prengne / et tant fait la vielle par promesses, luy promettant que elle la excusera vers ces amis si aucune chose en parlent, que la fille prent le chapeau.

126. fol. 92v (L 12794, D 222-223)

Quant la ioenne fille a prins le chapellet de lamant / par le moyen de la vielle / et que la dicte vielle la aminee de lamour de lamant ainxi que font plusieurs femmes lesquelles quant ilz ont en leur iennesse este paillardes, elles sont ioyeuses den faire daultres coment elles ont este; la dicte vielle / de la theorique de paillardise bien ensaignee, et auxi selon nature, car coment dit Ouide / au commencement de son liure de lart de amer³² / Les femmes sceuent lart daymer par nature / Luy monstre toutes les cautelles et finesses que doyuent faire filles rusees amoureusez / vers leurs amoureux abuses.³³

127. fol. 93r (L 12836, D 223)

Les regres des Amours folles du temps passe par la vielle / qui garde bel acueil, et la repentence dicelle vielle, pourquoy elle na myeulx plume ces amoureux et est la premiere instruction que elle donne a bel acueil.

128. fol. 94r (L 12999-13006, D 225-226)

Ensaignemens de la vielle a la jenne fille que elle ait plusieurs < s > amoureux et q<ue> elle prengne abhoc et abhac. Temoing Ou<ide> de Arte aman<di> qui dist ... bi ... semper hab ... amitas.³⁴

³² (nota 126) *lamer* ms.

³³ (nota 126) The allusion may be to *Ars amatoria* 1.269-274.

³⁴ (nota 128) The illegible reference may be to *Ars amatoria* 3.425-426, a couplet much quoted in the Middle Ages: 'Casus ubique valet; semper tibi pendeat hamus: / Quo minime credas gurgite, piscis erit'. I am grateful to the late Professor Hoffman for this suggestion.

129. fol. 94v (L 13089-104, D 227)

Aultres ensayngemens de la vielle a bel acueil, coment elle face a croire a chacun de ces amoureux / en soy paruirant que elle nest que a luy / voire et fussent ilz mille.

130. fol. 95r (L 13156, D 228)

Cy donne la vielle exemple / de Dido / a la belle fille, comment cest grant follie daymer seulement ung home.

131. fol. 100v (L 14009-22, D 240)

Aultres persuasions / coment naturellement toutes choses desirent franchise, pour quoy ne se fault esmeruiller se Venus changa Vulcanus, ne auxi des aultres femmes se elles changent leur maris.

132. fol. 104r (L 14591, D 249)

Le consentement de bel acueil / par la persuasion de la vielle, que lamant la vienge veoir / cest / la belle fille qui est contente par lamonition et inuestigation de la vielle, donner atrait et familiarite a son amoureux en gardant encore avec elle honte et crainte.

133. fol. 105r (L 14740, D 251)

Laces de lamant vers belacueil / Lequel trouua le dieu damours et tout son oost quant il eust passe la premiere porte / et de la est printe / par doulx regard a bel acueil. Par ce est a entendre / la venue du voluptueux par le moyen de la vielle maquerelle, lequel quant il passa³⁵ la premiere porte du chasteau – cest a dire quant il a apaise les mauuaisses langues – il treuve le dieu damours qui luy baille doulx regart qui le printe a bel acueil; ce veult dire que il treuve la fille amoureuse de luy laquelle luy monstre plusieurs doulx regards / foles et sotes contenances damours desordonnee.

134. fol. 105v (L 14771, D 252)

Après que bel acueil par le moyen de la vielle a receu lamant, et que bel acueil / cest la belle fille, se printe a luy par honneur, qui est la couverture des iennes amoureuses / lamant voulant prendre la rose, cest a dire la belle fille, pour la doulce offre que elle luy auoit faicte et en faire sa plaisance; Danger, paour / et honte / acoirrent, lesquels prohibent a lamant qui ny touche. Cest a dire que la ienne fille amoureuse – au commencement pour la peur de ces amys / et la honte que elle a de perdre son pucelage affin que elle ne soit diffamee – elle se courouce et feint destre troublee / en repudiant lamant par diuerses paroles et diuerses allegations de danger qui sen pourroit enfuir.

³⁵ (nota 133) il la passa ms.

135. fol. 107r (L 15077, D 257)

Pendant le temps de la repudiation de lamant de bel acueil / par danger / honte / et par craynte, vient le dieu damours a tout son oost donner secours a lamant; cest a dire / Quant la ienne fille amoureuse / pour le danger et la crainte de ces amys, et pour la honte et la mauuaise renommee quelle craynt destre diffamee / escondit son amoureux, le dieu damours vient a tout son oost / cest a dire lamour charnelle quelle a a son amoureux a tout / iennesse, folle pitie, delectation charnelle / oiziuete / remembrance de la grant largesse diceluy amant, ladmonneste a donner obliuion et³⁶ nonchalance de paour et de honte.

136. fol. 109r-v (L 15364, D 261)

Loost du dieu damours venu au secours de lamant, franchise vient contre danger aiant une lance / dou le fer estoit appelle doulce priere / et ung escu nomme suplication / borde de promesses et de sermens / Cest a dire quant le ienne amoureux desordonne, eschauffe par voluptuosite, ne puet acomplir sa volonte auec celle de qui il est amoureux, franchise vient / cest que les suplications / les dons / les promesses, les conuenances / les juremens que font le voluptueux a sa dicte amoureuse, lamollissent / Maiz danger / vient / qui depiece les armes de franchise / o tout sa mace de refus / cest a dire que la ienne fille pour le danger qui pourroit venir de ce / sil estoit sceu, luy refuse sa requeste et de primeface ne luy veult obair. Puis vient pitie qui tenoit vne misericorde en lieu despee. Son escu estoit appelle Alegement / tout borde de gémissement / de pleures / et de complaints / laquelle poignoit Danger tant quil sen vouloit fouir. Cest a dire que les promesses / juremens / et les sermens / casses par la ienne fille / que luy a faiz le voluptueux, pour le danger de ces amys, neantmoins / le dit amant, tout incense de folle amour, la requiert instantement / lune fois en souspirant, < la > utre fois en gémissant / < po > urquoy la pouure fille, < t > enue damour sote / et < l > e pitie femenins, de < l > aisse et oublie danger < o > u sen puet enfuir; et < n > estoit / paour et honte < e > lle obtemperoit a sa fole < a > mour.

137. fol. 109v (L 15385-406, D 261-262)

Après que danger sen vouloit fouir / honte lappelle / et le blasme de ce quil est trouue lasche / et que sil laisse aller bel acueil, il baillera la rose qui pourroit estre flestrie et gastee. Cest a dire / que après que la fille a delaisse danger, elle a honte dobtemperer a la volonte de lamant / en repregnant danger auec elle / cest que se elle sabandonnoit a la volonte de lamant, elle pourroit devenir grosse par quoy / elle seroit deshonnouree et destruite de ces parens.

³⁶ (*nota* 135) et et ms.

138. fols. 109v-110r (L 15444, D 262)

Quant honte eust secouru danger, elle garnye dune espee / nomme / Soussy daparcouement, et dune targe nommee / Doubte de malle renommee / de quoy elle frape pitie, et la reculle. Cest a dire / quant la belle fille esloigne le danger dauec elle / que peult venir de folle amour,³⁷ elle a apres honte par quoy elle chiet en doubte et soussy destre mal renommee / pour quoy elle differe les piteables requestes de lamant, et apres vient delit / de plaisant vie / ayant une espee / et ung escu appelle Ayse / borde de soulaz et de ioye / le quel delit frappa honte / maiz honte le fiert et labat a terre; cest a dire / que vie mondaine et plaine de delit ayde moult les ienne amoureuse a folle amour, nestoit honte que le met deuant les yeulx doubte destre mal renommee. Apres vient bien celer au secours de delit³⁸ / le quel auoit ung escu de seur repost / cest de lieu seur / borde de seurees alles et de reuenez celles, le quel abat honte / cest a dire quant le voluptueux promet a sa amoureuse de venir a elle secretement tant que sa bone renommee nen sera ia diminuee / ne ces parens nen auront ia congnoissance / la pouure fole amoureuse vacile et veult delessier honte, et elle, persuadee et stimulee par lesquillon damours, devient effrontee / et na puissance de respondre / Lors vient paour a tout vne espee / appelle Soupecon / o tout vng escu de doubte et de peril borde de trauail et de payne / Laquelle frapa bien celer tant quelle lestourdit. Cest a dire quant la ienne amoureuse pert honte et ne luy chault de sa renommee pour obair a sa voluptuosite, touteffoys elle est en paour et en souspecon de ces amys quilz ne le sachent pour quoy encore ne se veult acorder – lors vient hardement au secours d<e> bien celer / leque<l> a vne espee de fo<rse>nerie et vng escu nomme Respit de <mort> borde dabandonne<mant> le quel hardemen<t> paour / abat a ter<re> et luy crie mercy, elle ne locasse my<e>, cest a dire / apres qu<e> le voluptueuse a de la honte, et que son am<ant> luy a promiz de la g<arder> en sa bone renom<mee> et qui gardera son ho<nte> et pource quil la voit effrontee / comme forsen<erie>, voluptueux desir / s<e> donne dutout enf<aire> son plaisir; maiz l<a> paour de ces amys la fait differer / et r<end> le dit voluptueux loinz de sa volunte.

139. fols. 110v-111r (L 15563, D 264)

Apres que paour eust abatu hardement, Seurete / vint a layde de hardement / portant vne espee de fuite / et ung escu de paix / tout borde de concordance / cest a dire / Apres que le voluptueux / a voulu sa amoureuse prendre / et en faire son plaisir, pour ce que il la voit effrontee et hardie et qui preste a impudicite, nestoit la paour de ces amys, il lasure luy promettant que ia ny sera trouue et que se aucun y sournenoit pour les prendre

³⁷ (nota 138) Damour ms.

³⁸ (nota 138) delit bien celer ms.

ensemble, il scet le lieu par lequel il sen doit fourir; et dauantage / Quant ainxi seroit que ilz y seroient trouees, il feroit la paix avec les amys et parens – neantmoyns paour fiert hardement / tant que lescu et espee luy vole des mains / cest a dire / que la ienne amoureuse, pour la creynte de ces amys, refuse toutes voyes et toutes promesses de seurete de son / amy; et quant seurte se voit sans baston, elle prent paour par les temples et se couplent ensemble / cest a dire quant le voluptueux voit que la belle fille de laquelle il est amoureux / a perdu honte / et quil ne reste que la crainte de ces amys / et quelle ne se veult asseurer pour paroles ne pour promesses, le voluptueux la presse moytie figue / moitie raison, et la veult contraindre de luy souffrir faire son plaisir; laquelle resiste par crainte – et en la fin le dieu damours prent treues de paour / cest a dire que lamour desordonnee, delunz et delautre / les fait retirer de la communication par aulcuns iours; pendant lesquieux le dieu damours enuoie querir Venus par doulx regard; cest a dire que la ienne fille, ebetee de concupiscence par les doulx et foulz regars de son amoureux, desire Voluptuosite deshoneste.

140. fol. 111r (L 15645, D 265)

Adonys selon les poetes estoit filz de Cinaras roy de Paphe / et de sa fille Mirra / et signifie delice / et pource estoit Venus amoureuse de luy pour sa beaute / car luxure se delicte en beaux corps. Le porc Letua / cest a dire lardeur de luxure laquelle toute sa vie il demena.³⁹

141. fol. 112r (L 15762, D 267)

La venue de Venus au siege par le mandement de son filz / amours / lesquels assiegerent et combattrrent de nouveau le chasteau au belacueil estoit. Cest a dire / que quant amoureux / atant poursuy celle de qui il est amoureux quil la contrainte de faire son plaisir / nestoit la craynte de ces amys, icelle, esmue par folle amour, chiet en delit charnel par volunte; et quant son dit amoureux lasault / cest a dire la prie, paour la deffend par petites vergetes prinses au iardin de danger / cest a dire / par excusations allegant la paour de ces parens.

³⁹ (nota 140) Cf. Mansion, *Bible des poetes*, fol. cxiii^v: 'Adonin signifie suauite ou delice. Cestuy fut bel et en sa beaulte se delectoit. De nus estoit sa mye / Car luxure se delecte en beaulx corps. Il fut veneur aux bestes / car il chassa et quist luxure qui est beste moult sauuaige et de grant fierte / moult perilleuse en la poursuyte. ... Le porc occist cestuy Adonin / ce fut lardeur de luxure qui est signifiee par le porc laquelle il toute sa vie demena.' The glossator, following Mansion, thus views Adonis' boar hunt as carnal, not charitable, and emblematic of the pursuits of Venus. The interpretation is persuasive, and evokes multiple ironies in this episode of the *Roman*. For a different reading of the poem here, see Robertson, *Preface*, pp. 103 n. 92 and 263, and Fleming, *Roman*, p. 187, where an alternative mythographical tradition is cited to suggest that the boar hunt is a 'hard' hunt of charity.

142. fol. 113v (L 16075, D 273)

En cest coulonne et en la prochayne donne lacteur obiection de larquemye / prouuant / que Art oeuvre coment nature / pource que elle mue vne espece en aultre, comment argent en or / maiz en la fin conclut que nature pour ce nest pas ataynte par art; car nature produit sans science ces especes.

143. fol. 114v (L 16235, D 275)

Nature fust fille [<de>] Demogorgon / et selon Seruie / cest vne vertu diuine donnee aux chosez par lesquelles de semblables produisent leurs semblables. Et pour ce elle qui desire la conseruation de ces especes se complaint a Genius, le dieu de nature et de delectation, de ceus qui empeschent loeuure de laquelle peult ensuiuir generation.⁴⁰

144. fol. 115r (L 16272, D 275)

Genius fut filz [<de>] Demogorgon / et est dieu des nopces et de delectation / et de nature / et a vertu sus toutes chosez / et mesmement sus les homes / et a ceste cause anciennement sappelloyent les lis des nouueaux maries / geniaux.⁴¹

145. fol. 115r (L 16293-307, D 276)

Cy apres prohibe Genius a tous homes de quelque estat quilz soyent de ne dire aulcun secret a leurs femmes ne a leurs amoureux <ses>.

146. fol. 123r (L 17549-86, D 293-294)

Exemple par Deucalion coment les homes ne sont pas subietz a destinee.

147. fol. 123r (L 17549-86, D 293-294)

Les poetes feignent que quant Jupiter eust destruit le monde par eau, Deucalion / et Pirr <a> sa femme / se sauueren <t>. Et apres iceluy deluge ilz allerent au temple de Themys la deesse ancie <nne> ⁴² de prescience et de diuination / et par ice <lle> souloient bailler les die <ux> leurs responses et se demanderent en quell <e> manyere ilz pourroi- <ent> reparer le monde.⁴³

⁴⁰ (nota 143) Cf. Servius' commentary on *Georgics* 2.49, in *Servii grammatici qui feruntur in Vergilii Bucolica et Georgica commentarii*, ed. Georg Thilo, 3 vols. (Hildesheim, 1881; rpt. 1961), 3.222: "Quippe solo natura subest" quia, ut supra diximus, naturaliter rerum omnium mater est terra et universa intra se continet semina: hinc est "quippe solo natura subest". nam natura dicta est ab eo, quod nasci aliquid faciat. mire autem ait "subest", id est inest latenter; nam non apparet: unde Epicurei dicunt nihil esse, quod non habeat originem sui; nam hoc est *gigni de nihilo nihilum: in nihilum nil posse reverti*."

⁴¹ (nota 144) Thus, Juvenal 6.21-22: 'Anticum et vetus est alienum, Postume, lectum / concutere atque sacri genium contemnere fulcri.' See also footnote 50 below.

⁴² (nota 147) ancie <nne> deesse ms.

⁴³ (nota 147) Cf. Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1.318 ff.

148. fol. 123v (L 17603-10, D 294)

Par Deucalion qui getta pierres empres luy est entendu morellement / quil est necessite apres que le monde fut absorbe par eau que de pecheurs le benoist dieu fist au monde homes justes.⁴⁴

149. fol. 129v (L 18577-88, D 308)

Comment Nature cy preuee que nul est fors les vertueux de noble condicion, et que tous sont nobles de natiuite, lun comment lautre.

150. fol. 129v (L 18605-14, D 308)

Cy preuee nature que les clers vertueux sont gentilz homes.

151. fol. 133v (L 19234, D 318)

Siziphus est selon les poetes en enfer pres de Ysion tourmente / en portant vne grant meule sus vng grant mont / puis laroule enbas et court apres / puis la raporte arriere tousiours recommencant sa peigne. Siziphus fut au dieu des vens / Eolus. Par Siziphus sont entendus les traitres et deceueurs daustry et les enuieurs du bien daultroy.⁴⁵

152. fol. 133v (L 19234, D 318)

Les Rodiennes⁴⁶ selon les poetes sont en enfer aupres de Siziphus. Lesquelles ne cessent de puiser vne fontaine a tout vaisseaux perces incessamment car ilz sont condampnes a ce tourment perpetuellement, pour ce que elles tuerent leurs maris en dormant. Par elles sont entendues lez femmes qui rompent leurs mariages.⁴⁷

153. fol. 133v (L 19235, D 318)

Yxion selon les poetes, pource quil requist Juno de adultere, est en enfer mitz sus vne roe ardant et detrenchant coment rasoirs esmoulus, de quoy il est detrenche par pieces, puis est resioint pour estre tantost detrenche et

⁴⁴ (nota 148) Cf. Mansion, *Bible des poetes*, fol. vi^v: 'Pourquoi il est necessaire que Deuchalion cest a dire Iesu Crist face de icelles pierres cest adyre des pecheurs durs homes iustes et par patience et par penitence les soustienne et viuiffie mais comment ce pourra ceste chose faire certainement par gecter ces pierres derriere celuy cest adire en soulzmetant ces durs pecheurs qui proprement sont ditz os de la terre entant quilz sont terrestres et auaricieus en tribulation et a pourete....'

⁴⁵ (nota 151) Cf. Mansion, *ibid.*, fol. xxxvi^r: 'La fable dit que Sisiphus fut ung homme traître et deceueur de gens. ... Il fut plain de forcenerie et dorgueil robeur et meurdrier de gens pour leur auoir et pource est en celle peine et aussi seront traitres robeurs et putiers qui pour enuie dauoir les substances daultroy font maint grief a plusieurs gens.'

⁴⁶ (nota 152) *Rodiennes* seems to be a scribal error for *Belidienes*, the usual textual reading (cf. L 19273). The only variant which Langlois records (*Manuscrits*, p. 452) is *beles dianes*.

⁴⁷ (nota 152) Cf. Mansion, *Bible des poetes*, fol. xxxvi^r: 'Ainsi sont iugiez en enfer les faulces femmes et desloyales qui corrompent leurs mariages et trahissent leurs maris et les enragees et forcenees qui empoisonnent et meurdrirent leurs loyaux espoux....'

tousiours ainxi tourmente. Par Yzion sont notes les mondains qui laissent dieu por acomplir leurs concupiscences.⁴⁸

154. fol. 133v (L 19274, D 318)

Tantalus selon les poetes fut vng riche roy le quel conuoya les dieux a digner avec luy, et par son auarice tua son filz Pelops pour leur menger / maiz les dieux nen voulurent menger fors Ceres, qui nen sauoit rien laquelle menga lune des espauls / et pour la enormite / les dieux voulurent auoir toutes les pieces du dit Pelops et les ioignirent ensemble / et le ressusciterent; maiz pour ce que il luy failloit vne espaulle, Ceres luy endonna vne dyuyere. Et pour son auarice est le dit Tantalus en enfer a leau jucque au menton, souffrant extreme soif / et si ne peut boire.

155. fol. 134r (L 19275, D 318)

Ticius selon les poetes, pour ce qui voulut deceuoir Lathone mere de Phebus / est en enfer tousiours menge de vultours / et au septieme iour est derechef entier pour estre menge des vultours / et est continuellement en ce tourment. Pour luy sont entendus ceuz qui decoient la simple gent.⁴⁹

156. fol. 134r (L 19315, D 319)

Comment dame Nature enuoye Genius en lost du dieu damours – cest a dire que Nature, qui desire tousiours conseruer ces especes en produisant de nouuelles, enuoie Genius a lost damours / cest a dire delectation / a ceus qui ayment aucune fille / affin que leur espece soit conseruee; car Genius est le dieu de delectation et de nature; et est dit de *Gigno* 'gignis', qui en fransois vault dire / Engendrer.⁵⁰

157. fol. 134v (L 19381-96, D 320)

Cy assoult Genius / Nature / luy donnant en penitance quelle labourast tousiours en sa forge / ce peut estre entendu que Nature par laide de Genius, qui est et signifie delectation, produist et garde sa generation et ces especes.

158. fol. 134v (L 19437, D 321)

Laces de Genius en lost damours, ce peut estre entendu / que en amours desordonnee, Genius, qui signifie delectation, est cause dacomplir amour libidineuse.

⁴⁸ (nota 153) Cf. Mansion, *ibid.*, fol. xxxvi^r: 'On peut par Yxion noter ceulx qui laissent dieu en nonchaloir pour les delices terriens et pour faire au monde leurs vuloirs et acomplir leurs concupiscences et ne cuydent point que cestuy monde iamaiz leur faille.'

⁴⁹ (nota 155) Cf. Mansion, *ibid.*, fol. xxxvi^r: 'A luy peuent estre comparez ceulx qui par faulce simulacion trahysent et decoient les bonnes et simples gens et les diffament.'

⁵⁰ (nota 156) Cf. Isidore, *Etymologiae* 8.11.88, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford, 1911): 'Genium autem dicunt, quod quasi vim habeat omnium rerum gignendarum, seu a gignendis liberis; unde et geniales lecti dicebantur a gentibus, qui novo marito sternebantur.'

159. fol. 135v (L 19500-20, D 322)

Comment Genius par le commandement de Nature excommenie en lost
damours ceuz qui empeschent les oeuvres de Nature / ce peut estre entendu
que Nature par Genius / qui est delectation / veult conseruer chascunnes de
ces especes en voulant tousiours produire son semblable; ainsi que dit le
philosophe en son liure de generation / tout chose qui engendre / engendre
son semblent en espece.⁵¹

160. fol. 136v (L 19697-732, D 325)

Cadmus selon les poetes trouua ces compaignons mors que vng serpent auoit
tues en vng bois, le quel serpent il tua et apres il oit vne voix qui luy dist /
Cadmus / ne tefroy pas pour le serpent que tu as tue, car deuant ta mort tu
seras serpent. Quant il eust oy ces parolles / il deuint comment vng ymage
sans memoire / Adonc descendist Pallas pour lassurer et luy dist que il arast
la terre / et la semast des dens du serpent pour engerner le peuple qui en
deuoit yssir.⁵²

161. fol. 136v (L 19739, D 325)

Les poetes ont ces trois deesses de forcennerie, seurs / filles de Megara / cest
assauoir / Cloto / Lathesis / et Atropos; feynt / la premiere tenir vne
quenoille, cest assauoir la natiuite de la creature humayne; la seconde, cest
Lathesis, porte la quenoille, cest a dire que elle ourdist le cours de la vie
humayne. La tierce / cest Atropos corrent vniuersellement tout ce ... chose
que Fortune / ou vie humayne peult titre en ce monde mortel. Et les
appellent les poetes Parces par opposite; car elles nespargnent a aucun.

162. fol. 138r (L 19941, D 328)

En ce chapitre persuade Genius / que on doit metre peigne dentrer / au
champ flory et estre du nombre de brebis desquelles le pastour a la toison
blanche / et veult ces dictes brebis vestues comment luy. Cest a entendre /
que on se doit purger par confession pour auoir la robe de Innocence
comment le benoist filz de dieu / et metre peigne destre de ces brebis, cest a
dire de ces eslus pour entrer au champ flory / cest a dire en paradis / ou il ny
a point de nuyt / ne de temps preterit ne de temps futur.

163. fol. 138v (L 20001-16, D 329)

< Le > s poetes faignent Jupiter < es > tre filz de Saturne et < d > e Cibelle /
deesse⁵³ de la terre / le quel / < s > a mere enuoya nourrir < e > n Crethe
pour paour que < s > on pere ne le deuourast. < Q > uant Jupiter fut home

⁵¹ (nota 159) Cf. Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* 1.1 (715a21-716a1).

⁵² (nota 160) The glossator exhibits nice discrimination in rejecting from his essentially moral allegory Mansion's anagogical interpretation of Cadmus (*Bible des poetes*, fol. xxiii^r): 'Cestuy Cadmus peut signifier nostre sauueur Jesu Christ....'

⁵³ (nota 163) desse ms.

<p> arfait il vint darcadie <e> n Crethe quil⁵⁴ conquesta, puis en expulsa son pere <S> aturne / au quel il tren<c> ha les genitoires / et les <g> etta en la mer / et di<c> elles et de lescume de la mer fut engendree <l> a grant Venus, mere de <l> a deesse Venus.⁵⁵

164. fol. 139r (L 20103, D 330-331)

Note que Jupiter fut lubrique et de deshonneste conuersation / et dessoulz luy / commenca laage dargent, cest a dire enuie et ambicion des poessions terriennes / et en parauant on viuoit selon droit de nature / et de ce que la terre produisoit seullement. Et pource dit Genius que les brebis lesquelles se gouuernent comment Jupiter, cest a dire delicieusement, nentreront ia au champ flory / cest a dire avec dieu en paradis.

165. fol. 139v (L 20213-19, D 332)

Par les bestes noires sont entendus les pecheurs.

166. fol. 140r (L 20249-58, D 332-333)

La difference du parc poly / cest a dire de paradis et du jardin / de deduit / duquel oyseuse est portiere / cest a dire du iardin / de mondanite.

167. fol. 140v (L 20317-22, D 333)

Note que les chosez contenues au Jardyn [<de>] deduit sont toutes truffes et chosez mortelles et corrompables.

168. fol. 140v (L 20343, D 334)

Note / que les chosez contenues dedens le iardin poly et delicieux, cest paradis, sont permanentes et incorruptibles.

169. fol. 140v (L 20375-82, D 334)

La villete de la fontayne de Narcisus.

170. fol. 141r (L 20435-40, D 335)

De la louenge de la fonteyne de iardin delicieux et permanant, cest a dire de la ben<oi>ste trinite qui resi<de> en paradis de lauell<e> les beneures sero<nt> rasasies.

⁵⁴ (nota 163) qui ms.

⁵⁵ (nota 163) Cf. Mansion, *Bible des poetes*, fol. iv^r: 'Saturne fut roy de Crete et tint la terre paisiblement long temps sans contredit. ... [Jupiter] luy treucha les genitoires et les gecta en la mer. Delles et de lescume dicelle mer fut engendree la grande Venus laquelle Iupiter ayma par amour et conceut en elle la belle Venus qui fut deesse damours. Celle Venus creut tousiours en beaulte et tant pleut a son pere que il geut avec elle et en elle engendra Jocus. Jocus et Cupido sont ceulx qui ont sur les amans seigneurie / car Jocus porte le brandon amoureux et Cupido lenflamme. Ainsi Venus art et Cupido point. Jocus et Cupido sont paings en peinture nude et aueugles. Car qui est espris damours il est nud de sens et aueugle de cognoissance tellement que conduire il ne se scet.'

171. fol. 141v (L 20487-90, D 336)

Par loliue peult estre entendue la glorieuse Vierge Marie / qui a porte la fonteyne de vie / cest le benoist filz de dieu.

172. fol. 141v (L 20495-503, D 336)

Lescharboucle est la benoiste trinite qui est vne mesme chose indiuisee.⁵⁶

173. fol. 141v (L 20537-44, D 336)

Note que les beneures en voyant la essence diuine, ilz voyent / et congnoissent toutes chosez.

174. fol. 142r (L 20609-14, D 337)

La conclusion / et suasion par Genius que chacun doit le parc delaigne, cest paradis, metr <e> peigne a lobtenir; et fouir le jardin de ded <uit> et de oiseuse, cest de delit charnel.

175. fol. 142v (L 20638-48, D 338)

Par le sierge de Genius et la flambe diceluy est entendu la delectation charnelle / de laquelle tout home et toute femme selon nature / est enteché / et a laquelle il est subiect.

176. fol. 142v (L 20681-702, D 339)

Ladmonition de Venus a honte et a paour quilz se rendent – lesquelle ont respondu quelle nentrera ia au chasteau. Cest a dire / que delit charnel / effrene et esmeut tant la ienne amoureuse acomplir son lubrique desir que quasi elle est preste de laisser la craynte de ces amys / et la honte de chacun.

177. fol. 142v (L 20702, D 339)

Note en ce chapitre les repliques de Venus / a honte, lesquelles sont a entendre / quant vne ienne fille a perdu honte et crainte pour acomplir sa luxure, apres elle effrence et sans vergoigne sabandonne a plusieurs / aux vns pour argent, aux aultres pour Amour.

178. fol. 143r (L 20766, D 340)

Comme Venus trait ung brandon de feu a honte et a paour, cest a dire que luxure et delectation charnelle en femmes amoureusez ostent honte et crainte de dieu / de ces amys et du mond <e>, pour acomplir son peche. // *Luxuria mulieris in umbilico.*⁵⁷

⁵⁶ (nota 172) See Dahlberg, *Romance*, p. 420.

⁵⁷ (nota 178) Cf. Isidore, *Etymologiae* 11.1.98: 'Lumbi ob libidinis lasciviam dicti, quia in viris causa corporeae voluptatis in ipsis est, sicut in umbilico feminis.' Professor Robertson, who provided me with this text, suggests that the idea may have become proverbial in the form in which it appears in the gloss.

179. fol. 144r (L 20853, D 341)

Par Pymaleon et par sa ymage est a entendre lamour charnelle⁵⁸ et voluptueuse qui aucunesfois se met entre le pere espirituel / et sa fille spirituelle. Ou lamour charnelle du pere et de la fille naturelle. Coment de Cynaras et de Mirra sa fille lesquels engendrèrent Adonyn, lun des Amys [<de>] Venus.⁵⁹

180. fol. 146v (L 21237-48, D 347)

Quant les brandons de feu furent gettes au chasteau par Venus / Danger, paour / et creynte sen foyrent et laissent le chastel embrase. Cest a dire quant la fille ou la femme est embrasee damour charnelle, il ne luy chault⁶⁰ de la crainte de dieu / ne de ces amys, de la honte de dieu ne du monde / fors quelle acomplisse sa volonte desordonnee / et ne a consideration ne cure des maulx ne des grans dangers qui en peuvent aduenir, et demeure la pouure pecheresse toute embrasee de voluptuosite, et vuyde de toute raison et vertu.

181. fol. 146v (L 21288, D 348)

Après que Crainte et honte sont hors de la tour / Courtoisie / franchise / et pitie / viennent a belacueil et lennortent que il ne se laisse pas bruler – maiz que il acorde a lamant ce quil demande. Cest a dire que la ienne amoureuse par voluptueusete embrasee – après que elle a perdu et crainte et honte, sabandonne volontairement a folle et deshonneste Amour.

182. fol. 147v (L 21436, D 350)

En ce chapitre est repudiee lamour des vielles pour ce quilz sont trop rusees.

183. fol. 148v (L 21520-22, D 351)

Ci conclut lamant quil fait bon aimer vielles et iennes.

184. fol. 148v (L 21557, D 351)

Cy après exprime lamant / la manyere comment il cueillit la rose / et le bouton, et comment il renuersa les feuilles du rosier pour le bouton chercher, qui est la conclusion du liure / laquelle est magnifeste asses / par ce present texte.

Temple University.

⁵⁸ (nota 179) charnelle ~~qui~~ ms.

⁵⁹ (nota 179) Cf. Mansion, *Bible des poetes*, fol. cviii^v: 'Par la fable de Pymalion que a sa priere fist auoir vie a son ymage de yuoire / pouons moralement entendre aucun bon religieux qui de long temps a propose de viure chastement. Par lymage dyuoire entendre pouons aucune religieuse chaste et froide a maniere dyuoire. Mais souuent aduient que cestuy bon religieux vient par deuers icelle religieuse pour aucune deuote et bonne instruction dont par les colocucions et paroles blandes et attrayas avec ce atouchemens il la reschauffe et la eslieue en desordonnee luxure par les incitemens de dame Venus. Et ainsi donc de celle que estoit morte / cest a dire de propos de viure chastement deuient viuue et de bonne deuient folle et mauuaise....'

⁶⁰ (nota 180) chault ~~de chault~~ ms.

THE PLACE OF RYURIK ROSTISLAVICH'S DEATH: KIEV OR CHERNIGOV?

Martin Dimnik, C.S.B.

At a congress of princes held in Lyubech in 1097 the towns of Chernigov and Novgorod Severskiy, located in the lands of Chernigov, were given as patrimonies to David and Oleg, the sons of Svyatoslav Yaroslavich. The latter received these in 1054 from his father, Yaroslav 'the Wise'.¹ From that time, the princes of Chernigov protected their patrimony at every turn. This was especially true of the Ol'govichi, the descendants of Oleg, who became the sole rulers of the lands of Chernigov in the middle of the twelfth century after David's family died out. They had considerable success, especially after 1094 when Oleg expelled his cousin Vladimir Vsevolodovich *Monomakh*. None of *Monomakh*'s descendants ruled there, if chronicle information is correct, except the grandson of Mstislav Vladimirovich, Ryurik Rostislavich.² He was a member of the family of Rostislavichi, the princes of Smolensk, and prince of Vruchiy (present day Ovruch), a town located northwest of Kiev. Under the year 1210, as we shall see, many sources state that he and the Ol'govichi concluded an agreement according to which he occupied Chernigov and Vsevolod Svyatoslavich 'the Red' (*Chermnyy*), prince of Chernigov, became grand prince of Kiev. A number of sources also state that, in 1215, Ryurik died in Chernigov.

If, as many historians believe, the information concerning Ryurik's 'rule' in Chernigov is true, in light of the Lyubech agreement it suggests that there existed an 'unorthodox' relationship between the Rostislavichi and the Ol'govichi. First, it means that Ryurik was the only prince not descended from Svyatoslav Yaroslavich to rule in Chernigov after 1094 when Vladimir *Monomakh* was driven out by Oleg. Second, it signifies the sole occasion on which the descendants of Svyatoslav failed to protect their inviolable right, as it were, to Chernigov. Consequently, it bespeaks the nadir of their political

¹ See the genealogical table on p. 393 below, nos. 1, 2, 4, 5.

² *ibid.*, nos. 6, 9, 25.

power. Third, it reveals a major violation of the agreement at the congress of Lyubech where the princes of Rus' had allocated patrimonies to the various families descended from Yaroslav 'the Wise'. Can it be true, therefore, that Ryurik Rostislavich was the only prince from among all the Monomashichi, and by no means the most illustrious, who succeeded in disrupting the tradition of succession among the Ol'govichi which had become, so to speak, sacrosanct?

The question of Ryurik's 'rule' in Chernigov is of prime importance both for the success of the Lyubech agreement and for the history of the Ol'govichi. The answer to this question is dependent on the yet unsolved problem of the time and place of Ryurik's death. It is the purpose of this article to investigate the circumstances surrounding the last days of Ryurik's life. First, the observations of earlier investigators will be evaluated. Then, by examining the sources and drawing upon information which has not been used in the past, we hope that new light will be shed on the confusion surrounding Ryurik's last days.

I

The following is a summary of relevant events which occurred between the years 1205 and 1215, the period under investigation. In 1205, after Roman Mstislavich, prince of Galich in southwest Rus', was killed in battle, Ryurik Rostislavich, whom Roman had compelled to take tonsure, doffed his monk's habit and reinstated himself as grand prince of Kiev. He concluded peace with Vsevolod Svyatoslavich 'the Red', prince of Chernigov, and together they attacked Galich, but without success.³ In 1206 they failed again to occupy the town. However, the Galicians invited the Igorevichi, a junior branch of the cadet family of Ol'govichi, to be their princes. Then Vsevolod occupied Kiev and forced Ryurik to withdraw to his patrimony in Vruchiy. Later in the same year, the latter recouped his forces and drove Vsevolod from Kiev. In the winter the Ol'govichi attempted to regain the town but failed.⁴ In 1207 they were more successful, forcing Ryurik to flee to Vruchiy and expelling the other Rostislavichi from the lands of Kiev; Vsevolod then became grand prince for a second time. When Grand Prince Vsevolod Yur'evich of Vladimir in Rostov-Suzdal' was informed that the Ol'govichi, with the aid of the nomadic Polovtsy, were pillaging the lands of Kiev, he resolved to attack Chernigov. However, after he set out on the campaign, his attack was diverted against the princes of Ryazan'; he took them and their wives as captives to Vladimir. Meanwhile, when Ryurik saw that Vsevolod 'the Red' had sent his troops to the defence of

³ *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*, *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisey* (abbr. PSRL) 1, 2nd edition (Leningrad, 1926), cols. 425 – 26, s. a. 1206; for the correct date, see N. G. Berezikov, *Khronologiya russkogo letopisaniya* (Moscow, 1963), p. 88.

⁴ PSRL 1, cols. 426–28.

Chernigov, he besieged Kiev and drove out his rival. In the winter of 1207 the Ol'govichi retaliated, but failed to take Kiev.⁵ During the following two years, according to most sources, nothing important happened in southern Rus', but two chronicles state that, in 1208, Ryurik Rostislavich died.⁶

Two years later Ryurik's eldest son, Rostislav, became prince of Galich and Roman Igorevich was expelled but invited to return in the autumn after Rostislav had been driven out.⁷ In the winter of the same year Vsevolod 'the Red' and the Ol'govichi sent Metropolitan Matfey from Kiev to Vsevolod Yur'evich to ask for peace. The latter concluded a treaty and in confirmation 'kissed the cross'. According to many sources, in 1210, Vsevolod 'the Red' became grand prince of Kiev and Ryurik went to rule in Chernigov.⁸ On 19 April 1211, according to the eighteenth-century historian V. N. Tatishchev, Ryurik died in Kiev.⁹ In the same year Vsevolod Yur'evich and Vsevolod 'the Red' consolidated their peace agreement of 1210 with a marriage alliance.¹⁰ The following year, on 13 April 1212, Vsevolod Yur'evich died. His son Yury, who succeeded him, released the princes of Ryazan' and Bishop Arseny who had been held captive in Vladimir.¹¹

Meanwhile, in 1211, in the principality of Galicia, the Igorevichi were overthrown by the Hungarians and a number of them were hanged by the

⁵ *ibid.*, cols. 429-34.

⁶ *Tipografskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 24 (Petrograd, 1921), p. 85; *Piskarevskiy letopisets*, *PSRL* 34 (Moscow, 1978), p. 81.

⁷ *Moskovskiy letopisnyy svod kontsa XV veka* (i.e., the Moscow *svod* of 1479), *PSRL* 25 (M.-L., 1949), p. 108; *Voskresenskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 7 (Spb., 1856), pp. 116-17; *Patriarshaya ili Nikonovskaya letopis'* (i.e., the Nikon Chronicle), *PSRL* 10 (Spb., 1885), p. 60; *Ermolinskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 23 (Spb., 1910), p. 62; *L'vovskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 20, part 1 (Spb., 1910), p. 146; *Tverskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 15 (Spb., 1863), p. 308; the *svod* of 1497, *PSRL* 28 (M.-L., 1963), p. 45; the *svod* of 1518, *PSRL* 28 (M.-L., 1963), p. 202; *Kholmogorskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 33 (Leningrad, 1977), p. 59.

⁸ *PSRL* 1, col. 435; *PSRL* 25, p. 108; *PSRL* 7, p. 117; *PSRL* 23, pp. 62-63; *PSRL* 20, part 1, p. 146; *PSRL* 15, p. 309; the *svod* of 1497, *PSRL* 28, p. 45; the *svod* of 1518, *PSRL* 28, pp. 202-203; *PSRL* 33, p. 59; the Nikon Chronicle has the reference to Metropolitan Matfey under the year 1210 and the one to Ryurik under the year 1211 (*PSRL* 10, p. 62). The following sources, using the Ultra-March style of dating, place the information under the year 1211: *Simeonovskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 18 (Spb., 1913), p. 46; *Vladimirskiy letopisets*, *PSRL* 30 (Moscow, 1965), p. 83; *Troitskaya letopis'*, *rekonstruktsiya teksta*, ed. M. D. Priselkov (M.-L., 1950), p. 298; *Gustinskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 2 (Spb., 1843), p. 331; cf. *Rodoslovnaya kniga (spisok B)*, *Vremennik, Imperatorskogo Moskovskogo Obshchestva istorii i Drevnostey Rossiyskikh*, book 10 (Moscow, 1851), p. 211, s. a. 1208 and the supplement to the *Voskresenskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 7, p. 235, s. a. 1209.

⁹ *Istoriya Rossiyskaya*, 7 vols. (M.-L., 1962-68), 4.341, 3.184. The exact date is given only in the latter volume.

¹⁰ Yury Vsevolodovich married the daughter of Vsevolod 'the Red' (*PSRL* 1, col. 435); the *svod* of 1479 gives the date 10 April (*PSRL* 25, p. 108). Tatishchev gives the date 29 April 1212 in both editions (4.342, 3.185).

¹¹ *PSRL* 1, col. 436.

boyars of Galich.¹² Vsevolod 'the Red' accused the Rostislavichi living in the lands of Kiev of inciting the Galician boyars against the Igorevichi, and he expelled them from the lands of Rus'. The princes turned for help to Mstislav Romanovich, prince of Smolensk, and to his cousin Mstislav Mstislavich 'the Bold' (*Udaloy*), prince of Novgorod. In June of 1212 the latter set off from Novgorod and joined forces with the prince of Smolensk. The united armies of the Rostislavichi marched against Vsevolod and engaged him in battle at Vyshgorod, a town north of Kiev, where the Ol'govichi were defeated. Two of the Ol'govichi, Rostislav Yaroslavich and his brother Yaropolk, were captured, but Vsevolod escaped and fled first to Kiev, where he 'secured' (затворивъ) his brother Gleb, and then to Chernigov. The Rostislavichi took Kiev from Gleb and then pursued Vsevolod; they besieged Chernigov for twelve days and, although they failed to capture the town, they forced Vsevolod to sue for peace. He renounced his claim to Kiev and soon after died in Chernigov. Mstislav Romanovich replaced him as grand prince of Kiev.¹³ Three years later, under the year 1215, a number of sources state that Rurik Rostislavich died as prince of Chernigov.¹⁴ Finally, one chronicle, the *Gustinskaya letopis'*, gives the year 1219 as the date of Rurik's death.¹⁵

II

The riddle of Rurik's 'rule' in Chernigov arises from conflicting information concerning the time and place of his death. According to the above summary, different sources state that he died either in 1208 as prince of Kiev, in 1211 in Kiev, in 1215 as prince of Chernigov, or in 1219 as prince of Kiev. Surprisingly, there has been no investigation of the accounts which give 1208 as the year of Rurik's death. The eighteenth-century historian M. M.

¹² *PSRL* 25, p. 108; cf. *PSRL* 10, p. 63, s. a. 1212.

¹³ *PSRL* 25, p. 109; *PSRL* 7, p. 118; *PSRL* 23, pp. 63-64; *PSRL* 20, part 1, p. 147; the *svod* of 1518, *PSRL* 28, p. 203; *PSRL* 33, p. 59; *PSRL* 15, col. 311; *PSRL* 24, p. 86; *PSRL* 34, p. 82; the supplement to the *Voskresenskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 7, p. 235; *Rodoslovnaya kniga (spisok B)*, p. 212. All the following sources have the account of the battle under the year 1214: *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov* (abbr. *NPL*), ed. A. N. Nasonov (M.-L., 1950), pp. 53, 251-52; *Novgorodskaya chetvertaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 4 (Petrograd, 1915), pp. 184-85; *PSRL* 10, p. 67; *PSRL* 30, p. 84; Tatishchev, *Istoriya* 4.344-45, 3.189-90. Only the *Gustinskaya letopis'* places the account under the year 1213, *PSRL* 2 (1843 edition), p. 333.

¹⁴ *PSRL* 1, col. 438; *PSRL* 25, p. 110; *PSRL* 7, p. 119; *PSRL* 10, p. 69. A number of chronicles which use the Ultra-March style of dating place the event under the year 1216: *PSRL* 18, p. 48; *PSRL* 30, p. 84; *Troitskaya letopis'*, p. 301. According to other information, a certain Rostislav of Kiev (киевский) died as ruler of Chernigov. See *PSRL* 23, p. 64; *PSRL* 20, part 1, p. 148; *PSRL* 15, col. 315; the *svod* of 1497, *PSRL* 28, p. 46; the *svod* of 1518, *PSRL* 28, p. 204; *PSRL* 33, p. 60; cf. the *Gustinskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 2 (1843 edition), p. 334, s. a. 1218.

¹⁵ *PSRL* 2 (1843 edition), p. 334.

Shcherbatov who had, it appears, access to information now lost, concluded that the prince was already dead in 1209 when Vsevolod 'the Red' occupied Kiev.¹⁶ This view was adopted by A. V. Ekzemplyarsky who believed that Ryurik died in 1209, or was dead by the beginning of 1210 at the latest.¹⁷

The *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*, under the year 1215, states that 'Ryurik Rostislavich, the prince of Kiev, died as ruler in Chernigov.'¹⁸ This account has been accepted at face value by some historians.¹⁹ However, N. M. Karamzin, who wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and many later scholars questioned the validity of this statement. Although Karamzin considered the chronicle to be one of the most reliable sources, he was convinced that the information it contained under the year 1215 was not true. He concluded that Ryurik died before 1214, the year in which, according to a number of sources,²⁰ the Rostislavichi drove out the Ol'govichi from Kiev.²¹ But he, and others, failed to find the date of Ryurik's death. Given the rivalry between the Rostislavichi and the Ol'govichi, many investigators were also perplexed by the chronicler's claim that Ryurik 'ruled' in Chernigov. Nevertheless, since they were not able to disprove the chronicle information, they accepted it as true.²² Although these historians were correct, according to N. G. Berezhev, in concluding that Ryurik died before the Rostislavichi drove out Vsevolod 'the Red' from Kiev, he demonstrated that their date for the event was two years off the mark. According to Berezhev, the Rostislavichi occupied Kiev in 1212.²³

¹⁶ This information was obtained from R. V. Zotov, *O Chernigovskikh knyazyakh po Lyubetskому sinodiku i o Chernigovskom knyazhestve v Tatarskoe vremya* (Spb., 1892), pp. 53-54.

¹⁷ See 'Chernigovskie, knyaz'ya', *Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar'* 22 (Spb., 1905), p. 239.

¹⁸ 'Престависа Рюрикъ Ростиславичъ. князъ Кыевскыи. княжа Черниговъ' (*PSRL* 1, col. 438).

¹⁹ For example, V. I. Sergeevich, *Veche i Knyaz'. Russkoe gosudarstvennoe ustroystvo i upravlenie vo vremena knyazey Ryurikovichy* (Moscow, 1867), p. 223; P. V. Golubovsky, *Istoriya Smolenskoy zemli do nachala XV st.* (Kiev, 1895), p. 193; K. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, *Russkaya istoriya* 1 (Spb., 1872), p. 177; N. de Baumgarten, *Généalogies et mariages occidentaux des Rurikides Russes du X^e au XIII^e siècle* (*Orientalia Christiana* 9.1, No. 35; Rome, 1927), p. 39, Table IX, No. 6; V. T. Pashuto, *Ocherki po istorii Galitsko-volynskoy Rusi* (A. N. SSSR, 1950), p. 219.

²⁰ See n. 13 above.

²¹ See his *Istoriya gosudarstva Rossiiskago* 3 (Spb., 1892) (Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, Mouton, 1969), nn. 133, 155; cf. S. M. Solov'ev, *Istoriya Rossii s drevneyshikh vremen*, book 1, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1959), p. 731 n. 400.

²² See, for example, N. Kostomarov, *Istoricheskaya monografiya i issledovaniya* 1 (Spb., 1863), pp. 186-87; M. Pogodin, *Drevnyaya russkaya istoriya do mongol'skago iga* 1 (Moscow, 1871), p. 230; D. Ilovaysky, *Istoriya Rossii*, part 1 (Moscow, 1876), pp. 281-82; M. Hrushevsky, *Ocherk istorii Kievskoy zemli ot smerti Yaroslava do kontsa XIV stoletiya* (Kiev, 1891), pp. 271-73; A. Andreev, 'Ryurik-Vasily Rostislavich', *Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar'* 17.770.

²³ See his *Khronologiya*, p. 104. This date was adopted by other historians, for example, O. M. Rapov, *Knyazheskie vladeniya na Rusi v X-pervoy polovine XIII v.* (Moscow, 1977), p. 163;

His investigation thus placed the time of Ryurik's death prior to the battle which occurred in the summer of that year. Consequently, all chronicle accounts which state that Ryurik died after 1212 – most sources, including the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*, fall into this category – may be discarded as having the wrong date.

R. V. Zotov was the first to reject the claim that Ryurik 'ruled' in Chernigov. After concluding that the prince was deprived of Kiev in 1209, he affirmed that Ryurik moved to Chernigov where he lived for a time, but not as its prince. He suggested that the account in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* is an error made by a later copyist. This northeastern scribe, in rewriting the original source, copied the wrong information because he did not know the identities of the princes in southern Rus'. Zotov posited the question: was it possible that the Ol'govichi who, as is seen from their activities, adhered steadfastly to the idea of succession according to seniority, would allow a member of the rival clan of Monomashichi to rule peacefully on their ancestral throne for almost five years?

He argued convincingly against this hypothesis. First, it was inconsistent of Ryurik, who fought for the throne of Kiev all his life and occupied it seven times, to renounce his claim to it so suddenly and to reconcile himself to rule in Chernigov. It is also strange that, after 1210, he should mysteriously disappear from the pages of the chronicles which, until then, had been filled with accounts of his battles for control of Kiev. To be sure, the fact that, in 1212, his name is not mentioned in the battle between the Rostislavichi and the Ol'govichi is completely unexplainable. Given that he was their senior prince, where was he when all the other Rostislavichi were besieging Chernigov?

Zotov continued to challenge the account of Ryurik's 'rule' in Chernigov on the grounds of other evidence. If Vsevolod 'the Red' gave up his hereditary throne to Ryurik on the strength of unknown circumstances, or from an egoistic desire to rule in Kiev as suggested by Karamzin, would the remaining Ol'govichi have condoned this violation of their rights and done nothing? The answer is no, Zotov claimed, because the history of this 'proud, energetic, restless and bellicose' clan speaks against it. Yet the chronicles do not record any opposition to Ryurik's 'rule' on the part of the Ol'govichi. Had they campaigned against him this would have been noted by the sources. Their silence suggests, therefore, that the Ol'govichi were inactive and that they were not disaffected. Consequently, he concluded, the entry in the *Lavrent'evskaya*

V. V. Mavrodin, 'Chernigovskoe knyazhestvo', *Ocherki Istorii SSSR, period feodalizma IX-XV vv.*, part 1 (Moscow, 1953), pp. 399-400; P. P. Tolochko, *Kiev i Kievskaya zemlya v epokhu feodal'noy razdrobennosti XII-XIII vekov* (Kiev, 1980), p. 184.

letopis' has wrong information; Rurik did not die in Chernigov in 1215 nor become its prince in 1210 as suggested by the sources.²⁴

If Rurik did not occupy Chernigov in 1210, how can one explain the error in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*? Zotov observed that in 1212, according to Tatishchev, a certain Rurik Ol'govich became prince of Chernigov. Tatishchev is the only source for this prince who apparently entertained Vsevolod 'the Red's' daughter on her passage through Chernigov *en route* to Vladimir, in Rostov-Suzdal', where she married Yuri Vsevolodovich. Zotov explained that during this period, when most chronicles were filled with the exploits of Rurik Rostislavich, the copyist of the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* may have erred and mistaken Rurik Rostislavich for Rurik Ol'govich, the prince who ruled and died in Chernigov in 1215.²⁵ Thus, basing his observations on information given by Tatishchev, Zotov concluded that Rurik Rostislavich never ruled in Chernigov; he died, not in 1211 as Tatishchev claimed, but in 1210 in Kiev. However, Zotov acknowledged that the date of the prince's death still lay open to debate.²⁶

Given the circumstantial evidence, Zotov's arguments explaining away Rurik's 'rule' in Chernigov are certainly cogent, but his suggestion that the prince in question was Rurik Ol'govich is open to question. First, as has been noted, Tatishchev alone speaks of the prince. This, of course, is not sufficient reason for rejecting the evidence as invalid, but the fact that it is not supported by chronicle accounts raises doubts concerning its reliability. Second, according to the system of lateral succession among the Ol'govichi,²⁷ a Rurik Ol'govich was not eligible to rule in Chernigov.²⁸ Finally, onomastic evidence suggests that the Ol'govichi did not use the appellation Rurik as a name for their sons. According to chronicle evidence, not one prince in the family of the Ol'govichi was named Rurik. If, as Tatishchev claimed, there was a Rurik Ol'govich, he would have been the only exception to this custom. Hence, it appears highly

²⁴ Zotov, *O Chernigovskikh knyazyakh*, pp. 58-59.

²⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

²⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 60-61. This view was adopted by V. Lyaskoronsky, *Istoriya Pereyaslavl'skoy zemli s drevneyshikh vremen do poloviny XIII stoletiya* (Kiev, 1897), pp. 45-46.

²⁷ According to this system, seniority passed laterally from brother to younger brother and from the youngest brother to his eldest eligible nephew (i.e., the son of an *izgoy* – a prince debarred from competing for the title of senior prince – was not eligible).

²⁸ If a Rurik Ol'govich existed, it appears that he would have been the son of either Oleg Svyatoslavich, the senior prince of the cadet family of Ol'govichi (see No. 12 in the genealogical table on p. 393 below), or the son of Oleg Svyatoslavich, the elder and deceased brother of Vsevolod 'the Red' (see No. 17 in the genealogical table). As the son of either of the two princes, Rurik Ol'govich would not have been eligible to rule in Chernigov because there were princes senior to him in line for the throne.

unlikely that Ryurik Ol'govich ever existed; therefore Zotov's claim that he was the prince of Chernigov from 1210 to 1215 must be wrong.

To sum up: while Zotov explained correctly why Ryurik did not 'rule' in Chernigov, he failed to find the prince who did rule in the town.

The most recent investigation of the problem has been made by J. L. I. Fennell. Unlike most of his predecessors, he accepted the date given by the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* as correct. But, like Zotov, Fennell questioned the validity of the statement concerning Ryurik's 'rule' and has offered a different explanation of the problem. He argued that, in light of the history of the Rostislavichi and the Ol'govichi, it was improbable for Vsevolod 'the Red', on becoming grand prince in 1210, to allow Ryurik to occupy Chernigov. After 1194, when the latter became grand prince, the two families had been bitter enemies fighting for supreme power in southern Rus'. During Vsevolod's occupation of the throne of Chernigov from 1204 to 1210, they became embroiled in an almost constant struggle for control of Kiev. Because of this rivalry, it is doubtful that Vsevolod would have entrusted his ancestral throne to the archenemy of his family. According to Fennell, the simplest explanation for the text of the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* is that in 1210 Vsevolod, having received Kiev from Vsevolod Yur'evich of Vladimir, arrested Ryurik and sent him as a prisoner to Chernigov where he died five years later. Fennell explains that the chronicler's use of the terms '*sede*' (meaning he 'ascended the throne') and '*knyazhiv*' ('ruled') in reference to Ryurik was 'little more than a euphemism to disguise the fact that the Ol'govichi were keeping Ryurik well out of the way.'²⁹

Fennell's suggestion that the prince was kept prisoner by the Ol'govichi during the five-year period is ingenious. It not only gives credibility to the year 1215 for the prince's death as reported in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* but also provides a plausible explanation for the enigmatic silence in the sources, after 1210, concerning Ryurik's activity. However, in light of other evidence, it seems unlikely that Ryurik was kept prisoner at all by the Ol'govichi for the following reasons:

(1) Given the solidarity of the Rostislavichi as a family, it is difficult to understand how the Ol'govichi would have been able to keep Ryurik captive in 1212 after the Rostislavichi defeated them near Vyshgorod, drove them out of Kiev and besieged Chernigov. The latter town, it is true, was not taken, but since Vsevolod 'the Red' was forced to sue for peace at that time, surely one of the main demands of the Rostislavichi would have been the release of Ryurik,

²⁹ 'The Last Years of Rjurik Rostislavič', to be published in a Festschrift honouring A. A. Zimin.

their senior prince. The Ol'govichi, to be sure, could do little but acquiesce to their demands since the Rostislavichi also held three Ol'govichi captive, namely, the two Yaroslavichi captured near Vyshgorod and, presumably, Gleb whom Vsevolod had 'secured' in Kiev.

(2) Given that Vsevolod Yur'evich, Ryurik's most powerful ally, had consistently supported his claim to Kiev in the past, under 1210 the chronicles give no reason why Vsevolod should have changed his policy toward Ryurik so radically as to support the Ol'govichi against him.

(3) Finally, in 1228, Ryurik's son Grand Prince Vladimir and Mikhail Vsevolodovich the son of Vsevolod 'the Red' and prince of Chernigov attacked the town of Kamenets in eastern Volyn'. It belonged to Daniil, the son of Roman Mstislavich and prince of Volyn'. According to the chronicler, Vladimir's reason for besieging Kamenets was that twenty-three years earlier, in 1205, Daniil's father had humiliated Vladimir's father by forcing him to become a monk in Kiev.³⁰ Consequently, had Mikhail's father humiliated Ryurik in a similar manner in 1210 by imprisoning him in Chernigov, there is good reason to suspect that Vladimir would have been hostile to Mikhail just as he was to Daniil. But this was not the case. On the contrary, in 1228, Vladimir and Mikhail formed an alliance against Daniil; this suggests that Ryurik had not been a prisoner of the Ol'govichi since Vladimir, according to chronicle evidence, held no grudge against him on that account.

III

Clearly historians have not reached a consensus of opinion concerning the time and place of Ryurik's death. The account which has proven to be the Gordian knot of the investigations is that given by the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*. As the oldest source containing information about Ryurik, it is considered to be one of the most reliable. Ironically enough, all its information concerning Ryurik under the years 1210 and 1215 (the last two years under which the prince is mentioned in it) has been either challenged or rejected. Many historians, relying on circumstantial evidence, rejected its date of 1215 for Ryurik's death; some, among them Tatishchev, Zotov and Fennell, have also questioned the reliability of its claim that, after 1210, he 'ruled' in Chernigov. Tatishchev and Zotov further challenged the chronicle's claim that the prince in question was Ryurik Rostislavich. Clearly the information concerning Ryurik

³⁰ *Ipat'evskaya letopis'*, *PSRL* 2 (Spb., 1908), col. 753. Karamzin, who had access to sources now lost, gives the following information concerning this event. When the metropolitan approached Vladimir and attempted in vain to dissuade him from the attack, the latter replied, in reference to his father's humiliation, that 'such deeds are not forgotten' (*Istoriya* 3.162).

under the years 1210 and 1215 in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*, and in all the chronicles which have identical accounts, is not entirely convincing. Therefore, we must turn elsewhere if we wish to find more trustworthy evidence about Ryurik's last days.

In this investigation there are two premisses which will serve as starting points. First, following Zotov and Fennell, we may conclude that Ryurik did not 'rule' in Chernigov: the evident animosity which existed between the Rostislavichi and the Ol'govichi excludes any such action on his part. Furthermore, the silence of the chronicles concerning Ryurik's activity after 1210, especially the lack of references to any attempt by the Ol'govichi to depose him, speaks against his 'rule'. Second, we can accept as true the conclusion reached by Karamzin that Ryurik died before the battle which took place in the summer of 1212³¹ (although Karamzin mistakenly believed that the battle occurred two years later); at that time the Rostislavichi drove out Vsevolod 'the Red' from Kiev. The date of 1212 was determined, in part, by the silence of the sources regarding Ryurik's activity in that year and was confirmed by the tradition of lateral succession. On the one hand, according to this custom, if Ryurik was ruling in Chernigov in 1212, as senior prince of the Rostislavichi, it would have been his responsibility to lead them against Vsevolod 'the Red' to redress the wrong suffered by the Rostislavichi in the lands of Kiev. On the other hand, had Ryurik been a prisoner in Chernigov as was suggested, the Rostislavichi, given their unity of purpose and their victory over the Ol'govichi in 1212, would have doubtless demanded the release of their senior prince.

Having established from circumstantial evidence that Ryurik died before the summer of 1212, we can discard as incorrect all chronicle accounts which speak of him as being alive after that year.³² It has also been noted that the last chronicle reference to Ryurik, which can be accepted as credible, is the one under the year 1207; at that time he occupied Kiev for the last time and later, in the winter, repelled the Ol'govichi attack on the town.³³ Therefore, Ryurik's death occurred sometime during the five years. We will now examine all chronicle entries which refer to Ryurik during this period so as to ascertain the

³¹ In fact, a closer look at circumstantial evidence suggests that he was already dead in 1211. In that year, as we have seen, a number of the Rostislavichi princes were driven off their lands in Rus' by Vsevolod 'the Red'. In their efforts to regain their lost territories they sought help from Mstislav Romanovich, prince of Smolensk. The latter, along with his cousin Mstislav Mstislavich of Novgorod, in the summer of 1212, led the Rostislavichi against the Ol'govichi. It is significant that Mstislav Romanovich was the next prince in seniority after Ryurik. The fact that, in 1211, the expelled Rostislavichi turned to Mstislav for help suggests, therefore, that he was already senior prince at that time because Ryurik was dead.

³² See nn. 14 and 15 above.

³³ *PSRL* 1, cols. 429-34.

time and place of his death. Consequently, the question which must be answered is the following: what is the last credible chronicle entry of the few that remain which concern Ryurik before the battle in the summer of 1212 near Vyshgorod?

The eighteenth-century historian Tatishchev has information which cannot be ignored since some sources then at his disposal are no longer extant. Under the year 1211 Tatishchev gives a unique account of Ryurik's death. He writes that Grand Prince Ryurik Rostislavich died in Kiev after ruling there for thirty-seven years. He was expelled four times, tonsured as a monk and suffered much at the hands of his son-in-law (i.e., Roman Mstislavich). Ryurik was not given a moment of peace because he drank too much and lived a profligate life; he devoted little effort to the administration of the land and his officials caused much evil. As a result, he was not greatly loved even by the inhabitants of Kiev. Two sons, Rostislav and Vladimir, survived him. After Ryurik's death Vsevolod Svyatoslavich succeeded to the throne of Kiev and Ryurik Ol'govich became prince of Chernigov.³⁴

Although this account of Ryurik's death is the most extensive, it contains little new information. Much of the material is general knowledge which, no doubt, was introduced by Tatishchev into his account and we have already established as wrong his contention that Ryurik Ol'govich became prince of Chernigov. We must examine now that passage which states that Ryurik died in Kiev and gives a description of his character and administration and, secondly, the date 1211 put forth for Ryurik's death.

The first part of Tatishchev's account – that Ryurik died in Kiev and was prone to imbibing to excess and licentious living, that he paid little attention to administration and allowed his officials to cause much evil in the land – is similar to the more succinct information for the year 1219 in the *Gustinskaya letopis*.³⁵ The similarity of the material suggests a common source. It is

³⁴ 'Преставися князь великий Рюрик Ростиславич в Киеве, княжив 37 лет, четыре раза изгоняем быст и пострыжен, от зятя много пострадав. Не име покоя ниоткуда, зане сам питию многу вдашеся, женами водим бе, мало о устрое земнем прилежа, и тиуны его много зла творяху. Сего дея и киевляном в мале любим бе. Осташася по нем сынове его Ростислав и Володимер.'

По смерти Рюрикове сяде на великом княжении руском паки Всеволод Святославич, а Рюрик Ольгович в Чернигове.'

See *Istoriya* 4.341. In his second edition (3.184-85) he gives the exact date, 19 April, for Ryurik's death. He claims that Ryurik was expelled from Kiev six times and not four, and concludes by changing the name of Ryurik Ol'govich to Oleg, the elder brother of Vsevolod 'the Red', who died in 1204 (see *PSRL* 25, p. 104).

³⁵ It states that Ryurik Rostislavich, who was ruling in Kiev, died; and there was much evil during his reign as well as after it. ('Преставися Рурикъ Ростиславичъ, иже бѣ на княженіи Кіевскомъ, и много зла бысть во время его княженія, паче же и по пемъ.') See *PSRL* 2 (1843 edition), p. 334.

significant that here the latter differs from the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*. Unlike this chronicle Tatishchev and the *Gustinskaya letopis'* do not speak of Ryurik 'ruling' or dying in Chernigov but claim that he died either in Kiev or as prince of Kiev. This is important because it is an indication that there existed more than one chronicle tradition concerning Ryurik's last days.

Next, let us turn to the date given by Tatishchev and see how it fits into the scheme of known events. The year 1211 clearly falls before the battle in the summer of 1212, the last possible date for Ryurik's death as established by Karamzin. However, Zotov, who more than any other historian relied on Tatishchev's information about Ryurik, rejected the date. He postulated that Ryurik must have died, at the latest, before Metropolitan Matfey went to Vladimir in 1210, since at that time Vsevolod 'the Red' was already grand prince of Kiev.³⁶ Zotov's conclusion appears to be justified. In the past Vsevolod Yur'evich of Vladimir had always supported Ryurik's claim to Kiev against the Ol'govichi. The fact that, in 1210, he concluded a peace treaty with the Ol'govichi and confirmed, for the first time, Vsevolod 'the Red's' appointment as grand prince reveals an important reversal in his policy towards the Rostislavichi. And yet, prior to 1210, the chronicles speak of no major disagreement between Ryurik and Vsevolod Yur'evich which would have induced the latter to adopt such a hostile action. One obvious explanation for Vsevolod Yur'evich's decision is that his close ally, Ryurik, was dead. In light of his own special relationship to Ryurik, if the latter had been alive in 1210, the grand prince would not have approved Vsevolod 'the Red's' occupation of Kiev. Observations of this kind thus appear to indicate that Tatishchev's date of 1211 is incorrect.

His date must be further questioned on the basis of his presentation of events from the year 1207 to 1211 which do not coincide, for the most part, with the years given by the chronicles. For example, in comparing his dates with those in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* and the Moscow *svod* of 1479, we see that Tatishchev's entries have the Ultra-March (*ultramartovskiy*) style of dating for the years 1207 to 1209. The only exception is one item under the year 1209, which gives the birth of Vasily Konstantinovich; it has the March (*martovskiy*) style of dating. The accounts which Tatishchev placed under the year 1210, however, are as much as three years off the mark and belong to the years 1208, 1209 and 1210. Under the year 1211, all the entries also found in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*, including the item about Ryurik's death, have the Ultra-March style of dating. The last entry, which has Novgorod information, is the only exception and falls correctly under 1211 in the March style of dating.³⁷

³⁶ *O Chernigovskikh knyazyakh*, p. 61.

³⁷ *NPL*, pp. 52, 250.

Therefore, Tatishchev's account of Ryurik's death, which is the first entry under the year 1211, has the Ultra-March style of dating and, to judge from similar information in the chronicles, belongs under the year 1210. Tatishchev believed wrongly that 1211 was the correct date for Ryurik's death and, it appears, tampered with his information to accommodate his understanding of events.

This can be illustrated. Tatishchev gives the following information: 'After Ryurik's death, Vsevolod Svyatoslavich again became grand prince of Rus', and Ryurik Ol'govich became prince of Chernigov.' This entry contains an amalgamation of evidence. First, it draws from material similar to that contained in the entry under the year 1219 in the *Gustinskaya letopis'*; second, it has evidence derived from the entry under the year 1210 in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* (or from a source containing the same information). But the accounts in these two sources have contradictory evidence. While the *Gustinskaya letopis'* claims that Ryurik died as prince of Kiev, according to the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* (under 1210) he went to 'rule' in Chernigov³⁸ and died there five years later. Tatishchev attempted to solve the discrepancy in the two accounts by combining them, as best he could, to suit his understanding of events. By doing this, however, he changed the information contained in the sources. In his view, the death of Ryurik and Vsevolod's return to Kiev were related events, for he writes that Vsevolod Svyatoslavich became grand prince *after* Ryurik's death. It is important to note that he accepted as more reliable the evidence, similar to that in the *Gustinskaya letopis'*, which states that Ryurik died as grand prince of Kiev, rather than the entry under 1210 in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* that Ryurik went to Chernigov. Tatishchev's understanding of the chronology of events shows that he was confused by the accounts in his sources:

(1) He had to explain away the embarrassing evidence under the year 1210 in the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* (and in other sources under the year 1211 in the Ultra-March style of dating),³⁹ according to which Ryurik went to Chernigov, and he attempted to solve this problem by finding a suitable Ol'govich for the post. Therefore, he suggested that the prince who 'ruled' in Chernigov from 1210 to 1215 was a certain Ryurik Ol'govich.

(2) Several chronicles state that, in the winter of 1210, Vsevolod 'the Red' and the Ol'govichi sent Metropolitan Matfey from Kiev to Vsevolod Yur'evich in Vladimir to ask for peace. The latter concluded a treaty and acknowledged

³⁸ As has been noted, most chronicles place the information concerning Ryurik's flight to 'Chernigov' under the year 1210, but a small number of them have it under the year 1211 in the Ultra-March style of dating (see n. 8).

³⁹ See n. 8.

Vsevolod 'the Red' as grand prince of Kiev. Ryurik went to Chernigov also at that time.⁴⁰ Some sources have the information under 1210 in the March style of dating while others have it under 1211 in the Ultra-March style of dating. This resulted in Tatishchev's apparent belief that the metropolitan made *two* visits to Vsevolod Yur'evich. Thus he placed the entry describing the supposed first visit under the year 1210 and news of the supposed second visit under the year 1211.⁴¹ Tatishchev 'solved' his problem of chronology by placing under the year 1211, and between what he believed to be two visits of the metropolitan, the account of Ryurik's death (i.e., information similar to that in the *Gustinskaya letopis'*) and information concerning Vsevolod 'the Red's' occupation of Kiev and Ryurik Ol'govich's transfer to Chernigov (i.e., information derived from the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*). From the evidence of other sources, we know that 1210 is the correct date for the accounts of the metropolitan's visit, Vsevolod's occupation of Kiev and Ryurik's 'rule' in Chernigov.

We do not know what year Tatishchev's source gave for Ryurik's death. Like Tatishchev himself it may have placed the event under the year 1211. If this was the case, the entry was doubtless in the Ultra-March style of dating used for the other entries in his account under that year. This means that, according to his source, 1210 was the year of Ryurik's death. Possibly also, the entry in his source was dated earlier, under the years 1209 or 1208, and Tatishchev placed it under 1211 to suit his interpretation of events. This likelihood is suggested by the fact that, in Tatishchev's *Istoriya*, the entry immediately preceding the one describing Ryurik's death is the news of the raid which *Kir* Mikhail, prince of Pronsk, led against Moscow in the winter of 1208/9.⁴² We may note here that Tatishchev inadvertently argues against his own date. He was convinced that Ryurik died before Vsevolod 'the Red' became grand prince of Kiev, but, since it is known from other sources that this occurred before the winter of 1210, Ryurik must have died before that time.

There is one final reference to Ryurik in Tatishchev's *Istoriya* which must be examined. Under the year 1210 he states that the prince formed an alliance with the king of Hungary and sent his son Rostislav to rule in Galich after

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ See 4.340-41, 3.183, 185.

⁴² *PSRL* 1, col. 434. The latter view also receives faint support from the *Gustinskaya letopis'*. As has been noted, the chronicler misplaced its account of Ryurik's death under the year 1219. Was the original date, in fact, 1209? Since such an entry would have been either in the Ultra-March style of dating or in the March style of dating, the event could have occurred either in 1209 or in 1208.

expelling Roman Igorevich.⁴³ Although a number of chronicles record, under the same year, that Rostislav became prince of Galich, none of them makes any reference to Ryurik and his treaty with the king of Hungary.⁴⁴ In light of the chronicle evidence, it is safe to assume that the allusion to Ryurik is Tatishchev's own interpolation, and hence under the year 1210 the sources do not speak of Ryurik.

The following conclusions may be drawn from an examination of Tatishchev's references to the prince. With regard to Ryurik's death, the similarity between his description and that in the *Gustinskaya letopis'*, especially the lack of any reference to Chernigov, shows that both accounts derived their material from a source different from that of the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*. According to Tatishchev and the *Gustinskaya letopis'*, Ryurik died in Kiev; he was an inept ruler and his administration gave rise to abuses which brought misery on the people. The latter information, of course, may be a topos inserted by a hostile chronicler. But, if it does reflect specific characteristics of Ryurik's administration, it may well be a clue to the lack of information concerning his death, since chroniclers favourably disposed to the prince may have attempted to expunge all incriminating evidence. Moreover, an examination of Tatishchev's account of Ryurik under the year 1211 has shown that the date is not reliable. However, it is important that he concluded, perhaps basing his judgement on evidence of sources available to him and now lost, that Ryurik was already dead in 1210 when Vsevolod 'the Red' occupied Kiev. Although Tatishchev alone gives the exact date for Ryurik's death, namely, 19 April, it is not possible to verify its accuracy.

IV

Since there are no further references to the prince under the years 1211 and 1210, we must turn to the earlier years.

The chronicles have no information concerning Ryurik under the year 1209, but under 1208 two sources have unique evidence. The *Tipografskaya letopis'*⁴⁵

⁴³ *Istoriya* 4.340, 3.182-83.

⁴⁴ See n. 7.

⁴⁵ This chronicle was published for the first time under the title *Letopisets sodержashchiiy Rossiyskuyu istoriyu ot 6714 (1206) do 7042 (1534) leta, to est', do tsarstvovaniya Tsarya Ioanna Vasil'evicha, kotoryy sluzhit prodolzheniem Nestorovu letopistsu* (Moscow, 1784). In 1853 it was reprinted in Moscow. The published version was not a faithful copy of the original text since the editors introduced corrections and revisions to the latter from sources which they did not identify. In 1921 the chronicle appeared in volume 24 of *PSRL* (Petrograd). The text of this edition was taken from the *Sinodal'nyy spisok* and variants were drawn from the *Tolstovskiy spisok*, the only other copy known at that time (see *PSRL* 24, pp. 1-III).

and the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*⁴⁶ have identical accounts of Rurik's death. They read: 'In that year Rurik, prince of Kiev, died; then Vsevolod "the Red" occupied Kiev.'⁴⁷ No investigator has ever used the information given by the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*. Although Zotov cited the *Tipografskaya letopis'* in relation to this problem, since that time it has been ignored by historians. Surprisingly enough, Zotov himself did not take its date for Rurik's death into serious consideration.⁴⁸ And yet, the importance of the news given by both chronicles cannot be overemphasized. Aside from Tatishchev, these are the only chronicle accounts which place Rurik's death before the year 1212, that is, *correctly*, according to the circumstantial evidence provided by Karamzin and by a large number of historians after him.

From what sources did the *Tipografskaya letopis'* draw its information, and how reliable is it? A. A. Shakhmatov, who studied this source in relation to chronicle writing at the archiepiscopal court in Rostov, examined two copies of the chronicle, namely, the *Sinodal'nyy spisok* and the *Tolstovskiy spisok*. Since they have almost identical texts up to the year 1484, he postulated a Rostov compilation (*svod*) of 1484 as their common source. He discovered further that the text common to both copies could be divided into two parts: the first part ended with the year 1423, and the second part included the period between the years 1425 and 1484. In his opinion, the first part contained, in the main, abbreviated material from the Moscow *svod* of 1479 as well as information from a chronicle compilation similar to the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*, while the second part had a greater number of original entries.⁴⁹ Later A. N. Nasonov discovered five more copies of the *Tipografskaya letopis'*. An examination of their texts led him to conclude that the chronicle existed in two redactions, what he called the *Tipografskaya Sinodal'naya* (abbr. *Tip. Sin.*), and the *Tipografskaya Akademicheskaya* (abbr. *Tip. Ak.*).⁵⁰ However, he did not ascertain which of the redactions contained the original text of the chronicle.

⁴⁶ The chronicle has been preserved in only one copy; it was written during the first half of the seventeenth century (see O. A. Yakovleva, 'Piskarevskiy letopisets', *Materialy po istorii SSSR II, Dokumenty po istorii XV-XVII vv.*, gen. ed. A. A. Novosel'sky [Moscow, 1955], pp. 9, 12; M. N. Tikhomirov, 'Piskarevskiy letopisets kak istoricheskiy istochnik o sobyitiyakh XVI-nachala XVII v.', *Russkoe letopisanie* [Moscow, 1979], p. 232; cf. T. V. Dianova, 'K voprosu o vremeni sozdaniya rukopisi Piskarevskogo letopistsa', *Letopisi i khroniki, 1976 g. M. N. Tikhomirov i letopisevedenie* [Moscow, 1976], p. 146). The second part of the chronicle, the period between the years 1533 and 1645, was published first, in 1955, by O. A. Yakovleva (see 'Piskarevskiy letopisets', 5-210). The complete chronicle was not published until 1978 when it appeared in volume 34 of *PSRL*.

⁴⁷ 'Того же лѣта преставися Рюрикъ, князь Киевскый, а Всеволодъ Чермный сѣде в Киевѣ' (*PSRL* 24, p. 85; *PSRL* 34, p. 81).

⁴⁸ *O Chernigovskikh knyazyakh*, pp. 51, 54-55, 60.

⁴⁹ *Obozrenie russkikh letopisnykh svodov XV-XVI vv.* (M.-L., 1938), p. 285.

⁵⁰ *Istoriya russkogo letopisaniya XI-nachala XVIII veka* (Moscow, 1951), pp. 389-94, 402-409.

This was done by Ya. S. Lur'e. After making a detailed examination of the ten copies known to him,⁵¹ he made the following assumptions. In the late 1480s a scribe, associated with the archiepiscopal court in Rostov, wrote an unofficial compilation. Drawing his material from the archbishop's chronicle collection, he ended his account with the year 1490. This was the original text of *Tip. Ak.* (To date there are eight known copies of this redaction.) Towards the end of the fifteenth century and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, according to Lur'e, the first *svod* was edited by a scribe closely associated with Archbishop Tikhon of Rostov. He abbreviated the conclusion and revised the text, up to the year 1497, by inserting entries taken from the chronicle of the grand prince of Moscow; the new *svod* contained more extensive information concerning the appointment of the archbishop of Rostov. This was the original text of *Tip. Sin.*⁵² (Only two copies of this redaction are known at present.)⁵³

What, then, are the sources of the original text of the *Tipografskaya letopis'*? Shakhmatov divided the text into two parts. The first part, which is the significant section for this investigation, ended with the year 1423 and had the Moscow *svod* of 1479 as its main source. Lur'e observed that this source was consistently abbreviated by the compiler of the original text of the *Tipografskaya letopis'*. The scribe expunged details describing inter-princely relations but generally preserved items of ecclesiastical nature. Up to the year 1263, the scribe inserted into his text material which he obtained in a source similar to the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*. Lur'e also noted that the insertions included unique entries.⁵⁴ His findings, therefore, support the argument that the entry concerning Ryurik's death given by the *Tipografskaya letopis'* is reliable.

Much less is known about the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*, the second chronicle which contains the information about the prince. In 1955 O. A. Yakovleva published the second part of the chronicle, the period between the years 1533 to 1645.⁵⁵ This section is especially valuable for the history of sixteenth-century Muscovy because it contains much original material; unfortunately for our investigation, it is this section which has attracted the attention of historians.⁵⁶

⁵¹ *Obshcherusskie letopisi XIV-XV vv.* (Leningrad, 1976), pp. 213-14, especially n. 15.

⁵² *ibid.*, p. 223.

⁵³ It must be noted that, for the purpose of this investigation, it was not possible to examine all ten copies of the chronicle. Only the two copies available in volume 24 of *PSRL* were used. As has been noted, the text of the *Sinodal'nyy spisok* was used for this edition; it contains the second redaction (i.e., *Tip. Sin.*) of the chronicle. The *Tolstovskiy spisok*, from which variants were taken for the printed edition, contains the first redaction (i.e., *Tip. Ak.*) of the chronicle.

⁵⁴ *Obshcherusskie letopisi*, pp. 215-16; cf. Shakhmatov, *Obozrenie*, pp. 286-89.

⁵⁵ 'Piskarevskiy letopisets', 5-210.

⁵⁶ In writing the history of sixteenth-century Muscovy many historians relied extensively on this source, including I. I. Smirnov, S. O. Shmidt, A. A. Zimin, R. G. Skrynnikov and others; see I. B. Grekov, 'Ob ideyno-politicheskikh tendentsiyakh nekotorykh literaturnykh pamyatnikov

However, only the first part of the chronicle is relevant to our study: it begins with the history of the Kievan State in the ninth century and ends with the year 1431. This section was not published until 1978 when the complete text of the chronicle appeared for the first time in volume 34 of *PSRL*, and it has not yet received detailed analysis. Much of the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*, from the earliest times to the sixteenth century, is based on the *Voskresenskaya letopis'* or on a similar chronicle, and it has material resembling that found in the *Sofiyskaya pervaya letopis'*, the *Novgorodskaya chetvertaya letopis'* and the Moscow *svod* of 1479.⁵⁷ As has already been noted, the Moscow *svod* of 1479 was also the main source for the *Tipografskaya letopis'*.

Although it is not within the scope of this article to attempt a detailed comparison of the texts of the *Tipografskaya letopis'* and the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*, the following observations will help to illustrate the reliability of their information. For the period beginning with the ninth century and ending in the middle of the thirteenth century, the accounts of the two chronicles are, for the most part, identical. However, it is unlikely that one of the two texts served as the source of the other. First, Lur'e, in establishing the secondary nature of *Tip. Sin.* to *Tip. Ak.*, pointed out that some accounts in the former were incomplete compared to those found in the latter.⁵⁸ One account cited by Lur'e is also found, in its complete form, in the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*.⁵⁹ Consequently, it appears that the text of the latter is closer to *Tip. Ak.* than to *Tip. Sin.* and thus is similar to the original text of the *Tipografskaya letopis'*. Secondly, a comparison of the two chronicles reveals that each has material for this period which is missing in the other,⁶⁰ and hence neither was the source of the other. Therefore,

nachala XVII v. (ob avtore Piskarevskogo letopistsa)', *Kul'turnye svyazi narodov Vostochnoy Evropy v XVI v.* (Moscow, 1976), p. 329.

⁵⁷ *PSRL* 34, pp. 4-5.

⁵⁸ *Obshcherusskie letopisi*, p. 214 n. 16.

⁵⁹ See the account of Vsevolod's flight to Novgorod under the year 1135 (6643), in *PSRL* 24, p. 75 n. 9; cf. *PSRL* 34, p. 73.

⁶⁰ For example, the following information is found only in the *Tipografskaya letopis'*: concerning Evpraksia, 1106 (6614); an account of Vladimir and Rogvolod, 1128 (6636); details of Yury's death, 1157 (6665); the birth of Konstantin, 1185 (6693); details of Avramiy's martyrdom and details concerning Bishop Kiril, 1229 (6737). Following are some examples of entries found only in the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*: an account of Vladimir Monomakh, 1113 (6621); information about Novgorod, 1169 (6677); events associated with Andrey Bogolyubskiy's death, 1175 (6683); concerning Pereyaslav', 1192 (6700); concerning Nizhniy Novgorod, 1212 (6720); the death of Fedor, 1233 (6741); the description of the Tatar invasion 1237-38 (6745-46); and the account of the Tatar sack of Chernigov, 1239 (6747). The last entry is of special interest, as it is identical to that found only in the *Sofiyskaya pervaya letopis'* and the *Novgorodskaya chetvertaya letopis'* (see *PSRL* 5, 2nd edition [Leningrad, 1925], pp. 218-19; *PSRL* 4, pp. 222-23). These chronicles stem from the so-called hypothetical 'svod of 1448' (see Lur'e, *Obshcherusskie letopisi*, pp. 67 ff.). This suggests that the *Piskarevskiy letopisets* may stem from the 'svod of 1448' as well.

it may be concluded that the two chronicles obtained their unique information concerning Ryurik's death independently of each other, albeit probably from the same original source. The latter, as both Shakhmatov and Lur'e suggested, was a chronicle similar to the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'*.

It is not difficult to explain why the two chronicles have not been used in investigations concerning Ryurik's death. Although Zotov cited the *Tipograf-skaya letopis'*, it was available to him in only two copies. Since little was known about its provenance, he may have assumed that its date for the prince's death was not reliable. The fact that the chronicle has been preserved in such a large number of copies (ten) has increased its reliability and has also prompted historians, especially Nasonov and Lur'e, to investigate its origins. By establishing that the *Tipografskaya letopis'* contains material not found in other sources, they confirmed its importance to research.

Now that we have identified the two sources which contain the accounts of Ryurik's death under the year 1208, let us see how this information relates to the known evidence. The date 1208 does not contradict any known facts about Ryurik's activity or the inter-princely relations of this period. This information gives the most obvious and the most satisfactory explanation for the total silence in the sources concerning the prince (except for spurious references) after the year 1207. What is more, certain political developments during the years 1208 and 1209 support the date given by the *Tipografskaya letopis'* and the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*.

According to the Novgorod First Chronicle the following events occurred in the winter of 1208/9. Mstislav Mstislavich, prince of Toropets, attacked Torzhok, a frontier town of Novgorod. He imprisoned the mayor (*posadnik*) and the courtiers (*dvoryane*) of Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich who was prince of Novgorod and the son of Vsevolod Yur'evich. After imprisoning Svyatoslav in the bishop's court, the Novgorodians invited Mstislav to be their prince. He accepted their offer and led their troops against Vsevolod Yur'evich in Vladimir. But the latter sent emissaries to him requesting that Mstislav release both Svyatoslav, together with his men, and all the goods he had captured. Vsevolod, on his part, promised to set free the foreign merchants and their wares. The princes concluded peace and Mstislav returned to Novgorod as prince.⁶¹

Before 1208 a prince of the Rostislavichi family had not ruled in Novgorod for twenty-one years.⁶² Mstislav Mstislavich's occupation of the town and subsequent campaign against Grand Prince Vsevolod Yur'evich of Vladimir

⁶¹ *NPL*, pp. 51-52, 249, s. a. 1210; for the correct dating, see Berezkhov, *Khronologiya*, pp. 255-56.

⁶² In 1187, Mstislav Davidovich was driven out by the Novgorodians (*NPL*, pp. 38-39, 229).

indicates a reverse in the policy of the Rostislavichi towards their relatives, the princes of Rostov-Suzdal'. What change of fortune prompted Mstislav to initiate aggressive action against Vsevolod Yur'evich who, since 1187, had been controlling the appointment of princes to Novgorod? The Rostislavichi, obviously, had not challenged his authority over the town while Ryurik had been their senior prince and grand prince of Kiev. On numerous occasions the latter had turned to Vsevolod Yur'evich, as the senior prince of all the Monomashichi,⁶³ for military backing to support his claim to Kiev. Mstislav's action in the winter of 1208 was, therefore, a revolt against Ryurik's policy of cooperation with Vsevolod. If Ryurik were still alive at that time, surely Vsevolod Yur'evich would have brought pressure to bear on him to restrain Mstislav from his aggressiveness. But the chronicles speak of no such measure being adopted. Therefore, Mstislav's attack on the grand prince of Vladimir suggests that Ryurik was dead, and that Mstislav, if not all the Rostislavichi, rejected any agreement which Ryurik may have made with Vsevolod concerning Novgorod. It may well have been Mstislav's continued success in Novgorod which finally prompted the grand prince of Vladimir two years later, in 1210, to withdraw his support of the Rostislavichi claim to Kiev. In an effort to weaken their hold over Novgorod, he seems to have acknowledged Vsevolod 'the Red', their rival, as grand prince of Kiev.

Mstislav Mstislavich's decision to become prince of Novgorod in 1208 was, probably, prompted by other considerations. Had Ryurik been grand prince of Kiev at that time, Mstislav, in all likelihood, would not have gone to Novgorod for a different reason as well. It is more likely that he would have returned to Torchesk, a town in southern Rus', where he had been prince prior to 1207 when he was driven out by the Ol'govichi.⁶⁴ Given Mstislav's previous activity in southern Rus', and in light of his future involvement there, as well as his death,⁶⁵ we may assume that in 1208 he was not able to return to Torchesk because the Ol'govichi were controlling the town. This meant, of course, that

⁶³ In 1195, the year after Ryurik became grand prince of Kiev, he had an altercation with Roman Mstislavich of Galich over a number of towns which he had given to Vsevolod Yur'evich. Mstislav challenged Ryurik's action and the latter defended himself by giving what, in effect, was his manifesto. He declared that the Rostislavichi could not rule without the support of Vsevolod Yur'evich because they acknowledged him as the senior prince of all the Monomashichi: 'а намъ. безо Всеволода нелѣа быти. положили есмы на немъ старѣишнство вса братыя. во Володимѣрѣ племени' (*PSRL* 2 [1908 edition], cols. 685-86).

⁶⁴ At that time they also expelled his cousin, Mstislav Romanovich, from Belgorod near Kiev, forcing him to return to Smolensk; meanwhile, Ryurik fled from Kiev to Vruchiy (*PSRL* 1, col. 429).

⁶⁵ He returned to Kiev from Novgorod in the winter of 1214/15 (*NPL*, pp. 53, 252). In 1218 he went to Galicia (*NPL*, pp. 57, 258-59). and remained in southern Rus' until he died there ten years later (*PSRL* 1, col. 450).

Vsevolod 'the Red' had replaced Ryurik Rostislavich as grand prince of Kiev.⁶⁶ Thus we have further evidence which corroborates the date for Ryurik's death given by the *Tipografskaya letopis'* and the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*.

V

Our investigation has enabled us to ascertain the credibility of the information concerning Ryurik's last days given by various sources. It has been shown that the chronicles which claim he went to Chernigov, in 1210, are wrong. The account under the year 1215, given by the *Lavrent'evskaya letopis'* and by those chronicles which have similar information, is also incorrect. We have seen that only the *Tipografskaya letopis'* and the *Piskarevskiy letopisets* have the true date for Ryurik's death. A third chronicle tradition contends that he died as grand prince of Kiev and gives a description, perhaps true, of his personality and the nature of his administration. This material is preserved in the *Gustinskaya letopis'* and in Tatishchev's *Istoriya Rossiyskaya*. The latter alone of all the sources contains the exact date, 19 April, for the prince's death; but its accuracy cannot be verified.


The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the chronology of events surrounding Ryurik's death. First, and most important, it has been established that he neither ruled in Chernigov nor was held captive there. Instead, he died in 1208 as grand prince of Kiev. Although Vsevolod 'the Red' succeeded Ryurik to the throne of Kiev soon after his death, it was not until 1210 that Vsevolod received approbation for his action from Grand Prince Vsevolod Yur'evich of Vladimir. However, two years later, in the summer of

⁶⁶ There is one final item of information that is of interest. The *Sinodal'nyy spisok* of the *Book of Generations* (*Rodoslovnaya kniga*), written around the beginning of the seventeenth century, has the following account under the year 1208: Vsevolod 'the Red' attacked Ryurik again and, driving him out of Kiev, occupied the town; Ryurik fled to Vrchiiy after ruling in Kiev for three years ('И прииде на него [Рюрика] опять Князь Всеволодъ Чермной и согна Князя Рюрика съ Кіева и сяде на Кіевѣ, а Князь Рюрикъ, выбежа Вручей, и княжилъ на Кіевѣ 3 лѣта'); see *Vremennik, Imperatorskago Moskovskago Obshchestva istorii i Drevnostey Rossiyskikh*, book 10 (1851), p. 13. This is the last reference to Ryurik in the *Book of Generations* and, interestingly enough, it makes no mention of his going to Chernigov. This account alone states that Ryurik returned to Vrchiiy, his patrimony, after being driven out of Kiev for the last time. Consequently, according to this evidence, it may be assumed that he died in that town. Finally, the observation that he ruled in Kiev for three years (i.e., three years from the occasion of Roman Mstislavich's death in 1205) places Ryurik's final expulsion from Kiev under the year 1208. Thus the evidence of the *Sinodal'nyy spisok* supports the information given by the *Tipografskaya letopis'* and the *Piskarevskiy letopisets*, but it is not possible to determine its credibility; cf. the information given by the seventeenth-century *Spisok B* of the *Book of Generations* (see *Vremennik*, pp. 211, 246).

1212, the Rostislavichi drove out Vsevolod 'the Red' from Kiev; he withdrew to Chernigov where he died soon after. We see, therefore, that in accord with the Lyubech agreement the princes of Chernigov successfully defended their patrimony and ruled there continuously from 1097 until the Tatar invasion. Contrary to the accounts of a number of sources, the Ol'govichi did not conclude a humiliating agreement with Ryurik whereby he was given their ancestral throne. Instead, in 1210, for the first time, Vsevolod 'the Red' formed an alliance with Vsevolod Yur'evich, thus strengthening his position over southern Rus'. The effectiveness of this relationship is illustrated by the fact that the Rostislavichi made no attempt to reclaim Kiev until June 1212, some two months after the death of Vsevolod Yur'evich.

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GENEALOGICAL TABLE



THE PROBLEM OF THE *SPECIES IN MEDIO* AT OXFORD IN THE GENERATION AFTER OCKHAM *

Katherine H. Tachau

INTELLECTUAL historians generally assume that William of Ockham succeeded in eliminating from fourteenth-century epistemology sensible species as mediators between object and knower.¹ It is accepted that at least a coterie of 'Ockhamists', if not most influential thinkers of the fourteenth century, adopted Ockham's notion of intuitive and abstractive cognition as the modes of human knowledge; and because for Ockham the requirements of intuitive cognition excluded species, the *Ockhamistae* followed suit both in eliminating species and in rejecting the Augustinian Neoplatonism from which they derived.² Never-

* The idea for this investigation arose in conversation with Dr. A. Mark Smith, to whom I am grateful for his sustained interest and advice. This study has also benefited greatly from the encouragement and assistance of Professor William J. Courtenay, as well as from the generous access he provided me to his collection of manuscript microfilms. I am further indebted to Professor David C. Lindberg, the influence of whose research is apparent in the notes, and whom I thank for his criticism; and to Professors Paul A. Streveler and Mary Sirridge, and Frances Ball, who read and offered suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, portions of which were read at the Twelfth and Thirteenth Conferences on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo in May 1977 and 1978.

¹ For a concise discussion of modern treatments of Ockham's influence on fourteenth-century epistemology, see W. J. Courtenay, 'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion' in C. Trinkaus and H. A. Oberman, eds., *The Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion* (Leiden, 1974), pp. 50-51, 54-56. See also A. Maier, 'Das Problem der *species sensibiles in medio* und die neue Naturphilosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts' in *Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts*, 3 vols. (Rome, 1967), 2:419-51. The assumption is implicit in many accounts of the absorption of Ockham's epistemology: cf., e.g., G. Leff, *The Dissolution of the Medieval Outlook* (New York, 1976), pp. 8-9, 12-13, 88-89; E. A. Moody, 'William of Ockham', *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 8 (New York, 1967) 306-17; and E. Grant, *Physical Sciences in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1971), pp. 31-32.

² G. Leff, *William of Ockham. The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse* (Manchester, 1975), p. 4, lauds Ockham's account of cognition because it 'entailed the virtual rejection of the medieval neoplatonized conception of Aristotle'. See also his *Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries. An Institutional and Intellectual History* (New York, 1968), especially p. 295. The hazards of assuming that fourteenth-century thought was characterized

theless, the influence on fourteenth-century thought of Ockham's divorce of epistemology from this Neoplatonic metaphysics and, in particular, his denial of species, is largely assumed rather than established. In fact, Ockham's attack on the species elicited an almost immediate and prolonged negative response. Why should this have been so?

To delineate the reception of Ockham's theory, it is necessary first to appreciate the one he attempted to replace. The *species in medio* had seemed necessary to most late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century thinkers, who understood cognition to involve a process of abstraction from sense experience. The prototypical sense was vision, and the prototypical formulation of this process was achieved by thinkers concerned specifically with explaining vision, namely, the perspectivists.³ Thus, Durand of St. Pourçain, who preceded Ockham in the effort to remove species from accounts of cognition, decided:

These species, however, seem to have been introduced originally on account of the sense of sight and the sensibles of that sense. For color seems to effect its species in the medium and the [sense] organ, just as it appears sensibly [to do] when reflected in a mirror. And if it were not for this, perhaps mention would never have been made of species required for cognition. But because some believe that the species of color in the eye represents to sight the color of which it is the species, they therefore posit, both in our and in angelic intellects, certain species for the purpose of representing things, that they may be known both by us and by angels. This, however, I do not consider true, neither in our senses nor in our intellect....⁴

by 'schools of thought' have been articulated by W. J. Courtenay, 'The Schools of the Fourteenth Century' (unpublished paper, March 1977).

³ On the overwhelming concentration upon vision to the exclusion of other senses in discussing sensation, in addition to Maier's article, see for example: J. V. Brown, 'Sensation in Henry of Ghent: A Late Medieval Aristotelian-Augustinian Synthesis', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 53 (1971) 238-66; D. C. Lindberg and N. H. Steneck, 'The Sense of Vision and the Origins of Modern Science' in A. G. Debus, ed., *Science, Medicine, and Society in the Renaissance. Essays in Honor Walter Pagel* (New York, 1972), pp. 29-45. The preponderance of attention to vision is reinforced by Aristotle's concentration upon that sense in the *De anima*, as well as by Augustine; indeed, Augustine's conviction that light is active in all five senses, elaborated in the *De Genesi ad litteram*, was axiomatic in Grosseteste's writings. See J. McEvoy, 'The Sun as "res" and "signum": Grosseteste's Commentary on *Ecclesiasticus* ch. 43, vv. 1-5', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 41 (1974) 38-91. The perspectivists, or practitioners of *perspectiva*, included in the thirteenth century Roger Bacon, John Pecham, and Witelo; see D. C. Lindberg, *Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler* (Chicago, 1976), pp. 116-46.

⁴ Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In Sent.* 2.3.6 (Venice, 1571), fols. 139rb-va: '9. Istaе autem species originaliter introductae videntur esse propter sensum visus, et sensibilia illius sensus. Color enim videtur facere speciem suam in medio, et in organo sicut sensibilibus apparet in retractione (*sic*) quae est in speculo. Nisi enim istud fuisset, forsitan numquam fuisset facta mentio de speciebus requisitis ad cognitionem. Sed quia quidam credunt quod species coloris in oculo representat visui colorem, cuius est species, ideo ponunt tam in intellectu nostro quam

Among the perspectivists, Roger Bacon was most responsible for elaborating the doctrine of the 'multiplication of species' that was at the core of what became the standard explanation of perception and cognition based on perception.⁵ According to this theory, a visible object generates or 'multiplies' species, also called 'forms' or 'images', of light and color in the adjacent, transparent medium. These, in turn, generate further species in the medium contiguous to them, which results in a continuous multiplication of species along rays proceeding in all directions from all points on the object's surface. These visible species convey the object's accidents through the intervening medium, which serves as their substance, to the eye of the viewer, upon which they are impressed. Once received in the sense organ, each species continues to be multiplied, now in the internal senses, until from it an intelligible species is abstracted. Moreover, the visible species are only one instance of a general multiplication of species by all objects and powers in the universe:

Every efficient cause acts through its own power, which it exercises on the adjacent matter, as the light (*lux*) of the sun exercises its power on the air (which power is light [*lumen*] diffused through the whole world from the solar light [*lux*]). And this power is called 'likeness', 'image', and 'species', and is designated by many other names, and it is produced both by substance and by accident, spiritual and corporeal. ... This species produces every action in the world, for it acts on sense, on the intellect, and on all matter of the world for the generation of things.⁶

angelico quasdam species ad representandum res, ut cognoscantur tam a nobis quam ab angelis. 10. Hoc autem non reputo verum esse, nec in sensu, nec in intellectu nostro, nec in angelico....' The text is quoted by Maier, 'Das Problem', 429 n. 14, where the printer's error 'retractione' is corrected to 'refractione'; sense is better served, however, by emending as 'reflectione'.

⁵ On Bacon's role, see Lindberg, *Vision*, pp. 104-21; Maier, *ibid.*, 420; A. M. Smith, *Witelo on the Principles of Reflection: A Critical Edition and English Translation, with Notes and Commentary, of Book V of Witelo's 'Perspectiva'* (Diss. Wisconsin, 1976; forthcoming in *Studia copernicana*), pp. 28-32, 61-65. Bacon stressed vision as the fundamental sense: 'Our experience of things here on earth we owe to vision, because a blind man can have no experience worthy of the name concerning this world', and 'We know everything through vision ... for vision shows us the *differentiae* of things', quoted in N. W. Fisher and S. Unguru, 'Experimental Science and Mathematics in Roger Bacon's Thought', *Traditio* 27 (1971) 359 nn. 29, 30. The most pertinent passages in Roger Bacon's work are: *De multiplicatione specierum* 1.1 (Bridges, 2.409), 2.1 (2.458); *Perspectiva (Opus maius, pars quinta)* 1.5.1 (2.30-32), 1.6.1-4 (2.35-46), 1.8.1 (2.54-56), 1.9.4 (2.71-74), 1.10.2 (2.76-79); *Opus maius* 4.2.1 (1.111). All citations are to the edition of J. H. Bridges, *The Opus Maius of Roger Bacon*, 3 vols. (London, 1900).

⁶ *Opus maius* 4.2.1 (1.111); the translation is from Lindberg, *Vision*, p. 113. See also *De multiplicatione specierum* 2.1 (2.458); compare Bacon, *De multiplicatione specierum* 1.1 (2.417) to Grosseteste, *De lineis, angulis, et figuris*, ed. L. Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln* (BGPTM 9; Munich, 1912), p. 60. Among the synonyms Bacon claims for *species* are: *imago*, *idolum*, *simulacrum*, *phantasma*, *forma*, *intentio*, *passio*, *impressio*, and *umbra*; see *De multiplicatione specierum* 1.1 (2.409). On medieval use of the term *species*, see P. Michaud-Quantin, *Études sur le vocabulaire philosophique du Moyen Âge* (Rome, 1970), pp. 113-50.

Ultimately, then, Bacon's theory is more than an account of vision grounded in the writings of Avicenna and, more importantly, in Alhazen's *Perspectiva*. It is part of an emanationist Neoplatonic tradition that had strong roots in Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius and pervaded Grosseteste's treatises which were Bacon's direct source for the notion of multiplication of species in a medium.⁷

The theory of multiplication of species helped to explain perception in important ways as, for example, by providing a mechanism for the apparent action of an object at some distance from the observer, or for the rectilinear propagation of light. Yet the presence of visible species, with the intelligible species and phantasms derived from them by abstraction, encumbered accounts of cognition and memory. At the heart of the problem was the nature of the *species*: were they corporeal, as an explanation of light required, or spiritual, i.e., immaterial entities? Although Bacon had contended that the species conveyed the accidents of an object to the senses via a surrogate substance (the medium), he had also stated that 'the species have material and natural being in the medium and in the sense' and that 'the species is of the same nature as what effects it'.⁸ Moreover, in an apparent effort to avoid the paradoxical consequences of positing material species in the immaterial intellect and memory, Bacon claimed that 'because the species are insensible, they are called spiritual; but this spirituality is not a contradiction of their corporeality or materiality when they are in corporeal or material things'.⁹ The qualifier 'when they are in corporeal or material things' was to be too rarely remembered by subsequent thinkers, perhaps because Bacon failed to persuade that no contradiction existed.¹⁰

Experiences such as afterimages, dreams, delusions, and optical illusions, numerous examples of which could be culled from Aristotle's *De anima* and

⁷ On the Augustinian and Pseudo-Dionysian elements in Grosseteste and the role of light in his thought, see Lindberg, *Vision*, pp. 94-102; Baur's introduction to his edition (n. 6 above); G. Battisti Saccaro, 'Il Grossatesta e la luce', *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 2 (1976) 21-75; J. McEvoy, 'La connaissance intellectuelle selon Robert Grosseteste', *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 75 (1977) 5-48 and 'The Sun as "res"', 38-91; L. E. Lynch, 'The Doctrine of Divine Ideas and Illumination in Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln', *Mediaeval Studies* 3 (1941) 161-73. For Grosseteste's influence on Bacon, see Lindberg, *Vision*, pp. 108-109 and McEvoy, 'The Sun as "res"', 57-61. Alhazen's *Perspectiva*, also known as the *De aspectibus* in the Latin West, was the most direct impetus to the development of perspectivist *Summae* in the West; cf. Lindberg, *Vision*, pp. 58-86.

⁸ *Perspectiva* 1.6.3 (2.40-41). Although Bacon, like Grosseteste, considers light to be corporeal, Grosseteste had argued that the *species in sensu* were immaterial; cf. his *Hexaemeron*, quoted in McEvoy, 'La connaissance', 32.

⁹ *Perspectiva* 1.6.4 (2.44-45).

¹⁰ See the discussion of Holcot and Crathorn on pp. 417-22 below.

Parva naturalia, Avicenna's and Averroes' psychological opera, Augustine's *De Trinitate*, and Alhazen's *Perspectiva* – in short, the major sources for late medieval psychological theory – seemed among the most persuasive evidence that, in the course of sensation, some lasting impression was made on the senses. At the same time, the presence of such enduring impressions intrinsically posed the major epistemological difficulty of endangering existential certainty: how was one to know infallibly that one was seeing a present, existing, extramental object, and not an impression remaining in the object's absence?

Thus, the elimination of species could only simplify psychological and epistemological theory. Nor was their presence in accounts of vision as innocent of complications as perspectivists supposed. How, for example, to explain the apparently instantaneous nature of visual perception?¹¹

Such complications invited attempts to refine and replace the theory of cognition by abstraction, which followed rapidly upon its definitive formulation. Henry of Ghent's well-known denial of intelligible species presaged more thorough attacks on species, both sensible and intelligible. Within a few years of Henry's arguments, Peter John Olivi had advanced reasons for rejecting the hypothesis of extramental sensible species received from objects, although he posited the existence of intelligible species, as well as species stored in the memory. By the middle of the second decade of the fourteenth century, systematic attacks on species had been presented, of which the most formidable were Durand of St. Pourçain's and Gerard of Bologna's. The latter's stance was scorned by Peter Aureol who, although he accepted sensible species as a mechanism required for producing vision, indicated an alternative explanation for the evidently imagistic aspects of sensation and intellection. Aureol proposed the formation, by the external senses and the intellect, of apparent, objective images (the *esse apparens*), as the central fact of conceptualization. Ockham's own effort to eradicate species was in many respects derived from the efforts of which it was the culmination; nonetheless, his formulation of the problem eclipsed, both in his time and in ours, earlier attacks.¹²

¹¹ Among the perspectivists, this problem was pointed out first by Roger Bacon himself (*Perspectiva* 1.9.3 [2.68]); his own response to his question is that 'relinquitur ergo quod lux multiplicatur in tempore, et omnes species rei visibilis et visus similiter. Sed tamen non in tempore sensibili et perceptibili a visu, sed insensibili, quia quilibet experitur quod ipse non percipit tempus in quo fit lux ab oriente in occidentem' (ibid., p. 71). On the difficulty of disentangling the question of the speed of light from the discussion of visual perception, see D. C. Lindberg, 'Medieval Latin Theories of the Speed of Light' in *Roemer et la vitesse de la lumière* (Paris, 1978), pp. 45-72.

¹² On Henry of Ghent's views, in addition to Brown's 'Sensation in Henry of Ghent', see his

When Ockham modified Scotus' theory of intuitive cognition to provide simple, immediate knowledge of an object's existence as a prerequisite for all other knowledge, he obviated, or so he thought, the need to posit sensible and intelligible species.¹³ Ockham distinguished between sensation and intellection, but when discussing the existence of species he, in the manner of his contemporaries, frequently crossed the border from intellection into sensation. In part, this tendency was an inevitable result of the usual adherence to the Aristotelian dictum that whatever is in the intellect was first in the senses; in other words, the intellect knows sensible objects through the senses. The blurring of boundaries was also due to the fact that, despite the bifurcation of

'Henry of Ghent on Internal Sensation', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 10 (1972) 15-28. Maier, 'Das Problem', discussed the influence upon Ockham of earlier theologians, especially Durand of St. Pourçain.

The most extensive epistemological discussions in Peter Aureol's *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, ed. E. M. Buytaert, 2 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953-56) pertinent to the present problem are *In Sent.* 1, prooem. 2 (1.198-99) and 1.3.14 (2.696-99). In both contexts, Aureol adduced *experientiae* of illusions, afterimages, and dreams to establish the formation of an *esse apparens* in the course of intuitive cognition, by which he meant vision. Aureol's understanding of *intuitio* as vision explains his conviction that Gerard of Bologna erred in attempting to explain that process without species (prooem. 1.2 [1.206-207]). The theories of Henry of Ghent, Peter John Olivi, and Peter Aureol are discussed in greater detail in my *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham* (Diss. Wisconsin, 1981). For Aureol, see also: P. Boehner, 'Notitia Intuitiva of Non Existents according to Peter Aureoli, Q.F.M. (1322)', *Franciscan Studies* 8 (1948) 388-416; M. M. Adams, 'Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities', *The Philosophical Review* 86 (1977) 144-76.

¹³ It has seemed useful at certain points to mention opposition to aspects of Ockham's theory not of central concern here as, for example, to his claim that intuitive cognition is the means by which we know that an object does not exist (or is not present) when it does (is) not. Nevertheless, what follows is not intended either as a complete exposition of Ockham's theory of knowledge or of such reactions. For both, the reader is referred to *Vision and Certitude*.

The literature on Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition is extensive; the most comprehensive treatments include S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1947), and Leff, *Ockham*, pp. 2-77. Recent discussions of particular interest are: T. K. Scott, 'Ockham on Evidence, Necessity, and Intuition', *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 7 (1969) 27-49; J. F. Boler, 'Ockham on Intuitive Cognition', *ibid.* 11 (1973) 95-106 and 'Ockham on Evident Cognition', *Franciscan Studies* 36 (1976) 85-98; P. A. Streveler, 'Ockham and His Critics on: Intuitive Cognition', *Franciscan Studies* 35 (1975) 223-36; M. M. Adams, 'Ockham on Certainty and Scepticism: A Reconsideration' (unpublished paper delivered at John Carroll University, October 1976); J. R. Weinberg, 'The Problem of Sensory Cognition' in *Ockham, Descartes, and Hume. Self-Knowledge, Substance, and Causality* (Madison, Wisc., 1977); and A. Ghisalberti, 'L'intuizione in Ockham', *Rivista di filosofia neoscholastica* 70 (1978) 207-26.

References to Ockham are to the following editions: to the *Ordinatio* (= *Ord.*), see G. Gál, S. Brown, G. J. Etzkorn, and F. E. Kelley, eds., *Opera theologica. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio*, 4 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967-79) (henceforth cited as OT); to *Reportatio* 2.14-15, see P. Böhner, 'The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ockham', *Traditio* 1 (1943) 223-75; other references to the *Reportatio* are to the Lyons edition of 1495 (rpt. London, 1962), with punctuation supplied by this author.

sensitive and intellectual parts of the soul, it was not usual to posit *extramental* intelligible species. Convinced, then, that sensory awareness, while not sufficient for knowledge of contingent reality, was nevertheless the beginning of all such knowledge, Ockham began his discussion by defending his view that, in order for direct, immediate contact between the knower and the sensed object to occur, there must be no sensible species in the senses.¹⁴

If intuitive cognition is the means by which we know that an object exists and is present when it is, then, if species really exist, we should have *notitiae intuitivae* of them. But species, Ockham argues, are not known experientially: that is, while we are aware of the visible object when we see it, we are not aware of anything passing from it to our eyes.¹⁵ Moreover, there is no need for a species, because intuitive cognition, whether of the senses or the intellect, does not require a 'representation' or 'image' of the object.¹⁶ For vision, all that is required in the sense is an impressed quality and, not being a sensible species, no intelligible species or phantasms are extracted from it.¹⁷ This quality suffices to account for the experiential evidence of an impression made on the senses, which permits sensation to outlast contact with the object as occurs, for example, in the perception of afterimages.¹⁸

The act of sensation also seems to leave something in the internal senses, principally in imagination and memory, enabling them to act in the object's absence. Again, for Ockham the *qualitas impressa* rather than a species suffices

¹⁴ Ockham, prol. 1 (OT 1.25-27, 31-32); *Ord.* 3.6 (OT 2.492); *Rep.* 2.15 (pp. 248-51, 254).

¹⁵ In addition to *Rep.* 2.15.O (p. 254, par. 2) and P (ibid., par. 4), cf. *Rep.* 2.18.F: 'Sed non apparet necessitas ponendi tales species productas in medio alterius rationis ab obiectis a quibus causantur, quia omnes istae species non possunt sentiri ab aliquo sensu. Sed cum istae species non possint sentiri ab aliquo sensu, non debent poni, nisi propter rationem deductam ex principiis per se notis vel experimento.'

¹⁶ *Rep.* 2.15.P (p. 254, par. 3) and T (p. 257, pars. 2-3).

¹⁷ *Rep.* 2.17.F: 'Tertia conclusio est quod in visu imprimitur aliquid quod potest videri et esse principium visionis. ... ideo, dico quod in visu aliquid imprimitur a sensibili, scilicet aliqua qualitas quae non est actus videndi nec species nec generatur ex actu videndi, et causatur ab obiecto sicut actus videndi; sed est quaedam qualitas impressa visui simul cum actu videndi, et est obiectum causa totalis illius qualitatatis.'

¹⁸ *ibid.*, M: 'Quantum ergo ad potentias < sensitivas > exteriores recapitulando, dico quod in visu imprimitur quaedam qualitas confortans vel debilitans organum. Et illa est subiective in organo, quia organum debilitatur, et non potentia, sicut patet per Philosophum I *De anima* de oculo senis'; and D: 'Prima < conclusio > est quod in sensu exteriori – accipiendo 'sensus' pro composito ex organo et potentia – est aliquid absolutum impressum praeter actum sentiendi. Hoc probatur per experientiam Philosophi multiplicem libro *De somno et vigilia*. Prima est: si aliquis solem vel aliquod splendidum inspicit, et post transferat se ad minus lucidum, vel non videbit vel debilius videbit. ... Secunda est: si aliquis inspicit colorem album longo tempore, si post convertat se ad aliud alterius coloris, illud videbitur esse eiusdem coloris. Tertia est: si aliquis inspexerit solem vel aliud splendidum et post claudat oculos, primo apparebit color splendidus, deinde alii colores usque ad nigrum, et tunc evanescit.'

to incline the faculty to act.¹⁹ If instead a species were impressed on the interior senses, he argues, then it would either be of the same nature as the sensible object, or of a different nature. Neither alternative is tenable; the first means that there would be ‘true sound, true color’, and so forth in the soul as the result of sensation, which, he insists, is absurd. If the object and the species were different in nature, then we should be aware of the species, which we are not. After all, he points out, we are able to discern lesser differences than that between objects differing in their nature.²⁰ To those who understand Aristotle as having explicitly posited the impression of species on the senses, Ockham responds: ‘I say that [the Philosopher] uses “species” in place of “act” or “habit”. This is clear, because the Commentator never names the species, but where the Philosopher says “species”, he [Averroes] always calls this “form”; and he uses “form” for “intellection” or “habit”. And when he says that the intellect is the “place of species”, it is true, because [the intellect] is the subject for intellections and habits.’²¹

¹⁹ *Rep.* 2.17.H: ‘Secundus articulus est de sensu interiori, puta de fantasia. Et est haec prima conclusio, quod aliquid ibi remanet post actum sentiendi, quia prima potentia aliter est reducibilis ad actum post primum actum quam ante, quia ante non reducitur ad actum nisi in praesentia sensibilis realiter, et post primum actum potest reduci ad actum in absentia. Igitur, necessario aliquid requiritur inclinans ad actum post primum actum quod prius, ante primum actum, ibi non fuit’; *Rep.* 4.12.I: ‘Dico quod memoria dupliciter accipitur: uno modo pro potentia habente aliquem habitum vel qualitatem derelictam ex actu praeterito virtute cuius potest talis potentia in aliquem actum consimilem et eiusdem rationis cum actu praeterito, qui quidem actus praeteritus aliquid requirit ad suum esse quod non exigitur ad esse secundi actus, puta obiectum extra. ... Primo modo accipiendo “memoriam,” dico quod memoria reperitur in parte sensitiva et intellectiva, quia certum est quod in utraque derelinquitur aliqua qualitas mediante qua potest in aliquem actum in quem prius non potuit et in actum similem primo actui, sicut alibi probatum est in quaestione de speciebus’; see also *Rep.* 2.15.Q (p. 255).

²⁰ *Rep.* 2.17.K: ‘Item, si habeat rationem obiecti terminantis sicut similitudo rei aut est eiusdem rationis cum obiecto exteriori, aut alterius. Si eiusdem, tunc quod in anima relinquitur est verus sonus, verus color <etc.> Hoc autem est absurdum. Probatur, quia omne activum eiusdem rationis potest effectum aliquem augmentabilem prius causatum ab agente eiusdem rationis augmentare. Igitur, si in potentia interiori causetur verus calor vel verum frigus per unum calidum extrinsecum, potest aliud calidum eundem calorem causatum augmentare. Et sic illa potentia esset multum calida et frigida et alba et nigra ex sola aspectione istorum, quod vere falsum est. Nec est ibi aliquid terminans actum alterius rationis ab obiecto exteriori, quia omnis potentia potens discernere inter minus dissimilia potest discernere inter magis dissimilia; sed haec virtus potest discernere individua eiusdem speciei; igitur, potest discernere inter illud derelictum – quod habet rationem obiecti terminantis per te – et obiectum extra cuius est imago, quod est falsum et contra experientiam.’

²¹ *Rep.* 2.15.FF (p. 265, ad 2^{um}). Ockham modified this statement in *Rep.* 2.17.R: ‘Ad auctoritatem, dico quod magna est aequivocatio de specie, quia aliquando Philosophus accipit “speciem” pro “actu,” aliquando pro “habitu,” aliquando pro “individuo” eiusdem rationis quod potest dici “forma” vel “species”. Et ideo communiter vel semper ubi Philosophus ponit speciem, Commentator ponit formam.’

Insofar as intellectual intuitive cognition is concerned, Ockham insists again that 'it is useless to achieve by more things what can equally well be achieved by fewer; but intuitive cognition can occur by means of the intellect and the thing seen, without any species.'²² Concomitantly, first abstractive cognition requires only this intuitive cognition and the intellect.²³ In turn, abstractive cognition occurring together with the intuitive cognition of an object acts with the intellect to produce a habit 'inclining [the intellect] to imperfect intuitive cognition' by which the mind judges that something has existed. Thus for memory, and for thinking about the past, habits are sufficient.²⁴ Indeed, because it would be superfluous to posit both habits and species, and since the former 'save the phenomena' and the latter do not, the acceptance of habits entails the rejection of species.²⁵

Yet if the acceptance of an account devoid of species disposes of needless psychological and epistemological complexities in Ockham's view, he is nevertheless aware that without the *species in medio* vision would require action at a distance. This consequence Ockham not only accepts but defends; for, he asserts, such action *does* occur, as when the sun illuminates or heats the air near the earth without illuminating or heating the intervening heavens. The action of magnets also offers an example of *actio in distans*.²⁶ The recognition of the

²² *Rep.* 2.15.O (p. 254, par. 1).

²³ *ibid.*, U (p. 258).

²⁴ *ibid.*, G (p. 250) and J (p. 252). On the production of habits in the interior sense, cf. *Rep.* 2.18.N: 'Sed quantum ad sensum interiore, puta fantasiam, est ibi duplex qualitas: una impressa ab obiecto confortativa vel debilitativa organi, et illa est alterius rationis ab obiecto extra sicut illa in visu; et est alia generata per actum ymaginandi, que non est subiective in organo – ut distinguitur contra potentiam – ut praecedens qualitas, sed est subiective in potentia – ut distinguitur contra organum – sicut ipse actus fantasiandi. Et illa qualitas secunda non est obiectum alicuius actus, sed est habitus generatus per actum fantasiandi inclinans sicut causa partialis ad actus consimiles in absentia rei sensibilis, sicut posui prius in intellectu, ita quod post primum actum si ipsum sensibile destruat potest potentia fantastica cum illo habitu generato ex primo actu elicere actum fantasiandi terminatum ad idem sensibile numero quod prius vidi, sicut cognitio abstractiva intellectus terminatur ad idem singulare numero quod vidi intuitive intellectualiter, et non terminatur ad aliquam similitudinem vel ymaginem sicut ymaginantur aliqui et false, quia omnia illa quae a prophetis sanctis et doctoribus vocantur "fantasmata", "simulacra", "ydola" sunt ipsamet sensibilia prius sensata et post fantasiata, et non species sensibilium.' The present reading comes from Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16398, fol. 19va, and Oxford, Merton College 100, fol. 181rb.

²⁵ *Rep.* 2.15.R-S (p. 256). On the importance to Ockham of the *habitus*, see O. Fuchs, *The Psychology of Habit according to William Ockham* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1952).

²⁶ *Rep.* 2.15.T (p. 257, par. 5); *ibid.*, 18.B-E: 'Hic dicitur communiter quod species sunt ponendae in medio, et hoc probatur per rationem, per experientiam, et per auctoritatem. Per rationem primo sic: nihil agit in distans nisi prius agat in medium ... maior < nihil agit, etc. > patet per Commentatorem 7 *Physicorum* commento 9, ubi dicit illud quod movens et motum sunt simul.... Contra primam rationem, probo quod non semper movens immediatum est simul cum moto, sed quod potest distare. Probo, quia sol causat lumen hic inferius iuxta terram, et non

problem of action at a distance, together with the specific examples adduced, may well have come from Peter John Olivi, but the result is Ockham's own. Olivi, who restricted the capacity to act at a distance to *virtutes animarum*, therefore denied that these phenomena were in fact occurrences of action at a distance, unlike Ockham.²⁷ The latter maintains further that light and color are present *per se*, not *per accidens*, in the medium. That being the case, species are no more required to explain the presence of light and color *in medio* than to account for the luminosity of a luminous body.²⁸ Moreover, because action can occur at a distance, and light and color are independent of the medium, Ockham can deny that vision necessarily requires the medium as a condition for sight.²⁹

At many points in his exposition of cognition, Ockham considered his view at odds with Scotus', whose epistemology required species.³⁰ Yet to anyone familiar with Roger Bacon's *Perspectiva*, the ultimate target of Ockham's lengthy discussion of the superfluity of *species in medio* is obvious: Ockham's treatment amounts to a detailed *improbatio* of Bacon's theory. It is significant that Ockham attempts to counter Bacon on his own perspectivist ground, by marshalling the authority of Alhazen.³¹

medium illuminatum quod est inter solem et lunam causantem lumen hic inferius prope terram; ergo, sol potest agere per medium distans immediate ex parte solis; et per consequens eodem modo potest agere in diversis mediis immediate.... Et per consequens, potest sol immediate agere in distans.... Tertia experientia est de magnete, qui secundum Commentatorem 7 *Physicorum* trahit ferrum distans ab eo localiter. Trahit, dico, immediate et non virtute aliqua existente in medio vel ferro; ergo lapis ille immediate agit in distans non agendo in medium.' Ockham elsewhere defends solar action at a distance (*Ord.* 1.37 [OT 4.563-65]): 'Nec valet proterviendo dicere quod sol bene agit in distans sed mediate, non immediate' (p. 565).

²⁷ Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *In Sent.* 2.23, in his *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. B. Jansen, 3 vols. (Quaracchi, 1922-26), 1.422-23, 431-33 and *In Sent.* 2.73 (3.103-104).

²⁸ Ockham, *Rep.* 2.18.E: 'Item, contra primam experientiam probatur quod non causatur ibi species coloris quando radius transit per vitrum rubeum, sed causatur verus color, quia omne quod videtur ab oculo corporali per se est lux vel verus color....'

²⁹ *ibid.*, O: 'Cum declaratum est quod visus necessario indiget medio declarata est per hoc causa propter quam color non videtur nisi in luce et est quia non videtur nisi per medium. Unde dico quod lux et color sunt duae causae partiales ad causandum visionem terminatam, et una sine altera non sufficit ad causandum effectum illum. Et medium illuminatum nihil recipit a corpore nec color a luce; sed sunt duae causae partiales ad causandum unum effectum, et color forte est principalis.'

³⁰ In *Ord.*, prol. 1 (OT 1.33-35) and *Rep.* 2.14-15.O-P (p. 254) Ockham is completely explicit in disputing Scotus. For Scotus' most extensive defense of species, cf. *Ord.* 1.3.3.1 (ed. Balić, 3.224-43) and q. 2 (3.299).

³¹ For citations of Alhazen, see particularly *Rep.* 2.18.FF (Ad sextum dubium) where Ockham refers to *De aspectibus* 4, EE (Ad quintum dubium), and O. The 'second experience' of *Rep.* 2.18.D, in fact, probably derives from Alhazen, and appears in different guise in Bacon's *Perspectiva* 1.6.4 (2.45). See also *Rep.* 2.17.B, C for references to *De aspectibus* 2.2. Ockham's quotations of Alhazen nevertheless demonstrate no profound mastery of *perspectiva*.

It should be evident that Ockham's chief concern is not to apply the notorious razor to species as an instance of metaphysical entities posited without necessity, although he clearly believes them unnecessary and frequently denies their existence on those grounds. The elimination of species, the insistence that neither vision nor knowledge requires 'representations' of the object, and the claim of action at a distance with the implied (if incidental) circumscription of solar influence are the more coherent when viewed as a general alienation from emanationist Neoplatonism. It was not an alienation, however, that his contemporaries were prepared to share.

READING AND CHATTON

The first theologian to take issue with Ockham was John of Reading who as a defense of Scotus undertook, while revising his *Sentences* commentary at Avignon shortly after 1322, a point-by-point refutation of Ockham. At *Sent.* 1.3.3, Reading outlines Scotus' arguments in favor of intelligible species, relates Ockham's and Richard Drayton's³² critiques of Scotus' position, and after countering their arguments turns to an extended rebuttal of Ockham. At the outset, Reading attempts to demonstrate that *intellectual* intuitive cognition, as Ockham had delineated it, is redundant: that is, all the abilities Ockham posits for it are already posited of sensitive intuitive cognition. Hence,

it suffices that one see by sensitive vision alone; therefore [intellectual] intuitive [cognition] is not necessary for the sake of certainty concerning contingent propositions. But just as he [Ockham] uses the principle of Aristotle and the Subtle Doctor, 'plurality is not to be posited without necessity', therefore, one ought not to posit such intellectual intuitive cognition. Rather, sensitive [intuitive] cognition suffices.³³

³² On John of Reading, see W. J. Courtenay, *Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings* (Leiden, 1978), pp. 62-63; S. Brown, 'Sources for Ockham's Prologue to the *Sentences*', *Franciscan Studies* 26 (1966) 36-51; idem and G. Gál, introduction to Ockham, OT 2.18*-34*; G. J. Etzkorn, introduction to Ockham, OT 3.16*-18*; E. Longpré, 'Jean de Reading et le B. Jean Duns Scot', *La France franciscaine* 7 (1924) 99-109; and G. Gál, 'Quaestio Ioannis de Reading de necessitate specierum intelligibilium. Defensio doctrinae Scoti', *Franciscan Studies* 29 (1969) 66-156, which contains an edition of *Sent.* 1.3.3. All references to this question are to Gál's edition. Reading's commentary survives in Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Conv. soppr. D.4.95. What follows is not a comprehensive account of Reading's own theory of cognition, which I discuss more fully in *Vision and Certitude*, chap. 4.

Drayton, whose works are not extant, has not to date been the subject of scholarly study; he is quoted at length by Reading. For his biography, see A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-59), 1.593.

³³ Gál, 'Quaestio Ioannis de Reading', 133-34, par. 226 (translation mine): 'Sed < hoc > non est nisi quia videt terminos coniungi in re; sed ad talem certitudinem sufficit quod viderit tantum visione sensitiva; igitur intuitiva < intellectualiva > non est necessaria propter certitudinem propo-

Turning to Ockham's claim that for the occurrence of intuitive cognition only the intellect and the object are required, Reading argues that, supposing one granted intellectual intuitive cognition, species would not be superfluous. For there is a species in sensitive intuitive cognition, although, rather than a cause of vision, the species is only a naturally prior effect; one could suppose therefore that intellectual intuitive cognition similarly involves species.³⁴ If it is unclear why Reading should deny the superfluity of species in sensitive cognition, while claiming that they are not the cause of vision, this may be because the point was unclear to Reading as well; for it is certainly a position from which he retreats. Instead, he claims that a natural thing naturally causes its likeness, that is, its species,³⁵ in the sensitive organ. This species in the visual organ is the partial cause of the phantasm in the imagination, which in turn is the partial cause of the intelligible species in the intellect, from which abstractive cognition can be generated.³⁶ Corporeal vision seems to present a problem that other senses do not, Reading concedes, for vision *requires* that the object be distant from the viewer in order to cause the species, or vision, in the sense of sight. Yet each of the exterior senses, according to Reading, requires a medium intervening between it and the object for perception; in more perfect faculties, i.e., the intellect and the internal senses, no medium is necessary.³⁷ Clearly, Reading here treats the species as the partial cause of vision as well as of intellection and imagination.

Regardless of whether the intellect can know intuitively, at least in order to have abstractive cognition, intuitive cognition does not suffice without *species causatae*.³⁸ Intuitive cognition, whether of the intellect or the senses, is not the partial cause of abstraction. It does not make sense to suppose that whenever one sees an object, if the intellect is not distracted, there will be two simultaneous acts of knowing, i.e., intuitive and abstractive; nor is it helpful to

sitionis contingentis. Sed sicut *ipse* utitur principio *Aristotelis* et *Doctoris Subtilis*, pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate; igitur non oportet ponere talem cognitionem intuitivam intellectivam, sed sufficit sensitiva.' (The italicized insertion indicates my departure from Gál's text.) See also p. 134, par. 231.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 141-42, par. 262; cf. also p. 118, par. 168.

³⁵ *ibid.*, 146, par. 273 and 149, par. 284; prol. 1 (Florence Conv. soppr. D.4.95, p. 8): '... cognitio dicitur abstractiva illa quae est cognitio quam scilicet res in se praesens non causat, sed quam species rei causat, et talem cognitionem essentialiter potest species causare sive res existat sive non existat. ... Unde quia res post tergum multiplicat directe similitudinem suam usque ad speculum, nec potest ultra multiplicare, multiplicat similitudinem suam secundum lineam aliquo modo reflexam usque ad oculum, et ideo quia causat visionem in oculo de re....' This discussion is repeated in prol. 3 (p. 31), where Reading replaces 'similitudo' with 'species'.

³⁶ Gál, 'Quaestio Ioannis de Reading', 141, par. 262 and 153, par. 302.

³⁷ *ibid.*, 155, par. 307.

³⁸ *ibid.*, 145, par. 270.

assume that intuitive cognition is a partial cause only for first abstractive cognition, all succeeding abstractive cognitions of the same object requiring simply a *habitus*.³⁹ While Ockham is correct in considering abstractive cognition a cause of habit, it is not true that 'everything which can be saved by [positing] species can be saved by [positing] habits'. Habit alone is insufficient to cause any abstractive cognition, or to incline the intellect to 'imperfect' intuitive cognition.⁴⁰ The fact that after an intuitive cognition of an object we experience the ability to know what we were unable previously to know is not evidence that habits rather than species are necessary. Experience will not tell us how to distinguish our habits from *species conservatae*; if anything, experience should lead one to posit species rather than habits. For not only are we not inclined to think about everything we have once known intuitively, we often encounter difficulty in thinking about or recalling such things. The *habitus* by definition, however, is what inclines us to or facilitates memory; thus, such difficulties argue rather for a species. If one were therefore to eliminate species, as Ockham does, on the grounds that they cannot be inferred from what is known *per se* or from certain experience, then one should eliminate the *habitus* on the same grounds.⁴¹

Reading's defense of species, both sensible and intelligible, and of their roles in re-presenting the object outside the mind to the knower does not greatly depart from a defense of Scotus' epistemology. Reading is, however, significant, because he seems to have been the first to recognize how major a departure from the Subtle Doctor's teaching Ockham's elimination of species is. Nevertheless, Reading leaves largely untreated the problems for a theory of perception that Ockham's concomitant rejection of sensible species entails. For example, while noting the 'problem' (*dubium*) concerning vision (as distinct from the other senses) resulting from the necessary distance of the object from the percipient, he ignores Ockham's claim that the object can act at a distance on the viewer immediately. Instead, Reading focuses upon what he sees as Ockham's failure to show that the existence of habits obviates species, and upon the apparent superfluity of Ockham's intellectual intuitive cognition. These aspects of Ockham's thought would be echoed in later Oxford discussions.

More significant than Reading as an early critic of Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition was Walter Chatton. One of the leading Oxford theologians in the years separating the commentaries of Ockham and Adam Wodeham, and like them a Franciscan, Chatton may well have resided at the Franciscan

³⁹ *ibid.*, 136, par. 241.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 145, par. 270.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, 142, par. 263.

convent in Oxford during the years encompassing the Venerable Inceptor's lectures on the *Sentences*. In 1321-23 Chatton lectured on Lombard, probably at the London convent; he was at Oxford in 1329-30, presumably as *magister regens*. At some time between 1321 and 1330 he prepared the redaction of his commentary known as the *Lectura*; and although it is not clear whether the *Lectura* reflects lectures given at Oxford, the opinions Chatton expressed both in it and in the London (?) *Reportatio* were known at Oxford by 1330, when he had already been an influential controversialist for a decade.⁴²

Although other authors were also the subject of Chatton's criticism, Ockham was his most frequent focus; often the juxtaposition of his views with Peter Aureol's established the poles between which their younger confrère attempted to steer. This is the case in the second question of Chatton's prologue, a question largely devoted to the nature and relation of intuitive and abstractive cognition.⁴³ These, Chatton argues, are really distinct; they can occur in both the senses and the intellect.⁴⁴ In the former, intuitive and abstractive cognition are organic acts, and 'are nothing other than interior and exterior sensation, or rather exterior sensation and the act of imagining', in the order of occurrence.⁴⁵ In the case of intellectual cognition, Chatton continues,

⁴² The other preeminent theologians of this period are Richard FitzRalph and John of Rodington; see n. 67 below. On Chatton, see Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 66-74, who discusses the various modern reconstructions of Chatton's biography and guides the reader to much of the significant literature on Chatton. See also, M. E. Reina, 'La prima questione del Prologo del "Commento alle Sentenze" di Walter Catton', *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 25 (1970) 48-74, 290-314; L. Cova, ed., *Commento alle Sentenze. Prologo, questione terza* (Rome, 1973), 'La quarta questione del Prologo del "Commento alle Sentenze" di Walter Catton', *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 30 (1975) 303-30, and 'Francesco de Meyronnes e Walter Catton nella controversia scolastica sulla "notitia intuitiva de re non existente"', *Medioevo. Rivista di storia della filosofia medievale* 2 (1976) 227-51; J. O'Callaghan, 'The Second Question of the Prologue to Walter Catton's Commentary on the Sentences. On Intuitive and Abstractive Knowledge' in J. R. O'Donnell, ed., *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers: A Collection of Hitherto Unedited Texts* (Toronto, 1955), pp. 233-69.

⁴³ All references to the second question of the prologue are to the edition of O'Callaghan (n. 42 above). Chatton's attention to the views of Ockham and Aureol is well known; recent studies of their debates include: G. Gál, 'Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham controversia de natura conceptus universalis', *Franciscan Studies* 27 (1967) 191-212; N. A. Fitzpatrick, 'Walter Chatton on the Univocity of Being: A Reaction to Peter Aureoli and William Ockham', *ibid.* 31 (1971) 88-177; G. J. Etzkorn, 'Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace', *ibid.* 37 (1977) 32-65; Ockham, OT 1.26*-31*; Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 68-72.

⁴⁴ Here Chatton's argument is aimed at Campsall, whose *Sentences* commentary has not yet been discovered. For his influence, see my *Vision and Certitude*, chap. 5 and pp. 343-44; E. A. Synan, 'Richard of Campsall, an English Theologian of the Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies* 14 (1952) 1-8 and *The Works of Richard Campsall* 1 (Toronto, 1968), pp. 13-17; Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 60-61.

⁴⁵ Prol. 2 (p. 248, par. 3); cf. also, in response to Campsall, p. 238, par. 4.

the difference between them is not [experientially] grasped by us better than through [analogy with] exterior sensation and imagination. I say, therefore, that they are acts such that by them the soul relates to a thing as do imagination and exterior sensation in sensing a thing, so that intellectual intuitive [cognition] is that act by which the soul knows a thing to be just as it senses the thing through the exterior sense; and abstractive intellection is that [act] through which the soul proportionally knows the thing to be just as it senses the thing through the act of imagining.⁴⁶

This description stems from an analogy Scotus had drawn in his *Quodlibeta*, an analogy so familiar to Chatton's generation that he could have expected his readers to recognize the source.⁴⁷ It is by means of intuitive cognition that we know an object exists and is present when it is, Chatton continues, but not, as Ockham had argued, that it does not exist or is absent.⁴⁸ Moreover, *cognitio intuitiva* does not render species superfluous in this life, wherein intellection is dependent upon sensation; and sensation occurs through the impression of species, which are qualities, on the senses.⁴⁹ Nor, in this life, is an intellectual intuitive cognition necessary in addition to sense cognition, in order to know that an object exists, and thereby to derive an understanding of any contingent fact.⁵⁰

Chatton's discussion of intuitive cognition is aimed only in part at Ockham; the insistence that intuitive cognition provides the means of knowing that an object exists is directed also at Campsall and Aureol.⁵¹ Chatton's defense of species, however, is couched as a rebuttal of Ockham, as is clear from the five

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 248, par. 3.

⁴⁷ Scotus, *Quodl.* 13 (ed. Vivès, 25.521): 'Distinguo de operatione.... Aliqua ergo cognitio est per se existentis, sicut quae attingit obiectum in sua propria existentia actuali. Exemplum de visione coloris, et communiter in sensatione sensus exterioris. Aliqua etiam est cognitio obiecti, non ut existentis in se, sed vel obiectum non existit, vel saltem illa cognitio non est eius ut actualiter existentis. Exemplum, ut imaginatio coloris, quia contingit imaginari rem quando non existit, sicut quando existit. Consimilis distinctio probari potest in cognitione intellectiva.' Scotus offers the analogy also in *Ord.* 1.1.1.2 (ed. Balić, 2.23-24). Chatton's contemporary at Oxford, the Benedictine Robert Graystones, quotes the passage from Scotus' *Quodlibet*, and names the location, in his *In Sent.* 1.1.1 (London, Westminster Abbey 13, fol. 3vb).

⁴⁸ Prol. 2 (p. 246, par. 4), 'Contra istam opinionem'; at p. 249, par. 2, Chatton claims that we know an object to be absent or not to exist 'arguitive', not intuitively. By 'cognoscere arguitive' Chatton means that 'aliquis potest percipere se non habere intuitivam <cognitionem> illius rei, et ex hoc arguere quod illa res non est praesens...' (*ibid.*).

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 251-55.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, see also Fitzpatrick, 'Chatton on Univocity', 145.

⁵¹ Chatton discusses Aureol, prol. 2.2 (pp. 241-46), which concerns Aureol's *In Sent.* 1.3.14 and prooem. 2 (see above, n. 12). Chatton denies that there is any *esse obiectivum apparens*, and concomitantly, that there is intuitive cognition in the absence of a real object, explaining Aureol's experiential evidence instead as the effects of species. See my *Vision and Certitude*, pp. 171-81; Cova, 'Francesco de Meyronnes'.

questions on distinction 4, book 2 of Chatton's *Reportatio*, where he responds to the entire range of his colleague's objections to species. Inquiring first 'whether species of a visible object multiply through the corporeal medium',⁵² Chatton responds that they do, for action would otherwise occur at a distance.⁵³ If, however, as 'common opinion holds', a visible object multiplies species in the medium, are they then of the same essence as the object, or essentially different? That this fundamental difficulty afforded by the Baconian theory impressed Chatton as pivotal for a tradition of dissatisfaction with that theory – a tradition, moreover, from his vantage point antecedent to Ockham – may be inferred from Chatton's summary of the intellectual alignments on the issue:

For many are of the opinion that whiteness [for example] causes a form in the medium of the same essence [as the object]: Durand [of St. Pourçain], Hugh of Novo Castro, and many *de villa* [i.e., at Oxford]. Some of them, however, hold at the same time that contrary qualities, no matter how diminished they may be, cannot be simultaneously in the same subject. Some [i.e., Ockham] prove this conclusion, because redness diffused by a ray crossing through a window is truly color, as it is truly visible, and nothing is visible except light or color.⁵⁴

⁵² My discussion is based on these questions as found in Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Conv. soppr. C.5.357, and Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 15887. 'Utrum species rei visibilis multiplicetur per medium corporale' (*In Sent.* 2.4.1) occupies fols. 194va-195va in the Florence codex and fols. 102rb-103va in the Paris ms. See also *In Sent.* 2.13 (Paris lat. 15887, fol. 110ra): 'Utrum sol causet lumen in medio distinctum a sole et medio'.

⁵³ Concluding the arguments of fol. 102rb-va (Paris lat. 15887), Chatton states on fol. 102va: 'Item ad oppositum maxime moveret illud <argumentum> de radio, et tamen illud non concludit, quia ponas <casum> ut alias tetigi ... et tamen contra sensum est quin prius ad istum quam ad alium. Ergo argumentum tuum non cogit'; fol. 102vb: 'Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod possit agere in distans.' The 'alias tetigi' is a cross-reference to his *In Sent.* 1.2.3 (Paris lat. 15887, fol. 72ra), where, in arguing against action at a distance, Chatton mentions that 'Alia est opinio Petri Aureoli, quod generaliter activum situatum non agit in distans nisi per medium; probro, quia hoc experimur in diffusione radii.'

⁵⁴ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fols. 194vb-195ra and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 102vb: 'Secundus articulus est an obiectum visibile causet in medio aliquid eiusdem rationis vel alterius, nam communis opinio est quod aliquid causet. Sed vertitur in dubium, an aliquid eiusdem rationis vel alterius. Et sunt opiniones multe quod albedo causat in medio formam eiusdem rationis: Durandi et Hugonis de Novo Castro et multorum de villa. Aliqui tamen de eis simul tenent quod qualitates contrarie quantumcumque remisse sint non possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto. Istam conclusionem probant aliqui, quia rubedo diffusa per radium transeuntem per vitrum est vere color, quia est vere visibile, et nihil est visibile nisi lux vel color, et non est species in qua reponatur in genere colorum nisi rubedo; igitur, etc.' For Ockham, cf. n. 28 above. Chatton's remarks support Maier's hypothesis that Ockham was influenced by Durand. Even more interesting is Chatton's conjunction of Durand and Hugh of Novo Castro, whose modern characterization as Scotist may well deserve qualification, given Reading's and Chatton's Scotistic motivations for retaining species.

Although Chatton here refers to his opponent by the politely oblique 'some', he is elsewhere more explicit in describing the same view, telling his reader to 'look in Ockham's *Reportatio*'.⁵⁵ To his arguments, Chatton responds that the object causes something in the medium essentially different from itself, for 'light [*lux*] in the body of the sun and the light [*lumen*] that it causes in the medium are essentially different, since they are no less different than the light [*lumen*] caused by the sun and the light caused by the moon: and these differ essentially....'⁵⁶

Having established species in the medium, Chatton next asks 'whether a sensible object causes a species, that differs from act, in the exterior sense?' The very formulation of the question is clearly a rejoinder to Ockham's claim that, by 'species', Aristotle had intended 'act' or 'habit' as the effect of a sensible object on a sense.⁵⁷ Chatton reminds his audience of experiences, such as afterimages, from which it seems incontrovertible that in sensation there is an impression made on the senses. Yet according to 'another opinion' (which is correctly attributed in the margin to Ockham), these *experientiae* do not prove that what is impressed on the senses is a *species*; rather, a sensible object such as color 'impresses some comforting or damaging *quality* upon the organ.' Chatton counters that the act of seeing is organic, that is, it is caused either by the presence of some impressed form or by something received in the sense organ, which something is 'what I call "species"'.⁵⁸ Consequently, action on the

⁵⁵ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 195ra and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103ra: 'Tertius articulus est respondere ad formam questionis. Dicunt aliqui quod non species alterius speciei, quia non est necessitas, et nihil ponendum est sine necessitate; et auctoritates dicentes in oppositum glosande sunt quod aliquid causant colores in medio, sed non alterius speciei, sed colores eiusdem speciei, et quod unus illorum non plus est species alterius quam e contra. Et quod dicunt auctoritates – quod sunt intentionaliter in medio – verum est: i.e., si oculus esset in illa parte medii, videret colorem, etc. Vide in *Reportatione* Ockham.' On the use of such plural forms as 'alii dicunt' when a single opponent is intended, cf. Buytaert, introduction to Aureol's *Scriptum* (1.ix).

⁵⁶ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 194vb and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 102vb: 'Non teneo igitur hoc, et arguo quod causet rem alterius speciei; nam lux in corpore solis et lumen quod causat in medio sunt alterius speciei, quia non minus quam lumen causatum a sole et lumen causatum a luna; sed ista sunt alterius speciei.'

⁵⁷ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 195va-b and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103va-b: 'Secundo quero utrum sensibile causet in sensu exteriori speciem differentem ab actu.' For Ockham's view, see above, n. 21.

⁵⁸ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 195va and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103va: 'Alia est opinio in contrarium quod nulla species sibi imprimitur, sed aliquod sensibile, puta color, et ille videtur; et per hoc evadunt omnes experientias < Petri Aureoli supra positas >, et dicunt quod iste color non plus est species alterius quam e contra. Et preter hoc dicunt quod sensibile imprimit organo aliquam qualitatem confortativam vel nocivam. ... Contra: actus videndi est organicus, que causa < est > aut quia causatur ad presentiam alicuius forme impressae in organo, et habeo propositum, quia illam voco 'speciem'; aut quia recipitur in organo, et hoc non est verum

sense is mediate rather than immediate, and Chatton reminds his reader that he has already said that intellection is received mediately in the organ.⁵⁹ If, after all, an extramental object could cause action in the soul immediately, then, he argues, the soul would not need the sense organs for sensation.⁶⁰

Perhaps Chatton's argument is truncated, for it is not at all clear how he thinks he has refuted Ockham's assertion that what is impressed is no species, but only a quality. To confuse the issue further, Chatton continues:

They [i.e., Ockham] rely upon paucity, but regarding the matter at hand they multiply and make more qualities without necessity, that is, by positing an act and an impressed color, and beyond that, there is a quality disposing or indisposing the organ [to act]. But with respect to the same sensible object, for that moment everything can be saved if a single quality, which I say [is the] species, is impressed on the organ.⁶¹

In the third question, Chatton extends his defense of species to the inner senses, insisting that species better explain the acts of imagining and remembering than does Ockham's habit. Imagination, like the act of seeing, is organic, depending upon a species impressed in the organ – here, phantasy.⁶² Similarly, a species impressed in the senses best accounts for the act of remembering an isolated incident.⁶³ Chatton therefore again accuses the

immediate non plus quam intellectio, quia cum sit actus vitalis recipitur necessario immediate in forma viva.' This doctrine of the organic action of the soul is derived from Scotus; cf. his *Ord.* 1.3.3.1 (ed. Balić, 3.236-37).

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, 'Quod autem mediate recipitur in organo, non curo, quia ita dixi de intellectione, quod recipitur mediate in organo.'

⁶⁰ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 195vb and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103vb: 'Item, si res extra posset immediate causare actus in anima, tunc anima non indigeret organis propter sensationem; nam receptio non impedit, quia ut prius actus vitalis non recipitur immediate in organo sed in forma viva; igitur hoc est quia indiget formis impressis organis – formis inquam immediate causativis et conservativis actuum.'

⁶¹ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 195vb and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103va-b: 'Item, isti innituntur paucitati, sed in proposito multiplicant et plurificant qualitates sine necessitate. Ponunt enim actum et colorem impressum et preter illum, aliam qualitatem disponentem vel indisponentem organum; sed respectu eiusdem sensibilis pro tunc omnia salvari possunt si organo imprimatur tantum una qualitas, quam dico "speciem".'

⁶² Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fols. 195vb-196ra and Paris lat. 15887, fols. 103vb-104ra: 'Tertio quero utrum in sensu interiori sit necesse ponere speciem differentem actui'; respectively, fol. 195vb and fol. 103vb: 'Contra: in absentia sensibilium et sensationum exteriorum per consequens possumus habere notitiam sensuum interiorum; igitur, aliquid imprimitur illis sensibus < interioribus > quod causet actus. Tunc tenet una opinio quod non, sed tamen aliquid imprimitur sibi, scilicet habitus, quia post actus frequentes potest post quietem in aliquos in quos non ante primum actum. ... Contra: primus actus ymaginandi est organicus; < igitur > etc. Ut prius contra Ockham questione precedenti: primus actus non est habitu, igitur < est > a specie impressa organo fantasie.'

⁶³ *ibid.*: 'Item, omnia sensibilia eque sentiuntur per speciem vel non per speciem; sed aliquod sentitur per speciem. Probo, nam possibile est quod Sortes videat aliquem, et tamen quod hoc

Venerable Inceptor of 'positing pluralities without necessity', namely, habit and an additional quality for disposing the senses, interior and exterior, to act.⁶⁴

Turning finally from the senses to the 'intellectual part' of the soul, Chatton admits that, while

it is difficult to prove that such a species is there, nevertheless, the intellect no less than the sensitive part [of the soul] has a principle sufficient to cause its first act. Therefore, what suffices to cause the first abstractive act of the intellect is not from the soul alone, because before sensation it cannot cause that act which it now can; nor is [the sufficient cause] an intuitive intellection, because I have elsewhere proven that we do not have that in this life; nor is it a habit, because I am speaking of the first act; nor is it sensation, because the intellectual part has a sufficient principle of its own. Hence, it is the species acquired there from the intermediate sensations.⁶⁵

Even if one were to posit intuitive cognition *in via*, no habit inclining the intellect to abstractive acts would result since, as Chatton reminds his audience, Ockham himself had insisted that one thing cannot cause the first cognition of another thing. This is a stance, by Ockham's criterion at least, inconsistent with Chatton's assertion that species differ essentially from the objects from which

non percipiat dum videt illum, et tamen quod post recordetur se vidisse illum. Quid causat illum actum recordandi? Non ipsa visio, quia tunc non est; nec habitus, quia non percepit visionem quando fuit; igitur non precessit aliquis actus, qui actus posset illum habitum causare (per positum). Igitur non est ibi aliquis habitus cuius obiectum sit ipsa visio, nec etiam per eum una res causat primam notitiam incomplexam alterius rei. Igitur relinquitur ibi species visionis in organo aliquo non solum visibilis, sed ipsius visionis.' Cf. also *In Sent.* 2.4.4 (Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 196ra and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 104ra) where the same example is used to argue for species in the intellect.

⁶⁴ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 195vb and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103vb: 'Item, ponunt hic pluralitatem sine necessitate, scilicet habitum et qualitatem aliam indisponentem, ut prius < in questione secunda dictum est >. Et tamen respectu eiusdem, omnia illa possunt salvari per unam qualitatem que est ipsa species, quam pono.' Chatton's repeated deployment of 'Ockham's razor' should not be construed to betoken a parsimoniousness in metaphysics more radical than its eponymous author's: it reflects, rather, the debator's glee at turning his opponent's own arguments against him. Indeed, Chatton's criterion for 'positing pluralities reasonably' is no stricter than Ockham's: prol. 2 (p. 240): 'Item, non requiritur tanta necessitas plurificandi res quod evidens sit contradictionem sequi, si non plurificentur. Necessitas enim requisita ad hoc quod rationabiliter ponantur plures sufficit quod convenientius omnia salventur per plures quam per pauciores.'

⁶⁵ Florence Conv. soppr. C.5.357, fol. 196ra and Paris lat. 15887, fol. 104ra: 'Sed contra: licet reputem difficile probare ibi speciem talem, non minus tamen intellectus habet principium sufficiens causandi primum actum suum quam pars sensitiva; igitur, quod causare sufficit primum actum intellectus abstractivum non ab anima tantum, quia ante sensationem non potest causare illum actum sicut modo potest; nec intellectio intuitiva, quia alias probavi quod talem non habemus in via; nec habitus, quia loquor de primo actu; nec sensatio, quia pars intellectiva habet penes se principium sufficiens. Igitur, species ibi adquisita mediantibus sensationibus.'

they multiply. Finally, Chatton attacks the *habitus* on the grounds that it cannot provide more evident cognition than a *species*.⁶⁶

Although at times repetitive, Chatton's rebuttal of Ockham attempts a systematic defense of species. And while it is clear that his treatment of cognition is in large measure conceived as a reply to Ockham, it is worth noting the extent to which Peter Aureol's arguments, linked to the Venerable Inceptor's, established the foci of the discussion. Moreover, Chatton's insistence on the *organic* nature of the soul's actions and, as a corollary, on the intellect's dependence in this life upon the senses is significant both for its Scotistic inspiration and as an incipient response to Ockham's relative disinterest in the organic aspects of psychology. Yet what interests Ockham only slightly is fundamental both to the Aristotelian psychological corpus and to perspectivist theory, and it is therefore hardly surprising that Chatton's reaction should not have been an isolated one.

HOLCOT, CRATHORN, AND WODEHAM

The *Sentences* commentaries composed at Oxford at the beginning of the 1330s were the products of a generation of theologians who had been students during the years of Ockham's and Chatton's lectures. Among the prominent members of this generation, *socii* whose lectures overlapped, were the Dominicans Robert Holcot and William Crathorn and the Franciscan Adam Wodeham.⁶⁷

Robert Holcot occupies an ill-defined position among these theologians of the 1330s, but he has generally been considered to be, next to Adam Wodeham, intellectually closest to Ockham.⁶⁸ In his *Sentences* commentary, which

⁶⁶ *ibid.*: 'Preterea etiam ponendo actus intuitivos, illi non causarent habitum inclinativum in actus abstractivos. Dices quod simul causatur cum primo actu intuitivo alius actus abstractivus. Contra: a quo? Non ab actu intuitivo, quia una res, per eos, non causat primam notitiam alterius. ... Item, habitus in intellectu potest augeri et possunt elici mediante habitu intensiores actus, intensione correspondente habitui augmentato absque hoc quod habeantur actus evidentiore quam prius. Igitur, ad habendum actum evidentiorem oportet recurrere ad species.'

⁶⁷ For an introduction to the literature concerning these thinkers, and the establishment of their academic biographies, see Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 95-106. Two significant theologians whose careers bridged the years between Ockham and this generation of scholars were Richard FitzRalph, a secular theologian, and John of Rodington. Concerning the former, see G. Leff, *Richard FitzRalph, Commentator of the Sentences. A Study in Theological Orthodoxy* (Manchester, 1963), pp. 66-90; for Rodington, see M. Tweedale, *John of Rodinton on Knowledge, Science, and Theology* (Diss. California, 1965). Their theories of cognition, which require species, are discussed in *Vision and Certitude*, chap. 5; for their *curricula vitae*, see also Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 75-83.

⁶⁸ On Holcot's position as an Ockhamist, see Leff, *Dissolution*, pp. 52-53 and H. Schepers' two articles, 'Holcot contra dicta Crathorn. I. Quellenkritik und biographische Auswertung der Bakkalareatsschriften zweier Oxforder Dominikaner des xiv. Jahrhunderts' and 'Holcot contra

probably dates from 1329-31, and the subsequent *Sex articuli* and *Quodlibetal Questions*, Holcot repeatedly addresses the issue of positing species.⁶⁹ His stance is clear: while consistently accepting Ockham's arguments for immediate intuitive knowledge of a present object,⁷⁰ Holcot nevertheless disputes Ockham's theory of cognition at many points, and maintains that sensible and intelligible species are necessary.

A major reason for Holcot's unwillingness to approve Ockham's jettisoning of species lies in Holcot's concern not with the explanation of visual perception itself but rather with 'recordative cognition' or memory.⁷¹ In the prologue of his *Sentences* commentary, the Dominican insists that, contrary to Ockham, 'many appearances in our actions can be saved by positing species in the memory that cannot be saved when their existence is denied. Nor is his argument conclusive when he argues that since any thing causes cognition of itself before cognition of another thing, if a species were posited, it would first cause cognition of the species itself, and neither intention nor habit nor the like [would do so].'⁷² In other words, Ockham's elimination of species on the grounds of the lack of

dicta Crathorn. II. Das "significatum per propositionem". Aufbau und Kritik einer nominalistischen Theorie über den Gegenstand des Wissens', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 77 (1970) 320-54 and 79 (1972) 106-36, respectively. The difficulties with this characterization are developed in A. W. Brinkley (Birk), *Robert Holcot: Toward an Empirical Theory of Knowledge* (Diss. Harvard, 1972), for access to which I am grateful to the author and Professor John E. Murdoch; H. Gelber, 'Robert Holcot's Epistemology and the Problem of Sceptical Nominalism' (unpublished paper, December 1967); Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 100-106; and O. Grassi, 'Le tesi di Robert Holcot sul valore non scientifico della conoscenza teologica', *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* 71 (1979) 49-79.

⁶⁹ Schepers and Courtenay (*Wodeham*, pp. 96-100) differ in dating Holcot's *œuvre*; nevertheless, the chronological order is a matter of agreement: *Sentences* commentary, *Sex articuli*, and *Quodlibeta*. The following discussion is based principally on *In Sent.* 1, prol. (Oxford, Oriel College 15, fols. 206ra-207rb), 1.2 (ibid., fols. 127vb-131vb), and 2.3.3 (ibid., fols. 157ra-159rb); *Sex articuli* as quoted in Schepers, 'Holcot contra dicta... II', 113; the *Quodlibetal Question* occurring as no. 50 in Cambridge, Pembroke College 236, fols. 159ra-160rb, and as no. 52 in Oxford, Balliol College 71, fols. 216va-218ra; and the *Quodlibetal Question* edited in W. J. Courtenay, 'A Revised Text of Robert Holcot's Quodlibetal Dispute on Whether God Is Able to Know More than He Knows', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 53 (1971) 1-21.

⁷⁰ Holcot's retention of species was first noted by Gelber (n. 68 above); see also Brinkley, *Robert Holcot*, pp. 4, 15.

⁷¹ *In Sent.* 2.3 (Oriel 15, fol. 159ra): 'Dico quod mihi apparet probabile dicere quod aliqua cognoscit per res ipsas et per essentiam suam que est intellectus suus. Unde, ad notitiam intuitivam ista duo sufficient ... potest dici quod respectu rei existentis non indiget Angelus specie, sed pro cognitione recordativa indiget specie vel habitu.' It should be noted that Holcot does not accept Ockham's definition of intuitive cognition in its entirety.

⁷² *In Sent.* 1, prol. (Oriel 15, fol. 207ra): '(Contra Ockham in marg.) Quantum ad ista, credo quod salvantur enim multe apparentie in factis nostris ponendo species in memoria, que non salvantur eas negando. Nec concludit argumentum suum quando arguitur: "quelibet res prius causat notitiam sui quam alterius." Si igitur species poneretur, citius causaret species notitiam sui; nec intentio, nec habitus, nec huiusmodi.'

experiential knowledge of them is not, according to Holcot, adequately motivated. The fact that one is unaware of species in cognition of individuals that are present is not sufficient grounds for denying the existence of those species, given that their existence will 'save the phenomena' and their absence, he thinks, will not.

What are these species in Holcot's view? They are only qualities, albeit called by many names: in the intellect they are 'concepts' or 'words'; in the memory they are 'species', 'idol', 'image', or 'exemplar', even though they are not, properly speaking, a similitude of the object outside the mind.⁷³ Holcot tells his reader elsewhere that

I do not much care about this [argument] because I do not posit that the species is a natural similitude of the thing of which it brings about cognition, such that the similitude of a stone in the angel would be a stone. But I do posit a quality causative of the cognition of a stone when the stone is not present. For that reason it is called 'representative' of the stone, or a 'likeness' of the stone, or its 'species'; and the same thing can be called a 'habit' because it facilitates or inclines the intellect toward the abstractive cognition of the stone.⁷⁴

He goes a step further: '... these qualities that I call "species" could reasonably enough be called "scientific habit"; and when the thing itself is beyond question, I am not concerned about the names for it.'⁷⁵

⁷³ *ibid.*, 'Speciei in intellectu que vocatur conceptus et verbum....' Oriel 15, fol. 207rb: 'Illa res, que est species in intellectu, non est naturalis similitudo obiecti eo modo quo duo alba dicuntur similia vel alia huiusmodi, quibus demonstratis vere dicitur: ista sunt similia. Sed similitudo omnino dicitur equivoce de talibus qualitatibus spiritualibus et qualitatibus extra. Immo due species sunt similes inter se vere, et una species est similitudo alterius, sed non est similitudo obiecti sive rei extra proprie loquendo et univoce, quia sic forent eiusdem speciei; sed quia sic experimur in nobis et quando habemus notitiam alicuius rei absentis et occurrit nobis alia res sibi consimilis, causatur in nobis actualis notitia rei absentis. Sicut si vidi prius Herculem, et postea videam unam statuam que est figurata et colorata sicut Hercules fuit quando eum vidi, iam statim moveor ad cogitandum de Hercule ita quod ista similitudo est causa illius cogitationis actualis de Hercule. Et propter hanc experientiam transtulerunt philosophi ista nomina: species, ydolum, imago, exemplar, ad significandum tales qualitates requisitas ad intelligendum, licet in nullo sunt similes rebus extra in essendo; et dicuntur apud philosophos "similes in representando", non in essendo, idest quod non sunt essentie talis nature qualis nature sunt obiecta extra'. *In Sent.* 2.3 (Oriel 15, fol. 159rb): 'Ideo, iste qualitates quas ego voco "species"....' See also Courtenay, 'A Revised Text', 16-17, ll. 291-305, where Holcot emphasizes: '... tales similitudines < i.e., species > causantur a rebus et non significant ad placitum, sed naturaliter, res quarum sunt similitudines.'

⁷⁴ *In Sent.* 2.3 (Oriel 15, fol. 159ra): 'Parum curo de hoc quia non pono speciem naturalem similitudinem rei cuius cognitionem facit, ut similitudo lapidis in angelo sit (*corr. ex* sicut) lapis. Sed pono unam qualitatem causativam notitie lapidis quando lapis non est presens. Propter quod dicitur "representativa" lapidis et "similitudo" lapidis, vel eius "species"; et eadem res potest vocari "habitus", quia faciliat vel inclinat intellectum ad cognitionem abstractivam lapidis.'

⁷⁵ *ibid.* (Oriel 15, fol. 159rb): 'Ideo iste qualitates quas ego voco "species" possunt satis rationabiliter dici "habitus scientialis". Et cum de re constat, de nominibus non est cura.'

Holcot's position on intuitive cognition and the necessity for positing species is remarkable for the number of fences it attempts to straddle. In the first place, Holcot enumerates the synonyms that Bacon and Grosseteste had catalogued for the *species*, adding to the list Ockham's 'scientific habit'. Indeed, Holcot treats *species* synonymously with *habitus* as if this were a mere quibble.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, his stance is not easily reconciled with that of Ockham, for whom the terms certainly were not interchangeable. The abandonment of species in favor of a non-representational habit had seemed a major step to Ockham's contemporaries, as is evident from the responses it spurred from Reading and Chatton, who argued at considerable length that habits were not species, and that the former did not render the latter unnecessary. Why, then, given Ockham's deliberate rejection both of representation and of species as the instrument of that representation, did Holcot argue for both and in the same discussion hold that species were habits? This stance would seem to be the result of Holcot's attempt to reconcile with Ockham the other major influence on his own thought: Thomas Aquinas. Holcot was at pains to achieve such a reconciliation throughout his *Sentences* commentary and *Quodlibetal Questions*, and for Aquinas, as was not the case for Ockham, the terms *habitus* and *species* could, in some contexts, be interchangeable.⁷⁷

Moreover, Holcot's view that species are 'sensible qualities' may express an effort to chart a course between Ockham, who admitted that in vision there occurs an impression of 'some quality' by the sensible, and Bacon, who specified that species were qualities. Indeed, Holcot's insistence that the species are merely qualities and not 'natural similitudes', i.e., likenesses by virtue of a shared nature, betokens a fundamental discomfort with the Baconian model, a discomfort that he elaborates in the *Sex articuli* and *Quodlibetal Questions*.

⁷⁶ No less an authority than Gregory of Rimini would later proceed along the same tack: '... nec aliqua difficultas est in sustinendo species plus quam habitus. Et ut dictum est, necesse est ponere quod talis notitia sit per aliquod representativum rei apprehensum; quia si dicerent illum habitum esse similitudinem rei et apprehendi seu cognosci in se et in illo rem illam, non est tunc dissonantia in re, sed vocabulo tantum; et ideo quod dico de specie dicam de habitu, quia de nomine non est contendendum. Nam et illa species in medio per actus intellectus frequentatos circa ipsam firmatur. ... talis autem species firmata non absurde potest vocari habitus' (*Super Sent.* 1.3.2.2) in *Gregorii Ariminensis O.E.S.A. Super primum et secundum Sententiarum* (Venice, 1522; rpt. St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), fol. 45 G; cf. also fol. 43 I-K.

⁷⁷ Fuchs, *The Psychology of Habit*, p. xv. On Holcot's efforts to reconcile Aquinas and Ockham, see Gelber, 'Robert Holcot's Epistemology'; Brinkley, 'Robert Holcot', 10; Grassi, 'Le tesi di Robert Holcot', 75-79; J. T. Muckle, 'Utrum Theologia sit Scientia: A Quodlibet Question of Robert Holcot O.P.', *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958) 141-43. It might be supposed that Holcot has Henry of Ghent's view of *habitus scientialis* in mind, but in that case one would expect him to side with Ockham in denying species. More important, Holcot rarely mentions Ghent, and on the one clear occasion that he does so in this context (Muckle, 'Utrum Theologia', 138), it is to take strong exception.

Holcot read Bacon's claim that the species were somehow material and corporeal to mean that the species were *realiter*, and thus substantially, the same in nature as the *res* from which they multiplied.⁷⁸

Holcot concluded, as had others before him, that the consequence of considering the species a natural similitude of the object from which it derived was untenable because such species would entail real changes in the incorporeal internal faculties of the soul whenever the object was perceived, pondered, imagined, or remembered.⁷⁹ Thus, in the case of angelic cognition, which is, of course, entirely incorporeal if the *viator*'s is not, if the species were a natural similitude, then, according to Holcot, depending on the known object, angels would sometimes be cold, sometimes hot, sometimes black, sometimes white, and so forth.⁸⁰ Further, given the Aristotelian principle that every heavy body tends naturally to descend to its natural place, Holcot points out that upon seeing a stone an angel should become heavy; why, then, do the angels not descend from heaven?⁸¹ That such consequences were absurd was generally conceded; for Ockham they were a further argument against the positing of any species, while for those who were committed to them Bacon's insistence on their material, corporeal nature was a major embarrassment. The usual evasion of the difficulty was the route Holcot took: simply to deny Bacon's view that the species, at least in the mind, were material at all.

Yet the evasion, though general, was not universal. At least one of Holcot's colleagues, his Dominican confrère William Crathorn, not only held with Bacon that the species was a *naturalis similitudo rei extra animam* but denied the absurdity of these materialist consequences, defending them instead at length. It was against Crathorn's arguments that Holcot framed his *Sex articuli*

⁷⁸ *Quodlibet* 50 (52) (Pembroke 236, fol. 160ra and Balliol 71, fol. 218ra): 'Alia conclusio est ista: similitudo naturalis rei cognite est eiusdem speciei cum re illa cuius est. Et hec est opinio Rogeri Bakonis in sua *Perspectiva*, d. 6, cap. 3.'

⁷⁹ See, e.g., Walter Burley, *Tractatus de sensibus*, ed. H. Shapiro and F. Scott in *Mitteilungen des Grabmann-Instituts der Universität München* 13 (1966) 10, who claimed that if species were material, then 'intentiones memorabilium in memoria essent eiusdem speciei cum rebus memorativis, et tunc intentio calorum in memoria esset calor. Consequens falsum, quia talis calor cito extingueretur in cerebro frigido et humido, et ita alie qualitates similes cito deficerent in absentia sensibilibus causantium illas qualitates et est contra experimentum.' For Ockham, see above, n. 20.

⁸⁰ *Sex articuli*, quoted in Schepers, 'Holcot contra dicta... II', 113 n. 44.

⁸¹ *Quodl.* 50 (52) (Pembroke 236, fol. 159va and Balliol 71, fol. 217ra-b): 'Dicitur quod color est motus lucidi secundum actum. Igitur, color in cerebro vere videtur. Item, omne grave naturaliter descendit; sed species lapidis in mente angeli est gravis; quare igitur non descendit? Item, vel species lapidis in anima vel in angelo est substantia corporea vel incorporea. Si incorporea, igitur non est corpus; si corporea, igitur lapis maximus est naturaliter in loco peccali. Item, Aristoteles dicit quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis, quod falsum < esset > per istam opinionem.'

and the *Quodlibetal Question* treating the issue, as well as, no doubt, the caveat in his *Sentences* commentary noted above.⁸²

What remains of Crathorn's *Sentences* commentary⁸³ is striking for the attempt to achieve a theorematologically-structured, systematic account of human knowledge. The species, both *in medio* and *in anima*, are at the core of the account, and the apparently absurd consequences to which Crathorn willingly assents have correctly been remarked as a measure of the importance he attaches to species.⁸⁴

Crathorn maintains that for vision to occur, the object and viewer must be separated by some distance, and the object acts on the viewer through the medium. He is thus quite clear in refuting Ockham's claim that action can occur at a distance without a medium, and the corollary assertion that a mover and what it moves need not even be contiguous. In the first case, even without explicit attribution to Ockham, his presence is readily apparent from Crathorn's careful rebuttal of the arguments that the sun can illuminate the air next to the earth and that a magnet can effect the motion of iron, each without any action in the intervening medium. Ockham had adduced both examples,⁸⁵ and when Crathorn later returns to the issue of the simultaneity of mover and moved, which Ockham had surmised as the axiom governing the denial of action at a

⁸² On Crathorn, see Schepers, 'Holcot contra dicta Crathorn'; V. Ritter, 'Handschriftliches zu Crathorn', *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 94 (1972) 445-49; J. Kraus, 'Die Stellung des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Crathorn zu Thomas von Aquin', *ibid.* 57 (1933) 66-88 and (ed.) *Quaestiones de universalibus magistrorum Crathorn O.P., Anonymi O.F.M., Ioannis Canonici O.F.M.* (Münster, 1937); Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 95-106; F. Hoffmann, 'Der Satz als Zeichen der theologischen Aussage bei Holcot, Crathorn, und Gregor von Rimini' in *Der Begriff der Repraesentatio im Mittelalter* (Miscellanea mediaevalia 8; Berlin, 1971), pp. 296-313. Crathorn defends the shared nature of species and object chiefly in *In Sent.* 1.1.7 (Basel, Universitätsbibliothek B V 30, pp. 19-21): '... ista qualitas que est verbum et similitudo naturalis rei [coniungit] existentis extra animam est eiusdem speciei cum re illa cuius est similitudo.'

⁸³ Crathorn's *Sentences* commentary is limited to book 1; cf. Schepers, 'Holcot contra dicta... I', 325 and Courtenay, *Wodeham*, p. 98.

⁸⁴ Schepers, 'Holcot contra dicta... II', 115.

⁸⁵ *In Sent.* 1.1.6 (Basel B V 30, pp. 16-17): 'Sexta conclusio <est> quod obiectum extrinsecum immutat medium inter videntem et obiectum, et non immediate ipsum videntem. ... Contra istam conclusionem ... arguitur sic: sol causat lumen in parte inferiori aeris non illuminando omnem partem superiorem ... tertio sic: si due candelae obiciantur in diversis sitibus uni foramini parietis vel tabule causabunt ex alia parte foraminis radios tendentes ad situs distantes et oppositos ... quarto sic: magnes (magnos *MS.*) attrahit ferrum a quo distat localiter: igitur movens proximum et motum non semper sunt simul localiter.... Ad primum tamen dicendum quod <sol> non illuminat partem inferiorem aeris nisi prius natura vel tempore illuminet partes superiores, et sibi immediatiores aliquo gradu luminis, quia non omne lumen est visibile a nobis.... Philosophus intendit quod movens et motum sunt simul situationaliter, ita quod nihil mediet localiter inter movens et motum proximum. ... ad quartum, dicendum quod magnes prius immutat medium quam ferrum, licet forma impressa aeri medio non sit ita perfecta sicut forma impressa magnetis'; cf. Ockham, *In Sent.* 2.18.D and *Ord.* 1.37 (n. 26 above).

distance, Crathorn cites Ockham explicitly, quoting the defense of solar action at a distance in Ockham's *Ordinatio*. Crathorn counters that illumination occurs through the multiplication of species from object to viewer, a process incorporating the actualization of the medium and the impression of species upon the percipient's sensitive or visual faculty (*potentia*).⁸⁶

If species are required to explain the propagation of light, they are equally important to an account of cognition. Crathorn stresses that 'sensible species, which are caused by sensible things in the sentient, are not superfluous, because sentient beings, while they are able to sense sensible qualities when actually before them, need also naturally to know or imagine absent things, and to remember sensible things in their absence. This they could not do unless the reception of species occurs.'⁸⁷ Natural experience offers evidence of such an impression and retention of species, and the *experientiae* Crathorn introduces would have been familiar to his Oxford audience as well as to readers of Peter Aureol's *Sentences* commentaries. Although Crathorn does not explicitly inquire whether such instances of extramental reality 'appearing' other than it is suggest the formation of an *esse apparens*, it may be assumed that he would find Aureol's hypothesis redundant. For Crathorn, what these experiences indicate is that there is a species, or 'similitudo' impressed on the sensitive faculty in the process of perception; thus, the multiplication of species can account for the discrepancy between what is and what is seen.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ *In Sent.* 1.16 (Basel B V 30, pp. 140-141): 'Sed istam rationem solvit Willielmus Ockham suo modo, questione quam movit super distinctionem 37, dicens quod non est verum generaliter quod movens et motum sunt simul. Et ad hoc probandum, adducit unam experientiam probans "quod sol immediate causat lumen in aliquo corpore hic inferius, et tamen non est presens alicui corpori."'; *In Sent.* 1.1.4 (ibid., p. 15): 'Quantumcumque medium esset illuminatum nisi lumen ipsi colori esset unitum, color non videretur; unde lumen ad hoc quod color videatur est necessarium ex parte obiecti'; ibid., concl. 6 (ibid., p. 18): '... species nigredinis in extremo aeris iuxta albedinem multiplicabuntur, et sic in illa parte aeris generabitur una species nigredinis intensa que naturaliter reagit immutando partes aeris versus nigredinem et versus videntem, et sic ut videtur imprimetur videnti species nigredinis et non sola species albedinis, ut supra dictum est'; cf. also reference, concl. 7 (ibid., pp. 19-20) to 'species genita in potentia visiva'.

⁸⁷ ibid., concl. 4 (Basel B V 30, p. 15): 'Dicendum quod species sensibiles, que causantur a rebus sensibilibus in sentiente, non superfluunt, licet sine illis possent qualitates sensibiles actualiter sentiri, quia animalia sensitiva non solum indigent ut actualiter sentiant res sibi prius naturaliter obiectas, sed ut possint naturaliter cognoscere vel ymaginare res absentes, et memorari et reminisci rerum sensibilibus ipsis absentibus, quod fieri non posset nisi per receptionem talium specierum.'

⁸⁸ For Aureol, see above, n. 12; these *experientiae* occur, however, in other *Sentences* commentaries (such as John of Rodington's) whose authors seem unfamiliar with Aureol's discussion. Crathorn, *In Sent.* 1.1.3 (Basel B V 30, p. 12): 'Tertia conclusio est quod predicta similitudo existens in cognoscente que est verbum et naturalis similitudo qualitatis sensualis et existentis extra cognoscentem, [an] cognoscitur et sentitur, non cognita intuitive nec sensata alia re cuius est similitudo. Quod proba sic: ad motionem circularem virge ignite (ingente *MS.*) in extremitate, videtur unus circulus, vel color circularis, nullo tali circulo existente extra videntem;

Not only is cognition inadequately explained without resort to species but in fact the species *is* cognition. That is, *cognitio*, which can also designate the cognitive power (identical in Crathorn's view with the soul) or the extramental *res*, most properly designates the similitude of the known object. This likeness, which is within the knower, is itself known *immediately*; termed 'immediate material cognition', it is the species.⁸⁹ If, moreover,

'cognition' is accepted for the species of a sensible or cognizable thing that is immediately sensed or known, which species is called 'cognition', 'concept', 'word', 'similitude', or 'image' of sensible or cognizable things, then our natural knowledge is effected mediately or immediately by sensible things. And with respect to 'cognition' thus accepted, the cognitive power ... [is] passive only, supposing that such cognitions [i.e., species] are received in that power.⁹⁰

To this canon of synonyms, Crathorn adds vision, which he considers not intellectual but corporeal. Thus defined, cognition is absolute, and any 'dependence' it may have on an external object is severable.⁹¹

ergo circulus ille visus est in anima vel in capite videntis. Dicitur forte ad istud, quod quando talis virga ignita in extremitate circumagitur, nullus color circularis figure videtur, sed tantum *apparet* videnti illum ignem circulariter motum quod videat colorem circularis figure; sed nullum talem colorem videt. Sed istud non est bene dictum, quia nisi videns illum ignem circumagitatum videret colorem circularem existentem in vidente vel extra, numquam iudicaret videns se videre colorem circularem. Ideo dicendum est quod color partis virge ignite existens in uno situ causat similitudinem suam in capite videntis ... ita quod color partis ignite ipsius virge circulariter mote generat in capite videntis multos colores et multas similitudines suas ex quibus invicem continuatis fit unus color circularis'; *ibid.* (p. 13): 'Dico igitur quod species qualitatum sensibilium que sunt extra videntem frequenter videntur quando qualitas cuius sunt species non videtur, vel quando qualitates quarum sunt species non videntur.' The discussion includes an explicit reference to the multiplication of species (p. 13): '... speculum aliquo modo est causa multiplicationis specierum visibilium vel visarum que sunt in vidente.'

⁸⁹ *ibid.* (Basel B V 30, p. 2): 'Istud nomen "cognitio" aliquando supponit in propositione pro illa re qua cognoscens cognoscit formaliter; aliquando supponit pro illa re que est similitudo rei cognite, que similitudo est in cognoscente et immediate cognoscitur; aliquando vero hoc nomen "cognitio" supponit pro re cognita que est extra cognoscentem et mediate cognoscitur, scilicet mediante sua similitudine quam gignit in cognoscente vel aliquid quod supplet vicem ipsius.... Unde quando quis videt parietem album, visio sua primo modo accepta est sua potentia visiva vel videns; secundo modo accepta est similitudo albedinis que est in pariete, que similitudo gignitur in vidente ab albedine visa que similitudo vocatur "conceptus" albedinis vel "verbum" albedinis et "visio genita"....'

⁹⁰ *ibid.* (Basel B V 30, p. 5): 'Si autem cognitio accipiatur < secundo modo > pro specie rei sensibilis vel cognoscibilis, que immediate sentitur vel cognoscitur, que species vocatur "cognitio", "conceptus", "verbum", vel "similitudo", < vel > "ymago" rei sensibilis ... sic cognitio nostra naturalis est effective < causata > mediate vel immediate a rebus sensibilibus. Et respectu cognitionis sic accepte, potentia cognitiva ... < est > tantum passiva, supposito quod talis cognitio < i.e., species > in ipsa potentia cognitiva recipiatur.'

⁹¹ See above, n. 89, in which his treatment of 'visio' and 'cognitio' as identical is typical of discussions of cognition; while this statement implies a corporeal rather than intellectual vision,

Once received in the cognitive faculty, species are stored in the memory which is located in the posterior ventricle of the brain. These in turn generate a 'generated cognition' (*notitia genita*), or 'mental word', which is really distinct from the generating species. The *notitia genita* is impressed on the middle ventricle of the brain, where it is seen intuitively by the soul; thus the soul is enabled to think about or remember objects that have previously been sensed.⁹²

In spite of the extensive delineation of the multiplication of species from object to percipient, and through his brain, it is not altogether clear what Crathorn thinks these species *are*. On the one hand, he states that the species is a quality within the knower. Unlike Ockham's *qualitas*, however, this has real existence ('est subiective existens') in the mind or 'in some part of the brain'. It is, moreover, immediately known and is called 'cognitio', not formally, but 'by reflection and representatively, namely, because the thing of which this is a

Crathorn is more explicit in concl. 1 (Basel B V 30, p. 5): 'Si visio sensitiva, vocando "visionem" illud quo videns videt formaliter <i.e., primo modo accepta>, esset una qualitas superaddita potentie visive, causaretur a re visibili.' Crathorn specifies that *visio* or *intellectio* is absolute (p. 4) and, once caused, independent of the contingent object's continued existence (p. 27).

⁹² *In Sent.* 1.2 (Basel B V 30, p. 33): 'Cellula memorialis realiter immutatur a propositione extrinseca audita, sed impossibile est quod propositio extrinseca prolata, cum distet localiter et situalter a memoriali cellula, immutat cellulam memorialem immediate; aliter, movens et alterans naturale non tangeret proximum alteratum, quod est contra Philosophum et veritatem.... Ergo, propositio extrinseca prolata et audita prius immutat organum audiendi et cellulam fantasticam, idest primam cellulam cerebri, et cellulam syllogisticam, idest mediam cellulam cerebri, antequam immutat cellulam memorialem, que est in posteriori parte capitis, quia est postrema pars vel postrema cellula cerebri. Ergo, similitudo propositionis extrinsece audite imprimit similitudinem suam organo sensus auditus, a qua similitudine imprimitur alia in anteriori cellula mediante immutatione nervi, qui descendit a pia matre et tendit versus aurem vel aures.... Ab ista autem similitudine prime cellule ... immutatur cellula memorialis, que est conservativa specierum rerum sensatarum ... et eodem modo a colore viso causantur in vidente similitudines solo numero et subiecto differentes. Et similiter ymaginandum est de omni re extrinseca sensata'; *ibid.* 1.7.8 (Basel B V 30, p. 108 [106]): 'Dico igitur quod notitia genita vel verbum mentale differt realiter a specie conservata in memoria: est enim una qualitas genita a specie conservata in memoria simillima sibi. Quantum mihi videtur imprimitur medie cellule, ubi impressa intuitive videtur ab anima cogitantis'; *ibid.* (p. 104 [102]): '... sed quia est causa illius verbi mentalis in quo res cognoscitur quando absens cogitatur.'

Although Rodington is similarly attentive to physiology, this is an unusually delineated physiological account of psychology within the confines of a *Sentences* commentary. Yet the importance, for Crathorn as for his contemporaries, of such a material psychology has been noted by Schepers, 'Holkot contra dicta... II', 112. Throughout the fourteenth century *De anima* commentaries evidence such an approach; in fact, it may be that the frequently sketchy attention paid in *Sentences* commentaries to the physiological implications of their authors' psychology is, at least on occasion, due to lengthier discussion in *De anima* commentaries which the *Sentences* lectures presupposed. For such *De anima* commentaries, see N. H. Steneck, *The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Fourteenth Century* (Diss. Wisconsin, 1970). See also the discussion of Chatton (pp. 410-12 above).

verbum is reflected and represented in it.⁹³ On the other hand, Crathorn does indeed insist, to the astonishment of Holcot, that the species is a natural similitude of the object from which it derives, albeit only of the object's accidents and not of the substance.⁹⁴ Thus, Crathorn admits that:

Speaking, however, of accidental form, I do not see that it is inconvenient to say that form naturally separated from corporeal matter is specifically the same as the form which naturally perfects the corporeal matter. Hence, when an angel intuits color, the species of color which is naturally in the angelic mind during the vision, and which is separated from all corporeal matter, is specifically the same as the color that the angel intuits – supposing that in the mind of an angel there is such a species of the known thing.⁹⁵

a supposition Crathorn does not doubt. On this basis Crathorn nonchalantly concedes that 'the soul seeing and knowing color is truly colored, not with color existing outside the soul but with its similitude which is truly color. And the same must be said concerning the knowing soul whenever the natural word of that color is formed within it.'⁹⁶ This is the conclusion that so amazes Holcot who, in ascribing the view's origin to Bacon, guides his audience to the chapter of the *Perspectiva* in which Bacon claims that the species is material and corporeal, not merely a spiritual quality.⁹⁷

Underlying Crathorn's treatment of knowledge is a distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition that is thoroughly unlike Ockham's. Crathorn understands the Venerable Inceptor to mean that 'the intellect, *pro statu isto*, has with respect to incomplex objects two specifically distinct cognitions of which one can be called "intuitive" and the other "abstractive".

⁹³ *In Sent.* 1.1 (Basel B V 30, p. 11): 'Alio modo hoc nomen "cognitio" supponit pro verbo rei cognite, quod verbum in mente nostra est una qualitas subiective existens in mente vel in aliqua parte cerebri, que immediate cognoscitur, que quidem (quedam *MS.*) qualitas vocatur "cognitio" non formaliter sed relucenter et representative, quia scilicet in ista qualitate res cuius est verbum relucet et representatur.'

⁹⁴ *ibid.* (Basel B V 30, p. 21): 'Ad quintum, dicendum quod Philosophus vocat "speciem" lapidis similitudinem accidentis lapidis: non autem similitudinem substantie lapidis, quia nulla talis est in anima humana pro statu isto'; see also n. 82 above.

⁹⁵ *ibid.* (Basel B V 30, p. 20): 'Loquendo tamen de forma accidentali, non video inconueniens dicere quod forma separata naturaliter a materia corporali sit eiusdem speciei cum forma que naturaliter perficit materiam corporalem. Unde, quando angelus intuetur colorem, species coloris que stante visione naturaliter est in mente angelica et ab omni materia corporali separata est eiusdem speciei cum colore quem angelus intuetur – supposito quod in mente angeli sit talis species rei intellecte.'

⁹⁶ *ibid.*: 'Ad secundum, dicendum quod argumentum concedit verum: anima videns et intelligens colorem est vere colorata nullo colore existente extra animam, sed ipsius similitudine que est verus color. Et idem dicendum est de anima intelligente quandocumque formatur in ea verbum naturale ipsius coloris.'

⁹⁷ See above, n. 78.

According to him, these differ in that by virtue of intuitive cognition one can know evidently whether a thing is if it is, or is not if it is not; and by virtue of abstractive cognition one cannot know whether a thing is or not.⁹⁸ Remarking that 'it is not difficult to respond to his arguments', Crathorn argues, as, apparently, had Campsall before him, to judge by Chatton's prologue,⁹⁹ that intuitive and abstractive cognition are not distinct. Rather, intuitive cognition is the cognitive faculty itself, and is as well abstractive cognition, 'such that the same thing numerically is called "intuitive" and "abstractive" with respect to the same object known in different ways.' When an object exists *in re* and is *secundum seipsam* presented to the faculty itself, and not just through its image or similitude, the object is known intuitively. The same cognitive faculty is called 'abstractive' vis-à-vis the same object when it is not thus present to the faculty but instead,

its similitude or image, or something that is by convention [*ad placitum*] its sign, is presented and placed before the cognitive faculty. *With respect to the similitude, image, or conventional sign, this faculty is called 'intuitive' or intuiting;* but with respect to the thing of which this is an image, it is called 'abstractive' cognition or abstracting. Hence, the same thing numerically is simultaneously intuitive and abstractive with respect to different objects.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ *In Sent.* 1.1 (Basel B V 30, pp. 24-25): 'Contingit igitur quod intellectus respectu incomplexi pro statu isto habet duas notitias specie distinctas quarum una potest vocari "intuitiva", et alia "abstractiva". Que notitiae isto modo differunt secundum eum <i.e., Ockham> quia notitia intuitiva est ista virtute cuius potest cognosci evidenter an res sit si sit vel quod (quia *MS.*) non sit si non sit; notitia abstractiva est ista virtute cuius non potest cognosci evidenter an res sit vel non sit.'

⁹⁹ *ibid.* (Basel B V 30, p. 25): 'Ad rationes Ockham non est difficile respondere....' For Campsall, see above, n. 44; if Crathorn was influenced by Campsall, it seems that their understandings of cognition nevertheless differ significantly.

¹⁰⁰ *In Sent.* 1.1 (Basel B V 30, p. 25): 'Sed videtur mihi quod notitia intuitiva et abstractiva non sunt due notitiae specie distinctae, nec etiam numero, sed eadem res omnino, quia notitia intuitiva est ipsa potentia cognitiva; et similiter, ipsa notitia abstractiva, ita quod eadem res numero vocatur "intuitiva" et "abstractiva" respectu eiusdem obiecti diversimode cogniti. Dicitur enim ipsa potentia cognitiva "intuitiva" vel "intuens" respectu obiecti rei existentis et presentis ipsi potentie cognoscentis; quando scilicet aliqua res secundum seipsam presentatur et obicitur ipsi potentie et non solum secundum ymaginem et similitudinem suam. Et illa eadem potentia cognitiva vocatur "notitia abstractiva" vel "abstrahens" respectu eiusdem rei quando secundum seipsam non est presens nec obiecta ipsi potentie cognoscentis, sed ipsi potentie cognitive presentatur et obicitur ipsius similitudo vel ymago vel aliquid quod est ipsius signum ad placitum. <Respectu> similitudinis vel ymaginis vel signi ad placitum, ipsa potentia dicitur intuitiva vel intuens, sed respectu illius cuius est imago dicitur cognitio abstrahens vel abstractiva (emphasis mine). Unde eadem res numero est simul intuitiva et abstractiva respectu diversorum obiectorum'; *ibid.* 1.2 (p. 32): 'Tertia distinctio est de isto termino "cognitum", quia aliquid dicitur esse cognitum intuitive, sicut albedo lapidis, que videtur, et similitudo albedinis que est in vidente et immediate videtur. Secundo modo dicitur aliquid cognitum abstractive, et isto modo cognoscitur id quod non est vel id quod non est presens cognoscenti.'

The importance to Crathorn of intuitive cognition is underscored by his refutation of a certain Franciscan *socius*, whose identity remains obscure, who had argued that intuitive cognition was not, properly speaking, cognition.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, Crathorn's notion of intuitive cognition seems epistemologically pointless. In his view, *pro statu isto*, only the species is known immediately or intuitively; the objects that the species represent to the knower are known only mediately. Thus, the species is not only the *means* by which an object is known but, in the case of intuitive cognition, *what* is known. Yet while the presence of species is inferable from the phenomena of perception, abstractive cognition, memory, and imagination, Crathorn readily admits that the mind is not experientially aware of them as it is of their generating objects.¹⁰² That is, they are what the mind knows, but they are not themselves known. Moreover, by insisting on the intuitive cognition of species, Crathorn proceeds to march deliberately into the quagmire that intuitive cognition should have permitted him to skirt. Whereas for Scotus and those who agreed with him, as well as for Ockham, *notitia intuitiva* is the guarantor of certainty, since it is the means by which one knows that an object exists and is present, for Crathorn it is instead the cause of uncertainty. Because the extramental *res* is never known in this life except through the mediation of species which, however, can and in the case of illusions, afterimages, or memory do occur without a present object, the *viator* can never be sure that the extramental object he knows both exists and is present.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ *In Sent.* 1.1 (Basel B V 30, p. 9): 'Preterea < contra Minorem > si nulla esset cognitio intuitiva proprie loquendo, ut iste dicit, vanum laboraverunt Doctores antiqui et moderni circa distinctionem inter cognitionem intuitivam et abstractivam.' On the possible *socius* whom Crathorn rebuts, see Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 106-109.

¹⁰² *In Sent.* 1.1 (Basel B V 30, p. 22): 'Multi videntes colorem ignorant utrum vide < a > nt mediante specie vel non, quod non contingeret si visio esset sufficiens causa ad probandum aliquam (-quem *MS.*) speciem coloris esse in vidente'; *ibid.* (p. 21): 'Ratio quare videns albedinem non potest eo ipso quod illam videt distinguere inter albedinem et species albedinis, est similitudo speciei albedinis ad albedinem; et quia situs speciei albedinis virtute visionis speciei a vidente non percipitur, nec etiam situs albedinis existentis extra animam potest cognosci evidenter a cognoscente vel vidente.' Ockham had, of course, denied each prong of this approach: that a *res* could be known by means of another *res* (hence the argument against representation), and that what was known was the species.

¹⁰³ *ibid.* (Basel B V 30, p. 21): 'Nona conclusio est ista, quod ex cognitione sensitiva non potest viator habere cognitionem certam et omnino infallibilem de existentia cuiuscumque accidentis extra animam. ... Et probo istam conclusionem sic: videns albedinem simul et indistincte videt albedinem et speciem albedinis; nec potest ex hoc solo quod videt distinguere inter albedinem et species albedinis; igitur, etsi videatur albedo que est extra ... non potest certificari utrum sit extra'; cf. also p. 21: 'Videns intense colorem viridem et subito se convertens ad locum obscurum iudicabit se videre colorem extra se existentem, et tamen decipitur, quia non videt nisi specie < m > coloris que adhuc pro aliqua morula remanet in anteriori cellula cerebri istius qui videt colorem extra; igitur, videns virtute visionis non potest habere cognitionem evidentem et omnino infallibilem quod color qui videtur sit color extra videntem.'

Ockham, when faced with the difficulty of achieving certainty given the analytical possibility of intuitive cognition of non-existents, had denied their occurrence in the natural order, while relying upon the independence of intellectual judgment from sensation to safeguard the validity of existential knowledge. Thus, deception of the senses did not lead ineluctably to deception of the intellect. This solution was lost to Crathorn, not only because he conflated sensation and intellection but because he further denied a distinction between sensation and judgment. Moreover, he found Ockham's reasoning circular.¹⁰⁴ The net result for Crathorn was, however, an account of cognition laced with difficulties, indicative of the inherent irreconcilability of the theories of Bacon and Ockham.

The *Sentences* commentaries of Holcot's and Crathorn's more influential contemporary, Adam Wodeham, also demonstrate this irreconcilability.¹⁰⁵ Wodeham was much more concerned than Holcot with accounting for visual perception, and his divergence from the Venerable Inceptor's views on cognition is already evident in the *Ordinatio* of his Oxford commentary, delivered 1330-32, throughout which he defends species.¹⁰⁶ The most extended

¹⁰⁴ In addition to n. 92 above, cf. *In Sent.* 1.1 (Basel B V 30, p. 6): 'Nono arguo sic: secundum omnes, quedam est cognitio sensitiva, quedam intellectiva: quedam est visio, quedam auditio; et sic de aliis. Unde omnes concedunt quod quando aliquis videt vel intuetur albedinem in pariete quod visio sua est cognitio sensitiva. Ex hoc arguo sic: omne cognitum in nobis vel est anima nostra, vel potentia cognitiva ipsius anime. Sed omnis nostra cognitio est cognitiva: igitur omnis nostra cognitio vel est anima nostra vel potentia cognitiva ipsius anime nostre. Maior est manifesta de se: minorem proba...'; and *ibid.*: 'Concedo quod anima hominis cognoscentis est cognitio, anima hominis videntis visio, anima < audientis > auditio, anima scientis scientia....' Crathorn's identification of sensation and judgment is directed against Thomas Aquinas (*ibid.*, p. 29): 'Igitur secundum mentem istius Doctoris < i.e., Thome >, quando homo actu videt, potentia visiva in nullo agit ad hoc quod res habeant operationem que est iudicium de propriis objectis, quia distincti actus sunt – secundum mentem istius Doctoris – sensatio rerum et iudicium de rebus sensatis. ... Contra istam opinionem sunt omnia argumenta prime conclusionis.' Crathorn argues against Ockham (*ibid.*, p. 27), for which see *Vision and Certitude*, chap. 6, pp. 277-80.

¹⁰⁵ In addition to Courtenay, *Wodeham*, see G. Gál, 'Adam of Wodeham's Question on the "complexe significabile" as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge', *Franciscan Studies* 37 (1977) 66-102; and this writer's 'Adam of Wodeham on First and Second Intentions', *Cahiers de l'Institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 35 (1980) 29-55.

¹⁰⁶ See, for example, *Ord.* 1.1.12.3.Z (Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 915, fol. 57ra and Bibliothèque de l'Université 193, fol. 68va): 'Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod respectu visionis causande hic multiplex occurrit efficientia requisita per se vel per aliud supplens vicem eius. Primo: generalis Dei efficientia, sine qua nihil causari potest; secundo: generalis < efficientia > propria intellectus et vitalis principii; tertio: secundum multos, efficientia habitus vel speciei; quarto: secundum veritatem, efficientia propria obiecti visibilis. Secunda et quarta sunt ita necessarie quod sine illis non potest visio aliqua causari sensitiva vel intellectiva, quam solemus vocare "notitiam intuitivam" nisi miraculose....' See also: *Ord.* 2.2 (Mazarine 915, fol. 132rb), 2.5 (fol. 152ra), 2.8.2.F-G (fol. 161ra-va), 3.10 (fol. 191rb-va), and 1.3.1 (Université 193, fol. 81va-b).

and original treatment of epistemology is, however, to be recovered from his final *Sentences* commentary, the *Lectura secunda*, particularly the first four questions of the prologue.¹⁰⁷

Wodeham, like most of his contemporaries, accepts a distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition; but his notion of these two modes of knowing is not Ockham's. Instead, Wodeham treats Ockham's and Scotus' definitions as virtually interchangeable, preferring the formulation of the latter.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, Wodeham denies the view that there are two simultaneous, really distinct intuitive cognitions and, concomitantly, two abstractive cognitions of a perceived object. He argues instead that the intellectual acts of evident assent or judgment concerning the existence of a sensible object or its attributes require no simple apprehension distinct from sensitive intuitive vision.¹⁰⁹ Lest his reader wonder who are the targets of his denial, Wodeham

¹⁰⁷ The *Lectura secunda* which, as Courtenay shows (Wodeham, pp. 25-26, 123-30), Wodeham constructed after he left Oxford, is preserved in one manuscript, Cambridge, Gonville and Caius College 281/674. Wodeham drew extensively from his London and Oxford lectures in developing the *Lectura secunda*, which represents the final shape of his thinking on the topics it covers. The following discussion is based on qq. 1-4 of the prologue (fols. 105ra-119ra), namely, (1) 'Utrum actui scientie in nobis necessario presupponatur aliqua simplex apprehensio realiter distincta a < b > omni sensatione'; (2) 'Utrum anima nostra in via naturaliter cognoscere possit actus suos cognitionibus intuitivis realiter distinctis ab abstractivis'; (3) 'Utrum notitia intuitiva sensitiva vel intellectiva possit naturaliter causari vel conservari sine existentia rei vise'; and (4) 'Utrum per visionem causetur "esse aliquod apparens" vel "esse visum" distinctum a visione et visibili.'

¹⁰⁸ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 2 (fol. 109ra): 'Prima conclusio quam pono est ista, quod anima respectu eiusdem cognoscibilis singularis potest habere duos actus absolutos proprios realiter et specificè distinctos, et ad placitum hominum unus illorum ab aliquibus vocatur intuitivus et alius abstractivus; et aliis non (placet *add. in marg.*) sic vocare, nec de hoc est alteranda probatio. Et est argumentum in forma Scoti, libro IV < *Sent.* >, d. 45, q. 3, et Ockham, prologo < *Ord.* >, q. 1, "omnis notitia incomplexa aliquorum que potest (naturaliter *add. in marg.*) esse causa notitie evidentis respectu propositionis contingentis de presenti vel rei significate per talem propositionem realiter et specificè distinguitur a notitia incomplexa illorum que quantumcumque intendatur non potest esse causa assensus evidentis respectu eiusdem, vel dissensus"; ibid. (fol. 110rb): 'Ex dictis patet conclusio una corollaria, scilicet quod rationabilis est illa differentia quam ponit Scotus ubique, licet alias ponat etiam minus bonas, inter intuitivam et abstractivam; quod, videlicet, abstractiva potest esse indifferenter existentis et non existentis, presentis et non presentis, intuitiva tantum presentis realiter et existentis. Ponit natural < em > esse differentia < m >, quia hec naturaliter requirit presentiam rei; illa non. Hec differentia brevis est et bona....'

¹⁰⁹ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 1 (fol. 105vb): 'Prima conclusio, quam opinative hic teneo, est quod alicui assensui evidenti intellectus in nobis de re sensibili, nulla necessario presupponitur simplex apprehensio sive notitia incomplexa intuitiva rei significate per subiectum propositionis cui assentitur vel mediante qua assentitur, distincta realiter ab omni sensatione. ... Si enim aliqua talis necessario requireretur, hoc maxime deberet poni ut ista mediante intellectus posset habere evidens iudicium de existentia sensibilis et aliis eius conditionibus contingentibus. Sed propter hoc non requiritur, quia accipimus assensum evidentem et certum quo intellectus iudicat hoc esse – demonstrata aliqua albedine visa – probo quod illud iudicium non requirit aliam notitiam

points out that 'I hold this conclusion ... in opposition to two writing [on the matter who] hold the opposite, namely, Scotus and Ockham. Each of them posits two intuitive cognitions of a sensible thing and, similarly, two abstractive cognitions which are really distinct, namely, sensitive and intellectual, which does not seem to me true....'¹¹⁰

Unlike Reading and Chatton, who had also considered Ockham's intellectual intuitive cognition superfluous for existential knowledge, Wodeham did not conceive his position as a defense of Scotus against Ockham. Rather, Wodeham saw both of them as motivated to posit dual intuitive and abstractive cognitions by their acceptance of a distinction: the former distinguishing between the soul's faculties and the soul, the latter between the intellectual and sensitive souls.¹¹¹ Nor, therefore, was Wodeham's position a defense of Ockham against Chatton, whose critique Wodeham treated at length and who had anticipated Wodeham by assuming this distinction to be the basis of Ockham's adherence to an intellectual intuitive cognition additional to sensitive cognition. Beyond the distinction between intellectual and sensitive souls, Wodeham further denied any between the soul and its faculties;¹¹² thus, for him Scotus' formal

simplicem intuitivam quam ipsam visionem sensitivam, quia idem quod immediate recipit illam intuitionem huius albedinis nullam aliam indiget recipere ad hoc quod iudicet hanc albedinem esse, nisi forte quod illa, si sit obscura vel imperfecta, intendatur. Sed illud idem quod immediate recipit istum assensum evidentem quo certitudinaliter iudicatur hoc esse immediate recipit illam intuitionem huius albedinis, visionem scilicet sensitivam; igitur < etc. >.'

¹¹⁰ *ibid.* (fol. 105vb): 'Istam conclusionem (supra, n. 109) negativam, et illam que sequitur de abstractiva, teneo per oppositum ad duos scribentes tenentes oppositum, scilicet Scotum in quarto libro <Sent.> d. 45, q. 3, et Ockham in prologo <Ord.> q. 1, quorum uterque ponit duas intuitivas de re sensibili et similiter duas abstractivas distinctas realiter, scilicet sensitivam et intellectivam, quod mihi non videtur verum, licet illi habeant hoc dicere ut post patebit.'

¹¹¹ *ibid.* (fol. 106ra): 'Minorem probro, quia si illud quod immediate recipit sensationes exteriores vel interiores distingueretur ab isto quod immediate recipit intellectiones, hoc esset vel quia sensitiva distinguitur ab intellectiva, vel quia potentia distinguitur ab anima'; *ibid.*: 'Huic rationi posset probabiliter dupliciter responderi, etiam tenendo quod in homine sit tantum unica anima, secundum principia Scoti: primo quod potentie anime, etsi non sint distincte res nec inter se nec ab anima, tamen sunt distincte realitates eiusdem rei simplicis, sic quod licet sint idem realiter, distinguuntur tamen aliquo modo a parte rei. Secundo posset etiam probabiliter multipliciter dici, et est via Scoti, quod idem quod immediate recipit quamcumque sensationem non est aliqua forma viva, sed compositum ex forma viva et determinato organo, et id compositum est res viva, quod videtur sufficere ad hoc quod immediate recipiat actum vitalem. Et ex illo, patet quare Scotus habet respectu eiusdem rei sensibilis ponere duas intuitivas'; *ibid.* (fol. 107vb): 'Igitur, si sensitiva et intellectiva sint nature distincte realiter, numquam per hoc quod sensitiva novit A, nisi ipsa etiam intellectiva noverit A, poterit intellectus componere A cum aliquo aut ab eo dividere. Et propter hoc Ockham, qui ponit in homine duas animas, consequenter ponit respectu eiusdem duplicem intuitivam et duplicem abstractivam.' On Ockham's views, cf. Leff, *Ockham*, pp. 547-48, and n. 127 below. Compare also the description of Scotus' position to Chatton (prol. 2 [p. 248]) and nn. 58-61 above.

¹¹² Versus the distinction between the soul and its powers, Wodeham argues (*Lect. sec.*, prol. 1 [fol. 106ra]): 'Si potentie distinguarentur ab anima – sive essent substantie sive accidentia – non

and Ockham's real distinction were equally misguided, since 'in order to save [i.e., account for] all acts which we experience in ourselves, one soul suffices in us.'¹¹³ This soul acquires existential knowledge of sensibles immediately, via external sensations, which are intuitive cognitions; after all, Wodeham remarks, 'to sense' is commonly used to mean 'to perceive'.¹¹⁴

Because the external senses are inherently (*natum*) causative of the judgment that a sensible object exists when it exists,¹¹⁵ Wodeham denies Ockham's claim that intuitive cognition can also provide existential knowledge that an object is not present or does not exist when it does not.¹¹⁶ Nor does he accept Ockham's 'imperfect intuitive cognition'. Positing such a 'third simple cognition' violates the principle of economy, Wodeham says, since in order to know evidently that

essent forme vive, et tunc non recipient immediate actus vitales cuiusmodi sunt omnes actus apprehensivi ... vel si distinguerentur, et nihilominus essent forme vive, iam haberemus in nobis plures animas; omnis enim forma viva in nobis est anima. Ex hiis arguo: omnes actus vitales in nobis recipiuntur immediate in forma viva; sed omnes sensationes tam interiores quam exteriores et omnes intellectiones in nobis sunt actus vitales; igitur < etc. >'; and (fol. 106va): 'Sequitur < argumentum Ockham > tamen necessario ex uno quod tenet in quo discordo ab eo, scilicet quod in homine intellectiva et sensitiva sunt forme distincte, quod falsum reputo.' Wodeham quotes and largely disputes Chatton's acceptance (prol. 2 [pp. 249-55]) of the distinction of the souls in man, throughout the first question. Against Chatton's understanding of Kilwardby's (1277) condemnation of the doctrine that there is only one 'forma simplex', Wodeham urges (fol. 106va-b): 'Nunc autem ex quo conclusio opposita consueta est dici in illa et aliis universitatibus approbatis, et etiam (Pecham *add. in marg.*) successor eius qui rediit super articulos ab illo < Kilwardby > condemnatos istum articulum et alios in idem sonantes non condemnavit, videtur mihi quod satis secure potest teneri oppositum illius articuli.' Wodeham denied the distinction *potentiarum anime ab anima* in his Oxford lectures also (*Ord.* 1.1.14 [Université 193, fols. 72vb-74va]) where his direct target is FitzRalph.

¹¹³ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 1 (fol. 106ra): 'Primum non est dandum, quia ad salvandum omnes actus quos in nobis experimur, sufficit una anima in nobis.'

¹¹⁴ *ibid.* 2 (fol. 109rb): 'Nam sensatio exterior est intuitio obiecti sui...' and (f. 111ra): 'Aliter adhuc < potest dici > quod accipitur forte "sentire" pro "percipere" sicut communiter accipitur'; cf. also n. 112 above. According to Gregory of Rimini, Wodeham propounded the identity of sensitive and intellectual souls, and the immediate reception of sensation in the soul, in his earlier London lectures as well. It should be noted that Rimini, on this issue, discusses only the views of Aquinas, Scotus, and Wodeham, an indication of the originality of Wodeham's views in the eyes of his contemporaries; cf. Rimini, *Super Sent.* 2.16-17.3.1 in *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarum*, ed. D. Trapp, 4 vols. numbered 1, 4-6, covering *super primum*, *prologus*, *dist. 1-6* and *super secundum*, *dist. 1-44* (Berlin-New York, 1978-81), 5: 354-68.

¹¹⁵ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 2 (fol. 109rb): 'Omnis actus qui est sensatio exterior vel se habens ad suum obiectum quoad iudicium natum causari virtute eius et quoad dependentiam ab illo, sicut se habet sensatio exterior ad suum < obiectum >, congrue vocatur "notitia intuitiva". ... sed talis est notitia incomplexa virtute cuius iudico rem existere, que tamen potest non existere.'

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*: 'Ideo de hoc pono quartam conclusionem, que est quod notitia intuitiva que, re existente, est virtute cuius potest sciri res existere, non est virtute cuius possit sciri non existere ipsa non existente.' As Wodeham notes, Chatton also held this view (*ibid.*, fol. 109vb): 'Item, pro quarta conclusione, arguunt aliqui (Chatton *add. in marg.*) sic contra responsionem Ockhami', a statement preceding the quotation of Chatton's discussion (prol. 2.3 [pp. 246-48]).

some object had existed, an abstractive cognition together with the memory of a prior vision of that object suffices.¹¹⁷

The conviction that it is inherent in the senses to provide existential knowledge leads Wodeham, in the third and fourth questions of the prologue, to address the issues Aureol had introduced by positing the *esse apparens vel intentionale* as an explanatory mechanism for illusions and for the corollary defense of natural intuitive cognitions of non-existent or absent objects.¹¹⁸ Treating the second problem first, Wodeham replies to Aureol that for vision to occur naturally, the existence and presence of the visible object is required; otherwise, as Chatton had argued, there could be no certitude of any contingent fact by route of the senses.¹¹⁹ Nevertheless, the experiences that Aureol had marshalled to demonstrate that vision occurs in the absence of any extramental object in fact argue only, Wodeham suggests, for the conservation of vision in the object's absence.¹²⁰ Moreover, what is conserved is not vision, but the *species*;¹²¹ and against Chatton's refutation of Aureol's claim that vision can

¹¹⁷ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 2 (fol. 109ra): 'Secundam pono conclusionem incidentalem quod scilicet respectu eiusdem singularis non est ponenda tertia notitia incomplexa propria, que vocatur ab aliquibus "intuitiva imperfecta" quam ponit Ockham in *Reportatione secundi*, virtute scilicet cuius possit evidenter cognosci sibi fuisse, nam ut dicunt virtute abstractive simpliciter non contingit evidenter cognoscere quod sit nec quod fuerat nec quod erit. Igitur, secundum eum habemus tres actus proprios, vel possumus habere. Hoc primo <im>probo, quia plura superfluent ubi pauciora sufficiunt; sed ad idem iudicium habendum propter quod ponitur tertius actus proprius, duo actus proprii sufficiunt, scilicet abstractiva notitia cum memoria actus videndi prehabiti.'

¹¹⁸ Wodeham's original intent seems to have been for questions 3 and 4 to form two articles of one question. Thus, question 3 lays out the *divisio questionis* (fol. 113ra): 'Hic primo videbitur de quesito <utrum notitia intuitiva sensitiva vel intellectiva possit naturaliter causari vel conservari sine existentia rei vise>; secundo, an per visionem causetur esse aliquod apparens vel <esse> visum distinctum a visione vel visibili.' The fourth question begins (fol. 115rb): 'Quarto quero de articulo omissio prioris questionis: utrum per visionem causetur esse aliquod apparens vel esse visum distinctum a visione et visibili.'

¹¹⁹ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 3 (fol. 113ra): 'Prima <conclusio> est quod non potest visio naturaliter causari sine existentia et presentia rei visibilis. Probo, quia tunc etiam circumscripto omni miraculo, numquam posset haberi certitudo aliqua naturaliter de existentia vel quacumque conditione contingentis rei sensibilis per viam sensus; nec per consequens, per viam intellectus. ... Et si sic, igitur nulla certitudo <foret> in huiusmodi, et tunc periret omnis scientia accepta per viam experientie, quia omnis scientia est notitia certa'; cf. also *ibid.* 2 (fol. 109rb): 'Tertia conclusio sit quod ille actus incomplexus qui natus est causare evidenter assensum de veritate contingentis de presenti, et que naturaliter requirit existentiam et presentiam, est intuitiva notitia. ... Contra primam conclusionem et tertiam, potest obici ... naturaliter potest aliquid videri ipso non existente, ad quod sunt multa experimenta; sed de isto videbuntur in sequenti questione.'

¹²⁰ *ibid.* 3 (fol. 113vb): 'Primum istorum argumentorum non probat quod visio possit naturaliter causari obiecto non existente vel absente, sed quod prius causata possit naturaliter conservari aliquamdiu; ... propter quod, pono secundam conclusionem contrariam sibi, scilicet quod visio prius causata a visibili non potest naturaliter conservari visibili destructo vel absente.'

¹²¹ *ibid.*: '(Responsio *add. in marg.*) Ad illud videtur posse responderi ex positione sua quod ideo visio prius causata potest per aliquod tempus manere re visa recedente eo quod species

outlast the presence of the visible object, Wodeham reminds Chatton that 'both according to you and in truth, the species is able to remain at least for some time without the presence of their cause.'¹²²

These species are not experientially discernible in the presence of their generating objects, in conjunction with which they are seen, much as stars are invisible by day.¹²³ But what are these species? They are the remnants (*reliquie*) of the 'forms made in the senses', i.e., in the organ or instrument of the senses, as Wodeham glosses Augustine;¹²⁴ they are 'certain qualities ... which are called by some "species"'.¹²⁵ He also terms the species a 'similitude of the thing seen with respect to the thing, and its distance, and all [its accidents]'.¹²⁶ Clearly, however, he does not intend by this to identify the species as substantially a *similitudo rei extra* as had Crathorn, for, in describing the species as *reliquie* and particularly as *qualitates*, Wodeham, like Holcot, is here attempting to avoid the materialist consequences faced by Scotus. Thus, while agreeing with Scotus that the species are real entities, Wodeham denies that they are corporeal; sensation is only *spiritualis*, not *extensa*, occurring as it does immediately in the soul. So, Wodeham argues, whereas according to Scotus' *De anima* commentary the multiplication of species from the imagination to the organs of the other senses (a process which implies corporeal species) accounts for the phenomena of dreaming and imagining, they are instead to be explained as reflexive acts or as vivid abstractive acts elicited through habit and specifically the same as the acts experienced while awake.¹²⁷

intensa per quam visio immediate causatur remanet per aliquod tempus recedente visibili'; cf. Chatton, prol. 2 (p. 244).

¹²² *ibid.* (fol. 114ra): '... species potest manere per te (*scil.* Chattonem) et secundum veritatem saltem per aliquod tempus sine presentia cause.'

¹²³ *ibid.* (fol. 114vb): 'Ad sextum, dicendum quod vel prius cernebatur, sed non discernebatur propter coniunctionem, etc.; vel aliter, quod sicut stelle non videntur de die, ita nec species, sive videtur principalis visibilis, et causa est assignanda consimilis utrobique....'

¹²⁴ *ibid.* (fol. 114rb): 'Dico igitur quod beatus Augustinus non dicit nec vult, nec experientia etiam < docet > quod ipsummet corpus lucidum quod prius videbatur adhuc videatur absente visibili, sed quedam reliquie istius forme que facta erat in sensu, idest in organo seu instrumento sensus, quando videbatur corpus lucidum extra. Non enim ipsa visio versatur in conspectu, quia visus non est reflexivus super actum suum, sed aliquid visibile versatur in conspectu, scilicet reliquie forme prius causate in organo.'

¹²⁵ *ibid.*: 'Dicendum est, igitur, ad istud experimentum quod in organo oculi remanent quedam qualitates causate a corpore visibili intense que videntur post actionem visibilis, que vocantur a quibusdam "species".'

¹²⁶ *ibid.* (fol. 115ra): 'Ad secundum per idem: vel potest aliter dici ad utrumque quod forte species una vel plures concurrentes sunt simillimae rei extra prius vise quoad rem et distantiam et omnia, et ideo creditur res videri que tamen non videtur.'

¹²⁷ *ibid.* 4 (fol. 117vb): 'Ad tertium, quod non videtur sequi contra alios qui ponunt visionem fore formam extensam, certum est, quia tunc potest continue crescere et decrescere; sed ideo videtur sequi contra me, quia pono visionem esse formam spirituales non extensam, sicut nec

In his treatment of Aureol's experiential arguments for the *esse apparens*, which he yokes with Chatton's and Ockham's critiques of it – a treatment as significant as it is complex –,¹²⁸ Wodeham's commitment to the perspectivist theory of the multiplication of species emerges more explicitly. Discussing Aureol's example of a stick that appears bent when partly submerged in water, Wodeham responds that

it belongs solely to the perspectivist to explain the cause why this appears to be, although not as it is. But the cause in the proposed [case] is the variation of the medium through which the species of the stick in the water multiplies to the eye. Indeed, if there were a hundred media through which it could go different ways, the line on which the species multiplies would be refracted that many times....¹²⁹

In the main lines of his account, Wodeham seems even more than the Venerable Inceptor to have been seeking to achieve an economy of means. Yet Wodeham's discussion of cognition in no wise marks him a 'slavish' Ockhamist, in the manner sometimes assumed to be true of him as Ockham's

eius subiectum primum extenditur. Ad illud potest dupliciter dici ... eadem difficultas est contra fere omnes; nam contra Chattonem est, manifestum est, quia ipse completior (commentator *MS.*) quam ego contra Scotum et Ockham et Petrum Aureoli est, quia illi ponunt intuitivam intellectivam concomitari sensitivam, et de illa intuitiva intellectiva restat eadem difficultas ibi tertia, quod – secundum Chattonem – omnes ille visiones essent simul...'; and, *Lect. sec.*, prol. 3 (fol. 115ra): 'Cuius causam assignat Scotus II *De anima* questione 9, quia actus ymaginandi multiplicat speciem suam in organum alterius sensibili < s >, etc. Sed hanc causam non possum ego assignare, quia non pono sensationes < esse > accidentia extensa sicut ipse, sed dico quod talia sunt realiter per actus reflexos vel per hoc quod mediantibus habitibus eliciuntur ibi actus abstractivi fortes eiusdem speciei cum < actibus > habitis in vigilia et eo fortiores, quo non est impedimentum per distractionem.'

The second passage is particularly significant: Wodeham's citation of Scotus supplements the evidence that the *De anima* commentary attributed to the Subtle Doctor is in fact his. The argument Wodeham cites, together with the context he alleges, does occur precisely where Wodeham locates it (ed. Vivès, 3.518); moreover, his discussion (prol. 4) of Aureol's *experientiae* also seems to draw on Scotus' *Quaestiones super libros De anima* 2.9. This section of Scotus' *De anima* is discussed in Steneck, *Internal Senses*, pp. 109–20, who also describes briefly the controversy on the authenticity of the commentary (p. 109 n. 10). C. H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Jacobus – Johannes Juff', *Traditio* 26 (1970) 193, lists the *Quaestiones super libros De anima* as doubtfully Scotus'.

¹²⁸ See *Vision and Certitude*, pp. 286–302, in which I argue that Wodeham's development of the influential notion of the *complexe significabile* is grounded in his conviction that Aureol's *experientiae* expose serious difficulties in Ockham's account of scientific knowledge.

¹²⁹ *Lect. sec.*, prol. 4 (fol. 118va): 'Tertia experientia de apparentiis fracture baculi, cuius pars est in aqua. ... Reddere autem causam quare ita apparet esse licet non ut sit, pertinet tantum ad perspectivum. Et causa autem est in proposito variatio medii per quod multiplicetur species baculi in aqua usque ad oculum. Si enim essent centum media per que diversaretur, totiens frangeretur linea per quam species multiplicaretur ita quod prior linea non indirecte protenderetur, idest statim incipiet fieri diversatio per lineam in alio situ exteriori vel interiori quam in medio priori. Aliud autem medium est aqua, aliud aer; igitur < etc. >' (Immediately before the last sentence the text contains an interpolation from the preceding *experientia*.)

own student and confrère.¹³⁰ Given this close association, the absence of any dependence upon Ockham's solutions to the problems under discussion in the *Lectura secunda* is particularly significant. Ockham's role in these questions is as a member of a constellation of thinkers, together with Scotus, Aureol, and Chatton, whose ideas were all cynosures for this younger Franciscan.

HALIFAX AND ROSETUS

Among the thinkers most likely to have been influenced by Ockham's thinking, and who thus provide another gauge of his impact, are those who, like Wodeham, were members of Ockham's own order. Among the influential Franciscans who lectured on the *Sentences* in the latter half of the decade were Robert of Halifax and Roger Rosetus whose work, although interesting to fourteenth-century thinkers, remains little studied.¹³¹ Known to his posterity also as Eliphaz, Robert of Halifax was trained in theology at Oxford in the early 1330s, where he composed his *Sentences* commentary sometime between 1334 and 1340.¹³² Particularly at Paris, his commentary was well known and his name, though not as often as his ideas, appears repeatedly in the commentaries of John of Mirecourt, Gregory of Rimini, and Hugolino of Orvieto, to name only three of the more seminal theologians who read him.¹³³

¹³⁰ For a discussion of Wodeham's relationship to Ockham, cf. Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 63-64, who states that, although Ockham was 'both teacher and friend' to Wodeham, 'it should be noted, however, that Wodeham did not consider his own thought derivative of Ockham's, nor is there any indication that he felt himself to belong to a school of *Ockhamistae*.' It seems to the present author that the tone of Wodeham's discussion of Chatton's arguments belies, despite their debates, a closer *lien intellectuel* than has largely been admitted to date. Cf. also Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 66-74; Gál, 'Complexe significabile', 67-68. For the more standard portrayal of Wodeham as an Ockhamist, see, e.g., Leff, *Dissolution*, pp. 52-53, 88-89.

¹³¹ Halifax's and Rosetus' thought primarily vis-à-vis Parisian theologians has received some attention in J. E. Murdoch's 'From Social into Intellectual Factors: An Aspect of the Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning' in Murdoch and E. D. Sylla, eds., *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning. Proceedings of the First International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages - September 1973* (Dordrecht-Boston, 1975), pp. 289-97, and J. E. Murdoch, 'Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Cefferon' in M. Cosman and B. Chandler, eds., *Machaut's World: Science and Art in the Fourteenth Century* (New York, 1978), pp. 51-86. Halifax is discussed also by A. Lang, *Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts* (BGPTM 30.4-6; Munich, 1930), pp. 154-59; A. Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert* (Rome, 1949), pp. 176-77.

¹³² W. J. Courtenay, 'Some Notes on Robert of Halifax, O.F.M.', *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973) 135-42 and *Wodeham*, pp. 118-20. The *terminus post quem* for Halifax's commentary is provided by his quotation of Wodeham; the *terminus ante quem* by Rimini's quotation in his own *Sentences* commentary, composed 1342, of Halifax.

¹³³ For Mirecourt's citation of Halifax, see Murdoch's articles, n. 131 above; for Mirecourt and Rimini, see Courtenay, 'Robert of Halifax', 138-39; for Hugolino of Orvieto, see D. Trapp,

Halifax, devoting considerable portions of his commentary to a treatment of light, vision, and cognition, drew upon sources not as compatible as he seems to have supposed. His account of light and vision is certainly dependent upon the perspectivist tradition, as his references to Grosseteste and to *perspectiva* bear overt witness. Indeed, the interest that Halifax evinces throughout his commentary in illumination, supported by frequent references to Grosseteste's writings and to Pseudo-Dionysius, suggests that at least for Halifax their Neoplatonic light-metaphysics is a background of greater importance than generally supposed in the period after Scotus and Ockham.¹³⁴ Whether the propagation of light is achieved by the mechanism of a Baconian multiplication of species, Halifax does not explicitly say, but many of the elements of the theory are present in his account, and it is probable that this is his model. Thus, he says, for vision to occur, light must actualize the medium intervening between object and viewer, and that light also actualizes color. 'Light is not caused', Halifax supposes, 'except by rays falling from the center of a luminous body.'¹³⁵ This light, which is an accidental form or quality, is subject to intension and remission by the successive addition or subtraction of parts, a position which accords not only with Scotus' and Ockham's definition of successive alteration but with the contemporary or slightly later views of the Mertonian *calculatores*.¹³⁶ Furthermore, 'no intension of light', Halifax claims,

'Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions, and Booklore', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956) 223.

¹³⁴ References to Halifax's commentary are to the *Questiones super Sententias* in Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 15880 and lat. 14514. In Paris lat. 15880, see, e.g., *Super Sent.* 2.1 (fols. 122rb, 123rb, 123va, 124ra, 125ra, 125va, 125vb, 126rb, 130ra, 130rb, 136ra) and 1.2.2 (fol. 25vb) for references to the *De divinis nominibus* and *De celesti hierarchia* of Pseudo-Dionysius; *Super Sent.* 1.2 (fol. 31va, 'sicut loquitur Lincolniensis de certitudine...') and 2.1 (fol. 130rb) for references to Grosseteste's commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*; and *Super Sent.* 1.5 (fol. 76vb) for references to Grosseteste's *De lineis, angulis, et figuris*. On fol. 77ra, Halifax mentions *perspectiva*.

¹³⁵ *Super Sent.* 1.5 (Paris lat. 15880, fols. 72va, 74va and lat. 14514, fols. 307va, 309rb): 'A corpore luminoso lumen non causatur nisi per incesum radium a centro illius corporis'; *Super Sent.* 2.1 (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 125va): 'Dyaphanum, quod recipit colorem et lucem insimul, sed lux activa se habet ad colorem...'; and *ibid.* (fol. 126vb, repeated fol. 131va): '... et hoc per talem modum qualem videmus in lumine corporali. Nam sicut est de medio obscuro et non illuminato, quod posito vel non posito obiecto visibili in illo, non videtur obiectum illud; sed posito visibili in medio illuminato, statim potest illud videri per directionem aciei visus super illud, etc.'

¹³⁶ *Super Sent.* 1.5 (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 74rb and lat. 14514, fol. 309ra): 'Quarta opinio est, et est opinio quam teneo, quod omnis forma accidentalis producit intensive et successive; et per consequens, per partem ante partem, que omnes partes maneant simul in fine...'; *ibid.*: 'Ad primum, quando arguitur: si forma accidentalis intenderetur et remitteretur per modum iam positum, igitur lumen in medio ibi causatum tali modo intenderet'; and *ibid.* (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 76vb): 'Ad tertium, dico quod illuminatio in medio causatur successive, et nulla in instanti nec secundum extensionem, nec secundum intensionem, sed utroque modo in uno tempore causatur, et in imperceptibili <tempore>.' For Ockham's position, cf. *Ord.* 1.17.5, opinio

'occurs in any part of the medium suddenly, but every generation of light is successive', i.e., requires time.¹³⁷

Given an illuminated medium, contact between object and perceiver occurs through the impression of the object's species on the senses. These species are each a natural similitude of one sensible object, although in proclaiming the species a *naturalis similitudo rei*, Halifax seems, as Wodeham had before him, to ignore the ontological ambiguities involved.¹³⁸ As a formal principle that

auctoris (OT 3.491), q. 6 (OT 3.511), and q. 8 (OT 3.553); 'Dico ergo quod augmentatio est duplex, quaedam est augmentatio extensiva, quaedam intensiva. Augmentatio extensiva est duplex. Una est per additionem partis ad partem facientis per se unum cum ea, et distincte ab ea loco et situ ... alia est augmentatio extensiva per rarefactionem.... Alia est augmentatio intensiva, quae est per additionem partis ad partem facientis per se unum cum ea et indistincte ab ea loco et situ, sicut quando album secundum se totum fit albius quam prius.'

On discussions of intension and remission of light, see E. D. Sylla, 'Medieval Quantifications of Qualities: The "Merton School"', *Archive for History of Exact Sciences* 8 (1971) 9-39 and 'Medieval Concepts of the Latitude of Forms: The Oxford Calculators', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 40 (1973) 223-83; and J. Coleman, 'Jean de Ripa O.F.M. and the Oxford Calculators', *Mediaeval Studies* 37 (1975) 130-89. Sylla, 'Latitude of Forms', 230-32, and 'Medieval Quantifications', 12-15, discusses Scotus' and Ockham's views. Adam Wodeham (*Ord.* 1.3 [Mazarine 915, fol. 68ra] and *Lect. sec.*, prol. 4 [fols. 117vb-118ra, 118va]) discusses the augmentation of vision, accepting the 'additive theory' of Scotus and Ockham.

According to Sylla, 'Medieval Quantifications', 24, the major representatives of the Calculatory tradition, particularly Bradwardine, Richard Swineshead, Heytesbury, and Dumbleton, all accepted the 'additive theory'. Furthermore, Sylla notes (p. 13): 'Notions of action and alteration, in turn, were highly influenced by the results that had been provided by the relatively independent science of optics. This does not mean that the so-called "light-metaphysics" was necessarily widely believed by medieval theorists. Instead, the situation seems to have been simply that when considering the relatively unknown process of alteration in general theorists adopted as models the better known descriptions of geometrical optics.' Although Sylla considers it unlikely that the Mertonians assumed a Neoplatonic light-metaphysics, the weight of this author's evidence suggests that such a metaphysical foundation would have been neither incompatible with their physics nor unusual.

¹³⁷ *Super Sent.* 1.5 (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 74va and lat. 14514, fol. 309rb): 'Ad aliud, dico quod nulla intensio luminis fiat in aliqua parte medii subito, sed omnis generatio luminis est successive. Et ad argumentum, dico quod generatio luminis est motivum et directum, et sic est secundum incesum radium'; *ibid.* (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 76vb): 'Dico quod visio simul causatur in tempore et species in medio.' Sylla, 'Medieval Quantifications', 13 n. 13, points out that the Mertonians (chiefly Dumbleton) assumed the instantaneous propagation of light. See also Lindberg, 'Speed of Light', 58-59, 64-65. Buridan's argument concerning the successive motion of the sun and Blasius of Parma's concerning the possibly infinite alteration from a finite force are strikingly similar to Halifax's argumentation (Paris lat. 15880, fols. 74va-b, 76vb and lat. 14514, fol. 309rb-va). It is worth noting that discussions such as Halifax's, although within the confines of a *Sentences* commentary, are methodologically indistinguishable from those within Aristotle commentaries or perspectivist treatises.

¹³⁸ *Super Sent.* 2.1 (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 123vb): 'Nam sicut oportet quod sensibile uniatur aliquo modo sensui ad hoc quod actualiter sentiat, puta per rei vise speciem que est forma et principium visionis in oculo'; *ibid.* (fol. 122vb): '... <species concreatas> cum sint naturales

unites object and sense or cognitive faculty, thereby actualizing it, 'a species or likeness of an object is necessarily required in the cognitive faculty, just as it is in the senses'. That is, the species is required to assimilate object to knower, for if the intellect could act without such assimilation, there would be no need of the senses. These species are, moreover, additional to habits and phantasms; having accepted the mechanism of species, he has no reason to deny them in the memory.¹³⁹

Knowledge derived by abstraction from sensible species, which is what Halifax understands by *notitia abstractiva*, is entailed by the acceptance of species *propter assimilationem*; in addition, there is a *notitia intuitiva* which, however, causes evident knowledge only of the sensible object's accidents, since 'accidents are sensibles, and the objects of the senses *per se*'.¹⁴⁰ Thus, while Halifax employs a distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, his distinction, like his defense of assimilation, is Scotus', not Ockham's; indeed, his discussion of cognition is often Scotistic in cast.¹⁴¹ Moreover, Halifax evinces a diminished concern with the epistemological issues central to treatments of intuitive cognition from Aureol through Wodeham. Virtually ignoring the issue of whether species have been shown to be incompatible with

similitudines rerum et representent naturaliter rebus naturalibus transmutantibus'; and *ibid.* (fol. 126vb): 'Nam cognitio cuiuslibet cogniti se extendit secundum modum forme, que est principium cognitionis, sicut species sensibilis, que est in sensu, est solum similitudo unius individui.'

¹³⁹ *ibid.* (fol. 123vb): 'Ita species aliqua obiecti vel similitudo in virtute cognitiva, que aliquando est in potentia cognoscen <di> necessario requiritur tamquam formale principium quo educitur intellectus de potentia ad actum intelligendi obiectum, quia aliter non essent in nobis sensus necessari ad cognitionem naturalem rerum sensibilium, si sine omni assimilatione obiecti posset intellectus educere se, sine quocumque alio, in actualem cognitionem illius, etc.'; *ibid.* (fol. 126va): 'Et hoc loquendo de cognitione acquisita ex sensibus pro statu isto, sed tota est una unius rei, sicut ille (illud *MS.*) habitus vel species vel fantasma non potest esse ratio et principium distincte apprehendendi vel cognoscendi, nisi respectu unius tantum rei, et non plurium'; *ibid.* (fol. 127ra): 'Et in hoc differt iste habitus in intellectu angeli a quocumque habitu vel fantasmate in memoria nostra, qui est ratio et principium actualis cognitionis in intellectu nostro, quia nihil tale in intellectu nostro pro statu isto acquirendi scientiam est per se ratio vel principium distincte cognoscendi plura, sed solum unius cognitionis distincte'; and *Super Sent.* 1.2 (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 29ra): 'Unde facit species in actu movere intellectum, sicut species extra movent memoriam et oculum.' For Ockham's denial that species are required on the grounds of assimilation see *Rep.* 2.15 (p. 256).

¹⁴⁰ *Super Sent.* 1.2 (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 31va): 'Dico quod intuitiva notitia sensibilium non causat evidentem <notitiam> de quidditate cognitorum, sed causat notitiam evidentem de accidentibus, quia accidentia sunt sensibilia et obiecta sensuum per se'; the discussion of intuitive and abstractive cognition occupies much of *Super Sent.* 1.2.2 (Paris lat. 15880, fols. 26va-32vb) and q. 4 (fol. 64rb-vb).

¹⁴¹ Halifax's *Super Sent.* 1.2, e.g., includes (Paris lat. 15880, fol. 29ra-vb) extensive verbatim and paraphrased quotations of Scotus, *Ord.* 1.3.1.4 (ed. Balić, 3.138-48). Cf. also Lang, *Glaubensbegründung*, pp. 154-59.

intuitive cognition and, therefore, whether they need be posited at all, Halifax skirts as well the question of intuitive cognition of non-existents, noting only in passing that vision does not require a present object, and bypasses, except insofar as Scotus' text leads him, the possibility of deception that the fact of illusion raises.¹⁴² Instead, the commentary reflects his generation's greater development of the questions epitomized by the 'calculatory tradition'.

Halifax's contemporary confrère, Roger Rosetus, composed his commentary on the *Sentences* probably no earlier than 1332, since he cites Wodeham, and no later than 1337, when it was copied at the Franciscan *studium* at Norwich. Beyond that, what is known about Rosetus is meager indeed. He was not Roger Swineshead, with whom some medieval scribes confused him. It is unclear whether he, or Adam of Ely (as one scribe stated), actually read this commentary at Norwich, nor is it certain where Rosetus earned his theological degree. The likelihood is great, however, that he studied at Oxford, both because he cited and disputed the opinions of Wodeham and Bradwardine and because the issues, style, and logical-mathematical content reflect English training.¹⁴³ Wherever he was trained, Rosetus should be included in the 'Oxford

¹⁴² *Super Sent.* 1.5 (Paris lat. 15880, fols. 76vb-77ra): 'Dico quod satis possibile <est> quod visio sit in oculo et quod oculus videat, et quod tamen non sit obiectum visus. ... Ymmo non solum per divinam potentiam potest hoc esse, sed ut probatur in perspectiva, posset sensibilis ad sensum, quia si sit fortis impressio ab aliquo obiecto causata in oculo, si velociter amoveatur obiectum a visu, post amotionem remanet species obiecti in oculo, idest visus obiecti....' At *Super Sent.* 1.2, Halifax quotes Scotus' discussion of illusions (cf. n. 141 above) in arguing that deception of the senses does not inevitably entail intellectual deception.

¹⁴³ On Rosetus, cf. V. Doucet, 'Le Studium Franciscain de Norwich en 1337 d'après le Ms Chigi B. V. 66 de la Bibliothèque Vaticane', *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 46 (1953) 89-93 and Courtenay, *Wodeham*, pp. 120-21.

At least two of the manuscripts containing Rosetus' *Sentences* commentary refer to him as in England: Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale 1551 names him 'Rogerius Rugosi Angli ordinis minorum', and Oxford, Bodleian Library Canon. Misc. 177 refers to 'Rugerio Suiscepto sive Roseto in studio Anglicano'. Furthermore, Doucet points out that the inventory of the Franciscan convent at Assisi, compiled in 1381, lists the Chigi ms. as 'Lectura super Sententias secundum fr. mag. Rogerium Rogeth ord. minorum de Anglia...' (p. 88). Bruges, Bibliothèque publique de la ville 192 also calls Rosetus 'magister'. While there is no unanimity about the spelling of this Franciscan master's name, most texts come closest to Rosetus. That a mendicant author of a *Sentences* commentary is called 'magister' indicates that he was a master of theology (rather than arts); thus, in Courtenay's view, the reference to the *studium Anglicanum* refers to a *studium generale*, i.e., to Cambridge or Oxford, rather than to Norwich. The fact that the Chigi ms. was copied at Norwich does not in itself warrant the inference that Rosetus himself was ever there. Of the two *studia generalia*, Rosetus was more likely to have studied at Oxford, a supposition supported by his involvement in the discussions of Oxford rather than Cambridge authors. When Rosetus analyses Wodeham's stance on the *capacitas anime*, for example, Rosetus considers as well the arguments of Wodeham's two *socii* who had disputed his views. Yet if Rosetus did not study at Oxford, his commentary will prove the more interesting as evidence of the rapid dissemination of Oxford speculation to other English *studia*.

tradition' of the generation after Ockham; his commentary was among the corpus of English writings known to Parisian theologians, although Rosetus' prominence may never have been as great as that of other English-trained scholars and was apparently not achieved as soon.¹⁴⁴

What is ostensibly an inquiry into whether the will's actions are instantaneous or successive requires for Rosetus, as for others, an exploration of vision. He asks whether vision occurs instantaneously or over time, and like most, but not like Ockham, concludes that vision requires time, albeit time so rapid as to be imperceptible.¹⁴⁵ In the process of disproving the claim that light is propagated instantaneously, Rosetus argues indirectly, if explicitly, that vision occurs through the multiplication of species. One can show, for example, that a visible object, if created by God instantaneously, is not, however, *seen* in the instant of its creation, because, 'positing that vision occurs through the multiplication of species in a medium, in that instant the object thus created does not multiply its species to the eye [of the observer], since, in such a multiplication in a medium, there will be time before the object will be seen.'¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, Rosetus claims, 'if vision did *not* occur through the multiplication of species ... the visible object would [still] not be seen in the instant of its creation, because the object *begins* to act on the sense of sight, and to cause there, successively, part by part, a quality. Thus, there would not be vision there immediately.'¹⁴⁷

So far, Rosetus has argued only that the elimination of the process of species multiplication does not establish the immediacy of vision. He has not, of course, demonstrated that there is such a multiplication. Countering a more serious objection, that if vision were not immediate, we would see a nearer object more quickly than one farther away, Rosetus responds that,

¹⁴⁴ In addition to Courtenay, *Wodeham*, p. 120, see Murdoch, 'Unitary Character', 314 n. 17, who notes that one manuscript of *In Sent.* 1.1, which circulated separately as a *Tractatus de maximo et minimo*, was owned by Peter of Candia; see above, n. 131.

¹⁴⁵ In addition to n. 149 below, cf., e.g., *In Sent.* 1.1.2 (Oriell 15, fol. 273va): 'Commentator dicit quod sensatio fit in instanti et non precedit eam actio aliqua diminuta; sed si ibi caperetur "instans" pro "parvo tempore", ita quod illud foret dicere, "sensatio fit in instanti, idest, in parvo tempore", igitur productionis sensationis que forent actiones diminute.'

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.* (fol. 274ra): 'Ad secundum, admitto casum totum quem ponit argumentum, et cum assumitur quod si illud visibile (veniale *MS.*) sit creatum a Deo instantanee, videtur in illo instanti in quo creatur, potest dici quod non. et hoc ponendo quod visio sit per multiplicationem speciei in medio, quia in illo instanti illud sic creatum non multiplicat suam speciem usque ad oculum, ex quo talis multiplicatio requirit tempus. Et ideo, si visio sit per talem multiplicationem in medio, tempus erit antequam illud visibile (veniale *MS.*) videbitur.'

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*: 'Si autem visio non fiat per multiplicationem specierum in medio, potest adhuc dici quod illud visibile (veniale *MS.*) non videtur in illo instanti in quo creatur, incipit visibile (veniale *MS.*) agere in sensu visus, et causare ibi successive unam qualitatem per partem ante partem, tunc non erit statim visio.'

if vision occurs through the multiplication of species in a medium, it does not follow that an object farther from sight would be seen more slowly [than a nearer] because such visible objects multiply their species throughout the *entire* medium. Therefore, wherever the eye is placed in the medium, whatever the distance from the objects the eye has to see, there will be equally powerful species of the objects in the eye. Therefore, one object will cause the vision of itself in the [observer's] eye as quickly as the other.¹⁴⁸

As before, Rosetus suggests that the rejection of the theory of the multiplication of species does not in itself establish that vision is instantaneous, for still 'one could posit that one object *would* be seen more quickly than the other; but it is not required that this be *perceived*, because each of them would cause the vision of itself in an imperceptible [amount of] time, no matter how far distant they are from each other, even if [one is as far away] as the heavens',¹⁴⁹ which is to return to Bacon's solution.

Rosetus' arguments for the successive nature of light and vision may not have been directed specifically or solely at Ockham. Nevertheless, he does contravene Ockham on important points. In the first place, Ockham had denied the existence of species partly on the grounds that we do not perceive them. But Rosetus claims here that our *perception* is inadequate to inform us whether vision is instantaneous (as it appears), or occurs with the passage of time (as it does). In effect, our experiential knowledge is an insufficient criterion for existential judgments. Moreover, for Rosetus, vision requires time – however imperceptible – because there is both distance and an entirely illuminated medium intervening between object and observer; thus, he also implicitly rejects Ockham's assertion that there can be immediate action at a distance, as well as the further conclusion that an illuminated medium is not a prerequisite of vision. Thirdly, Rosetus' insistence that if visible qualities act on the sense of sight, they do so successively, part by part, rather than forming an immediately completed vision of the object, would also seem to refute Ockham's substitution

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*: 'Ad tertium, dico quod si visio fiat per multiplicationem specierum in medio, non sequitur quod illud obiectum quod plus distaret a visu [quod] tardius videretur, quia talia < obiecta > multiplicant species per totum medium. Et ideo, ubicumque ponatur oculus in tali medio, et hoc ad talem distantiam quam habet oculus illa videre, ibi erunt species talium obiectorum eque potentes oculo. Et ideo, unum < obiectum > eque cito causabit visionem sui in illo oculo sicut a < liu > d obiectum.' In addition to Lindberg, 'Speed of Light', see n. 11 above.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*: 'Si autem ponatur quod visio non sit per talem multiplicationem specierum, tunc potest poni quod unum obiectum citius videbitur quam aliud; sed non oportet quod hoc percipiatur, quia utrumque illorum causabit visionem sui in tempore imperceptibili quantumcumque unum distet ab alio, etiam usque ad celum.' Rosetus, like Halifax, treats as pivotal the same issues as do, e.g., Buridan and Blasius of Parma, as described by Lindberg, and, for that matter, as had other theologians before them at Oxford. Cf. Chatton, *In Sent.* 2.4.1 (Paris lat. 15887, fol. 103rb) for his denial that light can be generated *in tempore imperceptibili*.

of 'visible qualities' for species. For Ockham, as a proponent of the 'additive theory' of the intension and remission of forms, does not deny the successive, i.e., temporal, requirements of an *augmentatio extensiva*, as would be the case in the sense organ (as opposed to an *augmentatio intensiva* in the sensitive faculty).¹⁵⁰ By Rosetus' argumentation, then, on Ockham's own terms these qualities do not achieve, as he intends, immediate cognition.

Thus, in spite of Rosetus' indirect manner of argument, it is reasonable to infer that he accepts the multiplication theory, if only because nothing is accomplished (in his view) by denying species. But his interest in visual perception is quite different from Ockham's, for whom an account of perception is connected directly to the delineation of the process of cognition. The discussion in Rosetus' commentary is, in effect, a digression; and unlike Chatton and Wodeham, for example, who also investigate the issues of the speed of light and vision, Rosetus does not in his commentary on the *Sentences* include treatments of cognition, abstractive or intuitive, *per se*.¹⁵¹ Neither epistemology nor psychology seems to have interested Rosetus, and the brevity of his discussion may indicate that debate at Oxford had shifted from the theories of intuitive cognition to other interests.

CONCLUSION

It is certainly clear, then, that those, including Ockham, who attempted in the early decades of the fourteenth century to jettison species from accounts of cognition catalyzed debate on a web of epistemological and psychological issues for which the species were a *nexus*. Ockham's systematic refutation of species, rather than ending the debate, was a focus for continued discussion and justification of the necessity of positing species. The foregoing survey of Oxford *Sentences* commentaries is not exhaustive; nevertheless, a perusal of others from the 1320s-1330s indicates general, if not universal, retention of species.¹⁵² At Paris, too, the pattern continues: the theologians of the 1340s most familiar with the 'Oxford tradition' wrestled with the same issues that the conflict

¹⁵⁰ For Ockham's position, see above, n. 136.

¹⁵¹ Wodeham discusses the speed of light and vision in *Ord.* 2.2 'Utrum profectus vel augmentum gratiae fiat per compositionem gratiae novae cum gratia praecedenti' (Mazarine 915, fols. 131vb-136rb, especially fol. 135rb).

¹⁵² E.g., see Kilvington, *In Sent.* 1.3 (Vatican Library, Vat. lat. 4353, p. 36) who refers to a 'multiplicatio speciei sensus ad memoriam, sicut in visu ad (!) obiectum'. Circa 1330, Walter of Odington, O.S.B. composed a *Tractatus de multiplicatione specierum in visu* preserved in Cambridge, University Library Ii.1.13 (fols. 44[35]v-51[42]r). Both Bradwardine, who wrote a short treatise *Propositiones de perspectiva* (Vatican Library, Vat. lat. 3102), and Buckingham also adopted species, although their discussions deserve fuller treatment.

between intuitive cognition and species posed. Gregory of Rimini, who composed his *Sentences* commentary in 1342-43, retained the multiplication of species, within an epistemology more indebted to Holcot, Crathorn, and Wodeham than to Ockham. Mirecourt, in his *Sentences* commentary of 1344-45, discussed at length whether species should be posited, in a treatment apparently strongly shaped by Wodeham's *Lectura secunda*.¹⁵³ Lecturing on the *Sentences* in the same year as Mirecourt, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo defended the species as he had earlier in his *De anima* commentary.¹⁵⁴ Since Ockham's attack in his *Sentences* commentary, which these authors knew well, had failed in the first thirty years after its composition to dislodge the species from discussions of perception, it is not surprising that they remained, albeit not without controversy, beyond the bounds of the century.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ For Rimini, in addition to n. 76 above, see *Super Sent.* 1.3.1.2 (fol. 39va-b) in which he defends the multiplication of species in a medium and in the sense organs, 1.17.2.2 (fols. 93ra-95rb), 2.7.2.1 (ed. Trapp, 5.72-85), and 2.7.3, add. 36 (5.98-117) and a. 1-2 (5.118-52) for the strongest defense of species, directed specifically against Ockham. For Mirecourt, see *In Sent.* 1.4, in A. Franzinelli, ed., 'Questioni inedite di Giovanni di Mirecourt sulla conoscenza', *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 13 (1958) 415-28. For an introduction to the immense literature on the influence of Oxford upon Parisian thought, in addition to Courtenay, 'Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion' and Wodeham, Murdoch, 'Unitary Character', and Coleman, 'Jean de Ripa', cf. P. Glorieux, 'Jean de Falisca. La formation d'un maître en théologie au xiv^e siècle', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 33 (1966) 23-104.

¹⁵⁴ Alphonsus Vargas' *De anima* commentary is discussed in Steneck, *Internal Senses*, pp. 206-26. The first scholar to comment explicitly on the fact that certain prominent fourteenth-century scientists (Buridan, Oresme, and Henry of Langenstein) retained species in opposition to Ockham, Steneck wrote: 'Quite obviously a considerable number of late medieval writers found it both convenient and necessary to explain the cogitative process in their treatises devoted specifically to the soul, in terms of Aristotelian epistemology – that is, in terms of the acquisition of knowledge via the mediation of material extramental representatives of objects (the species) – despite the insistence of Ockham and others that this system multiplied hypotheses without necessity' (p. 308). Steneck therefore reluctantly suggests (p. 309) that in *Sentences* commentaries, but not in *De anima* commentaries, late medieval authors propounded Ockham's theory of intuitive cognition, rather than retaining species. Such a solution, unhappily, tacitly requires a widespread acceptance of a 'double truth' theory on their parts. Fortunately, both a *Sentences* and a *De anima* commentary by Alphonsus Vargas survive, which makes it possible to disprove this hypothesis. For his defense of species in the *Sentences* commentary, see *In primum Sententiarum* (Venice, 1490; rpt. in *Cassiciacum* 2 [1952]), prol. 1, 1.3.1.1 'Responsio ad Aureolum', and 1.17.3.3-4.

A. M. Smith discusses the retention of species by Oresme and Buridan in his *Witelo's 'Perspectiva'* (n. 5 above), pp. 83-84 and 'Multiplication of Species in Fourteenth-Century Paris: The Case against "Nominalism"' (unpublished paper, delivered at the Twelfth Conference on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo in May 1977).

¹⁵⁵ See, for example, in addition to Lindberg, *Theories of Vision*, chaps. 7-9: N. H. Steneck, *Science and Creation in the Middle Ages. Henry of Langenstein (d. 1397) on Genesis* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1976), pp. 5, 131-32; E. G. Smith, *A Disagreement on the Need of a Sensible Species in the Writings of Some Medical Doctors in the Late Middle Ages* (Diss. St. Louis, 1974); and M. Tamny, 'Newton, Creation, and Perception', *Isis* 70 (1979) 48-58, who (55) quotes passages from Isaac Newton's 1706 edition of his *Opticks* that show he assumed sensible species.

Why should the species, particularly visible species, have remained so ubiquitous in the *Sentences* commentaries we have examined? The answer seems in part to rest in the fact that the alternative theory Ockham offered did not sufficiently 'save the phenomena' for which the Baconian theory, especially as incorporated in the teachings of Duns Scotus, helped to account.

In the first place, there was general agreement that the Venerable Inceptor's substitution of qualities immediately caused at a distance for the *species in medio* inadequately explained the phenomena, physical and metaphysical, of light and vision. But why should it have been so important to these fourteenth-century thinkers to preserve the ability to explain the actions of light and the process of visual perception, particularly given the epistemological benefits accruing from the replacement of representations of the object by direct contact between object and knower? It should be remembered that, after Scotus, theologians had a theory that offered such immediate contact additional to knowledge derived from abstraction from species, a theory which, as we have seen, thinkers tended to adopt in lieu of Ockham's. They did so in spite of Ockham's cogent claim that if intuitive cognition infallibly provides knowledge that an object exists, we should have *notitiae intuitivae* of species. Their denial of the strength of this claim was, in turn, not without its difficulties. Hence, the allegiance after Ockham to species indicates a compelling reason to retain them.

Part of the reason lies in the training a theologian received before he turned to the task of constructing his lectures on the *Sentences*. Before embarking on the theological degree, a scholar at Oxford or Paris knew inter alia the Aristotelian psychological corpus, and may have known the *Meteorologica*. As the allusions to *perspectiva* indicate, theologians had at least passing familiarity with the perspectivist literature itself; some, like Bradwardine, contributed to it. Fourteenth-century theologians knew and increasingly valued Augustine's epistemological and psychological views. All of these sources seemed to coalesce in Grosseteste's and Bacon's writings which, as the commentaries of Holcot and Halifax, for example, bear explicit witness, were to some extent known; indeed, Grosseteste may well have been a seminal thinker for fourteenth-century theologians.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁶ On the increasing interest in and familiarity with the Augustinian corpus, see W. J. Courtenay, 'Augustinianism at Oxford in the Fourteenth Century', *Augustiniana* 30 (1980) 58-70. As recent research makes clear, Grosseteste's thought was particularly important to theologians of the 1330s and 1340s concerned with the problem of future contingents; see C. Normore, 'Future Contingents' in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. Kenny, N. Kretzmann, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 358-83.

For the curriculum of seculars at Oxford, see J. A. Weisheipl, 'Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964) 143-85 and 'Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century', *ibid.* 28

The background that, in harness, these sources offered extended beyond a more or less reconcilable psychological theory founded, however problematically, on a physical explanation of vision; its metaphysical bases were heuristically useful. Far from being divorced from the Neoplatonic metaphysics of the thirteenth century, the pervasive fourteenth-century urge 'to measure everything',¹⁵⁷ exemplified by *calculatores* and by authors of *Sentences* commentaries alike, was in part justified by that light-metaphysics. In defending the study of mathematics, principally geometrical optics, for theologians, Bacon had offered an example:

Since the infusion of grace is very clearly illustrated through the multiplication of light, it is in every way expedient that through the corporeal multiplication of light there should be manifested to us the properties of grace in the good....¹⁵⁸

This was a view with which late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century theologians clearly concurred.

In the second place, Ockham's defense of the non-representational character of knowledge seemed to the generation of thinkers examined above inadequate to explain apparent images in memory and imagination, if not also in vision; images for which in addition to their own experience there was also the authority of Aristotle, his Arabic commentators, and Augustine. One response was to deny that the *habitus* was, as Ockham had argued, sufficient in lieu of the species to 'save these phenomena'; the other, essentially an attempt to

(1966) 151-75. It is unclear whether mendicants studied the same texts in their *studia* as seculars did at the university, but it seems to this writer probable that they did. If there was no statutory requirement that a mendicant have studied the books required of seculars in the arts curriculum, the exigencies of the required disputations, in which mendicants participated during their theological studies, would have encouraged as thorough grounding in such studies as seculars had received. Moreover, citations of Aristotelian psychological treatises, of Averroes, Avicenna, et al. are at least as frequent and accurate in the *Sentences* commentaries of the mendicants under consideration as in, e.g., that of FitzRalph, a secular. If mendicants did not study the Aristotelian corpus, to whom did Ockham, Scotus, and Alphonsus Vargas direct their Aristotle commentaries? The evidence is much stronger, moreover, that Franciscans, at least, studied perspectivist treatises, either directly or indirectly via such sources as Peter of Limoges' *De oculo morali*: the major work in the science of *perspectiva* had, after all, been achieved principally by Franciscans or, in Witelo's case, by a scholar closely associated with Dominicans and Franciscans. On the *De oculo morali*, see D. L. Clark, 'Optics for Preachers: The *De oculo morali* by Peter of Limoges', *Michigan Academician* 9 (1977) 329-43.

¹⁵⁷ See Murdoch, 'Unitary Character' and 'Subtilitates Anglicanae'.

¹⁵⁸ *The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon* 4, trans. R. B. Burke (Philadelphia, 1928), pp. 238-39, quoted in D. C. Lindberg, *John Pecham and the Science of Optics: Perspectiva communis* (Madison, Wisc., 1970), p. 19. It should be noted how frequently in fourteenth-century *Sentences* commentaries book 1, d. 17 (on *caritas*) becomes the locus for a discussion of light.

preserve both non-representational immediacy and images, was to treat *habitus*, *species*, and at times *verbum* as identical.¹⁵⁹

Third, Ockham's theory did not successfully improve upon Scotus' demarcation of roles for sensation and intellection in achieving existential knowledge. In retaining species, and therefore the process of abstraction from them, Scotus preserved the *raison d'être* for sensation distinct from intellection. In eliminating species, Ockham seemed to render *something* superfluous. To Reading, Chatton, and Halifax, it appeared that Ockham's theory denied the need for sensation; Crathorn and Wodeham came, for different reasons, to question distinctions between sensation and intellection, or between the soul and its faculties, or, in Crathorn's case, between the faculty and its 'contents'.

Fourth, Ockham's theory, which assumed infallible judgment concerning the existence of intuitively known extramental objects, had a perceived inability to guarantee that claim given the fact of illusions. Coupled with Peter Aureol's blithe assumption that such illusions were natural instances of intuitive cognitions of non-existent objects, fourteenth-century theologians were faced with a Scylla and a Charybdis between which to chart their search for a guarantee of existential certainty.¹⁶⁰

What is perhaps most remarkable in the attempts of the authors studied above to integrate theories Ockham had correctly understood as irreconcilable is the heterogeneity of their approaches. In order to harvest the advantages each theory offered, these theologians drew from the arguments of Ockham, Scotus, Aureol and, in Wodeham's case, Chatton, insights they hoped might fruitfully lead to such a reconciliation. As a result, in epistemology at any rate, there seems at Oxford to have been no school of *Ockhamistae*.

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¹⁵⁹ Although it is beyond the scope of this article to explore the ramifications of the retention of species for treatments of mental language, the debate between Holcot and Crathorn indicates the significance of such discussions; see Schepers, 'Holcot contra dicta ... II'.

¹⁶⁰ This is not to suggest, as did K. Michalski in 1926 ('Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIV^e siècle', rpt. in *La philosophie au XIV^e siècle. Six études*, ed. K. Flasch [Frankfurt a. Main, 1969], pp. 67-150), that either Ockham or his readers were skeptics; see *Vision and Certitude*.

FOR PEASANTS, PSALMS:
ERASMUS' *EDITIO PRINCEPS* OF HAYMO (1533)*

Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle

'How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?'
(Ps 137:4 RSV)

A misplaced Catholic in a city under Protestant siege, Erasmus of Rotterdam sent his congratulations to a confidant who had already migrated with other university theologians to Freiburg. As he parcelled his own library and dispatched it secretly down river, he reflected to Ludwig Baer on his estrangement in Basle among Christians whose city council had abolished the Mass. 'We have endured then this our Pasch without an alleluia, without the triumphal feast, although not without bitter herbs. For now, we seem to sit by the rivers of Babylon, ill-disposed to sing to the Lord a canticle in a strange land.'¹ There was rumor of his departure, and a crowd collected at the bridge on the Rhine a few weeks later on 13 April 1529, as Erasmus bid farewell to 'celebrated and elegant' Basle, whose humanists had embraced his learning and whose press of Johann Froben had disseminated it for a quarter century.²

* I wish to thank the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, for an appointment as a Research Associate 1977-78 to investigate the relationship of medieval culture to Erasmus' humanism. This is one of the resulting studies.

¹ 'Amicorum in Christo syncerissime, tibi quidem ex animo gratulamur, cui licet dominicam Resurrectionem spiritualibus, vt par est, celebrare gaudiis. Nos hic nostrum Pascha peragimus absque alleluia, absque victoriali conuiuio, licet non sine lactucis agrestibus. Videmurque nobis interim sedere ad flumina Babylonis, vt non libeat cantare canticum Domini in terra aliena': to Ludwig Baer, in *Erasmi Epistolae*, ed. P. S. Allen et al., 12 vols. (Oxford, 1906-58), 8.116.1-6, Ep 2136. This edition is hereafter abbreviated as *EE*. See also Paul Roth, *Durchbruch und Festsetzung der Reformation in Basel: eine Darstellung der Politik der Stadt Basel im Jahre 1529 auf Grunde der öffentlichen Akten* (Basler Beiträge zur Geschichtswissenschaft 8; Basel, 1942).

² For the chronicle of this departure, with appropriate references to Erasmus' correspondence, see Allen's introductory note to Ep 2149 (*EE* 8.137). 'Nulla res me coëgit Basileam relinquere, nisi palam profligata vetus religio, et res subinde illic nouae...' to 'Sed vtinam hanc solam liceret deplorare!': to Lorenzo Campeggi (*EE* 8.448.11-449.25); '... ciuitatem et celebrem et elegantem, cuius hospitio tam diu fueram vsus...' at ll. 23-24, and 'officina Frobeniana' at l. 12.

Erasmus, who had made the psalmist's question his own, ventured a reply to it from the security of Freiburg, when on 28 February 1533 he issued his only edition of a medieval author. Haymo of Halberstadt would seem an unlikely candidate for the notice of this eminent editor of classical and patristic texts. He was a man of merit in his own century – the ninth –, a monk of the monastery of Fulda, where he also taught, a friend there of Rabanus Maurus, later a student of Alcuin, then abbot of Hersfeld and bishop of Halberstadt. Or so Erasmus thought, for, with the critical methods he was only pioneering, he did not arrive at the modern scholarly judgment that the work is spurious, perhaps the labor of an obscurer Haymo of Auxerre.³ How did Haymo attract Erasmus, who looked to Basil and Chrysostom for the ideals of monastic life and biblical exegesis? Why did Erasmus edit Haymo?

The edition, commented but once in modern research on Erasmus, is described inaccurately there as 'an edition of the *Life of Blessed Haymo* ... this little work of Carolingian hagiography.'⁴ Following the dedicatory letter there is indeed a brief biography by Trithemius, extolling Haymo as 'certainly a most learned man, a very wise interpreter of holy scripture, and of excellent ability in preaching homilies to the people.'⁵ The edition, however, extends for 345 more folios to encompass Haymo's commentary on the entire psalter, *Pia, brevis ac dilucida in omnes psalmos explanatio*, and his interpretation of six songs from the same Testament.⁶ Issued by the press of Ioannes Faber Emmeus, it was

³ Eduard Riggenbach, *Die ältesten lateinischen Kommentare zum Hebräerbrief* (Leipzig, 1907), p. 102; and for recent attribution of works to Haymo of Auxerre see Riccardo Quadri, 'Aimone di Auxerre alla luce dei "Collectanea" di Heiric di Auxerre', *Italia medioevale e umanistica* 6 (1963) 1-43; idem, ed., *I Collectanea di Eirico di Auxerre* (Spicilegium Friburgense 11; Fribourg, 1966), pp. 3-28; John J. Contreni, 'Haimo of Auxerre, Abbot of Sasceium (Cessy-les-bois), and a New Sermon on 1 John V, 4-10', *Revue bénédictine* 85 (1975) 303-20 and 'The Biblical Glosses of Haimo of Auxerre and John Scottus Eriugena', *Speculum* 51 (1976) 411-34.

⁴ Myron P. Gilmore, 'Erasmus and the Cause of Christian Humanism: The Last Years 1529-1536' in his *Humanists and Jurists: Six Studies in the Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1963), p. 124.

⁵ '... vir certe undecunque doctissimus, divinarum Scripturarum sagacissimus interpres, in declamandis homiliis ad populum excellentis ingenii fuit' ('Vita d. Haymonis', PL 116.189).

⁶ *Pia, brevis ac dilucida in omnes psalmos explanatio sanctissimi viri D. Haymonis, olim episcopi Halberstatten. quam ille ueluti spiritualis apicula, ex omnium ueterum hortis ac pratis florentissimis decerpit, quo simplicibus et occupatis esset parata saluberrimi mellis copia. Opus antehac nunquam excusum* (Freiburg: Johannes Faber Emmeus, 1533). Following the dedicatory letter to van Heemstede is an alphabetical index of the psalms, a 'Vita D. Haymonis per Ioannem Tritthenhemium abbatem Spanhem.', Haymo's commentary on the psalter (fols. 1-333) and on the following songs (fols. 333-45): Canticum Esaiæ prophetae. Esaiæ 12. Confitebor; Canticum Ezechiae regis Iuda, cum aegrotaret, et de infirmitate cōualuisset: Ego dixi. Esaiæ 38; Canticum Annae. 1 Reg. 2. Exultavit; Canticum Moysi ad filios Israël. Exodi 15. Cantemus; Canticum Abacuc prophetae pro ignorantijs. Abac. 3. Domine audiui; Canticum Moysi: Audite coeli. Deut. 32. A microfilm of this first edition was kindly provided by the Library of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

published in the same year by Graphaeus at Antwerp, by C. Wechelus at Paris, and without imprint at Cologne. Only two years earlier the first edition of Haymo's spurious commentary on Isaiah had been published by Emmeus, as edited by Nikolaus Ferber of Holborn. In the same year as Erasmus' edition, Haymo's spurious *In XII prophetas et in Cantica canticorum* was published at Cologne; and in the following year, a *Homiliarum, siue concionum popularium ... pars aestiualis*, as edited by Godfridus Hittorpius.⁷ This flush of interest in Haymo may have simply been occasioned by the recovery of the manuscripts. It was common enough for printers to publish those at hand, and even for humanists to edit them fortuitously. There is no disclosure in Erasmus' correspondence, where he often confided works in progress, of this editorial project. It may be that, encouraged by sales of the 1531 edition, the printer Emmeus approached Erasmus for a redaction. Erasmus, nevertheless, would not have casually endorsed the publication of medieval exegesis, nor idly dedicated it to a friend so constant as the Carthusian Jan Symoens van Heemstede.⁸ The year 1533 absorbed him with the composition of his catechism, his last colloquy, his treatise on preparation for death (his was but three years off), and his own commentary on a psalm, Ps 83 (84 MT), a serious program into which medieval texts did not fit for pastime.⁹

Haymo assumes no significance in Erasmus' literature before this date. Although Erasmus consulted and cited the *Catena aurea*, which refers to Haymo,¹⁰ he did not repeat such references in his own annotations on the gospels.¹¹ Neither does Haymo appear in Erasmus' annotations of Acts or of Revelation.¹² Only once is he cited in the annotations on the Epistles, at the final

⁷ PL 116.184-90; *Bibliotheca Erasmi: répertoire des œuvres d'Érasme*, ed. J. vander Haeghen (Gand, 1893; rpt. Nieuwkoop, 1961), 2nd Ser., p. 29. The text in Migne's edition is that of Erasmus, printed with the dedicatory letter, from a posthumous edition (Cologne: Apud haeredes Joannis Quentel, 1561). The letter was published originally as 'Epistola in Haymonem ad Jo. Emstedium cartusianum' (Freiburg, 28 February 1533).

⁸ Van Heemstede was a monk of the charterhouse of Louvain, where Erasmus met him. As well as the edition of Haymo, Erasmus sent him an epitaph for his brother Carthusian Maarten Bartholomeuszoon van Dorp (*EE* 6.228.18-35, Ep 1646), and dedicated to him a lament for Johann Froben (*EE* 7.255-59, Ep 1900), first printed in his *Ciceronianus* (1528).

⁹ *Symbolum sive catechismus*, ed. J. N. Bakhuizen van den Brink in *Opera omnia* (Amsterdam, 1970-), 5/1.205-320; 'Epicureus' in *Colloquia*, ed. L.-E. Halkin et al., *ibid.* 1/3.720-33; *Quomodo se quisque debeat praeparare ad mortem*, ed. A. van Heck, *ibid.*, pp. 339-92; *De amabili ecclesiae concordia* in *Opera omnia*, ed. J. Clericus, 11 vols. (Leiden, 1703-1706), 5.470A-506D. The Amsterdam and Leiden editions are hereafter abbreviated as *ASD* and *LB*, respectively.

¹⁰ G. F. Rossi in his introduction to Thomas Aquinas, *Catena aurea*, 2 vols. (Turin, 1925), 1.xvii.

¹¹ *LB* 6.1B-422C.

¹² *ibid.*, 433A-542F, 1093D-1126A, 533A-1091F at 656A.

phrase of Romans. There Erasmus ridicules Nicolas of Lyra for supporting against every patristic authority Haymo's opinion that Paul wrote the letter from Athens, not Corinth.¹³ Had Erasmus, as have modern scholars, detected in Haymo's Pauline commentaries the origins of twelfth-century scholastic methods,¹⁴ contempt would have quashed any further traffic with him.

By 1533 Erasmus had already commented on nine psalms, none of which efforts has secured any attention from modern scholars, other than the brief notice that the first, 'Beatus vir', was complimentary to Beatus Rhenanus, his cherished friend who had long ago welcomed him to Basle. 'I send you yourself, a *Beatus* for a *Beatus*', Erasmus had written in 1515.¹⁵ Since then he had issued commentaries on Pss 2 in 1522; 3, 1524; 4, 1525; 8, 1528; 22 and 28, 1530; 33, 1531; 38, 1532.¹⁶ Five months after the publication of Haymo's commentaries, Erasmus published on 31 July his own on Ps 83 (84 MT), *De amabili ecclesiae concordia*.¹⁷ A comparison of this commentary with Haymo's

¹³ 'Deinde ridere libet novam Nicolai Lyrani diligentiam, qui, quum Origenes et divus Hieronymus, cumque his omnes Antiqui confirmant hanc Epistolam e Corintho fuisse missam, ipse tamen ambigit: nimirum quod Haimo scripsit ex Athenis missam. Verum hunc plus quam Gordianum nodum vide quanta dexteritate mirus explicat artifex: "Partem," inquit, "Scripsit Athenis: quod superat, deinde addidit Corinthi: atque ita Roman misit." O hominem suavem! mallet, opinor, Paulum quamlibet magnum itineris facere dispendium, ne quid patiatur auctoritas Haimonis, perinde quasi ille uno aut altero in loco labatur' (LB 6.655-56A). Nicolas of Lyra does cite Haymo thus in his *Postilla super totam Bibliam*, 4 vols. (Strassburg, 1492; rpt. Frankfurt/Main, 1971), 4, prol. to Romans. Haymo, however, has: 'A Corintho civitate metropoli Achaiae regionis scriptis apostolus Paulus Romanis hanc Epistolam...' (*Un divini Pauli epistolas expositio*, PL 117.361c).

¹⁴ E. Bertola, 'Il commentario paolino di Haimo di Halberstadt o di Auxerre e gli inizi del metodo scolastico', *Pier Lombardo* 5 (1961) 29-54 and 'I precedenti storici del metodo del *Sic et Non* di Abelardo', *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 53 (1961) 255-80; and briefly noting the method of raising and answering questions, Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 2nd rev. edition (Oxford, 1952), p. 40.

¹⁵ 'Mitto igitur te tibi, hoc est Beatum Beato': to Beatus Rhenanus (EE 2.62.46, Ep 327), trans. R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson, *The Collected Works of Erasmus* 3 (Toronto, 1976), p. 79 (abbreviated hereafter *CWE*). See also 'Enarratio Psalmi, Beatus vir' (LB 5.171E-198c).

¹⁶ 'Enarratio Psalmi, Quare fremuerunt Gentes' (LB 5.197D-232D); 'Paraphrasis in Psalmum, Domine quid multiplicati' (233A-242B); 'Concio in Psalmum, Quum invocarem' (241C-292D); 'Enarratio in Psalmum, Dominus regit me' (311F-346B); 'De bello Turcis inferendo consultatio' (345C-368B); 'Enarratio in Psalmum, Benedicam Domino in omni tempore' (369A-416C); 'Enarratio in Psalmum, Dixi custodiam vias meas' (417A-468F); 'Concio in Psalmum LXXXV' (507A-556E).

¹⁷ 'De amabili ecclesiae concordia, Enarratio Psalmi LXXXIII' (LB 5.469A-506D). There are several recent studies: Raymond E. Himelick's introduction to his translation of it in *Erasmus and the Seamless Coat of Jesus* (Lafayette, Ind., 1971), pp. 1-25; J. V. Pollet, 'Origine et structure du "De sancienda ecclesiae concordia" (1533) d'Érasme' in *Scrinium Erasmianum*, ed. J. Coppens, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1970), 2.183-95; Margaret Mann Phillips, 'Some Last Words of Erasmus' in *Luther, Erasmus and the Reformation*, ed. John C. Olin et al. (New York, 1969),

on the same psalm establishes that there was no exegetical influence of the monk on the humanist. The terse movement of Haymo's commentary, from phrase to phrase unfolding the psalm's address 'to the sons of the cross, the imitators of Christ',¹⁸ contrasts with Erasmus' course, in the description of P. S. Allen, 'as torrential as the most fluent orator's tongue, whirling along in eddies and backrushes which sometimes return almost to their starting-point.'¹⁹ Both exegetes interpret the psalm tropologically. For Haymo it concerns the winepresses of the Church in which the grapes and the seeds are sorted, that is, good from bad men.²⁰ For Erasmus, however, 'in it the Holy Spirit, arguing with the utmost plainness and cogency, urges upon us that blessed and lovely peace of the Church.' Haymo's exegesis achieves a kind of timeless, but unconvincing, validity. Erasmus' is immediate and urgent, deriving from a particular historical ferment, so that the psalm is for him 'useful and beneficial at any time, but in this age of proliferating sects more essential than any other.'²¹ It is in the exilic theme of Erasmus' interpretation of this psalm that the relevance of Haymo's labor suggests itself, and in its concordant theme that it is confirmed.

Erasmus discourses plaintively about the sojourn of the soul, groaning in exile for its heavenly home.²² He is careful to distinguish, however, that 'in the world' does not refer to the lay state and 'out of the world' to the monastic, but rather respectively to a heart that is empty of Christ's spirit or animated by it.²³ This conviction is reiterated in the prefatory letter to the edition of Haymo.²⁴ In *De concordia* Erasmus identifies the historical origin of monasticism in the

pp. 105-10; and the comments in my *Christening Pagan Mysteries: Erasmus in Pursuit of Wisdom* (Erasmus Studies 5; Toronto, 1981), pp. 87-89.

¹⁸ Haymo, *Pia, brevis ac dilucida in omnes psalmos explanatio*, p. 194 (PL 116.481).

¹⁹ P. S. Allen, *Erasmus: Lectures and Wayfaring Sketches* (Oxford, 1934), p. 82.

²⁰ Haymo, *Pia, brevis ac dilucida in omnes psalmos explanatio*, p. 194 (PL 116.481).

²¹ 'Psalmum octogesimum tertium ob id selegimus enarrandum, quod in eo Spiritus sanctus, multis argumentis magnaue tum evidentia tum vehementia, nobis speciosam illam ac beatam Ecclesiae concordiam commendat: qui sermo quum omni tempore salutaris est atque utilis, tum vero hoc seculo Sectarum feracissimo videtur ita necessarius, ut non alio magis' (*De concordia*, LB 5.469A; trans. Himelick, p. 29).

²² 'Sed interim fortassis subit alicujus animum admiratio...' to 'Hactenus mystagogus sive hierophanta noster, ostendit nobis amabile Domini tabernaculum, introduxit in atrium, commonstravit altaria, et hostias spirituales' (ibid., 483C-487E).

²³ 'Quum mundum dico, non designo professionem, vestem, cibos, aut titulum, sed animum Christi Spiritu vacuum. Vulgus enim hac voce, quemadmodum aliis multis, abutitur, mundanos appellans, qui sacris initiati non sunt, aut qui Monasticam vitam professi non sunt. Professos autem appellant extramundanos et mundo mortuos. Atqui, sicut sub omni veste, quantumvis sit vilis aut ἱεροπρεπής, latere potest mundanus animus, ita sub veste quamvis laica, aut etiam militari latere potest animus a mundo alienus, etiam si pluma struthiocameli volitet in pileo secto' (ibid., 483B-C).

²⁴ See below, nn. 33-34.

laments of unworldly men, 'panting for supernal happiness', who intensified their spiritual exile by withdrawing physically to secluded spots.²⁵ 'Hence, at one time after the Passion of Christ such flocks of men taking refuge in the Theban desert because they were unwilling to endure the wickedness and barbarism of idolatrous worship. Hence the beginning of monastic life: they were more content to associate with lions and panthers than with wicked men.'²⁶ Jerome, Benedict, Bernard and Patrick are singled out for example, as is 'Bruno, or whoever was the founder of the Carthusian order.'²⁷ Again, he states that 'the weariness of this exile here won these devout men over to such retreats; they were eager to separate themselves from the inhabitants of Kedar.'²⁸

In his own exile in Freiburg, routed by the Protestant siege of Basle from the only city he had adopted, drawn as he was from place to place by research or invitation, or pursued by plague, Erasmus could sympathize with the holy laments of the early monks. He does not, however, approve of their withdrawal from secular society. 'But wherever you turn here', he writes, 'wherever you go into hiding, you are in exile. Note, then, that however much you may long for some secluded retreat, as a man you are rushing off to humankind and that even as you try to avoid all association with men you are lugging man with you, carrying around a mortal body whose burden the Apostle was lamenting.'²⁹ Erasmus applauds the example rather of Basil, who 'called back to social concourse the monks who were spending their time in seclusion, far from human society, because, a shrewd man, he knew that many of those secluding themselves were not really devout but arrogant, puffed up with an unfounded assumption of sanctity, peevish, spiteful, captious, devoid of

²⁵ 'Hos gemitus videmus semper fuisse gravissimos in viris ad coelestiam beatitudinem anhelantibus. Hinc Prophetarum in deserta loca secessus' (*De concordia*, LB 5.484A; trans. Himelick, p. 55).

²⁶ 'Hinc olim post Christum passum tot hominum examina non ferentium idolatrarum impietatem ac saevitiam, occupaverunt solitudines Thebaidis. Hinc prima Monachorum origo. Satiatus esse ducebant cum leonibus ac pantheris habere commercium, quam cum hominibus impiis' (ibid., 484A-B; trans. Himelick, p. 55).

²⁷ 'Alii secesserunt in solitudines Syriae, quorum est beatus Hieronymus. Alii in desertas insulas sese abdebant. Alii montium cacumina, pene inaccessa obsidebant, ut divus Benedictus. Nonnulli paludes horridas, et vix ulli animantium habitabiles scrutabantur, ut Patricius ac Bernardus. Alii rupes et ipso adpectu horrenda quaerebant loca, ut Bruno, aut si quis alius fuit auctor Carthusianae sodalitatis' (ibid., 484B; trans. Himelick, p. 56).

²⁸ 'Haec suffugia persuadebat piis hominibus hujus exsilii taedium. Studebant seungi ab his qui habitabant Cedar' (ibid.; trans. Himelick, p. 56).

²⁹ 'Sed hic quocumque te vertas, quocumque te abdas, in exilio es. Quaere, pete quam voles retrusas latebras, homo ad homines vadis, atque ut universum hominum commercium effugas, hominem tecum effers, mortale corpus tecum circumfers quo gravatus sic ingemiscit Apostolus' (ibid., 484B-C; trans. Himelick, p. 56).

commonsense, and unfitted for every human task.'³⁰ The experience of Chrysostom was the same, he adds, whenever he summoned monks from their fasts and vigils to do the bishop's work.³¹ Erasmus draws the moral. 'They were looking outside of themselves for what they should have sought within. They were building nests, but hardly in the house of the Lord, since that kingdom of God is within us.'³²

The same norm of interior disposition, so characteristic of Erasmus' pastoral concern, is sustained in the preface to the edition of Haymo. There he affirms that, although the word 'monk' means 'simple and solitary', this solitude is 'not appraised by the number of companions, but by separation from evil affections: otherwise Carthusians are not alone.'³³ He continues thus: 'This solitude is present everywhere; where there is the most crowded fellowship, it is there. He is happily alone who is corrupted by the bad company of no man, who has no emotional disturbances warring with his spirit and conflicting with God. By *this* vow one can be a monk both in the courts of princes and of public magistrates, and in the midst of human commerce.'³⁴ This emphasis on the vocation universally vowed in baptism, while it serves to remind the Carthusian to whom the letter is addressed that the integrity of his state consists in adherence to Christ rather than to cloister and cowl, nevertheless seems amiss prefacing a monastic work.

More appropriate perhaps is the remainder of the dedication, a panegyric defense of monasticism. Monks are lauded humanistically as those men of such life and such discourse that no man would depart from their company or their colloquy unedified.³⁵ Erasmus catalogues descriptively their virtue in poverty,

³⁰ 'Divus Basilius legitur Monachos, qui in solitudinibus procul ab hominum commercio debebant, ad urbana sodalitia revocasse: quod vir prudens intelligeret illorum plerosque non evadere vere pios, sed superciliosos, falsa sanctimoniae persuasione turgidos, irritabiles, vindices, morosos, sensus communis expertes, et ad omnem vitae functionem ineptos' (ibid., 484c; trans. Himelick, p. 56).

³¹ 'Fatetur idem divus Chrysostomus, experimento cognosci, si quando ab illis jejuniis, vigiliis et chameuniis ad Episcopi munus accerserentur' (ibid., 484c-d).

³² 'Foris quaerebant, quod intus quaerendum erat. Ponebant nidos, sed non in atriis Domini, quum regnum Dei sit intra nos' (ibid., 484d; trans. Himelick, p. 56).

³³ 'Quod si nihil aliud displicet quam vocabulum, appellent pro monacho, si videtur, simplicem ac solitarium. Solitudo autem ea non aestimatur numero convictorum, sed separatione malorum affectuum: alioqui nec Cartusiani soli sunt': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.164.75-78).

³⁴ 'Vbicunque adest haec solitudo, ibi adest frequentissima sodalitas. Ille feliciter solus est, qui nullius improbi convictu corrumpitur, qui nullos habet in animo tumultus affectuum inter se pugnantium nec tamen cum Deo consentientium. Hoc pacto licet et in Principum aulis, et in publicis magistratibus, et in mediis hominum commerciis esse monachum' (ibid., ll. 78-84).

³⁵ 'Quorum talis est vita, talis oratio, vt nemo ab illorum conspectu, nemo a colloquio non melior discedat' (ibid., 163.31-32). For this humanist ideal in Erasmus see my *Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology* (Erasmus Studies 2; Toronto, 1978), pp. 35-57.

charity, and humility, emphasizing that no man need fear harm from them.³⁶ 'In sum', he writes, 'they reproduce for us a certain image of that heavenly city, and they somehow represent the angelic choir, whether because they chant perpetually the praises of God, or because spiritually transformed they hold no commerce with fleshly desires, or because they live in supreme concord, or because in the manner of angels they are as if the intermediaries of God and man, and they commend the prayers of the people and with petitioning they procure from Him the best things, not only for themselves, but for all.'³⁷ To their virtues Erasmus adds the gift of prophecy for teaching people in lectures and books.³⁸ Moreover, he writes, they 'immolate themselves for the salvation of the people' by crucifying their flesh with fasts, vigils, and labors to supply what is lacking in the passion of Christ.³⁹ Celebrating monks as 'men who dedicate themselves wholly to God' and as 'those who are most like Christ', Erasmus asks who would not love them, who would condemn them?⁴⁰ And, 'who, even if he were himself a reprobate, would not cherish and venerate such men as some demigods, divinely donated to the public service?', he inquires.⁴¹ Addressing laymen reproachfully, he writes, 'And you, laymen, can you wish evil to those who, while you snore deeply weighed with inebriation, watch for you, fast for you; while you provoke God to wrath with dice, with whores, and other abominations, pray for you; while you speak evilly of them before men, speak well of you before God?'⁴² Erasmus is convinced that 'whoever pronounces the word "monk" speaks the height of all heroic virtue'.⁴³

³⁶ 'A quibus nemo quicquam metuat incommodi...' to '... sed ex bona conscientia proficiens': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.163.32-49).

³⁷ 'In summa, coelestis illius ciuitatis imaginem quandam nobis referunt, et angelicos choros quodammodo repraesentant, vel quod iugiter decantant laudes Dei, vel quod transformati in spiritus nihil habeant commercii cum carnis affectibus, vel quod in summa viuunt concordia, vel quod angelorum ritu inter homines ac Deum velut internuntii et populorum vota illi commendant et plurima bona ab illo precibus assiduis impetrant, non sibi tantum, sed in commune' (*ibid.*, 163.49-164.56).

³⁸ 'Quid porro si ad has virtutes accedat donum prophetiae? vt gratis, vt pure, vt incorrupte doceant populum, siue voce, siue scriptis libris, siue vtroque?' (*ibid.*, 164.57-59).

³⁹ 'Quid quod ieiuniis, vigiliis, laboribus crucifigentes carnem suam, quantum licet, supplent ea quae desunt passionibus Christi, ac seipsos quodammodo immolant pro salute populi' (*ibid.*, II. 59-62).

⁴⁰ 'Quis enim non amet eos homines qui, vere mundo mortui, sese totos Deo dedicarunt?... Quatenus igitur est animi peruersitas odisse monachum, ob hoc ipsum quod monachus est? Profiteris te Christianum, et auersaris eos qui Christo simillimi sunt?' (*ibid.*, 163.29-30, 164.84-86).

⁴¹ 'Quis tales viros, non vt semideos quosdam veneretur, non amet, tanquam ad publicam vtilitatem quasi diuinitus datos, etiamsi ipse sit vir improbus?' (*ibid.*, 164.66-68).

⁴² 'Et tu, laice, potest male velle illis qui, dum crapula grauatus altum stertis, pro te vigilant, pro te ieiunant: dum tu Deum alea, scortis, aliisque sceleribus ad iram prouocas, illi pro te deprecantur: dum tu apud homines male de illis loqueris, illi de te bene loquuntur apud Deum?' (*ibid.*, II. 62-66).

⁴³ 'Qui monachum dicit, omnium heroicarum virtutum summam dicit...' (*ibid.*, I. 73).

These sentiments are not discordant with Erasmus' earlier convictions, although research has more often concentrated on his critical, even satirical, commentary on monasticism. His model of the Christian republic as a configuration of concentric circles orbiting about the axial Christ had designated the ecclesiastical state as that nearest Christ, and the common estate as that furthest from him.⁴⁴ Already he had published a colloquy, 'Militis et Cartusiani', which piously commended the cloistered life,⁴⁵ although it may be argued that for a pacifist like Erasmus any vocation would favorably compare with that of the military. The panegyric tone and emphasis of this dedicatory letter are unique, however. It has justly been stated that 'this preface shows an attitude toward monasticism very different from what might have been expected from the author of the *Praise of Folly* and some of the *Colloquies*. Coming from the pen of one who had himself fled from the monastery, rejecting the monastic discipline and spending years of his life in negotiations with ecclesiastical authority to regularize his position, these statements of his later years are the more remarkable.'⁴⁶ It has been conjectured further that 'Erasmus now makes perfectly clear that his previous attacks had been directed against abuses and that he accepts the institution of monasticism as he accepts the body of doctrine which he now regards the reformers as having repudiated.'⁴⁷

Why, however, should Erasmus *now* 'make perfectly clear that his previous attacks had been directed against abuses', when he had done so repeatedly in the past, in the case of the *Moria*, for example, by the noted letter to Maarten Bartholomeuszoon van Dorp,⁴⁸ or that of the censured colloquies, for another, by published replies to his critics?⁴⁹ Was he only now, eloquently writing of the 'nesting instinct',⁵⁰ in this year which saw the first English translation of his youthful exercise *De contemptu mundi* (?1488-89—1520),⁵¹ reevaluating the vows he had undone, nostalgically longing in exile for a monastic security which had once prompted him to exclaim from Steyn, 'Our whole life here is

⁴⁴ For the texts and an analysis see my *Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology*, pp. 72-117.

⁴⁵ 'Militis et Cartusiani' in *Colloquia*, ed. L.-E. Halkin et al. (ASD 1/3.314-19).

⁴⁶ Gilmore, 'Erasmus and the Cause of Christian Humanism: The Last Years 1529-1536' (n. 4 above), 125.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁸ To Maarten Bartholomeuszoon van Dorp (EE 2.91-114, Ep 337).

⁴⁹ For an account of these see Franz Bierlaire, *Les Colloques d'Érasme: réforme des études, réforme des mœurs et réforme de l'Église au XVI^e siècle* (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de philosophie et lettres de l'Université de Liège 222; Paris, 1978), pp. 201-303.

⁵⁰ 'Naturae instinctu omnia animantium genera parant sibi locum aliquem, in quo post labores tuta conquiescant...' (*De concordia*, LB 5.481f).

⁵¹ *De contemptu mundi*, ed. Sem Dresden (ASD 5/1.40-86).

Epicurean'?⁵² (In but two years, when he reflects on the martyrdom of Thomas More, that exemplary 'monk' while in the courts of princes and public magistrates, he will openly pine for that Epicurean ideal, *λάθε βιώσας*, to have lived unknown.⁵³) Or did Erasmus only pen this praise sophistically, to flatter his Carthusian friend van Heemstede?

Erasmus, who had earlier scoffed at Haymo in his annotation on Rom 16:27, is still reserved toward him in the prefatory letter to his commentary. He commends Haymo faintly as one 'who speaks more piously than artfully, although I do not see how it can be denied that what is said piously is said artfully.'⁵⁴ He introduces him as 'Haymo, the monk, abbot, and bishop, interpreting the Davidic psalms with remarkable brevity and with remarkable simplicity and transparency.'⁵⁵ The historical context of Haymo's text, which Erasmus immediately supplies, indicates that this admiration is to be construed as: not bad for those times.⁵⁶ Erasmus explains that Haymo's commentary is typical of the labor in which learned monks had engaged for several centuries, abridging into a compendium those teachings which were more learnedly written or more elegantly declaimed in public by the Fathers. In this category of drones Erasmus places Haymo, together with Anselm, Bede, and Claudius, all of 'whose industry brought the Church a better-than-average usefulness, especially if one considers the times, then the regions in which they lived.'⁵⁷ Erasmus, then, was not particularly attracted to Haymo, whom he simply

⁵² 'Imo vero, mi Iodoce, tota vitae nostrae ratio Epicurea est!' (ibid., 74.938-39, and see also 73.925-82.153).

⁵³ 'Si olim scissem quid sit celebre nomen, summa vi fuisset adnixus ne quis praeter domesticos nouisset Erasmus; nunc frustra mihi placet illud Epicuri *λάθε βιώσας*: to Piotr Tomicki (*EE* 11.218.23-26, Ep 3049). See also, 'Num recte dictum sit *λάθε βιώσας*, id est, sic vive, ut nemo te sentiat vixisse' (*LB* 4.51A-54B).

⁵⁴ '... tamen visum est vnum addere, qui pia loquitur verius quam diserta: tametsi non video quo pacto negari possit diserte dici quod pie dicitur': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.162.3-5).

⁵⁵ 'Is est Haymo monachus, Abbas et Episcopus, mira breuitate miraque simplicitate ac perspicuitate enarrans Psalmos Davidicos' (ibid., 162.5-163.7).

⁵⁶ This is analogous to Erasmus' evaluation of Thomas Aquinas as the 'most diligent of all the moderns': '... ipse neotericorum omnium diligentissimus Thomas Aquinas...' (*Ratio verae theologiae* in *Ausgewählte Werke*, ed. Hajo Holborn with Annemarie Holborn [Munich, 1964], p. 152.26 [hereafter abbreviated *H*]). The term 'moderns' is pejorative. See my *Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology*, for his critique of scholasticism; and also J.-P. Massaut, 'Érasme et Saint Thomas' in *Colloquia Erasmi Turonensia: 12^e Stage internationale d'études humanistes, Tours 1969*, ed. Jean-Claude Margolin, 2 vols. (De Pétrarque à Descartes 24; Paris, 1972), 2.581-611.

⁵⁷ 'Fuit hoc studium seculis aliquot monachis eruditissimis, ut quae a veteribus vel subtilius essent scripta doctis, vel fusius dicta apud populum, in compendium redigerent, adeo perspicua breuitate ut et ab occupatis et a tenuiter literatis facile valeant percipi. Huius ordinis praecipue sunt Anselmus, Beda, Claudius, et hic qui nunc venit in tuos complexus Haymo; quorum industria non mediocrem utilitatem attulit Ecclesiae, praesertim si quis spectet tum tempora, tum regiones in quibus illi vixerunt': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.163.7-14).

classified with other medieval commentators: among the 'plenty of plodding workers'.⁵⁸ Why then did he interrupt his edition of Origen, whom he did consider a masterful exegete,⁵⁹ to publish Haymo?

The clue to the edition of Haymo is planted emphatically in the final sentences of the prefatory letter. There Erasmus discloses that 'the venerable monastery of Canons Regular, popularly called Marbach, in Alsace furnished the original manuscript, the remains of a very inauspicious insurrection of peasants. May the Lord repay them good for their evil.'⁶⁰ The phrase *tumultus agricularum* in Erasmus' correspondence during 1525-26 designates the Peasants' War. From Basle he had once written of an earlier Paschal season, how suddenly had occurred a fatal insurrection of peasants, which left him hanging uncertainly there 'between the devil and the deep blue sea'.⁶¹ The event which Erasmus records was the outbreak precipitated when, as oral tradition preserves it, the countess of Lupfen at Stühlingen required peasants to interrupt their harvest to gather snail shells on which she could wind her yarns. This was only the most notorious of sporadic riots provoked by economic and political repression and promoted by religious reform and the new self-image of the peasant class.⁶² Erasmus, who lived just across the street from Basle's consul, was well apprised of the affair, and he reports hopefully that several princes and peasants are to convene in the city, to see if moderate negotiations can compose

⁵⁸ 'Post hos quidem nitor politiques theologiae sensim in deterius degeneravit et non parum rubiginis coepit contrahere. Non defuerunt aliquot secula docti, verum vt rariores, ita inferiores. Laboriosorum nunquam non fuit copia' (*Antibarbari*, ed. Kasimierz Kumaniecki, *ASD* 1/ 1.129.5-8; trans. Margaret Mann Phillips, *CWE* 23.111).

⁵⁹ The most recent study is Gerard J. Fokke, *Christus verae pacis auctor et unicus scopus: Erasmus and Origen* (Diss. Louvain, 1977).

⁶⁰ 'Exemplar exhibuit venerabile monasterium canonicorum regularium, vulgo dictum Marpach in Elsatia, reliquias inauspicatissimi tumultus agricularum. Dominus illis pro malis reponat bona': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.165.112-15).

⁶¹ 'Post Pascha hoc ipsum agente me, subito exortus est hic fatalis tumultus agricularum: qui facit vt hic haereamus, nescio quam tuto, inter Scyllam et Charybdim, vt aiunt': to Maximilianus Transsylvanus (*EE* 6.112.23-25, Ep 1585). The first mention of this in Erasmus' correspondence is 'Agitur hic per rusticos cruenta fabula; quae sit futura catastrophe nescio': to Adrian Barland (*ibid.*, 111.23-24, Ep 1584). See also, 'Hic agitur misera cruentaque fabula; cuius vtinam Dominus det felicem catastrophem! Nos subita tempestate deprehensi, inter sacrum et saxum, ut aiunt, heremus, non sine graui discrimine. Vtinam nunc liceret e Tyberi bibere!': to Jacopo Sadoletto (*ibid.*, 116.24-27, Ep 1586); 'Hic agitur fabula mire cruenta; quam *καταστροφήν* habitura nescio': to Germanus Brixius (*ibid.*, 149.13-14, Ep 1597); 'Nuper prodierunt in scenam nobiles et agricolaes. Actio fuit mire sanguinaria. Ea nunc recrudescit; quae sit futura catastrophe nescio': to Guillaume Budé (*ibid.*, 153.8-10, Ep 1601).

⁶² While the extensive and controversial literature on the Peasants' War can hardly be cited here, an introduction is Günther Franz, *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg*, 7th edition (Darmstadt, 1965). From this sentence to the end of the next paragraph I have cited directly from my forthcoming *Rhetoric and Reform: Erasmus' Civil Dispute with Luther*, q.v. for further analysis of Erasmus' criticism of Luther related to civil insurrection, and the Peasants' War in particular.

the 'bloodthirsty uprising'.⁶³ By the autumn, however, Erasmus is still narrating the 'cruel and bloodthirsty drama' in which 'farmers are violently dashing themselves to death.'⁶⁴ 'Daily', he writes, 'atrocious conflicts occur between nobles and peasants, and in this vicinity too, so that we hear the clash of arms and missiles, and almost the groan of men falling.'⁶⁵ Recounting how this fatal malady overruns every region, he adds that the princes are applying the usual remedies to it. Erasmus fears lest they exacerbate the evil, since 'only the standard of Christ the laborer can turn this fatal tempest to a joyful conclusion.'⁶⁶ By winter Erasmus is writing that more than a hundred thousand peasants have been slain, while daily priests are captured, tortured, hung, beheaded, and burned at the stake. 'I do not reject the necessary remedy, however harsh it may be', he writes, 'but we Germans have learned to punish evil better than to prevent it.'⁶⁷ In the spring of the subsequent year, Erasmus reports that the peasant uprisings have nearly been contained, but by severe measures. Although he suspects that riots might recur,⁶⁸ he observes that the mass executions of peasants have stirred in all hearts a hope of final victory.⁶⁹

⁶³ 'Magistratus huius urbis in hoc negotio prudentissime se gessit, praecipue Consul mihi proxime vicinus.... Erit Basileae conuentus aliquot principum et agricolarum: illic agetur si moderatis rationibus hic cruentus tumultus queat componi': to Maximilianus (*EE* 6.112.25-27, 29-31). See *ibid.*, 112 n. 27, for reference to the consul. Also, 'Basilienses conati sunt compositis rebus sanguinis effusionem excludere; sed inanis sumpta est opera': to Willibald Pirckheimer (*ibid.*, 155.12-13, Ep 1603).

⁶⁴ 'Hic agitur crudelis et cruenta fabula. Agricolae ruunt in mortem': to Polidoro Virgilio (*ibid.*, 160.17, Ep 1606). 'Hic sesquimenssem perpetua durauit pluuiā; et quasi parum sit commaduisse imbre coelesti, stant in procinctu nobiles et agricolae congressuri, quo magis madescant mutuo sanguine': to Pirckheimer (*ibid.*, 157-58.110-13).

⁶⁵ 'Quotidie fiunt conflictus atroces inter procures et rusticos, adeo in propinquo vt tormentorum et armorum crepitus ac prope cadentium gemitus exaudiamus': to Virgilio (*ibid.*, 160.17-20).

⁶⁶ 'Fatale malum est, mira celeritate peruagans omnes mundi plagas. Card. Campegius metu tumultus cessit ex Hungaria. Archiepiscopus profligatus est. Card. Salsburgen̄ iam pridem obsidetur. Legatus episcopus Verulanus cessit metu ex Eluetiis. Colonia fuere motus nonnulli. In Brabantia malum incruduit. Principes tantum agunt vulgaribus remediis. Metuo ne magis exasperent malum, sed Christus insignis artifex solus potest hanc fatalem tempestatem vertere in laetos exitus': to Virgilio (*ibid.*, ll. 21-28). See also the letter to Pirckheimer (*ibid.*, 154.8-155.14).

⁶⁷ 'Hic longe supra centum milia rusticorum interfecta sunt, et quotidie sacerdotes capiuntur, torquentur, suspenduntur, decollantur, exuruntur. Non nego necessarium remedium, quamuis immite: sed Germani magis nouimus malefacta punire quam excludere': to Nicolaas Everaerts (*ibid.*, 240.29-33, Ep 1653). See also, 'Locatur ille in crisim sanguinis; verum ea crisis Orco dedit agricolarum plus minus centum millia. Nunc remisit se paroxysmus, et Nausea, si venerit, reperiet malum aliquanto medicabilius': to Daniel Mauch (*ibid.*, 199.17-19, Ep 1633).

⁶⁸ 'Agricolarum motus fere coerciti sunt, sed immiti remedio. Sic postulabat morbi magnitudo. Quanquam ea pestis subinde meditatur recrudesce. Sed prouisum, opinor, ne rerum nouarum audis liceat quod licuit': to Francesco Chierigati (*ibid.*, 301.17-21, Ep 1686).

⁶⁹ 'Strages agricolarum sic in spem victoriae erexit animos omnium': to Pirckheimer (*ibid.*, 350.3-4, Ep 1717).

Erasmus is sympathetic toward these insurrections, although he does not condone their violence and understands their motivation too restrictively as moral indignation. 'Although it seems monstrous', he writes, 'that the peasants have sacked certain monasteries, nevertheless what provoked them is the depravity of those monks whom no law can correct, so do they wink at one another's faults.'⁷⁰ Commenting on the rough treatment of monks and nuns, how when their cloisters were not seized outright, they were stripped of all privileges and placed under the jurisdiction of local magistrates,⁷¹ Erasmus agrees that 'as most of them are intolerable, they cannot be corrected by any other means.'⁷² Yet he is convinced that monastic reform should properly be undertaken by papal and other ecclesiastical authority,⁷³ and he fears that 'what gestates in popular uprising will finish badly.'⁷⁴ As the legs of Christ's body,⁷⁵ peasants are to walk sturdily as commoners in field and town, and not to clamber over monastery walls to seize the ecclesiastical estate.

In concluding the preface to his edition of Haymo, Erasmus had revealed that the manuscript exemplar was the remains of the devastation of the abbey of Marbach by rampaging peasants.⁷⁶ Already ransacked by English troops in 1360, and pillaged by the Armagnacs in 1439 and again in 1444 as they crossed Alsace in an army of 100,000 under the Dauphin, Marbach was victimized by peasant uprisings from the beginning of the fifteenth century.⁷⁷ By one report, in 1525 the inhabitants of Gundolsheim, supported by citizens of the neighboring villages, profaned the altars, then demolished the entire living quarters, leaving only the abbey's walls and roof intact.⁷⁸ By another, the peasants burned an enormous quantity of archival documents. The most important of these, however, had already been sent by the abbot, Bruno de

⁷⁰ 'Et quanquam immane videtur quod rustici monasteria quaedam diripuerunt, tamen huc istorum improbitas prouocauit, qui nullis legibus corrigi possunt, vt ipsi inter sese conuiuent': to Pirckheimer (ibid., 157.89-92).

⁷¹ 'Tot priuilegiis, tot exemptionibus, tot phalangibus armati sunt...' to '... sed erunt subditi suis episcopis ac magistratibus, quemadmodum ceteri sacerdotes et laici': to Pirckheimer (ibid., 156.54-157.78). Also, 'Ob huiusmodi portenta totum monachorum genus venit in odium publicum...' to 'Existimant enim has coniuratas phalanges et tot priuilegiis armatas diutius ferri non posse': to Jean de Selve (ibid., 150.15-23, Ep 1598); 'Monachi et sacerdotes publico laborant odio': to Adriaan Aelius van Baerland (ibid., 111.19-20, Ep 1584).

⁷² 'Multis in locis dure tractati sunt monachi; verum plerique cum sint intolerabiles, alia tamen ratione corrigi non poterant': to Pirckheimer (ibid., 156.53-54).

⁷³ 'Si res ageretur Pontificis et episcoporum autoritate, rectissime fieret': to Pirckheimer (ibid., 157.84-85).

⁷⁴ 'Quod populari tumultu geritur, infoelicem habet exitum' (ibid., II. 82-83).

⁷⁵ For this metaphor see my *Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology*, pp. 84-85, 112.

⁷⁶ See above, n. 60.

⁷⁷ François A. Goehlinger, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Marbach* (Colmar, 1954), pp. 107-108.

⁷⁸ ibid.

Hüsseren, to the safety of Enguiseheim, in whose presbytery the monks themselves would soon take exile.⁷⁹ Was the manuscript of Haymo's commentary on the psalms among these transferred documents, or was it salvaged from the very fires and ashes at Marbach? How or when Erasmus came by it is uncertain.⁸⁰ But when he had inaugurated his evangelical reform with its paradigmatic edition, that of the New Testament, he had envisioned farmers at their ploughs, singing from scripture.⁸¹ Now, almost two decades later, as he reflected on the pillage of Marbach, he could hope that by repaying good for evil Haymo might recall them to their vocation.

Yet Erasmus published Haymo a full seven years after the resolution – if massacre be any resolution – of the Peasants' War. Did Erasmus in 1533 fear another insurrection? Luther did. And it is precisely in his own psalm commentaries from 1530 through 1532⁸² that he voices his apprehension. The scandalous behavior of the nobility has created 'bad blood among the common people and the suspicion that the whole nobility is worthless', he writes. 'Such a suspicion among the common people is dangerous, and it is not good that those who should rule in this world are discredited and disrespected. Some future confusion could result, as the devil finds time and opportunity, such as he found in the uprising under Münzer.'⁸³ Thomas Münzer embodied for Luther

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, p. 108.

⁸⁰ Among Erasmus' correspondents, only one seems to be a native of Marbach, namely, Benedikt Burgauer, who wrote Erasmus in October 1528 (*EE* 7.526, Ep 2067). He was not, however, in Marbach at the time of the Peasants' War, and had no recorded connection with the abbey. He affiliated himself rather with the Protestant reformers. See Allen's introductory note to that letter.

It may be that the bishop of Basle, Christoph von Utenheim, who had extended Erasmus great kindness, and to whom Erasmus dedicated his *De magnitudine misericordiarum Domini concio* (*LB* 5.557A-588E and *EE* 5.509, Ep 1474) and his *Epistola apologetica de interdicto esu carnum deque similibus hominum constitutionibus* (*EE* 5.46 n. 14) was the intermediary. For von Utenheim see the introductory note to Ep 598 (*EE* 3.7). The abbey of Marbach was jurisdictionally in the diocese of Basle, since 1462 when the bishop of that city had ordered its incorporation to the Windesheim congregation (Goehlinger, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Marbach*, pp. 107-108, 111-19).

⁸¹ 'Utinam hinc ad stivam aliquid decantet agricola, hinc nonnihil ad radios suos moduletur textor, huiusmodi fabulis itineris taedium lenet viator' (*Paraclesis*, *H* 142.21-23).

⁸² These are on Pss 82, 118, and 117, all composed and published in 1530, in Luther, *Werke*, 58 vols. (Weimar, 1883-1948; rpt. Graz, 1964-), 31/1.189-218, 68-182, 223-57 (hereafter abbreviated *WA*); Ps 147, written in 1531 and published in 1532 (*ibid.*, 431-56); Pss 2, 51, and 45, all publicly lectured in 1532 and published in 1546, 1538 and 1533-34, respectively (*WA* 40/2.193-312, 315-470, 472-610). The dates are taken from Jaroslav Pelikan's introductions to *Luther's Works*, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann et al., 54 vols. (St. Louis, 1955-), vols. 12-14; hereafter abbreviated *LW*.

⁸³ 'Denn es stellen und zieren sich itzt fast der mehrer teil des Adels so lesterlich und schendlich, das sie damit dam gemeinen man bose blut und argen wahn machen, als sei der gantz Adel durch und durch kein neutze. Und ist doch solcher wahn im pofel ferlich und auch

the peasant movement,⁸⁴ and he is repeatedly denounced in this series of psalm commentaries.⁸⁵ Luther expounds on the Peasants' War as a warning to the nobility who now 'strut and brag', forgetting that God alone rescued them. Whenever Luther sees or hears one of these bigwigs 'the insurrection is painted on him in lurid colors'.⁸⁶ 'Certainly', he writes, 'in the recent insurrection God demonstrated clearly that neither human power nor skill, but He alone governs the world. For these very same bigwigs who would rob God of His honor by bragging and boasting of their role in suppressing the insurrection were at that time the most fear-stricken wretches I have ever seen. Now', he regrets, 'they

nicht gut, das man die, so regieren sollen inn der welt, so geringe und leicht achte. Es moecht ein mal ein ander unrat draus folgen, wo der Teuffel raum und zeit fuende, wie er unter dem Meuntzer inn der affrhur fuernam' (*Der 117. Psalm ausgelegt*, WA 31/1.223.28-224.10; trans. Edward Sittler, LW 14.4).

⁸⁴ For review articles see Siegfried Bräuer, 'Müntzerforschung von 1965 bis 1975', *Lutherjahrbuch* 44 (1977) 127-41 and 45 (1978) 102-39, 183-84.

Luther spurns the Anabaptists as new monks: 'Sicut Anabaptistae et alii, reiectis haereticis operum sub uno nomine, reducunt eos sub alio nomine. Alius pilea gallica damnat et laudat tunicam griseam, ut vocant, Alius nihil vult habere proprii, ut eo liberius, quae aliorum sunt, sine labore ad se transferat, ac in his nugis ponunt sanctitatem aliquam. Sic reiectis operibus monachorum veterum reducunt novos monachos' (*Praelectio in psalmum 45*, WA 40/2.575.16-21).

⁸⁵ 'Denn das sind giftige und ferliche prediger, die ein teil allein fuer sich nemen, Schelten die herrn, auff das sie den poefel kuetzeln und den baurh hofieren wie der Muentzer, Carlstad und ander schwermer, Odder widderruemb den poefel allein schelten, das sie den herrn heuchlen und wol dienen wie unser widdersacher...' (*Der 82. Psalm ausgelegt*, WA 31/1.198.7-11; trans. C. M. Jacobs, LW 14.51). 'Hette man den Muentzer, Carlstat und ihre gefellen nicht so lassen schleichen und kriechen inn frembde heuser und kirchspiel, da hin sie niemand gesand, auch keinen beselb hatten, so were alles das grosse unglueck wol verblieben' (ibid., 210.35-38; trans. ibid., p. 64). 'Sed ubi ceptum est tumultuari a Munzero primum, qui ferebatur seditioso Spiritu, Deinde a Carlstadio, Zuinglio et aliis fanaticis doctoribus ecclesiae perturbarentur, ac iam idaea propria huius regni cerneretur...' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, WA 40/2.197.27-30; trans. Lewis Spitz, ibid., p. 17). 'Munzerus sedicionem excitat in Turingis...' (ibid., 209.27; trans. ibid., p. 16). 'Si Satanae unus Munzerus, Carlstadius, Zinglius non satis est excitet plures' (ibid., 210.20-21). 'Qui autem contemnunt et aversantur nos, illi putant nostra arma nihil esse, dicunt nos non intelligere scripturam et carere spiritu, sicut Muncerus dicebat' (*Praelectio in psalmum 45*, WA 40/2.500.28-30; trans. Koenker, ibid., p. 218). 'Munzerus, Zinglius et alii putabant se perventuros eo, quo cogitabant, Sie meineten, sie wolten das liedlin so hinaus singen, Sed priusquam vere incipiunt, pereunt' (ibid., 506.34-507.17; trans. ibid., p. 223). 'Ac sane Muncerus, Anabaptistae, Sacramentarii iam dudum maiores dedissent turbas neque resisti eis potuisset, nisi verbum obtulisset' (ibid., 547.29-31; trans. ibid., p. 253).

⁸⁶ 'Wie wol meinert halben sehe ichs gerne, das sie so stoltz daher pochen und scharren. Denn es dienet dazu, das mans ja nicht vergesse, wie ritterlich sie dazu mal inn der auffrur sich fur den amechtigen bauren furchten und flohen. Ich hette sonst solch geschicht mussen ettwo inn einen stein lassen hawen odder zum ewigen gedechtnis inn ein buch schreiben. Nu spar ich der kost und muhe. Denn wo man einen solchen Scharrhansen sihet odder horet, da ist solche auffrur lebendig an ihm gemalet...' (*Auslegung des 118. Psalms*, WA 31/1.80.31-81.22; trans. George Beto, LW 14.53).

forget the God who rescued them.'⁸⁷ It was only by divine wrath that the peasants were subdued in that revolt, Luther contends. They were condemned under the biblical threat, 'Therefore he who resists government will be punished [Rom 13:2].'⁸⁸ It was God himself who gave the impetus to their disastrous rebellion. 'When the subjects are ripe for it, as the peasants were in the revolt', Luther explains, 'God sentences them to rebellion or disobedience, that they may get a good beating.'⁸⁹ Luther is convinced that peace is maintained now in Germany only by God's 'special show of power' even as men 'plot and rage'. Solemnly he concludes, 'I am of the opinion that our present peace hangs by a silk thread; in fact, it is solely in God's hands, above and beyond our will and despite the fuming and the raving of all the devils. If human wisdom and the power of men were governing Germany today, she would be lying in ruins tomorrow.'⁹⁰ Again, he scores the insolence of the peasants who in these few years of peace have grown presumptuous. 'Their very skin seems to itch, almost like a sow fattened for the slaughter, as though they could not and would not put up with these good times any more and would not rest until the butcher seizes them and makes sausage of them. This is the thanks God gets for having given these villains such precious peace. But see how long He will put up with it!', he warns.⁹¹

⁸⁷ 'Und zwar hats uns Gott inn der nehesten auffrur greifflich gnug angezeigt, das wedder macht noch kunst die welt regiere, Sondern allein Gott. Denñ eben die selbigen Scharrhansen, die itzt seine ehre rauben, rheumen und bruesten sich, als hetten sie es ausgericht, waren zur selbigen zeit solche verzagte schelmen, als ich mein tage gesehen haben. Itzt vergessen sie Gottes, der sie dazu mal errettet...' (ibid., 79.34-80.21; trans. ibid., pp. 52-53).

⁸⁸ 'Darumb ist nichts, das man unterthanen, es sei baur odder burger, mit scharren zwingen wolle. Denn ein baur, kan auch messer stoertzen und schalgen, so wol als ein adelicher Scharrhans. Sondern Gott thuts, der lesst ihn sagen Ro. 13: Wer der oeberkeit widerstrebt, sol gestrafft werden. Solche wort, die thuns, Und Gott hellt auch drueber, und mus geschehen, wie er drewet' (ibid., 82.27-31).

⁸⁹ 'Darumb wenn die unterthanen reiff sind, wie die baur inn der affrur waren, so verhengt Gott uber sie, das sie affrur odder ungehorsam anrichten, auff das sie weidlich auff die koepffe geschlagen werden...' (ibid., II. 32-34; trans. Beto, *LW* 14.54).

⁹⁰ 'Sonst solt eitel mord und krieg in landen, auffrur und ungehorsam inn stedten sein. Und sonderlich helt er ja itzt inn Deutschen landen, mit treflicher gewalt, friede, wie wenig auch des selbigen ist, Denn man mus es greiffen, das itzt under den Deutschen kein mensch sei, der widder solchen ungehorsamen und reubischen adel die oeberkeit erhalten, widder solche untrew und diebische unterthanen die herren schuetzen moecht. Es ist ein solch rauben und stelen unternander, darnach viel wunderlicher meuchler mit seltzamen practiken, hetzen und reitzen. Und mache doch niemand kein gewissen drueber, das solchs fur Gott fuende sei. Das ichs dafur achte, unser itziger friede und stand, hange an einem seiden faden, Ja er schwebt schlecht inn der lufft allein inn Gottes henden, uber und widder unsern willen und gedancken, und widder aller teuffel wueten und toben, Denn wo menschliche weisheit und gewalt itzt solt Deutsch land regieren, Es lege morgen auff einem hauffen' (ibid., 83.21-84.18; trans. ibid.).

⁹¹ 'Denn es ist unseglich, wie geil und kutzel die bawrn itzt worden sind durch diese fridreiche zeit ettliche iar daher. Es iucket sie die haut so fast wie einer saw zur schlachtung gemestet, als wolten und kondten sie der guten tage nicht lenger leiden noch tragen, lassen auch

If Luther's psalm commentaries of 1530-32 are reviewed not only for his fear of a fresh insurrection by the peasants, but also for his cry for the dissolution of monasteries, the puzzle of Erasmus' edition of Haymo will lock. Luther's predictions of the whipping of the peasants in the end-time were multiplied a hundredfold for monks. Consistently in these commentaries Luther denounces the works-righteousness of monastic life, and he predicts its end. Monasteries, rules, cowls and cords have arisen, he lectures, not as Erasmus will suppose from the laments of holy men in exile,⁹² but from the smug sin of presumption. Men presume it God's will that they 'earn something before Him by their diligence and thus reconcile Him to themselves.'⁹³ Bragging of merits,⁹⁴ 'a monk thinks he presents the greatest service to God when he changes his clothing, abandons his calling, and withdraws into a monastery, where he eats, drinks, and sleeps in a new way.' While he supposes that he will 'be reborn and become a new man ... only the outward appearance has been changed, but the mind and the heart remain the same.'⁹⁵ Luther maintains that it is not 'bad per se to change clothes, like a monk, to fast, chastise the body, and the like,' but that the practice perpetuates the 'godless notion that these things are useful for obtaining the forgiveness of sins.' If only this notion were rejected, and a man put his trust entirely in the merits and grace of Christ, then he could be saved, even in a monk's hood,⁹⁶ Luther writes. If only monasteries were 'nothing else than Christian schools, as they were originally founded ... then the foundations would be fine.'⁹⁷ But monks confess the divinity of Christ with their tongues

nicht ab, bis der Fleisch hawer uber sie kome und mache worste draus. Solcher danck mus Gott empfaen, das er solchen buben so feinen fried gegeben hat. Uber schaw zu, wie lange ers leiden wird' (*Der 147. Psalm, Lauda Jerusalem, ausgelegt*, *ibid.*, 441.26-32; trans. Sittler, *LW* 14.120).

⁹² See above, n. 25.

⁹³ 'Deinde credunt Deum ea esse voluntate, ut ipsi sua diligentia et devotione eum possint demereri et sibi reconciliare. Hinc nata sunt Monasteria, Regulae, Cuculli, Funes, Missae, peregrinationes et similes stulti cultus, quos natura destituta cognitione Dei sibi contra et praeter verbum finxit' (*Enarratio psalmi LI*, *WA* 40/2.324.22-26; trans. Pelikan, *LW* 12.309).

⁹⁴ 'Monachorum, non Davidis sunt ista, iactare meritum et alia...' (*ibid.*, 341.27-28). This theme is common in these commentaries: e.g., *ibid.*, 404.12-406.30, 452.30-33; *Enarratio psalmi II*, *ibid.*, 269.32-270.25.

⁹⁵ 'Monachus putat se Deo praestare summum cultum, cum mutat vestem, cum relinquit vocationem et se abdit in monasterium, ubi novo modo comedit, bibit, dormit etc. Sic putat se renasci et fieri novum hominem, Et tamen solus externus habitus mutatus est, mens autem et animus manet idem...' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, *WA* 40/2.303.20-24; trans. Spitz, *LW* 12.86).

⁹⁶ 'Per se malum non est mutare vestem, sicut monachus mutat, ieiunare, affigere corpus etc. Reprehendimus enim haec tantum eo nomine, quia suscipiuntur cum impia opinione, tanquam res ad impetrandam remissionem peccatorum utiles. Hanc opinionem si abiicias, etiamsi retineas cucullum, modo Filium sincere osculeris, hoc est, modo nitaris eius meritis et gratia, vives in aeternum' (*ibid.*, 306.26-31; trans. *ibid.*, 88-89).

⁹⁷ 'Wenn sie aber ihre Stifft und Kloester hielten dafur und auch also brauchten, das man die Christliche iugent drinnen erzoege und den glauben und zucht lerete, damnit man feine person

and deny it with their lives, for they take refuge in works rather than in the cross,⁹⁸ and they make of their monasteries an 'estate superior to the ordinary class of Christians.'⁹⁹ Because of this arrogance, Luther announces, 'they will have to be torn to bits and scattered like stubborn Jerusalem; there is no help for it.'¹⁰⁰

While Erasmus would suppose that monasticism was founded by holy men,¹⁰¹ Luther lectures that it is blasphemous even to speak of a 'holy man'; the very expression is fictitious.¹⁰² The world judges it holiness 'if you put on dirty clothes, afflict your body with rigid diet, and torture yourself; if you seek out some corner somewhere remote from the affairs of men and their turbulent dealings and there undertake something extraordinary.' This is in Luther's other-worldly judgment a 'counterfeit holiness'.¹⁰³ The purveyors of monasticism are worldly; the justified man, however, rejects the hermit's life.¹⁰⁴

hette zu Christlichen ampten, Und weren also nichts anders denn Christliche shulen, wie sie von anfang gestiftet sind, und die namen der prelatur als Probst, Dechant, Scholasticus, Cantor und der gleichen noch wol anzeigen. So weren es feine Stifte' (*Der 117. Psalm ausgelegt*, WA 31/1.240.21-26; trans. Sittler, LW 14.20-21).

⁹⁸ 'Monachus ore confitetur, quod credat Christum esse Dei filium, Sed huic filio Dei affingit aliquid ex sua voluntate et statuit eum probare cucullum et hoc vitae genus singulare ac pro eo redditurum aeternam vitam. Sed, o hypocrita, quis iussit te Dei filio talem, ut sic vocem, nasum affingere? quis certum te fecit, Deum tale aliquid abs te velle?'

Nihilo igitur Monachus, quando secundum regulam suam sanctissime vivit, sanior aut melior est Ario, dicenti, quod Deus tantum unus sit, Christum autem dici Dei filium, quod sit perfectissima et prima creatura, per quem omnes aliae creaturae factae sunt. Si enim Christus Dei filius est et in eo uno nobis acquiescendum est, quod Deus eum miserit salvatorem, cur addit Monachus talem fiduciam suo operi a se delecto?' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, WA 40/2.252.24-35).

⁹⁹ 'Über einen stand draus zu machen, der besser sei weder der gemein Christenstand, das ist verkeret ding und Christum verleugnet und verflucht. Sie sollen dienen und helfen zum Christen stand wie die schulen, hauszucht und weltlich regiment, sampt allen andern Creaturn, Aber gleich, besser odder hoeher denn der Christenstand sollen sie nicht sein' (*Der 117. Psalm ausgelegt*, WA 31/1.240.26-31; trans. Sittler, LW 14.22).

¹⁰⁰ 'Weil sie nu solchs nicht woellen thun, muessen sie wie das halsstarrige Jerusalem auch zurissen und zuschmissen werden, da hilfft nichts fur' (*ibid.*, ll. 33-35; trans. *ibid.*).

¹⁰¹ See above, n. 25.

¹⁰² 'Quare isti nimis alti et inveterati errores ac falsae opiniones abiiciendae sunt, cum vocamus monachorum more sanctum Hieronymum, sanctum Paulum etc., quia in se peccatores sunt et solus Deus est sanctus, sicut Ecclesia canit...' to 'Ergo taceamus de sanctitate et sanctis, Sanctificatos autem scimus eos esse, qui ex peccatoribus insensatis fiunt peccatores sensati, qui non praesumunt de sua iusticia, quae nulla est...' (*Enarratio psalmi LI*, WA 40/2.347.32-348.27).

¹⁰³ 'Mundus enim sic iudicat, esse sanctitatem, si sordide vestias, si duro victu affligas corpus et te maceres, si angulum aliquem quaeras semotum a frequentia hominum et turbulentis negociis atque ibi aliquid insolitum instituas. Haec mendacia et fucatam hanc sanctimoniam intelligit caro et admiratur' (*ibid.*, 388.23-27; trans. Pelikan, LW 12.353).

¹⁰⁴ '... qui docent Ordines, Invocationem sanctorum, merita, fraternitates et similia, non Deum, sed se laudant, ideo etiam facile tolerantur et admittuntur a mundo.... Atque hic audis, quis sit ille iustificatus et quanam potissimum opera eligat: non ieiunium, non abstinentiam, non cilicium Ioannis, non heremum etc., quae etiam aliquid sunt' (*ibid.*, 448.19-21, 25-27).

Referring to his own entanglement in monastic piety,¹⁰⁵ Luther recounts how he still struggles against 'my monk', that is, his human nature which seeks to assert itself before God in works and refuses to accept its justification in Christ alone.¹⁰⁶ 'Each of us bears in his heart a great monk', he writes.¹⁰⁷ Because those men who are still wholly monks do not engage, as does Luther, in spiritual battle, because Christ is therefore blasphemed in the monasteries, Luther predicts that their foundations will be so scattered that "'not one stone shall stand upon another'" [Mt 24:2]. They are asking for it', he warns, 'and it will certainly happen.'¹⁰⁸

This doleful monition is significantly coupled with exaltation of the working class, although Luther continues to denounce the Peasants' War.¹⁰⁹ Stridently he demands the abolition of monasteries and convents: 'They should be torn

¹⁰⁵ 'Ego quidem, cum essem monachus, valde defatigabar per quindecim fere annos quotidie sacrificando, macerando me ieiuniis, vigiliis, oracionibus et aliis longe gravissimis operibus, quia serio cogitabam de iusticia per mea opera adipiscenda, nec putabam possibile esse, ut unquam obliviscerer eius vitae. At nunc, Dei gratia, oblitus sum. Memini quidem adhuc eius carnificinae, sed non sic, ut existimem redeundum ad illum carcerem, quanquam carnaliter loquendo non erat carcer, sed delicatum vitae genus, remotum ab omnibus illis molestiis, quas vel Politia vel Oeconomia infinitas habet, Carcer tamen fuit bonis hominibus, qui non tantum de ventre cogitabant, sed cupiebant salvari' (*Praelectio in psalmum 45*, *ibid.*, 574.25-34). 'Hac doctrina sane ita sum ego in scholis corruptus, ut vix magno labore, Dei gratia, me ad solum Auditum gaudii potuerim convertere...' to '... sed audiebam, tanquam nihil ad me pertineret' (*Enarratio psalmi LI*, *ibid.*, 411.36-412.26). 'Nam ego saepe a multis in monasterio rogavi, ut mihi dicerent, quid essent "humiliata ossa". Sed quia experientiam talium tentationum non habuerant, impossibile erat, ut de re ignota aliquid sani et certi dicerent' (*ibid.*, 415.14-16).

¹⁰⁶ 'Quare nemo sit securus, sed qui confitemur Christum, ambulemus in timore et proficiamus in fide et agnoscamus, quod singuli gestemus in pectore ingentem et deformem Monachum, hoc est, stultam et carnalem opinionem operum, pestem fidei' (*Praelectio in psalmum 45*, *ibid.*, 575.29-32). 'In ministerio plane sum oblitus huius monachi nec quisquam nomen eius ex me audit. Sed in corde non servo verbum meum, quod pure per os doceo, sed obrepat nonnunquam monachus imprudenti.... Ideo quo ad vivimus, luctamur contra istum monachum et diabolum, qui regit eum et fovet. Ac spiritus sanctus quoque, quia videt naturam nostram sic monachatam, adest monendo et hortando, ut audiamus, ut discamus oblivisci omnium preteritorum operum, etiam optimae iusticiae nostrae, ut, sicut doctrina oblita est monachi huius, ita quoque cor nostrum obliviscatur omnium et hereat pura fide in unius Christi iusticia' (*ibid.*, 576.16-19, 22-28; trans. Koenker, *LW* 12.275). 'Sed hic primum fallit nos opinio nostra, quam monachus nobiscum natus habet, quae heret in carne...' (*ibid.*, 580.30-32). '... quia Rex amat illum decorem, quando verbum audio et obliviscor mei Monachi et regi meo Christo credo, quod eius sanguine redemptus sim et eius merito iustificatus' (*ibid.*, 581.30-32). '... sicut cepimus, discamus oblivisci monachi istius...' (*ibid.*, 582.33-34).

¹⁰⁷ '... unusquisque nostrum gestat in sinu suo magnum monachum' (*ibid.*, 575.22; trans. *ibid.*, p. 275).

¹⁰⁸ 'Fiet aliquando, ut templa et monasteria illorum Rex noster propter has diras blasphemias ita disiiciat, ut non relinquatur lapis super lapidem. Hoc volunt, et fiet certo' (*ibid.*, 493.24-26; trans. *ibid.*, p. 213). 'Idem fiet cum Papa. Quia enim non cessat persequi verbum, ideo ruet ipse cum omnibus monasteriis, episcopis et collegiis sacerdotum' (*ibid.*, 577.20-22).

¹⁰⁹ See above, nn. 83-91.

down and destroyed.¹¹⁰ Why? Because monks magnify their spiritual works over the physical labors of commoners. Moreover, they transact business with the works of others and presume to help them so to heaven.¹¹¹ Decrying this as an 'unspeakable abomination', Luther asks, 'What else is this but saying by means of actions: "Compared with us, a simple, ordinary Christian is nothing. The status of a Christian is far below ours. By Baptism no one can rise to the level we achieve with our tonsures and cowls. A Christian will never be saved without the help of our estate"?'¹¹² Luther's censure here of monasticism is not prompted by democratic impulses but by a theological conviction that the works-piety in which monasticism flourishes denies the economy of salvation, that is, the bloody death and the resurrection of Christ, as confirmed in the Word and in the common administration of the sacrament of baptism.¹¹³ Monasticism, moreover, contravenes the order of creation. It was God himself, Luther instructs, who at creation confirmed 'all crafts, classes, and trades' necessary to the kingdom.¹¹⁴ Farmers, shoemakers, tailors, clerks, knights, masters, and servants, all citizens of this world, engage in the estates 'established by God to serve him according to the words of Gen 3:19: "In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread".' 'This', Luther affirms, 'is the way he intended it to be.' Therefore, he urges, 'if one wants to serve God, one should not turn up one's nose at them and creep away into a monastery or set up some other sect.'¹¹⁵ Yet Luther observes that theologians define the service of God as

¹¹⁰ 'Also sol es auch zu unser zeit den Stifften und Kloestern gehen, das sie zurissen und zuschmissen werden, wie es denn angefangen hat, unangefehen wie ein fein, schoen, gut wesen es scheinet' (*Der 117. Psalm ausgelegt*, WA 31/1.239.17-19; trans. Sittler, LW 14.20).

¹¹¹ 'Sondern solch ihr eigen werck und wesen so hoch heben und loben, das sie dadurch nicht allein woellen Christen sein und selig werden, sondern auch hoeher und besser denn die gemeinen Christen und dazu den andern Christen werck und verdienst verkeuffen und mit teilen, unterstehen sich damit den selbigen gen himel zu helffen' (ibid., ll. 21-25).

¹¹² 'Welchs alles ist ein unausprechlicher gewel, Und was machen sie damit anders, denn als sagten sie mit der that: Ein schlechter, gemein Christen mensch ist nichts gegen uns, Der Christen stand ist viel geringer denn unser stand, Durch die Tauff kan niemand so hoch komen, als durch unser platten und kappen, Ein Christ wuerde nimermehr selig, wo unser stand ihm nicht huelffe' (ibid., ll. 25-29; trans. ibid., p. 21).

¹¹³ 'Was ist aber das anders gesagt? Denn die Tauffe ist nichts, Christus blut ist nichts, Christus tod und leben ist nichts, Gottes wort ist nichts, Gott selber ist nichts...' to 'Nu kan ia niemand leugnen, das sie also haben gethan und ihren stand so hoch gepreiset uber den gemeinen Christenstand. Es sind brieffe und buecher, dazu das werck selbs furhanden, damit sie uberzeugt werden' (ibid., 239.30-240.20).

¹¹⁴ 'Damit bestettigt er zu gleich auch alle handwerk, stende und hendel so inn solchen weltlichen herrschafften sind, sie heissen, wie sie wollen, so fern sie ehrlich und loblich sind nach ihrem eigen landrecht' (ibid., 234.15-17; trans. ibid., p. 15).

¹¹⁵ 'Es sei Burger, Bauer, schuster, schneider, schreiber, reuter, Meister, knecht etc., Denn on solche alle (sagt Eccle.) bestehet keine stad noch land nicht, das man wissen solle, Solche stende an ihn selbs sind nicht widder Gott, und durffe sie nicht lassen faren, so man Gott dienen wil und inn ein Kloster kriechen odder sonst eine secten anrichten, Ja es sind alles stende, von

nothing other than fleeing to the desert, abandoning civil and domestic duties, and hiding in a monastery.¹¹⁶ The gospel, however, commends married love, the master-servant relationship, and the administration of government. To despise these is to contravene nature and sex. 'For what else does a monk do than wish, contrary to God's order, to be something else than a real man?'¹¹⁷ Luther urges that Christians be convinced that the service of God does not require change of clothing, denial of sex, abandonment of duties, and seclusion in a monastery, for these are externals. If they are undertaken without the authority of the Word, from a motive of devotion, they are abominable.¹¹⁸ 'It is not enough for Him that you become a Carthusian monk, a nun, or a priest', he writes. 'To Him that is lower than the lowliest manual labor on earth. He rejects and damns these self-chosen orders which flee, avoid, and despise the sweating (ordained for all men in Gen 3:19), as though they could invent a finer service to God than God Himself has established in the sweating of our faces.... What is it then that He demands?', Luther asks. 'It is the praise of the Lord.'¹¹⁹

The praise of the Lord is what Erasmus would demonstrate as the very vocation of monks through his edition of Haymo. By dedicating the edition to van Heemstede he specifies, moreover, that it is the vocation of Carthusians, the Order which Luther has divinely damned for fleeing, avoiding, and despising the sweat of the harvest. In these psalm commentaries Luther terms monasticism a hydra, that monster of classical mythology who would develop a

Gott eingesetzt, das sie ihm dienen sollen durch das wort Gene. 3: "Du solt dein brod essen im schweis deiner nasen." Das wil er gehalten haben' (ibid., ll. 17-24; trans. ibid.).

¹¹⁶ 'Consule enim recentium Theologorum libros, et videbis, "servire Deo" eis nihil esse aliud quam fugere in eremum, deserere politica aut oeconomica officia et sese abdere in monasterium' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, WA 40/2.282.34-36).

¹¹⁷ 'Nonne haec ipsa praecepta ostendunt, quod Euangelium omnes hos vitae ordines commendat? Quae igitur amentia fuit docere, quod servire Deo sit fugere haec vitae genera, mutare non solum habitum, sed etiam ipsam naturam et sexum? Quid enim aliud facit monachus, quam quod contra Dei ordinationem vult aliud esse quam masculus?' (ibid., 283.15-19; trans. Spitz, LW 12.71).

¹¹⁸ 'Constituenda igitur vera definitio est, ut statuas servire Deo non hoc esse, si mutes habitum, si mutes sexum, si relictis et politicis et oeconomicis ministeriis te abdas in monasterium. Haec omnia externa sunt et simulari possunt. Hoc autem etiam abominabile est, quod sine auctoritate verbi, ex propria devotione, ut vocant, suscipiuntur' (ibid., ll. 28-32).

¹¹⁹ 'Lest ihm auch daran nicht gnügen, das du ein Cartheuser, munch, Nonne, Pfaff werdest, Ja, er lests ihm weniger gefallen, denn das geringste handwerck auff erden, Berwirfft und verdampts wol dazu, Darumb das es eigen erwelte stende sind, die das nasen schwitzen (Gene. 3 allen menschen geboten) fliehen, meiden und verachten, als wolten sie bessere Gotts dienst stiften, denn Gott selbs gestift hat mit dam nasen schweis, wie denn die kluge, schalckhafftige vernunft imer dar Gott meistern wil und das ihre bei Gott sucht' (*Der 117. Psalm ausgelegt*, WA 31/1.234.27-33; trans. Sittler, LW 14.15). 'Was ists denn, das er foddert? Es ist Loben den Herrn' (ibid., 234.35; trans. ibid.).

head (here Order) for every one lopped off.¹²⁰ But he singles out the Carthusians, as in the passage above where they are damned. Reflecting on the path of righteousness, he again lectures, 'A Carthusian also has a splendid way on which to go. So also the other orders have their own special ways. But everything of this kind in the whole world produces nothing but wrath and damnation unless you kiss the Son.'¹²¹ When Luther argues, moreover, that 'it makes no difference whether a man is ... a Carthusian or a soldier ... if he does not put all his hope of salvation in the Son',¹²² he alludes to and rejects Erasmus' colloquy 'Militis et Cartusiani'. In these psalm commentaries Luther also confronts its author directly, writing that 'Erasmus is otherwise a most eloquent person, but in theology he writes so coldly, stupidly, and dully, that it is apparent he does nothing in earnest. It neither pricks nor leaves any impression; it neither stabs nor wounds; it does not knock you down nor jab the soul of the reader.'¹²³

Erasmus was not stirred to his edition of Haymo by personal pique, however, nor by a simple desire to defend the Carthusians, for among them he numbered enemies as well as friends. At issue was the preservation of tradition, humanistically understood as the mutual integrity of life and language, as historically exemplified in a pious and learned monasticism, and as now threatened by Luther's seditious preaching. Erasmus was not ignorant of Luther's impassioned tracts against the peasant uprisings.¹²⁴ Yet in his own

¹²⁰ 'Quid enim Papae regnum fuit aliud, quam monstrum diversorum capitum, praesertim si Monachos spectes, quorum hic Augustinum, ille Franciscum, tertius Dominicum, quartus Benedictum, ut putant dignum esse, cui nomen daret' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, WA 40/2.213.29-32). Luther refers to Franciscans in *Auslegung des 118. Psalms*, WA 31/1.175.19-21; *Praelectio in psalmum 45*, WA 40/2.588.30-31; *Enarratio psalmi LI*, *ibid.*, 395.31-32; to Minorites, *ibid.*, 440.22-24, and to Dominicans, *Auslegung des 118. Psalms*, WA 31/1.131.31-33.

¹²¹ 'Carthusianus etiam habet splendidam viam, in qua incedit. Sic aliorum ordinum sunt certae viae. Sed quidquid huiusmodi est in universo orbe terrarum, hoc totum, nisi Filium osculeris, est nihil nisi ira et damnatio, et ira faciet, ut viae hae aboleantur et pereant' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, WA 40/2.308.28-31; trans. Spitz, *LW* 12.90).

¹²² 'Sive sit Rex, sive pastor, sive Carthusianus, sive miles, sive coelebs vivat sive in coniugio, sive medicus sive Iureconsultus sit, si non osculatur Filium, hoc est, si non omnem spem salutis habet collocatam in Filio, etiamsi ad mortem usque se maceret ieiuniis, "etiamsi flammis subiici corpus suum permittat", peribit in ira Dei' (*ibid.*, 307.28-32; trans. *ibid.*, p. 89).

¹²³ 'Sicut Erasmus alias eloquentissimus, in Theologia tamen ita frigide, stupide et plumbee scribit, ut appareat eum nihil serio agere, das es weder haft noch klappet, es trifft noch wundet nicht, non ferit, non relinquit stimulos in animis lectorum' (*Praelectio in psalmum 45*, *ibid.*, 508.36-509.18; trans. Koenker, *LW* 12.225).

¹²⁴ *Hyperaspistes diatribae adversus servum arbitrium Martini Lutheri* (1526, 1527) (*LB* 10.1274b). Luther's works (all 1525) were: *Ermahnung zum Frieden auf die zwölf Artikel der Bauerschaft in Schwaben* (WA 18.291-334); *Beitrag zwischen dem löblichen Bund zu Schwaben und den zwei Haussen der Bauern vom Bodensee und Allgäu* (*ibid.*, 336-43); *Wider die räuberischen und mörderischen Rotten der Bauern* (*ibid.*, 357-61); *Eine schreckliche Geschichte*

correspondence of those years, he establishes a connection between Luther and the Peasants' War, squarely agreeing with the papist apologetic. He dubs Luther the principal actor of a bloody drama who now drags on stage the nobles and peasants for a gory act with an uncertain catastrophe.¹²⁵ While in comparison with modern historical evaluation of the complex political, social, and economic factors which fostered the insurrections Erasmus' analysis seems simplistic, it is entirely consistent with his humanist conviction that social order depends on the integrity of the text, paradigmatically that of scripture, as understood then affectively translated into eloquent speech and right behavior.¹²⁶ Erasmus ascribes the corruption of monasticism not to works-piety, as does Luther, although he deplores empty exercises, but to the intrusion of scholastic disputation. In the dedicatory letter to the edition of Haymo he complains of the new breed of monks, who, although vowed like Haymo to a life of apostolic simplicity based on scriptural meditation, embrace a new doctrine with superfluous arguments, with the dogmas of Averroes, and with new idleness.¹²⁷ To Erasmus' ears the psalm commentaries of Luther, a scholastic monk run amuck, were a cacophony. It was to Haymo that Erasmus resorted for an affirmation of tradition, a way yet to sing the Lord's song in a strange land, that is, with a 'remarkable simplicity and transparency', springing from an evangelical life.¹²⁸

The threat which Luther's lectures posed to the understanding of the Text, and so to the correct order of the world, was manifested for Erasmus in the moral dissolution of the Peasants' War. Luther's irresponsible preaching against the monasteries was incendiary. It lacked prudence. For while Luther railed against the monastic life, exalting the peasants' sweaty labors, he expected the same peasants to harvest the crops peaceably outside the cloister, to refrain

und ein Gericht Gottes über Thomas Münzer (ibid., 367-74); *Ein Sendbrief von dem harten Büchlein wider die Bauern* (ibid., 384-401).

¹²⁵ 'Hic primas egit Lutherus, non incruentae fabulae princeps.... Nuper prodierunt in scenam nobiles et agricolae. Actio fuit mire sanguinaria. Ea nunc recrudescit; quae sit futura catastrophe nescio': to Guillaume Budé (*EE* 6.153.5-6, 8-10, Ep 1601). Among the numerous references to Luther in the correspondence of these years are juxtapositions of Luther's 'tragedy' and the Peasants' War, such as in the letter to Nicolaas Everaerts (*EE* 6.240.6-10, 29-33, Ep 1653); and to Francesco Chierigati (ibid., 301.18-45, Ep 1686).

¹²⁶ Boyle, *Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology*, especially pp. 99-101. See also James K. McConica, 'Erasmus and the Grammar of Consent' in *Scrinium Erasmianum*, ed. J. Coppens, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1970), 2.77-99.

¹²⁷ 'Quo magis mirandum est, quod quidam, qui victu cultuque simplicitatem apostolicam profitentur, doctrinam amplectantur omnium minime simplicem, sed argutiis superuacaneis, et Auerroicis dogmatibus, ac nouis insuper somniis spinosissimam': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.163.17-21).

¹²⁸ See above, n. 55.

from plundering the property and wealth within.¹²⁹ The remains of one such insurrection of farmers was the very manuscript of Haymo which Erasmus was now preserving for posterity. It is this exact historical circumstance, and not a nostalgic turn of spirit, nor flattery for van Heemstede, which prompted the edition of Haymo, with its bold address:

And you, laymen, can you wish evil to those who, while you snore deeply weighed with inebriation, watch for you, fast for you; while you provoke God to wrath with dice, with whores, and other abominations, pray for you; while you speak evilly of them before men, speak well of you before God?¹³⁰

Among these ungrateful laymen Erasmus numbered Luther.

Erasmus was committed to securing a common cause with Luther that might issue in the peace of the Church, while still censuring his extreme reforms. His edition of Haymo served him in this protean purpose. It established a common basis in scripture, and in the psalms which Luther loved the best of all its books.¹³¹ It offered in this medieval monk an exegetical exemplar, not of humanist eloquence, for Luther would have scorned that, but of simple piety, which they both could appreciate. In the preface Erasmus argues a defense which is but an extension of one in a psalm commentary of Luther's. Against the papist apologetic that his preaching had incited the Peasants' War, Luther had pleaded, 'But suspend judgment a little while, and first reflect more carefully. Reduce the argument to a dialectical form, and consider whether this is a logical conclusion: "This theologian is evil, therefore theology is evil; this lawyer is worthless, therefore a knowledge of the law is also bad; this teacher is a fornicator, therefore the arts which he teaches are a fornication." Would we not call anyone mad who defended these conclusions as good and sound?'¹³² In presenting Haymo, Erasmus adds to the same argument the case of monks. To the criticism that many of them depart from the ideal, he rejoins that 'we will esteem no sort of life, if on account of the bad we also hate the good. What therefore remains? What except that we love men, we interpret certain things for the best part, we overlook lighter vices, we zealously strive to remedy graver ones rather than to exacerbate them, even that we venerate the very

¹²⁹ Boyle, *Rhetoric and Reform*.

¹³⁰ See above, n. 42.

¹³¹ Pelikan writes that Luther 'loved the Psalter more than the other books in the Bible, and ... regarded it as unique' (*LW* 12.xii).

¹³² 'Sed tu paulisper differ sententiam et prius de tota re cogita diligentius ac in formam dialecticam argumentum redige et adspice, num bona consequentia haec sit: Theologus iste est malus, ergo etiam Theologia est mala; Iureconsultus iste est nequam. Ergo cognitio Iuris quoque est mala; Hic Magister est scortator, ergo artes, quas profitetur, sunt scortatio. An non insanum dicemus, qui has consequentias defendat bonas et firmas esse?' (*Enarratio psalmi II*, *WA* 40/2.199.16-21; trans. Spitz, *LW* 12.8).

Order or institution?'¹³³ But this tolerance only underscored the apocalyptic urgency of Luther's reform.

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Erasmus' edition of Haymo failed triply. Luther's lectures on the psalms became a forum for criticizing him¹³⁴ and for criticizing monks at Divine Office. He scorned them, chanting the psalter, as 'merely reciting syllables'.¹³⁵ Even as they sing the Miserere, he argued, 'they have understood, done and taught the opposite. For this reason they have become unworthy of having the slightest inkling of its true meaning.'¹³⁶ Luther would allow no insight on the psalms to the monk Haymo or his editor, Erasmus. Among the Orders whom Erasmus would defend, the edition was wholly misunderstood by another editor of Haymo, Nikolaus Ferber, the General Commissary of the Franciscans for the cisalpine countries. He published in the same year of 1533 a book of sermons in which he virulently attacked Erasmus as a scribbler of lies against monastic Orders and a cohort of Luther in dividing the Church.¹³⁷ Erasmus retorted that

¹³³ 'Nullum igitur vitae genus probabimus, si propter malos oderimus et bonos. Quid igitur superest? Quid nisi vt amemus homines, incerta in meliorem interpretemur partem, ad vitia leuiora conniueamus, grauioribus mederi studeamus potius quam exasperare, ordinem ipsum et institutum veneremur etiam?': to van Heemstede (*EE* 10.164.88-92).

¹³⁴ For Luther's opinions of Erasmus in his commentary on Ps 90 (1534) see Boyle, *Christening Pagan Mysteries* (n. 17 above), pp. 89-90.

¹³⁵ 'Sic monachus, qui in superstitione sua vivit, saepe canit et murmurat: "Miserere mei, Deus." Sed quia in fiducia propriae iusticiae vivit et immundiciem cordis non sentit, tantum syllabas recitat, rem ipsam nec intelligit nec optat' (*Enarratio psalmi LI*, *WA* 40/2.333.34-334.12; trans. Pelikan, *LW* 12.315).

¹³⁶ 'Cecinerunt eum et canunt adhuc hodie Monachi et totus Papatus. Contrarium autem senserunt, fecerunt et docuerunt. Quare fuerunt indigni, qui haberent unam guttam odoris de vero sensu' (*Praelectio in psalmum 45*, *WA* 40/2.488.19-21; trans. Koenker, *LW* 12.209).

¹³⁷ 'At apud Michaellem Hillenium excuditur Antuerpiae, imo iam opinor excusus est, liber cuiusdam Franciscani Nicolai Herborn generalis commissarii Cismontani, hominis, id quod ipse declarat liber, indocti et intemperantis, qui nihil habet praeter ineptam loquacitatem, quam tamen ipsam hausisse videtur ex meis lucubrationibus. In eo libro plus quam scurriliter debachatur in nomen meum, fortiter mentiens. Pagina 285. facie 2. scribit me in Colloquiis non solum impia, verum etiam manifesta mendacia aduersus ordines scribere, quos iste familias appellat, quum in omnibus libris meis nihil sit quod vllam gentem aut ordinem impetat. Nec vllus mortalium hactenus hoc docere potuit. Pag: 322 fac: 2 annumerat me haereticis qui vexant ecclesiam Dei, meque subinde militem Pilati vocat. Addit quod aliquam Ecclesiae partem ad se traxit Luterus, nonnullam Oecolampadius et Zwinglius, sed maximam Erasmus': to Jean de Carondelet (*EE* 10.349.9-24). This is repeated to Johann Koler (*ibid.*, 358.47-70, Ep 2906). Also, 'Hillenius excudit librum concionum cuiusdam Franciscani prorsus asinium; quem non videtur alio consilio edidisse nisi vt admisceret sua venena. Tales scurras cogitur mundus non ferre tantum sed alere quoque': to Erasmus Schets (*ibid.*, 345.12-346.15).

Erasmus had three pages of the book as a specimen, sent him by someone at Hillen's press, as he reports above. He attaches these to a letter to Nicolaus Olahus, 'Rem plenius cognosces e schedis, quas huic adiunxi epistolae' (*ibid.*, 348.14); and to Carondelet, 'Mitto tres paginas, vt

his literature only deservedly ridiculed certain monastic superstitions. It certainly did not agree with Luther about that institution, he insisted.¹³⁸ For the safety of his reputation, however, he engineered through a patron the suppression of Ferber's defamatory book.¹³⁹ In three years Erasmus died in bed praying the psalms.¹⁴⁰ Luther followed him a decade later. The peasants, discontent to sing the psalter at the plough, rejected his pacifist politics. The land grew stranger still. The monastery of Fulda, where Haymo had once labored, was devastated in the Thirty Years' War and its two thousand manuscripts scattered.¹⁴¹ At Marbach, from where the manuscript had been rescued, Swiss soldiers profaned the abbey church, despoiling the altars of their sacred vessels, smashing the organ to splinters, removing the clocks, and pillaging the monastery completely: the wine still in its casks, the sacks of grain, the provisions and table-service; demolishing the windows and doors, so that at their departure only the walls and tower survived. Then in their wake the local peasants hewed hundreds of trees in the forest surrounding the abbey, and invading its very ruins, carted off the doors, the windows, and the roofing tiles, even the pipes of the organ.¹⁴²

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intelligat tua prudentia non esse somnium aut vanum rumorem, quod narro' (ibid., 350.46-47). Erasmus had the entire book sent him by Cornelis Schrijver in September 1535: 'Librum Nicolai Herboni ad te mitto, optime Erasme' from Schrijver (*EE* 11.226.1).

Whether the publication of Ferber's sermons was a factor in Erasmus' edition of Haymo is unclear. Erasmus first complains of Ferber's book in January 1534, well after he had published Haymo. While Ferber's book is dated 1533, the month is unknown as there appear to be no extant copies. An edition of Ferber's sermons in 1543 dates the dedicatory letter as 10 October 1532, according to Allen, p. 345 n. 12, so that the book may have been printed before 28 February 1533 when Erasmus' edition of Haymo appeared. If it was so published, then Erasmus, had he known of it, may have made of his own edition of Haymo a defense against Haymo's first editor, Ferber, as well as a lesson for Luther and the peasants.

¹³⁸ 'Scurra indoctus et impudens haec temulentus euomit, quum nullus adhuc vllum locum commonstrare potuerit in quo sentiam cum Luteranis et Zuinglianis. Ego praeter superstitionem et abusus hominum nihil notaui...' to 'Nam iste commissarius cismontanus vix idoneus videtur, cui grex porcorum committatur': to Carondelet (*EE* 10.349.24-350.46).

¹³⁹ 'Vestrae potius sollicitudinis fuerit istorum petulantiam cohibere, non tam mea caussa, cui non mediocriter fauetis, quam publicae tranquillitatis gratia...' to 'Interim oro vt solitum erga me fauorem retineatis' (ibid., ll. 50-60).

¹⁴⁰ Boyle, *Christening Pagan Mysteries*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁴¹ For the library of Fulda from the era of Erasmus and Luther see Franz Falk, *Beiträge zur Rekonstruktion der alten Bibliotheca fuldensis und Bibliotheca laureshamensis. Mit einer Beilage: Der Fuldaer Handschriftenkatalog aus dem 16. Jahrhundert*, ed. Carl Scherer (Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, Beiheft 26; Leipzig, 1902); Karl Christ, *Die Bibliothek des Klosters Fulda im 16. Jahrhundert: Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse* (Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, Beiheft 64; Leipzig, 1933); and Josef Leinweber, *Das Hochstift Fulda vor der Reformation* (Quellen und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Abtei u. Diözese Fulda 22; Fulda, 1972), with extensive bibliography on pp. 314-32.

¹⁴² Goehlinger, *Histoire de l'abbaye de Marbach*, p. 137 concerning the pillages of 1622 and 1635.

LEGITIMACY AND CONSENT: HENRY IV AND THE LANCASTRIAN TITLE, 1399-1406

Peter McNiven

OF all the problems which Henry IV faced during his reign, those most peculiar to his own kingship revolved around his need to justify his seizure of the throne. Of the two principal elements in the revolution of 1399 – the deposition of Richard II and the accession of Henry of Lancaster – it can be argued that the former was in many respects the less controversial. Although it was inevitable that the overthrow of any medieval monarch would produce profound constitutional and political upheavals, Richard's deposition was justified in public and at considerable length by the two most acceptable reasons for the setting aside of a legitimate king. It was announced that he had abdicated 'voluntarily' on account of his self-confessed incompetence, while it was 'proved' in addition that his misgovernment justified his formal deposition.¹ In the long term, the most tendentious aspect of the revolution was the question of the duke of Lancaster's right to seat himself on the vacant throne.

The whole procedure by which Henry became king, and all the arguments by which he justified his usurpation, implicitly acknowledged the flaws in his title. His very act of submitting for approval a claim to the throne was evidence of his apprehension that his credentials might be considered less than perfect. It is only necessary to compare the events of the previous deposition (that of Edward II in 1327) to see the fundamental difference which made Henry's position so much more difficult.² Edward III was his father's heir-apparent and the only conceivable candidate for the throne. Richard II had no such obvious

¹ See *Rotuli parliamentorum*, 6 vols. (London, 1767-77), 3.416-24. On the question of legal precedents for deposition, see G. E. Caspary, 'The Deposition of Richard II and the Canon Law' in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law*, ed. S. Kuttner and J. J. Ryan (Vatican City, 1965), pp. 189-201.

² For some remarks on the deposition of Edward II as a precedent for the events of 1399, see G. T. Lapsley, 'The Parliamentary Title of Henry IV', *English Historical Review* 49 (1934) 581-82, and B. Wilkinson, 'The Deposition of Richard II and the Accession of Henry IV', *ibid.* 54 (1939) 223-29.

heir, and there were very plausible arguments against the suggestion that the House of Lancaster stood next in line. The grounds chosen to depose Richard – the king's misgovernment and his alleged willingness to abdicate – had been adequate in themselves when they had been used to place Edward III on his father's throne with a minimum of constitutional controversy, but they were clearly insufficient for Henry's purposes. The would-be usurper needed to consider whether to claim the crown by virtue of *de facto* conquest, 'the will of God', 'the will of the people', a doctrine of hereditary right of his own devising, or the expressed wish of the abdicating king.

In the absence of an indisputable heir to Richard, the last of these alternatives had an obvious appeal. The official account of Richard's abdication did in fact maintain that the latter recommended that Henry should succeed him,³ and if this statement had been made the basis of Henry's claim, it would probably have sufficed in itself to put him on the throne. But the immediate acquisition of the throne was not Henry's most serious problem. There appeared to be fairly general agreement that Richard was no longer wanted and that Henry was the only practical replacement. The grounds on which he claimed the throne, however, would be crucial for his future security and that of his heirs. And a claim that Richard had nominated him as his successor was open to the same objections as the assertion that the king had abdicated voluntarily: there was no way of proving conclusively that it was true, and there were good grounds in common sense for believing the opposite.

Nor could Henry safely base his claim solely on the fact that he had overthrown Richard by force. Such a claim would have set a precedent which would in theory have given any magnate of royal blood the right to remove Henry if he was thought to have failed to rule better than his predecessor. The only claims which could give the Lancastrian dynasty the necessary degree of respectability had to be based on a hereditary title or on some very unequivocal form of public assent.

There is no doubt that Henry's accession was endorsed by the assembly of 30 September 1399, but the nature and significance of this endorsement have often been debated. Several contemporary sources speak of Henry's 'election', a term which is open to various shades of interpretation.⁴ Some chroniclers and early historians actually maintain that the assembly exercised the right to select a king from amongst the members of the royal family. Hardyng, for instance, states that Henry was chosen in preference to the earl of March, who was judged to

³ *Rot. parl.* 3.417.

⁴ See Lapsley, 'Parliamentary Title', 438-46, and Wilkinson, 'Deposition of Richard II', 229-30, for references to the issue of election as it applied to Henry's case.

be too young.⁵ In the present century, K. H. Vickers says that 'by his accession Henry subscribed to the doctrine that the king was no more than the nominee of the nation', and refers to the 'elective position of the Lancastrian dynasty'.⁶ While these extreme claims are difficult to sustain, the modern inclination to reject out of hand the suggestion that Henry was elected is injudicious for at least two reasons. Firstly, there had been an element of election in the accession of the kings of England since the earliest times, and positive indications of the continuance of this tradition may be observed in the formalities surrounding the royal succession until 1307.⁷ Secondly, 'election' can be taken to mean 'choice' in the broadest sense of the word. Henry was chosen as leader, if not necessarily at first as prospective king, by the thousands who rallied to his cause long before his success was assured.⁸ There is every indication, too, that the 'estates' which assembled at Westminster on 30 September 1399 enthusiastically approved Henry as their king. To the charge that their choice was not a free one because Henry had a monopoly of physical force at his disposal, it could be replied that this very monopoly was the best indication of the extent of the support which he commanded, and that no other candidate presented himself or was proposed by any body of political opinion. Even if Henry's 'election' in this sense has little significance in constitutional theory, it was still a practical political fact.

Hardly less outmoded is the theory that Henry had a 'parliamentary title'. The debate on this issue⁹ has centred upon two aspects of the proceedings of 30 September: whether the assembly which met on that date was a parliament, and to what extent it bestowed Henry's title upon him.

The argument that the assembly was a parliament is founded on the assumption that it must have been the parliament which was summoned, in the name of Richard II, to meet at Westminster on 30 September. This assumption

⁵ J. Hardyng, *Chronicle*, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1812), p. 351 (the 'Yorkist' version of Hardyng's metrical history); see also J. Stow, *Annales, or, a General Chronicle of England*, 2 vols. (London, 1631-32), 1.323.

⁶ K. H. Vickers, *England in the Later Middle Ages*, 2nd edition (London, 1919), p. 303.

⁷ See T. P. Taswell-Langmead, *English Constitutional History*, ed. T. F. T. Plucknett (London, 1875; 11th edition, 1960), pp. 474-85 [hereafter cited as Plucknett].

⁸ See, e.g., J. L. Kirby, *Henry IV of England* (London, 1970), pp. 54-58. The *Kirkstall Abbey Chronicle*, ed. J. Taylor (Thoresby Society Publications 42; Leeds, 1952), p. 77, maintains that Henry had collected 30,000 supporters before he marched south from Yorkshire.

⁹ It is not proposed to examine every aspect of the controversy surrounding Henry's accession and the nature of the assembly of 30 September 1399, as these issues have been very fully debated since 1930. Kirby, *ibid.*, p. 67, gives a useful list of the literature, which includes Lapsley's 'Richard II's "Last Parliament"' (a reply to H. G. Richardson's criticism of his earlier article), *English Historical Review* 53 (1938) 53-78; M. V. Clarke and V. H. Galbraith, 'The Deposition of Richard II', *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 14 (1930) 125-55; and the articles by Lapsley, Richardson, and Wilkinson referred to below.

was not seriously questioned by constitutional historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁰ Since 1934, however, when G. T. Lapsley's article¹¹ initiated a critical examination of the issue, most historians have taken the contrary view. H. G. Richardson, the principal modern proponent of the older theory, observes that the assembly was described as a parliament on the roll of Henry's coronation, 'evidence' which he regards as incontrovertible. 'If usurpation were to be given any constitutional veneer', says Richardson, 'was there any other device ready to a usurper's hand?' He considers that it was likely that Henry 'felt able to use, and could conceive, only the normal constitutional forms even for an abnormal purpose'.¹² The arguments put forward by Lapsley, however, provide strong grounds for believing that the wording of the Coronation Roll was a technical error. He notes that as Richard had already abdicated when the assembly met, and as not only was the throne vacant on the day, but no king existed to fill it, the assembly could not have been a parliament; the king was an integral constituent of that institution. Lapsley lists several other differences between the assembly and a parliament, one of the most significant being the presence, and active participation in the proceedings, of a body of individuals (described simply as 'the people') who would not have attended a true parliament.¹³

One relatively simple aspect of this complex debate has perhaps not received quite as much attention as it deserves. With the exception of the Coronation Roll, most contemporary sources, including the official record of the deposition, show a distinct reluctance to admit that the assembly was a parliament,¹⁴ even though they thereby tend to leave its real nature and significance embarrassingly ill-defined. To argue that an assembly was a parliament when it was not regarded as such by informed contemporary opinion is to tread on rather precarious ground.

If the assembly was not a parliament, it is obviously impossible to maintain that Henry succeeded to the throne by a parliamentary title. But in any case, there is good reason to believe that the concept of a parliamentary title, in the sense that a title to the throne could be bestowed by parliament, was totally alien to contemporaries. Parliament, T. F. T. Plucknett notes, was the king's court, and it was impossible to think of such a body as conferring a title upon its

¹⁰ E.g., C. L. Kingsford, who states in *Henry V. The Typical Mediaeval Hero* (New York, 1903; new edition, London-New York, 1923), p. 7, that the revolution of 1399 'gave to the royal power a parliamentary title'.

¹¹ Lapsley, 'Parliamentary Title', 423-49, 577-606.

¹² Richardson, 'Richard II's Last Parliament', *English Historical Review* 52 (1937) 39-47.

¹³ Lapsley, 'Parliamentary Title', 429-31.

¹⁴ Lapsley, *ibid.*, 433-49, is the only writer to have analysed this aspect of the controversy in detail.

lord.¹⁵ E. F. Jacob says that the suggestion that Henry feared a parliamentary title implies the isolation of the crown from parliament, and that 'the old maxim that the medieval king holds his court in his council in his parliaments represents the true line of English constitutional doctrine'.¹⁶ B. Wilkinson dismisses the idea as 'outside the practical possibilities offered to a successful rebel by the constitution of 1399'.¹⁷

Lapsley is probably correct, however, in saying that Henry could have had 'a complete and technically correct parliamentary title', in the sense that the transfer of sovereignty from Richard to Henry could have been accomplished in the parliament which had been summoned to meet in Richard's name. He suggests that Henry's supporters probably wanted this, and that Henry succeeded in preventing it.¹⁸ The idea that there was disagreement is supported by Wilkinson¹⁹ and by K. B. McFarlane,²⁰ who go one step further in maintaining that certain of Henry's allies may not even have wanted him to seize the throne. However, it is not necessary to prove that there were any such conflicts of opinion in order to account for the events of September 1399. It is surely just as likely that both Henry and his supporters originally intended to depose Richard in the parliament, and that they subsequently agreed among themselves to follow an alternative procedure. By obtaining Richard's abdication on 29 September, and thus preventing the assembly from being a parliament, Henry was not so much avoiding a parliamentary title as choosing not to follow a procedure which would almost certainly have proved far more politically traumatic than that which was ultimately adopted.

Although few historians now consider that the assembly was a parliament, it is nevertheless true that on 30 September 1399 Henry faced a gathering of men which could be said to represent 'the people of England', for the purpose of giving consent to a change of ruler, almost as adequately as a true parliament. And it was to this assembly that Henry submitted his claim to the throne. What is crucial, however, is that he sought the approval and endorsement of the assembly; he was in no sense nominated by it. While it is of considerable significance to the constitutional historian to determine whether or not the assembly was a parliament, that issue was of comparatively little practical

¹⁵ Plucknett, p. 492.

¹⁶ E. F. Jacob, *The Fifteenth Century, 1399-1485* (Oxford, 1961), p. 17.

¹⁷ Wilkinson, 'Deposition of Richard II', 239.

¹⁸ Lapsley, 'Parliamentary Title', 606.

¹⁹ Wilkinson, 'Deposition of Richard II', 217-20, 238-39. For a criticism of this view, which makes convincing use of evidence not produced by Wilkinson, see J. M. W. Bean, 'Henry IV and the Percies', *History* 44 (1959) 212-21.

²⁰ K. B. McFarlane, *Lancastrian Kings and Lollard Knights* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 49-55.

consequence on the day of Henry's accession. The assembly did not give him his title; it merely gave its assent to a *fait accompli*.

From a strictly political point of view, it could be said that Henry was 'elected' in that he was accepted as king by the most representative gathering of men which could be brought together in the circumstances, and that his title was 'parliamentary' in that his usurpation was ratified by his first parliament, composed of virtually the same personnel, which met a week later. To this extent, Henry was a popularly chosen and approved king. But he had made no constitutional concessions and had taken no liberties which an indisputably legitimate king might not have taken. He stated, for instance, that he wished to be as free in his prerogative as any of his predecessors;²¹ that he did not intend that anyone should suffer injustice as a result of his accession;²² and that he would be guided by the advice of the most appropriate men in his kingdom.²³ All these pronouncements had some relevance to Henry's special circumstances, but all could equally have been made by a king who was succeeding by the orthodox process.

The acclamation which was both explicit and implicit in the proceedings of 30 September and of the ensuing parliament was obviously an essential element in the process by which Henry obtained the throne. But it could not safely be assumed that public acceptance alone would be enough to guarantee the continuing succession of the Lancastrian dynasty. Henry needed to make some statement on the question of his legal right to be Richard II's successor. He presumably examined all the precedents for royal succession in England and considered whether they offered him any assistance.

It has been frequently observed that by 1399 there was still no law of succession to the English throne. Nevertheless, a study of the succession since the Norman Conquest shows that whenever there was any deviation from the principle which is now known as 'representative male primogeniture',²⁴ there was political strife until the issue was resolved either by the accession or the death of the 'legitimate' claimant. Since 1066, four kings could be regarded, by this criterion, as having succeeded irregularly. Two of these, William Rufus and Henry I, obtained the throne in preference to their elder brother Robert primarily as a consequence of their father's schemes for the division of his lands among his sons. The third, Stephen, became king in 1135 because the more 'legitimate' alternative of the rule of Henry I's daughter Matilda and her husband Geoffrey of Anjou was unacceptable to a majority of the Norman

²¹ *Rot. parl.* 3.434.

²² *ibid.*, 423.

²³ *ibid.*, 415.

²⁴ See Plucknett, pp. 478-84.

baronage. The succession of these kings had been determined by factors, principally those arising from the newness of Norman rule in England and the complex relationships between England, her kings, and the emerging states across the Channel,²⁵ which had no relevance to the circumstances of 1399 and which in any case cast no direct light upon Henry's particular problem.

The most recent 'exception' was John, who had been accepted as king in 1199 in preference to Arthur, the young son of a deceased elder brother. As the eight-year-old Edmund Mortimer, earl of March, was descended from Edward III's third son Lionel, duke of Clarence, while Henry's father John of Gaunt was only the fourth son of that king, there was a close parallel here. King John had been preferred to his nephew because he possessed far superior political strength, and because there was little enthusiasm for the succession of a minor. It is also possible, as Plucknett suggests, that 'the claim of proximity of blood, which the uncle possessed, was much more obvious in early times than the subtle doctrine of representative primogeniture'.²⁶ But there were compelling arguments against following this precedent. The fact that Arthur had his supporters, to the extent that John eventually felt obliged to procure his death, proved that even then the two theories of succession could be the subject of serious controversy. Far more important, however, was the reversal of the precedent in 1377, when Edward III's grandson Richard succeeded without dispute in preference to his eldest uncle, Henry's own father. Moreover, since John's reign three English kings had succeeded to the throne at the age of fourteen or less.

The situation in 1399, however, was different from that which prevailed at any previous time in English history. The Mortimers were descended from Philippa, daughter of Lionel of Clarence, while the Lancastrians could claim unbroken male descent from Edward III. The only occasion on which succession by or through females had arisen previously was in 1135, and then the choice had been between alternative lines of female descent from the Conqueror. Henry could now have attempted to establish a precedent of his own by maintaining that succession by or through females had only ever been permitted in the absence of a candidate claiming unbroken male descent. Such a claim could have laid Henry open to the charge that he was inventing rules to fit his own circumstances, but there was a more positive stumbling block. Edward III had claimed the throne of France through his mother, and if succession through females had not, in practice, been rejected in France, he would have been regarded as the legitimate heir of Charles IV in 1328. Henry

²⁵ W. L. Warren, *Henry II* (London, 1973), provides an excellent survey of the politics of succession in this period.

²⁶ Plucknett, p. 483.

therefore had to choose between maintaining that the law of succession which England wished to attribute to France did not prevail in England, or repudiating Edward III's claim on the grounds that English custom was no different from that of France. While no one could have been expected to take the former argument seriously, the abandonment of the claim to the French throne would not have endeared Henry to those of his supporters who had opposed Richard II's policy of reconciliation with France. If, however, Henry were to retain the title of king of France without dealing with these inconsistencies, he might expose himself to the charge that he had excluded the rightful heir to the French throne (and, for that matter, to the throne of England) on the very grounds on which the English claim had originally been made.

There is no conclusive evidence that Richard II had given any guidance on the question of his successor. It has been asserted that he regarded Roger Mortimer, earl of March, as his heir.²⁷ J. A. Tuck says that 'this interpretation is hard to sustain', that March's claim was 'strong in law but looked much weaker in reality', and that 'in every other way, Gaunt was a more plausible candidate'.²⁸ Against this it could be argued that Gaunt had been, from a strictly practical point of view, a 'more plausible' candidate in 1377, and that there seems no logical reason why he (or his son) should have expected to obtain on Richard's death what they had not claimed before his accession. The statement in the *Eulogium* proves, at the very least, that there were those who believed that March was Richard's heir-presumptive, and there is no other candidate of whom such a statement is even alleged to have been made. There was certainly no easy solution to the 'Mortimer problem', and Henry therefore embarked, in the fortnight before the parliament was due to assemble, on the sensational course of attempting to prove that he was the legitimate king of England by virtue of the royal ancestry of his mother. He ordered the commission which he had set up to deal with the legal aspects of Richard's deposition to investigate a 'legend' that Edmund of Lancaster, younger brother of Edward I and great-grandfather of Henry's mother Blanche of Lancaster, was really the elder brother, but had been secretly 'set aside' because of a physical deformity. If this story could have been substantiated, Henry would have defeated the Mortimers on their own ground – a claim through a female – with a prior claim to that transmitted by Edward III's granddaughter. No official mention was ever made of this enquiry, but Adam of Usk, who served on the commission, revealed in

²⁷ The *Eulogium historiarum*, ed. F. S. Haydon, 3 vols. (RS 9; London, 1858-63), 3.361, says that March was formally declared Richard's heir-presumptive in the parliament of 1385, but there is no evidence for this on the Parliament Roll.

²⁸ A. Tuck, *Richard II and the English Nobility* (London, 1973), pp. 205-206.

his chronicle that he and his colleagues found no evidence to support what is commonly called the 'Crouchback legend'.²⁹

In the light of all these obstacles to a hereditary title, we may now consider the 'challenge' or claim to the throne which Henry made in the assembly of 30 September at the point in the proceedings when the throne was declared vacant. Henry's words were:

In the name of Fadir, Son, and Holy Gost, I Henry of Lancastr' chalenge this Rewme of Yngland, and the Corone with all the membres and the appurtenances, als I that am disendit be right lyne of the Blode comyng fro the gude lorde Kyng Henry therde, and thorghe that ryght that God of his grace hath sent me, with helpe of my Kyn and of my Frendes to recover it: the which Rewme was in poynt to be undone for default of Governance and undoyng of the gode Lawes.³⁰

This declaration was only a part of the assortment of claims and processes by which Henry justified his usurpation. However, it was primarily upon these words that he and his successors were likely to be judged by posterity. The most significant feature of the 'challenge' as a whole is its explicitly repeated theme that Henry had a right to the crown which he wished to be acknowledged, but which did not depend upon such recognition for its legitimacy. The crucial verb 'challenge' means to claim something as one's right or due, and the actual word 'right' subsequently appears twice in the document. The single most remarkable element in the 'challenge', however, is surely the reference to Henry III. While a number of explanations have been offered for the mention of this distant progenitor of Henry, there is none that can avoid the admission that it draws attention to Henry IV's ancestry on his mother's side. J. L. Kirby says that the reference 'could be interpreted as no more than an assertion of his family's royal origins, and a pious reference to the last bearer of his own name to occupy the throne',³¹ while Tuck argues that it may only mean he had royal blood on both sides of his family, 'arguably a better claim than that of the earl of March'. 'Henry', he continues, 'was perhaps saying no more than that he had a good hereditary title to the throne'.³²

These suggestions seem somewhat forced. Henry's father was the son of a king, and this royal origin was quite sufficient without the additional allusion to the almost forgotten and much diluted royal blood of the original Lancastrian line. It is easy, however, to sympathise with the efforts of these authors to avoid accusing Henry of implicitly propounding an absurd myth as the mainstay of

²⁹ *Chronicon Adae de Usk, A.D. 1377-1421*, ed. E. Maunde Thompson (London, 1876; 2nd edition, 1904), pp. 182-84. See also Hardyng, pp. 353-54.

³⁰ *Rot. parl.* 3.422-23.

³¹ Kirby, *Henry IV*, p. 70.

³² Tuck, *Richard II*, p. 223.

his claim to a hereditary title. Nevertheless, if the wording is taken literally, it is hard to come to any other conclusion. Henry was descended 'by right line of the blood' from Edward III; his mother's ancestry could add nothing to this unless there had been an irregularity in the succession over a hundred years earlier. The juxtaposition of the words 'right line' and 'Henry III' can hardly carry any other implication than that the kings since Henry III had not been of the right line. What makes it seem more likely that the word 'right' is not mere verbiage is the use of the word 'recover' half a sentence later, for which there seem to be only two possible interpretations. One is that it meant that Henry was rescuing the kingdom – that he was 'bringing it back to itself' from the tyrannical hold of Richard II. This rather abstruse explanation could be supported by the statement which follows the word 'recover', and it is conceivable that Henry wished to give such an impression in order to tone down the more obvious but far more controversial interpretation – that he was recovering what was his by right.

A possible alternative interpretation of the challenge is that it was really a claim to succeed by conquest, and that other elements were added to the text to disguise this unpalatable truth. This theory receives superficial support from the story that Henry originally intended to claim the throne by conquest alone, but was dissuaded by Chief Justice Thirning,³³ and from Henry's statement, shortly after he had been recognised as king, that he would not 'by way of conquest' disinherit anyone or otherwise override their rights.³⁴ The latter may be dismissed as conclusive evidence on the grounds that Henry was undeniably a conqueror, and men were bound to fear for their security when the crown changed hands in an unorthodox way. But what if we accept the story that Henry had intended to claim the throne by conquest alone? As it would be assumed that no ordinary subject had the right to levy war against a king and to take the throne if he won, and as Henry was one of the foremost members of the English royal family, the practical implication of a claim to succeed by conquest would have been that it was strongly backed by an unspecified hereditary title. Henry's challenge specifically mentioned the hereditary claim which would have been taken as read in a claim of 'conquest', and hinted broadly but not at all explicitly at the precise nature of that claim. But Henry also rested his case strongly on the concept of divine approbation. He maintained that God had not merely given him the 'right' to make his 'challenge', but had actually sent him forth on his mission. If, therefore, it was the will of God that Henry should be king, any element of conquest was

³³ T. Walsingham, *Annales Ricardi Secundi et Henrici Quarti*, printed in *Chronica monasterii s. Albani*, ed. H. T. Riley (RS 28; London, 1866), p. 282.

³⁴ *Rot. parl.* 3.423.

subordinate to the divine command that a new ruler had to be found to save the country from misrule, or that the wrong of 1272 (the exclusion of Edmund of Lancaster) should be corrected. What Henry was seeking was an unorthodox form of 'divine right' – a supposition supported by Archbishop Arundel's speech to the assembly, immediately after Henry had made his challenge, for which he took as his text the words *Vir dominabitur populo*.³⁵ But whatever other elements played their part in his claim, Henry made it clear that he wished to be regarded primarily as a legitimate king whose hereditary credentials were good enough to be accepted without close inspection.

The great flaw in Henry's challenge was that, while it was more than satisfactory as the claim of the 'best all-round candidate for the throne' in 1399, it was inadequate to stand up to the precise and literal scrutiny which it was bound to receive if the Lancastrians' right to the throne, and more especially their hereditary right, was called in question in the future. V. H. H. Green, who is in no doubt that Henry was implicitly propounding the Crouchback legend, says that Henry introduced 'the solemn farce of a hereditary title'.³⁶ Plucknett describes the challenge as 'a silly attempt to forge history'.³⁷ Henry had failed completely to deal with the potential threat from the Mortimer claim. If he had chosen to put forward a doctrine of succession through the male line, which would have clashed with no precedent except his grandfather's claim to the French throne, he would, at the very least, have indicated that there were grounds for believing that the Mortimers' claim to be the legitimate heirs of Richard II was inferior to that of both Lancaster and York. As it was, while Henry was obliged to pretend that the Mortimers did not really exist as far as the succession was concerned, he was subsequently to draw attention to their ill-concealed importance by keeping the heir and his brother in virtual confinement, and by such acts as his refusal to ransom their uncle Edmund Mortimer from his Welsh captivity in 1402. Implicit in this inconsistent policy was the suggestion that whatever anyone might think of the legal niceties, England needed a real king, and that although there were possible grounds for regarding Henry as 'second best', it would be politically disastrous if that issue were to be raised. Henry probably deceived many of his contemporaries, and has surely deceived many a modern student, into believing that there was a straight choice in 1399 between an obscure boy with a technically legitimate claim and the next candidate in line, a man with every other factor in his favour.³⁸

³⁵ *ibid.* These words, quoted from 1 Reg 9:17, were included in God's message to Samuel shortly before the latter proclaimed Saul king of Israel.

³⁶ V. H. H. Green, *The Later Plantagenets* (London, 1955), p. 242.

³⁷ Plucknett, p. 497.

³⁸ The inordinately laboured references, in Archbishop Arundel's speech to the assembly of

In everything but the practicalities of the moment, this was far from being the case. The Mortimer family was plentiful. Roger Mortimer, the earl of March who was killed in Ireland in 1398, had two sons, two daughters, a brother and two sisters, all of whom were alive in 1399. All these people possessed better claims to the throne than Henry if there was any suggestion that March had merely been set aside for immediate political convenience. All except one were married or were soon to marry, and the possibilities for the proliferation of further Mortimer candidates were almost endless.³⁹ Furthermore, the wording of Henry's challenge actually aided the Mortimers' claim. If Henry regarded his mother's royal blood as crucially important, and there seems no reason why he should have alluded to it if he did not, he was hinting at the validity of succession through females. If Henry really derived any aspect of his title from his mother, there were strong grounds for maintaining that unless the Crouchback legend was true, March was the rightful king within the terms of Henry's own doctrines. If he had intended to make a vague statement as to his hereditary credentials, the very last thing Henry should have done was to draw attention to anything to do with succession through females. As there were men of far more consequence than Adam of Usk who knew that the legend was nonsense, Henry was on extremely dangerous ground.

The political manoeuvres and public pronouncements of the autumn of 1399 had achieved two very important ends: the deposition of Richard II and the acceptance of Henry of Lancaster as the only serious contender for the throne. What Henry had apparently not done was to have given sufficient thought to the future legitimacy of the new dynasty. His growing appreciation of this omission meant that no fewer than four attempts were made, between 1399 and 1406, to make the Lancastrian succession more secure.

The first of these came in Henry's first parliament, on 15 October 1399, only two days after his coronation. After Archbishop Arundel had reminded the Lords and Commons of the estates' acceptance of Henry on 30 September as the 'rightful' king, it was announced that Henry intended to invest his eldest son Henry with the titles of prince of Wales, duke of Cornwall and earl of Chester. Parliament was asked to assent to the prince's advancement, and also, almost as if it was an afterthought, to the principle that in the event of Henry IV predeceasing his eldest son, the latter should succeed him 'come droit heriter a

30 September 1399 (*Rot. parl.* 3.423), to the need for the rule of a man rather than a boy (e.g., 'non Puer dominatur, set Vir') could conceivably have been intended to invoke memories of Richard II's minority, or even his immature behaviour in his adult years, but it seems likely that the eight-year-old March was the archbishop's primary target.

³⁹ See Green, *Later Plantagenets*, p. 410, for a useful pedigree of the Mortimers.

la Roialme et la Corone d'Engleterre'. On 23 October, when the prince received the further title of duke of Aquitaine, his nomination as heir-apparent was specifically mentioned again.⁴⁰ These proceedings cannot simply be explained as a natural, logical and uncontroversial sequel to the assembly's assent to Henry's claim to the throne. They seem to indicate that the king was already uneasy about the deficiencies in his title. If he was really king 'by right line of the blood', it was surely superfluous even to make a public announcement that his eldest son was his heir, let alone to suggest that the latter's right to succeed him could be in any way enhanced by the approval of parliament. Henry's request for a statement of the obvious could, at worst, be taken as a progression from the straightforward assent of the assembly to an unquestioned legitimate title to the more positive consent of parliament to a claim which was not sound enough to stand unsupported.

Between 1399 and 1402, Henry's right to the throne was questioned on a number of occasions. In 1400, Richard's former friends rose in an attempt to restore their master. As this challenge to Henry's kingship was virtually confined to men who had been personally associated with the deposed king, and as there were gratifying signs that the rebels enjoyed hardly any popular support, the theoretical basis of the usurpation was able to survive unscathed. In 1402, however, the theory began to be challenged. Seditious ecclesiastics publicly challenged the validity of the process by which Henry obtained Richard's throne. The most circumstantial account related how a master of theology from Leicester maintained to Henry's face that his title was invalid on the grounds that Richard's abdication had not been voluntary and that the deposition was simply an illegal military coup.⁴¹ Such allegations, embarrassing though they were, could at least be countered by reference to the meticulously recorded details of the abdication and deposition on the Parliament Roll. It is worth noting, however, that the king is said to have retorted that 'Non invasi coronam, sed fui rite electus'. While it cannot safely be assumed either that these were Henry's exact words, or that the word 'electus' was used in any but its broader meaning, there is nevertheless a suggestion here that Henry chose to meet an attack on his right to the crown by taking his stand solely on that element in his title which depended on the positive consent of his subjects.

The essentially Ricardian nature of the manifestations of disaffection in 1400 and 1402 meant that Henry's opponents did not have occasion to touch upon the vital question of his right to be the late king's successor. In the summer of 1403, however, the Percies rose in rebellion. The king was totally successful in

⁴⁰ *Rot. parl.* 3.426.

⁴¹ *Eulogium historiarum* 3.391-92; *An English Chronicle of the Reigns of Richard II, Henry IV, Henry V, and Henry VI...*, ed. J. S. Davies (Camden Society 64; London, 1856), p. 25.

overcoming this insurrection with the aid of superior military might, astute strategy, and an encouraging degree of baronial support, and he could produce evidence of the hypocrisy of the Percies' claim that they had opposed both Richard's deposition and Henry's usurpation.⁴² But Henry had not yet put forward any statement of his right to the throne which satisfactorily countered the rebels' assertion that the earl of March was Richard's lawful heir.⁴³ The raising of that issue in the Percies' manifesto was potentially the most detrimental consequence of their rebellion. Henry undoubtedly felt the need to ensure that his dynasty would suffer no lasting damage as a result of this insurrection and sedition, and in the autumn of 1403, first at a meeting of the Council at Worcester and then in a Great Council at Westminster, those lords and 'other lieges' who were present were made to swear fresh oaths of loyalty to the king.

These transactions, though proof of Henry's amply justified sense of insecurity, may be regarded simply as a natural sequel to any unsuccessful baronial revolt, and provide no grounds for believing that Henry was reinforcing the element of consent in his title in order to counter the legal weakness to which the Percies had drawn attention. However, after the Lords and Commons had confirmed these oaths in the Westminster parliament of January-March 1404, they were induced to swear their assent to the principle that Henry should be succeeded by his four sons and their issue 'solonc la Ley d'Engleterre'.⁴⁴ Unlike the straightforward renewal of oaths in the previous autumn, the proceedings of the parliament gave the impression that there was a connection between the king's desire to be reassured of his subjects' loyalty and his need to confirm and reinforce the Lancastrian title to the throne. Precisely because Henry had chosen to make an oblique admission that his legal right to be king had been called in question, however, these measures were a dangerously inadequate answer to the rebels' manifesto. The pronouncement on the order of succession did nothing to undermine the fundamental principle behind the Mortimer claim. Whatever may have been the 'law of England' which was so loosely referred to, there was none which could be regarded as excluding succession through (or even by) female descendants of Henry's sons. In the absence of any written law of succession, Henry was demanding little more than an assurance that his dynasty should continue to rule, and the emphasis on consent to a title which was not even implicitly defined gave him

⁴² For a concise study of the Percies and their relations with the king, see Bean, 'Henry IV and the Percies', 212-27.

⁴³ Hardyng, pp. 352-53.

⁴⁴ *Rot. parl.* 3.525.

no more security than he had obtained when his new subjects, including the Percies, had sworn allegiance to him in 1399.

Scarcely more than a year later, Henry faced another major insurrection. After his decisive suppression of the rising of the earl of Northumberland and Archbishop Scrope, Henry waited until the next parliament before attempting to counter the theoretical aspects of his enemies' challenge. On 7 June 1406, twelve days before the Lords in parliament were called upon to pass judgment on the principal participants in the 1405 rising, the law of succession was laid down in a formal enactment for the first time in English history. Henry made it even clearer than in 1404 that his title had recently been called in question. The Parliament Roll specifically records that in spite of the oaths sworn in 1404, certain persons had since rebelled, and had propagated 'sinister informations'.⁴⁵ In the context of what follows, it seems beyond doubt that these 'informations' took the form of aspersions upon the legitimacy of the Lancastrian title. It was now unanimously agreed and ordained⁴⁶ that Henry should be succeeded by his four sons and their male issue. The latter crucial limitation was not, in spite of the impression given by Kirby,⁴⁷ incorporated in the previous pronouncement on this subject. While there was no positive acknowledgment that the agreements of 1404 and June 1406 were at variance with one another, the fact that they are mentioned consecutively in the text makes this as clear as the somewhat verbose and technical character of the document will allow. The almost excessive repetition of the word 'male' in the finer details of the settlement also seems to indicate that this was the really important aspect of this latest attempt to guarantee the Lancastrian succession. A proviso was added that this arrangement was not to affect the established rules of succession to the duchy of Lancaster. The enactment was to be published in all lands subject to Henry's rule, and was sealed with the Great Seal, the seals of the individual Lords, and the seal of the arms of Sir John Tiptoft, the Commons' speaker.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 575.

⁴⁶ Some historians have maintained that this enactment, unlike that of 22 December, was not a statute. J. E. Powell and K. Wallis, in *The House of Lords in the Middle Ages* (London, 1968), p. 436, observe that 'the charter was in the form of a land conveyance, which avoided the issue of controlling the succession by statute'. While there are technical differences between the two enactments, it may be noted that the Commons requested that the settlement of 7 June be held as a statute (*Rot. parl.* 3.574), and the account of the altered enactment of 22 December describes the earlier arrangement as a 'statutum et ordinatio' (*ibid.*, 582). Whatever the legal niceties, it seems that it was the Commons' intention that both settlements should have the force of statutes, and it is unlikely that they considered the second enactment, which all writers seem to agree was a statute, to be more authoritative than its predecessor.

⁴⁷ Kirby, *Henry IV*, p. 199.

⁴⁸ *Rot. parl.* 3.574-76.

There can be little doubt that the purpose of this document was to indicate that the first formal and comprehensive exemplification of the succession – the attention to detail and the unusually full procedure with the seals emphasised the difference between this settlement and the parliamentary transactions of 1404 – laid down that the crown of England henceforward descended through males only. If there was any suspicion that the exclusion of females and their descendants was an oversight, it should have been dispelled by the calculated reference to the different mode of succession to the duchy of Lancaster, which Henry, in effect, inherited through his mother, in accordance with the normal processes of English common law. In spite of the superficial impression created by the lengthy and precise text of the settlement, it was as much a revision of an earlier arrangement as an attempt to place the Lancastrian succession on a more formal footing.

It seems virtually certain that the purpose of the exclusion of females was to strike an oblique blow at the claims of the Mortimers. Henry was acting very belatedly and rather indecisively. He had to hope that the effect of two rebellions in favour of the Mortimers could be neutralised by an assumption that their claim to the throne was denied by a law which, although it only referred explicitly to the future, could, in the absence of previous enactments and contradictory precedents, be considered to apply retrospectively. Although the lack of any mention either of the Mortimers or the principle upon which earlier succession had been founded meant that Henry had failed to close every legal loophole, he or his successors could conceivably have maintained that parliament was not so much enacting or consenting to a new law as simply acknowledging the principle by which the crown rightly descended. Henry may have felt that a more specific statement of this doctrine would have led to awkward questions as to why he had not made the issue clearer in 1399 and thereby averted the situation in which he was forced on to the defensive by subsequent claims on the Mortimers' behalf.

It is, however, impossible to tell the extent to which this measure might have strengthened the Lancastrians' title, as on 22 December, the last day of the parliament, the law of succession was redefined. The new arrangement was in effect a statutory enactment of the settlement of 1404, and had the openly avowed purpose of restoring the rights of the female issue of Henry's sons.⁴⁹

This change calls for some explanation, yet none is readily forthcoming. The impression given by the Parliament Roll, that the June settlement had limited the succession by an unfortunate oversight, seems quite impossible to sustain in the light of the self-conscious precision of the earlier document. The likelihood of a simple error appears to be excluded even more positively by the

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 580-83.

recognition in June that the rules of succession to the throne and the duchy of Lancaster were now different. Sir Robert Somerville suggests that the protestation by the Lords and Commons in December that they did not mean to say anything touching 'la Duchie ne l'eritage de Lancastre' may have implied that they were now uneasy about this aspect of the arrangement, in spite of the guarantee in the June settlement.⁵⁰ But it is surely rather unlikely that if king, Lords, and Commons had been prepared in June to risk the hypothetical contingency of the crown and the duchy falling into different hands in the future, in exchange for the definite elimination of the principle of succession through females, their priorities over these issues should have changed in six months. One possible explanation of the alteration is that it had nothing to do with the question of Lancastrian legitimacy, but that it had something to do with the rise to political prominence of the prince of Wales. In the later months of 1406, the prince became involved in the affairs of the central government for perhaps the first time.⁵¹ Simultaneously, serious negotiations were in progress for his marriage to a French princess.⁵² From the French point of view, the June settlement meant that if the prince fathered daughters only, the succession would pass to his eldest surviving brother or the latter's male issue, and this would have diminished the long-term diplomatic value of the match. More crucial still may have been the prince's own attitude. Even if he was not yet at odds with his brother Thomas, he may have been unwilling to contemplate the possibility that Thomas or his sons might eventually take precedence over his descendants. But even more important may have been the question of the English claim to the French throne. By a logical deduction based on Edward III's claim, the earl of March, and not Henry IV, was the 'rightful' king of France.

It was difficult enough to overlook the contradiction in Henry's retention of the title of king of France; the additional factor of the positive prohibition of succession by or through females completed the process of making nonsense of the English claim. The king may have come to the conclusion that, with the prospect of peace and a marriage alliance with France, no purpose could be served by preserving a claim which, in view of its troublesome implications regarding succession through females, might advantageously be allowed to lapse. It certainly seems unlikely that Henry suddenly considered it sufficiently important to justify a revision of the law of succession. The one man who

⁵⁰ R. Somerville, *History of the Duchy of Lancaster* 1 (London, 1953), p. 151.

⁵¹ His first recorded appearance as a councillor was on 8 December 1406 (*Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England*, ed. N. H. Nicolas, 7 vols. [London, 1834-37], 1.295).

⁵² The negotiations for a marriage alliance, which had been initiated in the spring of 1406, had been resumed in October (*Foedera, conventiones, literae*..., ed. T. Rymer, 20 vols. [London, 1704-35], 8.435, 452-53).

might conceivably have raised objections on these grounds was the man who was to revive and prosecute the long-neglected claim. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that the marriage negotiations with France had already led the prince to consider the possibility of renewing his great-grandfather's challenge. All this is of course mere speculation, but it is difficult to think of anyone else who might have wished not only to draw attention yet again to the need for a formal settlement of the succession, but to do so in a way which re-opened the main door to an attack on the legitimacy of the dynasty.⁵³

Whoever was responsible, there were three major consequences, and all were detrimental to the prospects of the House of Lancaster. Firstly, the opportunity for claiming hereditary legitimacy for the Lancastrians on the grounds of male precedence was lost for ever. The Mortimers were to remain an embarrassing anomaly until their descendants (through another woman) eventually recovered their 'rights'. Secondly, Henry had thus admitted beyond question that the only real basis of his dynasty's claim to rule was consent, and more specifically, the consent of those assembled in parliament. Strictly speaking, parliament had not bestowed the crown upon the House of Lancaster in 1406 any more than it had done in 1399, but the cumulative effect of the four pronouncements and settlements between 1399 and 1406 was to emphasise that Henry had increasingly chosen to rely heavily on parliamentary consent to his claim. Consent, however, could be withdrawn, as had happened in 1400, 1403, and 1405; oaths could be broken, as Henry, of all people, could testify; and politically motivated statutes, once again as Henry had demonstrated, could be revoked. The statute of 1406 was revoked by the Yorkist faction in 1460.⁵⁴ Thirdly, the whole issue had been aired yet again. Every time, the pronouncement was more detailed; every time, the arrangements were different; and every time was once more too often. As the duke of York unkindly but pertinently observed in 1460, if Henry IV's title had been sound he would not have needed or desired the statute of 1406.⁵⁵ By the time of the 'Wars of the Roses' the Lancastrian apologist Fortescue was reduced to basing his most plausible argument on the theory of 'prescriptive right' – the doctrine that a dynasty was legitimate if it enjoyed divine and ecclesiastical approval, the

⁵³ It might just be possible to argue that the king was obliged to accede to the demands of a body of political opinion which positively wished that consent should remain the predominant element in the Lancastrian title to the throne, and believed that the unwritten implications of the June settlement had made Henry less dependent upon the continuing goodwill of his subjects. However, there is nothing positive to suggest that such views were held by either Lords or Commons in 1406, and it seems rather more likely that the revision was made by agreement within the royal family than that it was imposed upon an unwilling king who had neither the will nor the political strength to resist it.

⁵⁴ *Rot. parl.* 5.379.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, 377.

consent of the people, and possession over a long period.⁵⁶ All these subjective arguments proved ineffective in the face of the doctrine of hereditary legitimacy. By claiming male precedence, Henry IV would probably not have been able to forestall the raising of the Yorkist claim of legitimacy, but he could at least have given the Lancastrians a legitimacy of their own to set against it.

Almost from the moment that he took the throne, Henry realised that he needed to strengthen the ill-defined title which he had given himself in the assembly of 30 September 1399. But he appeared incapable of understanding that by attempting to consolidate his position by the repeated seeking of consent, while at the same time failing to clarify the legal and hereditary aspects of his claim to the throne, he increasingly drew attention to his vulnerability while doing virtually nothing to reinforce the theoretical basis of his rule. His conversion, in June 1406, to a form of title which might have provided the ideal blend of constitutional principles if it had been used in 1399 – parliamentary recognition of a not unconvincing doctrine of hereditary legitimacy – was probably already too late. Six months later, the one element in the succession statute which could have been used to defend the Lancastrians' legitimacy was eliminated for reasons which can only have been, in relative terms, short-sighted ones. One thing is surely indisputable: Henry should not have taken over seven years to make his final pronouncement on the royal succession.

Henry IV has sometimes been criticised for passing on an inadequate heritage to his successors.⁵⁷ In some respects, this seems an excessively harsh view. It might be argued that, in the circumstances, Henry did as much as any man could in retaining a kingdom to hand down to his son. The kingdom which Henry left to his heirs was not, by the standards of the time, an unstable one. But the right to hold it which he passed on was – legend has it, on Henry's own admission⁵⁸ – inadequate to sustain the dynasty. Henry's failure to formulate a plausible theory of hereditary legitimacy, and his reliance instead on the collective consent of his subjects, even when they happened to be assembled within the solemn confines of parliament, must be accounted a critical error of political judgment.

John Rylands University Library of Manchester.

⁵⁶ For a detailed discussion of Fortescue's doctrines, see P. E. Gill, 'Politics and Propaganda in Fifteenth-Century England: The Polemical Writings of Sir John Fortescue', *Speculum* 46 (1971) 333-47.

⁵⁷ McFarlane, perhaps Henry's harshest critic, concludes his account of Henry's shortcomings in the *Cambridge Medieval History*, 8 vols. (Cambridge, 1911-36), 8.363, by observing that '... if his dynasty was shortlived ... the blame in the first place must be attached to him.'

⁵⁸ On his deathbed, Henry is said to have asked his heir 'what right have you to the crown ... for you well know I had none' (E. de Monstrelet, *Chronicles*, trans. T. Johnes, 12 vols. [London, 1810], 3.139).

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